THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF KRUGLOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
\n(Applications nos. 11264\/04 and 15 others \u2013 see appended list)
\nJUDGMENT<\/p>\n
Art 8 \u2022 Respect for home and correspondence \u2022 Search of lawyers\u2019 homes and offices and seizure of electronic devices \u2022 Courts\u2019 failure to assess necessity and proportionality of investigating authorities\u2019 actions\u2022 Domestic law lacking procedural safeguards to prevent interference with professional secrecy \u2022 Total lack of safeguards to protect professional confidentiality of legal advisers who are not members of a Bar<\/p>\n
Art 1 P 1 \u2022 Control of the use of property \u2022 Unjustified lengthy retention of seized data-storage electronic devices<\/p>\n
STRASBOURG
\n4 February 2020<\/p>\n
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article\u00a044 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Kruglovand Others v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Having deliberated in private on 14 January 2020,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The case originated in sixteen applications (nos.\u00a011264\/04 and fifteen others) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article\u00a034 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by twenty-fiveRussian nationals. A list of the applicants, their representatives and their personal details is set out in the Appendix.<\/p>\n 2. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n 3. The applicants complained of searches in their premises and seizure and continued retention ofdata-storage devices.They also complained of the absence of effective remedies for those complaints.<\/p>\n 4. Between 11\u00a0February 2008 and 9\u00a0February 2017 the Government were given notice of above complaints. The remaining complaints in applications nos. 60648\/08, 14244\/11, 18403\/13 and 29786\/15 were declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule\u00a054\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n A. Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. The applicants are practising lawyers (with the exception of Mr\u00a0Sokolov, MrBurykin and MrMakovoz, who are clients of Ms\u00a0Belinskaya, a lawyer, application no. 14244\/11).With the exception of Mr\u00a0Fedorov, Mr\u00a0Silivanov and MrMezentsev(applications nos. 58290\/08, 10825\/11 and 73629\/13), they are members of the Bar. Police officers searched the lawyers\u2019 homes or offices. The applicants complained to the national courts of the unlawfulness of the search warrants and\/or of the manner in which the searcheshad been carried out.Their complaints were unsuccessful.<\/p>\n B. Particular applications<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Application no. 11264\/04, Kruglov v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 6. MrKruglov (formerly Mr Krug) was suspected of libel of a high\u2011ranking judge.<\/p>\n 7. On 20 October 2003 the Samarskiy District Court of Samara authoriseda search of Mr\u00a0Kruglov\u2019s flat. It found that based on the submitted material there were sufficient grounds to believethat the instruments of the crime might be located at his home.<\/p>\n 8. On 21 October 2003 the police searched the flat indicated in the court search warrant. As that was in factMr\u00a0Kruglov\u2019sparents\u2019residence, the police searched another flat where Mr\u00a0Kruglov actually lived.They did so under the \u201curgent procedure\u201d without seeking a court search warrant in respect of that flat.<\/p>\n 9. Mr\u00a0Kruglovbrought proceedings under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the \u201cCCrP\u201d, see below) alleging that the police\u2019s actions in respect of the search of his second flat had been unlawful. On 28\u00a0October 2003the court dismissed his complaint, holding that the search procedure had been complied with; that the search had been based on a valid court search warrant and that there had been no information that the authorities had seized any private or professional confidential information belonging to Mr\u00a0Kruglov.<\/p>\n 10. Mr\u00a0Kruglovappealed against the court decision of 20\u00a0October 2003 to issue a search warrant and the court decision under Article 125 of the CCrP of 28\u00a0October 2003. His appeals were dismissed on 5 December 2003.<\/p>\n 2. Application no. 32324\/06, Buraga v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 11. MsBuraga\u2019s husband was suspected of theft.<\/p>\n 12. On 1 November 2005 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburgauthoriseda search of MsBuraga\u2019s flat. It held that based on the submitted material there were sufficient grounds to believe that documents relevant to the criminal case might be located at MsBuraga\u2019s home.<\/p>\n 13. The search was performed on 22 November 2005. During the search,the police seized two computercentral processing units, two mobile phones, a compact disc and a red file containing some documents, all belonging to MsBuraga. An expert examined the content of the seized computer units on 24\u00a0November 2005.<\/p>\n 14. On 30\u00a0November 2005 MsBuragaasked the investigator to return the objects seized during the search of her flat, as she used them for her professional activities as an advocate. On 5\u00a0December 2005 the investigator replied that the seized objects would be returned once the investigating authorities no longer needed them.On 13\u00a0December 2005 the vice-president of the Bar of which MsBuraga was a memberasked the investigating authorities to return material covered by professional legal privilege which had been seized during the search.<\/p>\n 15. On 19\u00a0December 2005the two computer units and mobile phones werereturned to MsBuraga. The remainder of the seized objects was joined to the criminal case.<\/p>\n 16. Meanwhile,MsBuragaappealed against the court decision to issue a search warrant of 1\u00a0November 2005. She argued, in particular, that the court had not taken into account that the flat belonged to her and that she was a lawyer admitted to the Bar,with the result that informationcovered by professional legal privilege had been seized.On 23 December 2005 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that Ms\u00a0Buraga had not proved that she had been using her flat for professional activities.<\/p>\n 17. MsBuraga also brought proceedings under Article\u00a0125 of the CCrP, complaining about the police\u2019s actions when carrying out the search. She argued, among other things, that upon learning that she was an advocate,the police should have stopped the search.MsBuragafurther complained of the unlawful seizure of her computer processing units and documents, which contained legally privileged information concerning her clients.She also complained that the police had refused to permit her lawyer to assist her during the search. The court decisions on that complaint were quashed on two occasions, and on 3\u00a0February 2009 her complaint was eventually dismissed. The court established that the search had been lawful and well\u2011founded; it had been based on a valid court search warrant,which had been issued not in respect of MsBuraga, but in respect of her husband; Ms\u00a0Buraga had not mentioned her status as an advocate in the search record; there had been no information that any legally privileged material had been seized; and her lawyer, MrK., had not been allowed to attend the search because by the time he had arrived, the search had already begun.<\/p>\n 18. The court decision of 3\u00a0February 2005 was upheld on appeal on 6\u00a0March 2005.<\/p>\n 3. Application no. 26067\/08, Belinskaya v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 19. Mr L., who resided with MsBelinskaya in her flat, was suspected of drug dealing.