THIRD SECTION
\nDECISION
\nApplication no. 53661\/13
\nStojan MARKOVI\u0106
\nagainst Serbia<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 17\u00a0September 2019 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Georgios A. Serghides, President,
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nErik Wennerstr\u00f6m, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 28 May 2013,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Mr Stojan Markovi\u0107, is a Serbian national who was born in 1959 and lives in Serbia. He was represented before the Court by Mr\u00a0D. Lazarevi\u0107, a lawyer practising in Kragujevac.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Serbian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their former Agent, Ms Nata\u0161a Plav\u0161i\u0107.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0 The articles in question<\/em><\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was a journalist and the editor-in-chief of a local weekly newspaper.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 February 2009 the applicant published an article entitled \u201cThe enfeebled Mandarin (\u201cZanemo\u0107ali mandarin\u201d) which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cOnce upon a time a Mandarin lived in a certain town in a certain country.<\/p>\n … In troubled and unstable times he acquired power [by making] plenty of fine promises. He became rich, fat, got his hair done, spent all the tax revenues, bought new houses and flats, new cars, and opened a bank account in Cyprus and filled it.<\/p>\n … Nothing came of the monumental promises he had made to the people \u2013 no factories, no highway, no jobs, and no well-being. And then, again, elections were held in the Mandarin State.<\/p>\n … The Mandarin is no longer in power \u2013 just when he had got used to it. Just like we Serbs, so do the Mandarin people say that habit is second nature [navika je te\u0161ka odvika]. Now that he is in enfeebled [u slaba\u0161noj] opposition in Parliament, the Mandarin must be cocky [da se kur\u010di] in the hope that someone will notice him. He also has to be cocky at his pad, as young Mandarinettes are demanding, and age, fat, cholesterol, triglycerides and the constant fear of those damnable genital warts [kondiloma pustih] have caught up with him. He has become enfeebled [zanemo\u0107alo se].<\/p>\n However, the Mandarin\u2019s reputation is at stake. When diet, the gym or the [sight of a] young bare-arsed female body do not help the Mandarin, chemistry does. That twenty-first century wonder for macho Mandarins \u2013 Viagra. The breaking news on all the television stations was that the Mandarin had been injured at his Mandarin pad. With injuries to his Mandarin head he was brought to a Mandarin hospital. Mandarin journalists gathered to find out and publish what had happened. The following morning some Mandarin newspapers announced that it had been a stroke, although there were no reasonable grounds for assuming so. From the hospital it leaked that the head injuries were due to nausea caused by high blood pressure, which had caused the Mandarin\u2019s head to hit the wall and the floor. The injuries were quickly mended. The Mandarin\u2019s head is thick. The doctors were prepared to release him, but the Mandarin did not feel like going home. He asked to stay until the morning. Given the way things were, EEG and blood tests were conducted and from the medical standpoint it became clear: Viagra was the cause of it all.<\/p>\n Approval was granted to keep the Mandarin hospitalised until the effects of the little pill had worn off. There was no official press release, except that the little Mandarins from his political party announced that the reason was exhaustion from all his concern for the Mandarin people and the State.<\/p>\n Lest we forget, any resemblance between this true story of the Mandarin State and events in Serbia is coincidental.\u201d<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 February 2009 the applicant published an article entitled \u201cThe hour of reckoning is approaching \u2013 D., J., \u0160., the next one is …\u201d which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cAfter the recent arrests and announcements of indictments one gets the impression that all the [members of] mobster organisations in Serbia have been unmasked and, in part, arrested …<\/p>\n The logical question the public is asking these days is whether and to what extent the leader of a certain political party … is involved in the dirty business of which his closest associates are accused.<\/p>\n Although he is prone to claiming that he has never met these people, many facts \u2013 including our photograph \u2013 bear witness to the contrary. In any event, the boss is not innocent in this story because if he was not aware of what his associates were doing then he is an ignorant boss, and if he did know, then …<\/p>\n Leave it to justice, which is slow but sure, to do its job. For now, the party officials … have been caught in what the Master of Arts calls \u2018petty theft\u2019 [kraduckanje]. The first one was caught and arrested, the second one was indicted, and the third one is under investigation. The next one is …\u201d<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The article was illustrated by a photograph of Mr A. and B.J. The photograph was also accompanied by the following caption:<\/p>\n \u201cAt the end of the tunnel: [Mr A.] … and B.J.\u201d<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0It is lastly noted that Mr A. was a well-known Serbian political figure who had held various offices throughout his career. At the time when the above-mentioned articles were published, he was a member of the Serbian Parliament and the leader of a political party.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0 The civil proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0Shortly after the publication of the above-mentioned articles, Mr A. brought a civil action for non-pecuniary damages against the applicant, submitting that the articles had harmed his honour and reputation.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 March 2010 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) gave judgment, ordering the applicant to pay Mr A. 180,000 Serbian dinars (RSD) in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered and RSD 58,300 in costs (approximately 2,370 euros (EUR)) \u2013 plus statutory interest).<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 April 2010 the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) reduced the costs awarded to RSD 19,855 and upheld the remainder of the first-instance judgment (that is the total amount awarded in respect of compensation and costs, excluding interest \u2013 a total of approximately EUR\u00a01,990).