THIRD SECTION
\nDECISION
\nApplication no. 48159\/17
\nYelena Anatolyevna KIREYEVA
\nagainst Russia<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 3\u00a0September 2019 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1, President,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nGilberto Felici, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 July 2017,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
PROCEDURE AND FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Ms\u00a0Yelena AnatolyevnaKireyeva, is a Russian national, who was born in 1978 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. She was represented by Mr\u00a0S.\u00a0Gritsko, a lawyer practicing in Rostov-on-Don.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr\u00a0M.\u00a0Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s complaints under Article\u00a03 and Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention were communicated to the Government on 23\u00a0November 2017.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was accused of fraud. On 18\u00a0November 2016 she signed a bind-over not to leave the place of residence and to appear upon summons.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Between 13\u00a0March and 11\u00a0April 2017 the applicant failed to appear, on multiple occasions, upon summons from the investigator. She alleged that her three minor children were ill and she could not leave home.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 27\u00a0March 2017 the investigator came to the applicant\u2019s place of residence and served documents on the applicant in a car beside her house. The investigator offered to provide temporary care for the children for the duration of the necessary investigative measures. The applicant refused considering the offer as a threat to her children\u2019s liberty. She alleged that her children could not leave home due to their state of health and she had nobody else to take care of them.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0The investigator contacted the children\u2019s doctor who confirmed that the children had a cold and no fever, therefore they could leave home. Children\u2019s welfare services confirmed that the applicant had relatives (the children\u2019s grandparents) who could take care of the children.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0At the pre-trial stage of the proceedings the applicant, on several occasions, informed the investigator that she could only participate in the investigative measures on the dates chosen by her and only for a short period of time.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 20\u00a0April 2017 a court placed the applicant into pre-trial detention relying on the existence of a reasonable suspicion of her involvement in an aggravated criminal offence, an intentional violation of the previous restraint measure under the pretext of the children\u2019s illness, the applicant\u2019s attempts to drag the procedure and the existence of a risk of her absconding. The latter was confirmed, in particular, by the fact that the applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused, who is also her husband and her children\u2019s father, had absconded and was placed on a wanted persons list.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0At the court hearings on 20\u00a0April and 17\u00a0May 2017, where the pre\u2011trial detention was ordered and then extended, the applicant was placed into a safety cabin which the applicant describes as a metal cage.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0The most recent detention order authorising the applicant\u2019s detention was issued on 17\u00a0May 2017. The parties did not provide any other documents related to the case to conclude that the pre-trail detention was extended further.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Complaint under Article 3 of the Convention (use of metal cages in courtrooms)<\/strong><\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article\u00a03 of the Convention that her placement into a metal cage at the court hearings on 20\u00a0April and 17\u00a0May 2017 amounted to degrading treatment. This Convention provision reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had been placed behind a metal barrier with wide glass partition and that the circumstances of her confinement did not violate her rights under Article\u00a03.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined all the materials before it, in particular the observations and photographs submitted by the Government, the Court notes that on 20\u00a0April and 17\u00a0May 2017 the applicant was placed in a glass cabin and not in a metal cage.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously concluded that the placement of defendants behind glass partitions or in glass cabins does not in itself involve an element of humiliation sufficient to reach the minimum level of severity, as is the case with metal cages. This level may be attained, however, if the circumstances of their confinement, taken as a whole, would cause them distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see YaroslavBelousovv.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a02653\/13 and 60980\/14, \u00a7\u00a0125, 4\u00a0October 2016).<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0Unlike in the YaroslavBelousov case (cited above), the applicant did not mention overcrowding or any other issue with regard to the conditions of her confinement in the glass cabin.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03 and\u00a04 of the Convention.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also raised a complaint under Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention, having argued that there had been no reason to place her into pre-trial detention as she had to take care of three minor children and would not have absconded. Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be … entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the decisions which extended the applicant\u2019s detention had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons and complied with the requirements of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a03.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined all the materials before it, the Court considers that for the reasons stated below, the respondent Government cannot be held liable for the alleged violations of the Convention.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the authorisation and extension of the applicant\u2019s detention resulted from her having violated the initial written undertaking, including that of taking part in the investigation. Authorising the applicant\u2019s arrest, the domestic court took into consideration her repeated failure to appear upon the investigator\u2019s summons under the pretext of the children\u2019s illness, the children\u2019s state of health and the investigator\u2019s attempts to satisfy the needs of the children. The Court is convinced by the domestic courts\u2019 analysis of the case. It also notes that the parties submitted to the Court the extension of detention orders which covered a period till 5\u00a0November 2017, i.e. less than seven months of pre\u2011trial detention, no other extension orders or information was submitted.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0With a view to the materials in its possession and a relatively short period of detention, the Court is satisfied that the domestic courts duly examined all the pertinent factors and gave \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d reasons to justify the applicants\u2019 continued detention. The Court also finds that the domestic authorities displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings (see, for example, Khloyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046404\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a096\u2011107, 5\u00a0February 2015; Topekhin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a078774\/13, 10\u00a0May 2016; Sopin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a057319\/10, 18\u00a0December 2012; and Isayev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a020756\/04, 22\u00a0October 2009).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03 and\u00a04 of the Convention.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 26 September 2019.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n