<\/p>\n 20. On 26\u00a0July 2006 the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg authoriseda search of MsBelinskaya\u2019s flat. It held that since L. resided in that flat, objects and documents which could be used as evidence and to identify the perpetrator(s) of the offence could be located there.<\/p>\n 21. On 30\u00a0March 2007 MsBelinskaya\u2019s home was searched. Shebrought proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrPcomplaining of the authorities\u2019 unlawful actions during the search of her flat. In particular, she argued that after she had told the police officers that she was an advocate, they should have stopped the search. On 25\u00a0July 2007 the Vyborgskiy District Court dismissed her complaint. It held that the search had been based on a valid court search warrant issued as part of an ongoing criminal investigation not against MsBelinskaya but against D., who was suspected of drug offences; that MsBelinskaya had not made any comments, including about her advocate status, in the search record; and that no documents subject to legal privilege had been seized.<\/p>\n 22. The above-mentioned court decision was upheld on appeal on 17\u00a0October 2007.<\/p>\n 4. Application no. 58290\/08, Fedorov v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n (a) Court search warrant<\/p>\n 23. Mr\u00a0Fedorov is a lawyer working for a human rights organisation. He is not a member of a Bar association.<\/p>\n 24. On 6\u00a0August 2007 Mr\u00a0Fedorovwas engaged to defend Mr.\u00a0Ye., who was suspected of theft. On 13 August 2007 the Ibresinskiy District Court of the Republic of Chuvashiyaauthorised a search of Mr\u00a0Fedorov\u2019s flat. It found that there were reasons to believe that the objects stolen by Z. could be located at Mr\u00a0Fedorov\u2019s home and thus the search would help uncover evidence relevant for the criminal investigation.<\/p>\n 25. On 14 August 2007 an investigator searched Mr\u00a0Fedorov\u2019s flat in the presence of Mr\u00a0Fedorov and two witnesses. He found and seized two bracelets, a ring, a car radio and a notepad.<\/p>\n (b) Ex post facto judicial review of the decision to issue a search warrant<\/p>\n 26. On 18 September 2007 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya quashed the decision of 13 August 2007 and remitted the matter to the first-instance court for fresh examination. It held, in particular, that the first-instance court\u2019s conclusion as to the possible presence of stolen property at Mr\u00a0Fedorov\u2019s home had not been consistent with the facts of the criminal case.<\/p>\n 27. On 3 October 2007 the Ibresinskiy District Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya, having examined the case anew, held that the investigating authorities had not provided sufficient information to support their request for a search of Mr\u00a0Fedorov\u2019s flat and accordingly dismissed the request. On the same day the items seized from Mr\u00a0Fedorov\u2019s flat were returned to him.<\/p>\n 28. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya upheld that decision.<\/p>\n (c) Compensation proceedings<\/p>\n 29. On 31 March 2008 Mr\u00a0Fedorov brought court proceedings against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation before the Leninskiy District Court of Cheboksary, Republic of Chuvashiya (\u201cthe Leninskiy District Court\u201d). He sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage on the grounds that the search of his flat had been declared unlawful.<\/p>\n 30. On 22 May 2008 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed Mr\u00a0Fedorov\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. On 25 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiyaupheld that judgment on an appeal.<\/p>\n 5. Application no. 60648\/08, Fast v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 31. The police had been investigating allegedly fraudulent claims for damages and legal expenses from the Russian Railways using forged documents \u2013 bills for legal services provided by the law firm PravovoyeSodeystviye, where Ms\u00a0Fast worked.<\/p>\n 32. On 3\u00a0September 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod granted an application lodged by the investigator for a warrant to search the premises of the law firm, having found it \u201cwell-founded\u201d.<\/p>\n 33. On 5\u00a0September 2008 the police searched Ms Fast\u2019s office. During the search they seized seven computer central processing units from her office.<\/p>\n 34. On 17\u00a0October 2008 an appealcomplaint lodged by Ms Fast arguing that the search warrant of 3\u00a0September 2008and the seizure of the computer units had been unlawful was dismissed.<\/p>\n 35. On 29\u00a0May 2009 the criminal case within the framework of which Ms\u00a0Fast\u2019s office had been searched was closed for lack of corpus delicti. On an unspecified day thereafter,the seized computer units were returned to Ms\u00a0Fast.<\/p>\n 6. Application no. 2397\/11, Balyan and others v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 36. The authorities opened a criminal investigation against G. and B. and other unidentified people who were suspected of carrying out business activities without a proper licenceand with the use of fictitious companies. It appears that the investigating authorities believed that a law firm, ZAO \u201cPrintsipprava\u201d, could have had information about those fictitious companies.It applied to a court for a warrant to search the firm\u2019s premises.<\/p>\n 37. On 17\u00a0December 2009 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow issued a search warrant in respect of the law firm. It held that the investigator\u2019s application for a search warrant had complied with the criminal procedural requirements to its form and content, and that the investigator had had sufficient grounds to believe that objects and documents relevant for the investigation could have been located at the law firm\u2019s premises. On 25\u00a0December 2009 the search was carried out.<\/p>\n 38. The offices of the applicants MrBalyan, MrSokolov and Mr\u00a0Solovyev(who are all advocates) were located on the premises of that law firm, and during the search of the firm their offices were also inspected.<\/p>\n 39. During the search the police seized a computer central processing unit and two hard drives.A metal safe with money was seized from Mr\u00a0Balyan\u2019s office. On 14\u00a0January 2010 heasked the investigator to return his safe with its contents. On 19\u00a0January 2010 the investigating authorities examined the objects and documents contained in the safe and concluded that they were unrelated to the criminal case being investigated. On 19\u00a0March 2010 the investigator issued a decision to return the safe with its contents to MrBalyan. The decision was enforced on the same day.<\/p>\n 40. On 24\u00a0March 2010 the Moscow City Court quashed the court decision of 17 December 2009 because the search warrant had not indicated the particular grounds for the search or the exact documents and objects to be seized. It remitted the case for a new examination.<\/p>\n 41. Based on the fact that the court decision of 17\u00a0December 2009 had been quashed, MrBalyan, MrSokolov and MrSolovyevasked the investigator, on at least four occasions, to return the seized objects. On 29\u00a0March, and 5, 9 and 16 April 2010 the investigator refused their requests.The investigator\u2019s decisions indicated that MrBalyan, MrSokolov and Mr\u00a0Solovyev were entitled to challenge before the courts the refusals to return their computer unit and two hard drives. It appears that those devices have still not been returned.