<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the article entitled \u201cThe enfeebled Mandarin\u201d the court found, inter alia, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c… [T]he defendant published false information about the plaintiff. Among other things [he published] false information about the reasons for the plaintiff being hospitalised. The court found that the plaintiff had been hospitalised for injury caused by high blood pressure and intensive emotional stress … and not because he had used Viagra, as was falsely reported in the disputed article, in which the name of the plaintiff is not mentioned but … [the reference to him personally] … is clear from the description of events …\u201d<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the article \u201cThe hour of reckoning is approaching\u201d the court held that:<\/p>\n \u201c… the defendant pointed to the plaintiff as the potential perpetrator of a crime, even though no final court judgment had found the plaintiff guilty [of anything].\u201d<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The court then went on to opine:<\/p>\n \u201cThe press cannot overstep, invoking freedom of expression, certain boundaries, especially when the reputation and rights of others are at stake, and protection awarded to journalists by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in matters of general interest is conditional upon their acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information, in accordance with journalistic ethics.\u201d<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0 The proceedings before the Constitutional Court<\/em><\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 May 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Srbije). Relying on Articles 32 and 46 of the Constitution he complained that his right to a fair trial and his freedom of expression had been breached because: (i) the civil courts had found him liable for something that had not even been mentioned in the published articles \u2013 a bank account in Cyprus and the spending by Mr A. of certain municipal funds in order to buy real estate; and (ii)\u00a0his views, as presented in the article entitled \u201cThe enfeebled Mandarin\u201d, had initially been accepted as part of a humorous story by the civil courts but had later been described by them as having been based on a false representation of facts \u2013 two positions that were clearly simultaneously untenable.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 March 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal as lacking proper constitutional reasoning, deeming it (the appeal itself) as yet another attempt to seek the mere reassessment of the outcome of the civil proceedings in question, as well as to complain of the allegedly erroneous assessment of the relevant facts and the inadequate application of the pertinent law.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0 The criminal proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 February 2011, as part of the criminal proceedings initiated by Mr A. in the capacity of a private prosecutor, the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) convicted the applicant of criminal defamation (kleveta) and ordered him to pay a fine.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Following an appeal by the applicant, on 27 May 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the matter for re\u2011examination.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 May 2012 the first-instance court again convicted the applicant of the offence in question and ordered him to pay a fine in respect of the article entitled the \u201cThe hour of reckoning is approaching\u201d. At the same time, however, it acquitted the applicant as regards the other article entitled \u201cThe enfeebled Mandarin\u201d.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Following an appeal by the applicant, on 3 December 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the said acquittal but overturned the applicant\u2019s conviction. In acquitting the applicant, the court noted, inter alia, that the article entitled \u201cThe enfeebled Mandarin\u201d had been written allegorically and could not therefore amount to a crime. It had moreover contained no statements of fact or indeed even an indication of the identity of the person referred to as \u201cthe Mandarin\u201d. Regarding the other published article, the court stated, inter alia, that it had focused on current events and that it had referred to the private prosecutor (Mr A.) as the holder of a public function (vr\u0161ilac javnih funkcija). That, in turn, meant that he should have a higher degree of tolerance for any criticisms levelled against him and that any criminal responsibility on the part of the applicant was thus excluded. The applicant received that judgment on 24 January 2013.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0 The applicant\u2019s attempts to reopen the civil proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 February 2013 the applicant lodged a request for the reopening of the above civil proceedings on the basis of his ultimate acquittal in the criminal case.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 February 2013 the High Court refused that request owing to the failure of the applicant\u2019s legal representative to (as required under domestic law) to hold a special power of attorney to represent the applicant and to present it to the court.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 March 2013 the applicant lodged a new, albeit identical, request for the reopening of the civil proceedings in question. This time, however, it was accompanied by a proper power of attorney.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 April 2013 the High Court refused that request for having been submitted belatedly.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0Following an appeal by the applicant, on 10 May 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision at second instance. The applicant\u2019s legal representative received the said appellate decision on 27 May 2013.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Relevant domestic law<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0 The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 2006 (Ustav Republike Srbije; published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 98\/06)<\/em><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0Article 170 provides:<\/p>\n \u201cA constitutional appeal may be lodged against individual decisions or actions of State bodies or organisations exercising delegated public powers that violate or deny human or minority rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, if other legal remedies for their protection have already been exhausted or have not been prescribed\u201d.