<\/p>\n 42. On 16\u00a0April 2010 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow held a fresh hearing on the investigator\u2019s applicationfor a search warrant. Although MrBalyan\u2019sthen representative (Mr Nikolayev), Mr\u00a0Sokolov and Mr\u00a0Solovyevarrived at the hearing and the judge allowed them to remain, they were not permitted to make any submissions.The court referred to Article\u00a0165 \u00a7 3 of the CCrP(see paragraph 90 below),which only provided for the right of a prosecutor and an investigator to participate in court hearings on search warrants. The court again authorised the search of the law firm. It found that the investigator\u2019s application for a search warrant complied with criminal-procedure requirements and that there were sufficient grounds to believe that objects and documents relevant to the criminal case could be located at the law firm\u2019s office. The court also noted that given MrBalyan, MrSokolov and MrSolovyevhad the status of advocates, the search of their law firm had been possible on the basis of the court search warrant.<\/p>\n 43. On 23\u00a0June 2010 an appeal lodged by MrBalyan, MrSokolov and MrSolovyevcomplaining about the search warrant of 16\u00a0April 2010 was dismissed.<\/p>\n 44. Meanwhile,MrBalyan also brought proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP, complaining about the manner in which the searchhad been carried out and the seizure of documents and objects.In particular, he argued that the court search warrant of 17\u00a0December 2009 had been issued in respect of the law firm, but had not covered his advocate\u2019s office, a search of which should have been authorised on an individual basis.On 4\u00a0June 2010 his complaint was dismissed. The court held that the search had been performed in compliance with the criminal-procedure requirements and that it had been based on a valid court search warrant issued as part of an ongoing criminal investigation.<\/p>\n 45. On 2\u00a0August 2010 the above decision was upheld on appeal.<\/p>\n 7. Application no. 10825\/11, Silivanov v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 46. MrSilivanov is a practising lawyer, but is not a member of a Bar association. He had provided legal services to Ms M., who later became the subject of a criminal investigation in respect of illegal real-estate transactions.<\/p>\n 47. On 16\u00a0July 2010 the Kirovskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg granted an application lodged by the investigator for a warrant to search Mr\u00a0Silivanov\u2019s flat, having found it well-founded. It held that as Mr\u00a0Silivanov had a close relationship with Ms M., objects and documents about her real-estate transactions relevant to the investigation could be located at Mr\u00a0Silivanov\u2019s home. On 20\u00a0July 2010 MrSilivanov\u2019s home was searched.<\/p>\n 48. MrSilivanov appealed against the court\u2019s decision of 16\u00a0July 2010 to issue a search warrant, claiming that it was groundless, excessively wide\u2011ranging and disproportionate. MrSilivanov also relied on the Court\u2019s case\u2011law requiring special procedural safeguards to be available in respect of searches of lawyers\u2019 premises. On 11\u00a0August 2010 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court upheld the decision to issuea search warrant.<\/p>\n 8. Application no. 14244\/11, Belinskaya and others v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 49. MsBelinskaya was suspected of having been involved in the production of an allegedly forged medical report about the state of health of a client of hers, Mr\u00a0Makovoz. Mr\u00a0Sokolov and Mr\u00a0Burykin were otherclients of MsBelinskaya at the relevant time.<\/p>\n 50. On 25\u00a0March 2010 the Kalininskiy District Court of St Petersburgauthoriseda search of MsBelinskaya\u2019s office. It found that the forged medical report had been issued at the request of MsBelinskayaas an advocate, andthus objects and documents relevant to the ongoing criminal investigation could be located at her office. The court ordered the seizure of all data-storage devices with information about the medical report.<\/p>\n 51. On 26\u00a0March 2010 the police searched MsBelinskaya\u2019s office. During the search, they seized a hard drive andtwo computers belonging to her. MsBelinskaya appealed,alleging that the court search warrant of 25\u00a0March 2010 had been unlawful. Her appeal was dismissed on 11\u00a0May 2010.<\/p>\n 52. MsBelinskaya and Mr\u00a0Makovoz also brought proceedings under Article\u00a0125 of the CCrP. They complained that no special procedural safeguards had been put in place during the search and that Ms\u00a0Belinskaya\u2019s hard drive and computers had been seized.The complaint was dismissed on 15\u00a0June 2010.The Kalininskiy District Court of St Petersburg established that a criminal case against MrMakovoz had been opened; the investigator had had \u201cgrounds to believe that MsBelinskaya had been involved in the offence committed\u201d; the search of the advocate\u2019s flat had been duly authorised by the court; \u201cthe search warrant had not contained any limitations\u201d; MsBelinskaya had not made any comments in the search record; and that the refusal to return the seized objects had been justified by the need to perform expert examinations of those objects. MsBelinskaya\u2019s computer had already been returned to her. Thus, the court found no evidence of an unlawful interference with Ms\u00a0Belinskaya\u2019s activities as an advocate or with her private and family life. On 30\u00a0August 2010 the above court decision was upheld on appeal.<\/p>\n 53. Proceedings brought by Mr\u00a0Sokolov under Article 125 of the CCrP were dismissed on 16\u00a0August 2010.TheKalininskiy District Court of St\u00a0Petersburg declined to examine the complaint on the grounds that there had been no interference with Mr\u00a0Sokolov\u2019s rights and freedoms as no documents or objects related to him had been searched for or seized andMs\u00a0Belinskaya\u2019s computer had already been returned to her. On 30\u00a0September 2010 that decision was upheld on appeal.<\/p>\n 54. Proceedings brought by Mr\u00a0Burykin under Article 125 of the CCrPwere dismissed on 10\u00a0August 2010. The Kalininskiy District Court of St\u00a0Petersburg established that a criminal case against Mr\u00a0Makovoz had been opened; that the investigator had had grounds to believe that MsBelinskaya had been involved in the offence committed; the search of her flat had been duly authorised by the court; MsBelinskaya had not made any comments in the search record, thus there had been no evidence that the seized documents or objects contained information covered by professional legal privilege. On 23\u00a0September 2010 the above court decision was upheld on appeal.<\/p>\n 9. Application no. 78187\/11, Bulycheva v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 55. MsBulycheva\u2019s office was located on the premises of a company belonging to Ms M. The police suspected the latter of being involved in illegal money transfers. As MsBulycheva worked on the premises of Ms\u00a0M.\u2019s company, the police also suspected her of being involved.<\/p>\n 56. On 22\u00a0April 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Khabarovsk authoriseda search of MsBulycheva\u2019s office on the grounds that objects and documents relevant to the criminal case could be located there.<\/p>\n 57. A search of MsBulycheva\u2019s office was conducted on 25\u00a0April 2011.<\/p>\n 58. On 7\u00a0June 2011 an appeal lodged by MsBulycheva complaining of the unlawfulness of the court search warrant of 22\u00a0April 2011 was dismissed.<\/p>\n 10. Application no. 18403\/13, Moiseyeva v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 59. MsMoiseyeva was suspected of stealing three volumes of her client\u2019s criminal case file. On 13\u00a0July 2012 the Pervorechenskiy District Court of Vladivostok issued two identical search warrants, one for Ms\u00a0Moiseyeva\u2019s home and another for her office. It held that the searches were necessary to find the stolen documents.<\/p>\n 60. On 28\u00a0August 2012 an appeal lodged by MsMoiseyeva challenging the lawfulness of the court search warrant of 13\u00a0July 2012 was dismissed.<\/p>\n 11. Application no. 73629\/13, Mezentsev v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 61. MrMezentsev is a practising lawyer, but is not a Bar member. In 2011 he represented company P. in a tax dispute. In 2012 the tax authorities reported to the police an alleged offence of tax evasion by Mr M., a director of company P.<\/p>\n 62. On 10 October 2012 the police performed a crime-scene examination (\u043e\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0441\u0448\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f) in MrMezentsev\u2019s office. They seized two documents and MrMezentsev\u2019scomputer hard drive containing information about company P., as well as other companies and businessmen represented by MrMezentsev in other tax disputes. The tax authorities subsequently used the information from the hard drive as evidence in at least three of their disputes with MrMezentsev\u2019s clients. At the end of March 2013 the police returned the hard drive to MrMezentsev. No criminal charges were ever brought against MrM.<\/p>\n 63. MrMezentsevbrought proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP, complaining that the police actions had been unlawful. He argued, in particular, that although he was not a Bar member, he was a lawyer permitted by law to render legal services and that he owed a duty of confidentiality to his clients. Therefore, during the search of his office special procedural safeguards, such as prior court authorisation, should have been complied with.<\/p>\n 64. On 18 March 2013 the LeninskiyDistrict Court of the town of Orsk dismissed MrMezentsev\u2019scomplaint, finding no irregularities in the conduct of the crime-scene examination of his office. In particular, the court found that the police had been seeking information about criminal activities at company P. They had received \u201csufficient information giving grounds to believe that objects and documents concerning the activities of company P. might be located in the office…\u201d. The police had conducted a \u201ccrime-scene examination\u201d of MrMezentsev\u2019s office which did not require prior judicial authorisation under the CCrP; MrMezentsevhad been apprised of his rights; two attesting witnesses had been present; and they and Mr\u00a0Mezentsev had had the opportunity to add their comments to the record of the crime-scene examination. The court further held that prior authorisationfor a search was required from a court only in respect of Bar members, which MrMezentsev was not. Finally, the court had found no evidence that MrMezentsev\u2019s rights had been breached by the search and the seizure of his computer. On 30 April 2013 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court.<\/p>\n 12. Application no. 7101\/15, Lazutkin v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 65. MrLazutkin represented the interests of company A.The Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) suspected unidentified people of transferring money via company A. On 23\u00a0September 2014 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court of Yekaterinburg granted requests by an FSB officer for authorisation of operational-search activities (under the Operational-Search Activities Act, see paragraph 88 below) in the form of an \u201cinspection\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) of MrLazutkin\u2019s home, his office, and his workplace at company A. The court held that the FSB had information about Mr\u00a0Lazutkin\u2019s involvement in illegal foreign-currency transactions with the use of forged documents, and thus documents and objects used for criminal activities could be located at his premises.<\/p>\n 66. During the searches on 25\u00a0September 2014 the police seized two of MrLazutkin\u2019s notebooks and four computers belonging to company A. containing, among other things, documents subject to legal privilege. On 27\u00a0April 2016 the investigator issued a decision to retain the seized objects as physical evidence. It appears that the seized objects have not been returned to MrLazutkin.<\/p>\n 13. Application no. 29786\/15, Parnachev and others v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 67. The applicants, MrParnachev, Mr Prokhorov, MrPestov and Mr\u00a0Rozhkov (who are all advocates) were members of the Novosibirsk Town Advocate Association (\u201cthe NTAA\u201d). A Mr\u00a0Prokhorov\u2019s client was suspected of misappropriation of funds by means of transferring money for consulting and legal services to a firm of auditors, company N., and to the NTAA. On 5\u00a0October 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Novosibirsk authorised a search of premises (located in one building) occupied by the NTAA, company N. and other lawyers to find and seize documents related to the provision of consulting and legal services by company N. and the NTAA. The court search warrant contained a detailed list of the exact documents that the investigators were looking for. The court also ordered the seizure of all devices and mobile phones containing correspondence related to the provision of consulting and legal services by company N. and the NTAA. The search took place from 4 p.m. on 6\u00a0October 2014 until 11\u00a0a.m. on 8\u00a0October 2014 as a result of which the police seized all computers and hard drives. It appears that the seized objects have not been returned.<\/p>\n 68. Mr\u00a0Parnachev, Mr Prokhorov, MrPestov and MrRozhkov appealed against the court\u2019s decision to issue a search-and-seizure order of 5\u00a0October 2014. In particular, they argued that a search in respect of a lawyer\u2019s premises should relate to anindividual lawyer, rather than topremises including all lawyers working there. MrParnachev, Mr Prokhorov, Mr\u00a0Pestov and MrRozhkov considered that the searches of their offices had constituted a disproportionate interference with their rights under Article 8 of the Convention, as it had breached professional secrecy without applying any procedural safeguards as required by the Court\u2019s case-law. On 3\u00a0December 2014 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed the appeal. On 25\u00a0February 2015 an appeal in cassation lodged by them was also dismissed. A second appeal in cassation was successful and the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision to issue a search warrant was remitted to the appellate court for fresh examination. On 9\u00a0December 2016 the Novosibirsk Regional Court decided to amend the initial search warrant of 5\u00a0October 2014,specifying in more detail the documents to be sought by the investigating authorities.<\/p>\n 14. Application no. 19667\/16, Ponyayeva v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 69. The police investigated Mr N. on suspicion of fraud. MsPonyayeva provided legal services to Mr N.\u2019s companies and the police suspected her of involvement in the alleged fraud. Neither Mr N. nor MsPonyayeva have ever been officially accused of having committed any offences.<\/p>\n (a) Search of MsPonyayeva\u2019s office<\/p>\n 70. On 26\u00a0January 2015 the Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg authorised a search of the office of a company which was a client of Ms\u00a0Ponyayeva and where she rented a room in which to work. It held that the investigator\u2019s application for search warrant had been lawful, well-founded and reasoned and, thus, had had to be granted. The court noted that the materials submitted to it demonstrated objectively that the investigator had had sufficient grounds to believe that objects and documents relevant for the investigation could have been located on the premises of a company belonging to Mr\u00a0N. The judge was aware that MsPonyayeva represented the interests of Mr\u00a0N. before courts and other authorities, but found it unsubstantiated that MsPonyayevawas a member of the Bar and that she indeed had a workplace at the company.<\/p>\n 71. MsPonyayevabrought proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP, complaining that the police, while searching the company\u2019s office, had also searched the individual workplace that she rented there, despite her status as an advocate.