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0 The Obligations Act (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima; published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 29\/78, 39\/85, 45\/89 and 57\/89, as well as in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 31\/93)<\/em><\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 200of the Act anyone who has suffered mental anguish as a consequence of a breach of his or her honour or reputation may, depending on its duration and intensity, sue for financial compensation before the civil courts and, in addition, request other forms of redress \u201cwhich may be capable\u201d of affording adequate non-pecuniary satisfaction.<\/p>\n COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained, relying on Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, that the rulings of the civil courts rendered against him had amounted to a violation of his right to a fair hearing and his freedom of expression, given his subsequent acquittal in the criminal proceedings in respect of the same two newspaper articles. In the reasoning for the said acquittal, those articles were described as constituting a social critique, which as such could not attract criminal liability.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 \u00a7 1, in so far as relevant, and Article 10 of the Convention, referred to by the applicant in his complaints above, read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 6 \u00a7 1 (right to a fair trial)<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 10 (freedom of expression)<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The alleged abuse of the applicant\u2019s right of petition<\/strong><\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to provide the Court with all the facts relevant to his complaint. In particular, they argued that he had omitted to submit any information as regards his attempts to reopen the civil case following his ultimate acquittal in the criminal proceedings. In the Government\u2019s view, therefore, the applicant had abused his right of petition, within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the facts referred to by the Government were of no relevance to the complaints that he had raised in the present case. Notably, his request for the reopening of the civil suit had been refused and the situation as regards those proceedings had hence remained the same (that is to say as if the request had never been lodged).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention if, among other reasons, it was knowingly based on false information (see Kerechashvili v. Georgia (dec.), no.\u00a05667\/02, 2 May 2006; Bagheri and Maliki v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a030164\/06, 15 May 2007; Poznanski and Others v. Germany (dec.), no\u00a025101\/05, 3 July 2007; and Simitzi\u2011Papachristou and Others v. Greece (dec.), no. 50634\/11, \u00a7 36, 5\u00a0November 2013) or if significant information and documents were deliberately omitted, either where they were known from the outset (see Kerechashvili, cited above) or where new significant developments occurred during the procedure (see Predescu v. Romania, no.\u00a021447\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a025-27, 2 December 2008, and Tatalovi\u0107 and Deki\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia (dec.), no.\u00a015433\/07, 29\u00a0May\u00a02012). However, not every omission of such information will amount to abuse; the information in question must concern the very core of the case being adjudicated (see, for example, Komatinovi\u0107 v. Serbia (dec.), no.\u00a075381\/10, 29 January 2013).<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, it is noted that the applicant indeed failed to inform the Court of his attempts to have the civil suit reopened following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings. The Court, however, also notes that the civil proceedings were never reopened and that the final civil court judgment itself thus remained unaffected. Given the circumstances, while the facts relating to the attempted reopening cannot be deemed as being of no relevance (and might have been mentioned for reasons of general context), they certainly cannot either be described as concerning \u201cthe very core of the case being adjudicated\u201d.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection regarding the abuse of the right to individual application.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The exhaustion of the domestic remedies<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0 The parties\u2019 observation<\/em><\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant had failed to properly raise the factual aspect of his complaints before the Constitutional Court. In particular, he had made no reference to the criminal proceedings in his constitutional appeal and had also failed to supplement the said appeal once he had been served with his acquittal on 24 January 2013 \u2013 that is well before the Constitutional Court\u2019s own ruling of 5 March 2013. The Government furthermore argued that the applicant had not lodged his request for the reopening of the civil proceedings in a manner that was in accordance with the relevant domestic procedural requirements.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, in response, stated that there had been \u201cno legal grounds for mentioning\u201d the criminal case in his constitutional appeal, since it had been \u201clodged on the basis of [the] civil judgments, [and] not [in respect of the] criminal proceedings\u201d. Moreover, there had been \u201cno conditions\u201d for any additional submissions before the Constitutional Court regarding the criminal proceedings, and \u201ceven … [had that been] … possible …, it would … [have been] … pointless\u201d, since the constitutional appeal itself had only concerned the civil judgments. Lastly, the applicant maintained that, given the ultimate negative outcome, his attempts to have the civil proceedings reopened had ended up as being of no relevance to the present case.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring a case against a State before the Court to firstly use the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are dispensed from answering for their acts before an international body before they have had an opportunity to put matters right domestically (see Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7 70, 25 March 2014).