<\/p>\n 72. On 15\u00a0April 2015 MsPonyayeva\u2019scomplaint was dismissed. The court found that the search had been based on a valid court order. It further examined the search record,which contained a comment about the seizure of MsPonyayeva\u2019s legally privileged documents. The court questioned a witness who confirmed MsPonyayeva\u2019s position, but it dismissed her statements as unreliable. It thus concluded that there was no evidence that documents covered by professional legal privilege had been seized. The court considered that the remainder of MsPonyayeva\u2019s complaint related rather to admissibility of evidence, and was thus outside its competence.<\/p>\n 73. The above court decision was upheld on appeal on 25\u00a0August 2015.<\/p>\n (b) Search of MsPonyayeva\u2019s flat<\/p>\n 74. On 13\u00a0February 2015 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburgauthoriseda search of MsPonyayeva\u2019s flat, having found \u201can objective necessity\u201d to allow it.<\/p>\n 75. On 8\u00a0September 2016 the St Petersburg CityCourt declined to examine an appeal lodged by MsPonyayevaagainst the decision to issue a search warrant, and terminated the proceedings as the criminal case \u2013 in which MsPonyayeva\u2019s flat had been searched \u2013 had already been sent for trial.<\/p>\n 15. Application no. 36833\/16, Levchenko v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 76. The authorities were investigating illegal transfers of money based on an allegedly fraudulent arbitral award. They decided to apply for a warrant to search the office of the arbitral tribunal located at an advocates\u2019 association \u201cGorodskaya\u201d, headed by Mr\u00a0Levchenko. On 15\u00a0April 2015 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg granted an application for a search warrant on the grounds that it would contribute to the finding of additional information relevant to the criminal investigation.<\/p>\n 77. On 16\u00a0April 2015 the police searched the office of the arbitraltribunal,allegedly also shared by the collegium of advocates \u201cGorodskaya\u201d. They seized advocates\u2019 notebooks and returned them one year and three months later. The case file indicates that a lawyer from another advocates\u2019 associationwas eventually convicted in relation to the illegal money transfers under investigation.<\/p>\n 78. MrLevchenkobrought proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP, complainingthat the search warrant had concerned only the office of the arbitraltribunal and, thus, the search of the office of the advocates\u2019association had been unlawful. He also complained of the unlawful seizure of his notebook containing information subject to professional legal privilege. On 13\u00a0May 2015 the Leninskiy District Court found, in particular, that it had initially authorisedthe search as part of a criminal investigation;the search had been attended by attesting witnesses;MrLevchenko\u2019s workplace had been searched because there was no physical separation between it and the arbitraltribunal\u2019s office;and the seizure of Mr\u00a0Levchenko\u2019s notebook had also been lawful. An appeal lodged by Mr\u00a0Levchenko was dismissed on 20\u00a0July 2015; two appeals on cassation were dismissed on 29\u00a0October 2015 and 24\u00a0December 2015 respectively.<\/p>\n 16. Application no. 39456\/16, Pashkina and others v. Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 79. The authorities were investigating the allegedly deliberate bankruptcy of company\u00a0T. by its director, Mr M. On 24\u00a0March 2016 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi authoriseda search of the office of lawyers MsPashkina, MrPrivalov and Mr Levin. The court referred to the FSB\u2019s \u201cresults of operational-search activities\u201d and the need to collect evidence for the criminal investigation.<\/p>\n 80. On 25 March 2016 the authorities searched the office and seized a number of litigation case files and the information database from all the office computers. On 12\u00a0May 2016 the court\u2019s decision to issue the search warrant was upheld on appeal.<\/p>\n II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A. Provision of legal assistance and services<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Types of legal advisers<\/em><\/p>\n 81. Where legal advice is concerned, Russian law distinguishes between legal assistance (\u044e\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f\u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u044c),which is provided by qualified advocates,and legal services (\u044e\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435\u0443\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0433\u0438),which may be rendered by \u201cother people\u201d such as in-house counsel, partners or employees of law firms or other organisations giving legal advice, or independent legal advisers registered as individual businesses (section 1 of the Advocates Act (Law no. 63-FZ of 31 May 2002)). Advocatesare independent legal advisers who have been admitted to the Bar and who may not be employed by an organisation (section 2 of the Advocates Act).There are no qualifying requirements to satisfy in order to be allowed to providelegal services.<\/p>\n 2. Right to represent parties in court proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 82. Parties to constitutional, criminal, civil, commercial and administrative proceedings may be represented by an advocate or \u201canother person\u201d, as follows.<\/p>\n (a) Criminal proceedings<\/p>\n 83. Under Article 49 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d), a defendant may be represented in criminal proceedings against him or her by an advocate. Subject to the court\u2019s consentadefendant may also be represented by \u201canother person\u201d together with an advocate. In criminal proceedings before justices of thepeace \u201canother person\u201d may take the place of an advocate.<\/p>\n (b) Civil proceedings<\/p>\n 84. Under Article 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), representatives in civil proceedings should be legally capable and have power of attorney to pursue the case.<\/p>\n (c) Commercial proceedings<\/p>\n 85. Under Article\u00a059 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 6 of the Code of Commercial Procedure (\u201cthe ComPC\u201d), parties may be represented by advocates and \u201cother persons\u201dwith legal capacity and power of attorney to pursue the case.<\/p>\n (d) Administrative proceedings<\/p>\n 86. Under Article\u00a055 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (\u201cthe CAP\u201d), representatives in administrative proceedings may be advocates and \u201cother people\u201dwith full legal capacity, a law degree and power of attorney to pursue the case.<\/p>\n 3. Professional confidentiality and other obligations<\/em><\/p>\n 87. Advocates are required to abide by the professional ethics code (section 7(4) of the Advocates Act); any breach of the code will be subject to disciplinary liability. Their obligations include a duty of confidentiality to their clients (section 6(5) of the Advocates Act). Any search of an advocate\u2019s premises is subject to certain procedural safeguards (see paragraph 93 below). There are no particular professional requirements or disciplinary liability in respect of other legal advisors. Their premises do not have any special protection from searches.<\/p>\n B. Authorisation of searches<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. General provisions<\/em><\/p>\n 88. The Operational-Search Activities Act (Law no. 144\u00adFZ of 12\u00a0August 1995 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe OSAA\u201d) provides that investigating authorities may perform various operational-search measures, including \u201cinspection of premises, buildings, constructions, plots of land and vehicles\u201d (section 6(8)). Operational-search measures involving interference with the constitutional right to, among other things, privacy of the home, may be conducted subject to judicial authorisation (section 8).<\/p>\n 89. The CCrPprovides that examination of a crime scene, a plot of land, residential and other premises, objects and documents may be performed in order to discover criminal traces or other circumstances which are relevant to an investigation (Article\u00a0176 \u00a7\u00a01). Crime-scene examinationof residential premises may be performed only with the consent of the residents or on the basis of a court warrant (Article 176 \u00a7 5). In the latter case,an application for a court warrant is made in accordance with the procedure set out in Article\u00a0165.<\/p>\n 90. A search of a place of residence requires a search warrant issued by a court on the basis of an application by an investigator (Article 165). A prosecutor and the investigator have the right to participate in the court hearing on the investigator\u2019s application for a search warrant (Article\u00a0165\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03).<\/p>\n 91. The Constitutional Court of Russia, in its decision no. 70-O of 10\u00a0March 2005, held that Article 165 \u00a7 3 does not deprive a person whose home was searched of the possibility to participate in a judicial review of the lawfulness of the search.<\/p>\n 92. The CCrP provides that there are grounds to carry out a search if there is sufficient informationto believe that instruments of a crime or objects, documents or valuables relevant to a criminal case might be found in a specific place or on a specific person (Article 182 \u00a7 1).A lawyer of the person whose premises are searched may be present during the search (Article 182 \u00a7 11).<\/p>\n 2. Search of an advocate\u2019s premises<\/em><\/p>\n 93. A search of the residential and professional premises of an advocate must be authorised by a court warrant. The information, objects and documents obtained during the search may be used in evidence only if they are not covered by lawyer-client confidentiality in a given criminal case (section\u00a08(3) of the Advocates Act).<\/p>\n 94. The Constitutional Court invited the legislator to adopt additional safeguards for searches of lawyers\u2019 premises, in particular, to ensure that documents covered by professional legal privilege were treated differently from regular material (Resolution 33P\/2015 of 17 December 2015). Since 17\u00a0April 2017 a new Article 450.1 of the CCrPprovides that an advocate\u2019s premises may be searched only if he or she is a suspect in a criminal investigation, on the basis of a court warrant, and in the presence of a representative from the relevant collegium of advocates. A crime-scene examinationat an advocate\u2019s premises may exceptionally be carried out without those conditions being complied with.<\/p>\n C. Seizure and retention as material evidence<\/strong><\/p>\n 95. Article 81 \u00a7 4 of the CCrPprovides that objects seized during an investigation but not retained as material evidence should be returned to the people from whom they were seized. Since 28\u00a0June 2012 such objects include electronic data-storage devices, which may be returned to their owner after inspection and other necessary investigative actions, if this does not compromise the evidence.<\/p>\n 96. Since 3\u00a0July 2016 a new Article 81.1 of the CCrP provides that an investigator must take a decision to retain a seized object as material evidence within ten days of the seizure. If the number of seized objects is considerable or if there are other objective circumstances, the period may be extended to thirty days. Seized objects which are not to be retained as material evidence have to be returned within five days of the expiry of the above-mentioned periods.<\/p>\n 97. Since 27\u00a0December 2018 Article 164 \u00a7 4.1 of the CCrP prohibits an unreasonable use of measures which could interrupt lawful activities of legal persons or individual businessmen, including seizure of electronic data-storage devices within the framework of investigations of certain offences, subject to a number of exceptions. Under Article 164.1 \u00a7\u00a03 an investigator may copy information contained on electronic data-storage devices.<\/p>\n D. Judicial review<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The OSAA<\/em><\/p>\n 98. A judicial decision authorisingoperational-search measures, including a search of premises, is not amenable to appeal. However, a person concerned may challenge before a court the actions of the authorities carrying out operational-search activities, even where those actions were authorised by a court (section 5(3) and (9), and Constitutional Court decision no. 86-O of 14\u00a0July 1998).<\/p>\n 99. The Plenary Supreme Court, in its Ruling no. 1 of 10 February 2009, held that actions of officials or State agencies conducting operational\u2011search activities at the request of an investigator could be challenged in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Article 125 \u00a7 4 of the CCrP.<\/p>\n 2. The CCrP<\/em><\/p>\n 100. Decisions and acts or failures to act by an investigator or a prosecutor that are capable of adversely affecting the constitutional rights or freedoms of parties to criminal proceedings are amenable to a judicial review. Following examination of the complaint, the court either declares the challenged decision, act or failure to act unlawful or unjustified and instructs the responsible official to rectify the indicated shortcoming, or dismisses the complaint (Article 125 \u00a7 5). When instructing the official to rectify the indicated shortcoming, the court may not indicate any specific measures to be taken by the official or annul or require the official to annul the decision that had been found to be unlawful or unjustified (paragraph\u00a021 of Ruling no. 1 of 10\u00a0February 2009 of the Plenary Supreme Court of the Russian Federation).<\/p>\n 101. All court decisions taken during the pre-trial stage of a criminal case, including decisions to authorisea search under Article 165 of the CCrP,are amenable to appeal(Article 127).<\/p>\n E. International Legal Materials<\/strong><\/p>\n 102. According to paragraph 22 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (adopted in 1990 by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders), \u201cGovernments shall recognise and respect that all communications and consultations between lawyers and their clients within their professional relationship are confidential\u201d.<\/p>\n 103. In its Recommendation Rec(2000)21, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recommends the governments of member States to take all necessary measures \u201cto ensure the respect of the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship\u201d. Exceptions to that principle could be allowed \u201conly if compatible with the Rule of Law\u201d.<\/p>\n 104. In Recommendation 2085 (2016) and Resolution 2095 (2016) the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reminded member States of the role of human rights defenders and the need to strengthen their protection.