<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0As regards legal systems that provide constitutional protection for fundamental human rights and freedoms, such as the one in Serbia, it is incumbent on the aggrieved individual to test the extent of that protection (see, inter alia, Vin\u010di\u0107 and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698\/06 and 30 others, \u00a7\u00a051, 1 December 2009). An applicant\u2019s failure to make use of an available domestic remedy or to make proper use of it (by bringing a complaint at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law) will result in an application being declared inadmissible before this Court (seeG\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7 142, ECHR 2010, and Vu\u010dkovi\u0107, \u00a7\u00a072, cited above).<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore reiterates that the wording of Article 34 of the Convention indicates that a \u201cclaim\u201d or complaint in Convention terms comprises two elements \u2013 namely, factual allegations and the legal arguments underpinning them. Those two elements are intertwined because the facts complained of ought to be seen in the light of the legal arguments adduced and vice versa. A complaint is thus characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments advanced (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685\/10 and 22768\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 110 and 113, 20\u00a0March 2018).<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0Within the context of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, most notably in cases involving issues of exhaustion in substance, the Court has consistently placed emphasis on the factual situation presented in the light of national law, as well as the Convention arguments relied upon at the national level. To genuinely afford a Contracting State the opportunity of preventing or redressing an alleged violation, both the factual situation and the Convention arguments must be taken into account for the purposes of determining whether the complaint submitted to the Court was indeed raised beforehand, in substance, before the domestic authorities. That is because it would be contrary to the subsidiary character of the Convention machinery if an applicant, ignoring a possible Convention argument, could rely on some other ground before the national authorities for challenging an impugned measure, but then lodge an application before the Court on the basis of the Convention argument.\u00a0That, however, does not prevent an applicant from clarifying or elaborating upon his or her initial submissions during the Convention proceedings. The Court has to take account not only of the original application but also of the additional documents intended to complete that original application by eliminating any initial omissions or obscurities. Likewise, the Court may clarify those facts ex officio (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0116, 117 and 122, as well as the authorities cited therein).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that in the application form the applicant complained, relying on Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, that the rulings of the civil courts rendered against him had amounted to a violation of his right to a fair hearing and of his freedom of expression given his subsequent acquittal in the criminal proceedings in respect of the same two newspaper articles.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0In his constitutional complaint, however, the applicant maintained that his right to a fair trial and to his freedom of expression had been breached because (i) the civil courts had found him liable for something that had not even been mentioned in the published articles, and (ii) his views, as represented in the article entitled \u201cThe enfeebled Mandarin\u201d, had first been accepted as part of a humorous story by the civil courts but had later been described by them as having been based on a false representation of facts \u2013 two positions that were clearly simultaneously untenable.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the Government\u2019s observations, as already noted above, the applicant furthermore stated, inter alia, that any additional submissions before the Constitutional Court regarding the criminal proceedings would have been \u201cpointless\u201d since the constitutional appeal itself had only concerned the civil judgments.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0Under the circumstances, the Court notes that the allegation that the applicant\u2019s Convention rights were breached \u201cgiven his subsequent acquittal in the criminal proceedings in respect of the same two articles\u201d was absent from the constitutional appeal. While it is true that the criminal case was only concluded following the applicant\u2019s lodging of the said appeal, the applicant could have, as noted by the Government (see paragraph 35 above), supplemented his arguments before the Constitutional Court after his acquittal. Specifically, the applicant was served with the acquittal on 24\u00a0January 2013 and the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was rendered almost six weeks later, on 5 March 2013 (see paragraphs 20 and 16 above, in that order). The applicant, however, never did so and instead went on to admit, in his observations before the Court, that his constitutional case only concerned the civil judgments.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant did not raise before the Constitutional Court the only factual element of his complaints subsequently raised in Strasbourg, that is the alleged inconsistency in the adjudication of the same matter between the civil and the criminal courts domestically. Accordingly, the application as a whole must be rejected under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention for failure to properly exhaust domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0It is lastly understood that for the Court to rule otherwise would be contrary to the subsidiary character of the Convention machinery and would amount to depriving the respondent State of the opportunity to put matters right through its own legal system.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0In view of this conclusion, as well as its pronouncement in paragraphs 30-34 above, the Court does not find it necessary to rule on the Government\u2019s other exhaustion-related objection to the effect that the applicant had not lodged his request for the reopening of the civil proceedings in a manner that was in accordance with the relevant domestic procedural requirements.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 10 October 2019.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Georgios A. Serghides
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n