<\/p>\n 105. In its Recommendation Rec 2121 (2018) the Parliamentary Assembly further invited the Committee of Ministers to draft and adopt a convention on the profession of lawyer, based on the standards set out in Recommendation No. R (2000) 21and other relevant instruments, including the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe\u2019s Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession, the International Association of Lawyers\u2019 Turin Principles of Professional Conduct for the Legal Profession in the 21st Century and the International Bar Association\u2019s Standards for the Independence of the Legal Profession, International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession and Guide for Establishing and Maintaining Complaints and Discipline Procedures. In the opinion of the Parliamentary Assembly, the convention would help to reinforce such fundamental guarantees as legal professional privilege and the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 106. In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 107. The applicants complained that the searches of their residential or professional premises and the seizure of electronic devices containing personal information or documents covered by professional legal privilege amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. They also complained that in breach of Article 13 of the Convention, taken together with Article 8, there had been no effective remedies available to them in respect of the searches of their premises. The relevant parts of the Convention provisions read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 8<\/p>\n \u201c1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.<\/p>\n 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 13<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 108. The Court notes that the Government did not raise any objections as to the admissibility of this part of the application. Nevertheless, it will need to ascertain whether the applicants submitted their complaints within sixmonthsof the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. To that end, it will have to establish which, if any, remedies were available to themand whether they had the features of an effective remedy.<\/p>\n 1. Summary of the remedies used by the applicants in the present cases<\/em><\/p>\n 109. The Court observes at the outset that one applicant did not use any remedies (application no. 7101\/15). The other applicants used one or two remedies in respect of the searches of their premises. In particular, applicants in four applications contested only the investigating authorities\u2019 actions during the searches (applications nos. 11264\/04 (second search), 73629\/13, 19667\/16 (in respect of the office search) and 36833\/16). Applicants in nine applications challenged only the lawfulness of the search warrants (applications nos. 11264\/04 (first search), 58290\/08, 60648\/08, 10825\/11, 78187\/11, 18403\/13, 29786\/15, 19667\/16 (in respect of the flat search) and 39456\/16). In four applications (applications nos. 32324\/06, 26067\/08, 2397\/11 (first applicant) and 14244\/11) the applicants challenged both the lawfulness of the search warrants and the lawfulness of the authorities\u2019 actions during the searches. The Court has to determine from the final decision in the exhaustion of which, if any, of those remedies the six-month period has been running and whether the applicants have complied with it.<\/p>\n 110. Furthermore, one applicant was successful in challenging the lawfulness of the search warrant in respect of his flat (application no.\u00a058290\/08). However, when he subsequently applied for damages, his civil action claims were rejected. The Court has to determine whether this applicant also has complied with the six-month rule.<\/p>\n 2. Search under the OSAA: no remedies have been used<\/em><\/p>\n 111. The applicantin case no. 7101\/15 (MrLazutkin) did not make any complaints to the domestic authorities about the search of his premises,which had been authorised under the OSAA. He lodged the application with the Court within six months of the date of the search.<\/p>\n 112. The Court has previously found that a judicial decision authorising operational-search measures under the OSAA was not amenable to a review by a higher court and that no other remedies in respect of such decisions were available (see Avanesyan v. Russia, no. 41152\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a030-36, 18\u00a0September 2014). These findings are applicable in MrLazutkin\u2019s case and the Government did not argue otherwise. This application cannot therefore be rejected for non-exhaustion or for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit.<\/p>\n 3. Judicial review of the terms of search warrants<\/em><\/p>\n 113. Applicants in twelve applications (applications nos. 11264\/04 (first search), 32324\/06, 26067\/08, 58290\/08, 60648\/08, 2397\/11 (first applicant), 10825\/11, 14244\/11, 78187\/11, 18403\/13, 29786\/15, 19667\/16 (in respect of the flat search) and 39456\/16) \u2013 some of them in addition to using another remedy \u2013 appealed to a higher court seeking a full review of the decision to issue a search warrant. The Court accepts that an appeal against a decision to issue a search warrant is a prima facie effective remedy. The six-month period should be calculated from the date of the appeal decision. All of the applications but one (application no. 58290\/08, see below)were lodged with the Court within six months of the appeal decision; they were therefore not belated.<\/p>\n 114. In application no. 58290\/08the applicant successfully appealed against the search warrant.He then made a claim for compensation in the civil courts, which was eventually dismissed. The Court finds it appropriateto take the start of the six-month period from the date of the final decision of 25 June 2008 dismissing the applicant\u2019s claims for non-pecuniary damages for the unlawful search. As he lodged his application within six months of that decision, it was not belated.<\/p>\n 4. Judicial review of the manner of conducting the search (Article\u00a0125 of the CCrP)<\/em><\/p>\n 115. The applicants in eight applications (applications nos. 11264\/04 (second search), 32324\/06, 26067\/08, 2397\/11 (first applicant), 14244\/11, 73629\/13, 19667\/16 (in respect of the office search) and 36833\/16)applied for a judicial review under Article 125 of the CCrP. The Court notes that the scope of a judicial review under that provision was limited to reviewing the manner in which State officials had acted. A judge examining such a complaint was required to establish whether or not the investigating authorities had complied with the applicable legal requirements and whether they had abided by the terms of the judicial authorisation. The review under Article 125 of the CCrP did not touch upon the legal and factual grounds for the underlying judicial authorisation, that is to say, whether there had been relevant and sufficient reasons for granting that judicial authorisation and whether it was compatible with the legal requirements (see Avanesyan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a031\u201133, in respect of searches, and Zubkov and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a029431\/05 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 95-97, 7\u00a0November 2017, in respect of surveillance activities). Even if a judge had detected irregularities in the manner in which the search had been performed, this would not have affected the validity of the underlying judicial authorisation. The Court concludes that a judicial review under Article 125 of the CCrP could not provide relief in respect of complaints about allegedly unlawful judicial decisions authorisinginvestigative measures such as searchesor surveillance activities.<\/p>\n 116. The Court observes that in one of those eight cases (application no.\u00a014244\/11) the applicants complained about the search of the first applicant\u2019s office and seizure of her electronic devices both in the appeal complaint against the court search warrant and in the complaints about the authorities\u2019 allegedly unlawful actions under Article 125 of the CCrP. The applicants submitted their application to the Court on 5\u00a0February 2011, which was outside the six-month period as regards the appeal decision of 11\u00a0May 2010 on the lawfulness of the court search warrant (see \u00a7 51 above) and within the six-month period as regards the final decisions on the complaints under Article 125 of the CCrP (30\u00a0August, 23 and 30\u00a0September 2010, see \u00a7\u00a7 52 \u2013 54 above). The Court notes that the court search warrant of 25\u00a0March 2010 had imposed \u201cno limitations\u201d on the investigator\u2019s discretion during the performance of the search (see \u00a7 50 above). Thus, the manner of the performance of the search of the flat and the seizure of the electronic devices resulted from the search warrant itself and its terms rather than from the authorities\u2019 unlawful actions, for instance, at variance with the search warrant. Therefore, a complaint under Article\u00a0125 of the CCrP could not have provided a redress to the applicants\u2019 grievances stemming from the terms of the search warrant itself.<\/p>\n 117. Given that the complaints under Article 125 of the CCrP were ineffective for the applicants\u2019 grievances, only the appeal decision on the search warrant should be taken into account for the purposes of the six\u2011month period calculation. As noted above, the applicants filed their application more than six months after the appeal decision in respect of the search warrant. Thus, this application should be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 118. As for the other applicants who had used the complaint under Article 125 of the CCrP, the Court notes as follows. Two applicants (applications nos. 32324\/06 and 26067\/08) argued that the State officials should have stopped their search of the premises after learning on site that those premises had been in fact used by lawyers. Three applicants (applications nos. 2397\/11, 19667\/16 and 36833\/16) considered that the State officials had unlawfully extended the search to encompass the premises not covered by the search warrants. Two applicants (applications\u00a0nos.11264\/04 (second search) and 73629\/13) complained about the authorities\u2019 unlawful actions because the searches had been performed under the procedures not requiring a judicial authorisation at all, whether before or after the search.In the above circumstances, the applicants\u2019 grievances stemmed from the manner in which the authorities had acted,rather than from any supposed defects in the underlying judicial authorisation,where it existed. Given the courts\u2019 power to declare such actions unlawful or unjustified, the Court accepts that in the above circumstances the applicants\u2019 attempts to challenge the actions of the investigating authorities under Article 125 of the CCrPwere reasonable.<\/p>\n 119. The Court further notes that, with the exception of one (application no.\u00a036833\/16), all of the above applications were submitted within six months after the appeal decisions taken on the complaints under Article\u00a0125 of the CCrP. Thus they were not belated. Mr\u00a0Levchenko(application no.\u00a036833\/16) chose to continue the chain of appeals by using the two-tier cassation procedure and lodging an application with the Court within six months of its conclusion. That procedure, although it dealt with the applicant\u2019s claim against the State, was governed by the CCrP. As to the latter,the Court establishedinKashlan v. Russia((dec.), no. 60189\/15, 19\u00a0April 2016) that the two-tier cassation procedure is not an effective remedy in proceedings under the CCrP. However, at the material time,the Kashlan decision had not yet been adopted and the previous case-law applied, in which the cassation procedure could be considered to be an effective remedy (see Kashlan, \u00a7 27;Myalichev v. Russia [Committee], 9237\/14, \u00a7\u00a013, 8\u00a0November 2016; and Rozhkani v. Russia [Committee], 14918\/14, \u00a7 25, 9 July 2019). It was therefore not unreasonable for the applicant to attempt the cassation appeal procedureat that time. Accordingly, the Court finds that his application was not belated.<\/p>\n 5. Conclusion<\/em><\/p>\n 120. In sum, the Court has found that none of the applications, except application no. 14244\/11, were lodged belatedly. Thus, application no.\u00a014244\/11 should be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 4 of the Convention. The complaintsrelated to the searches of the remaining applicationsare not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Submissions of the parties<\/em><\/p>\n 121. The applicants submitted that the searches of their premises had fallen short of the standards set out in Article 8 of the Convention. The judicial decisions authorising the searches, where issued, had not been based on sufficient evidence to support the allegations that the applicants were in possession of the information sought. In fourteen applications the applicants had not been official suspects in the relevant investigations. In twelve applications the applicants\u2019 only connection to the criminal cases had been the fact that they had provided legal services to an individual or a legal person involved in those criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the courts had not specified in detail the scope of the searches and had not given any instructions aimed at protection of documents subject to professional legal privilege. Lastly, the searches of the premises and seizures of electronic devices had not been accompanied by procedural safeguards, such as the presence of independent observers.<\/p>\n 122. The Government submitted that the searches of the applicants\u2019 premises had been performed in compliance with national legislation and had not infringed the applicants\u2019 rights set out in the Convention. The investigating authorities had conducted the searches within the framework of preliminary investigations or pending criminal proceedings against the applicants or third parties. The investigating authorities had obtained judicial authorisationfor the searches in respect of the advocates, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Those applicants who were practising lawyers but not advocates had not been entitled to the same protection as members of the Bar, but the procedural requirements for the searches of their premises had also been complied with. The purpose of the searches had been to obtain information necessary for the criminal investigations. The investigating authorities had had sufficient grounds to believe that the applicants could have been keeping such information on their premises. The court search warrants instructed the investigating authorities to seize only documents pertaining to the relevant investigations. The Government asserted that the applicants had failed to show that any personal or legally privileged documents unrelated to the investigations in question had been seized or used against anyone. Thus, the searches had not affected the interests of the applicants or of their clients. The court search warrants had been scrutinised and the courts\u2019 decisions to issue them upheld on appeal. Therefore, the searches had been lawful and proportionate to their legitimate aim.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 123. The Court notes that the investigating authorities performed \u201cinspections\u201d, \u201ccrime-scene examinations\u201d or \u201csearches\u201d of the applicants\u2019homes or offices. The Court reiterates that any measure, if it is no different in its manner of execution and its practical effects from a search, amounts, regardless of its characterisation under domestic law, to interference with applicants\u2019 rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see Belousov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 4494\/07, \u00a7 103, 7\u00a0November 2013, and Avanesyan, cited above, \u00a7 39).<\/p>\n 124. With the exception of two applications (application nos. 11264\/04 (second search) and 73629\/13), the searches werebased onsearch warrants, and their stated aim was to uncover criminal evidence. In the two applications where the searches were performed without a court search warrant, they were carried out under different procedures set for urgent situations (application no. 11264\/04 (second search)) and for crime scene examinations (application no. 73629\/13).The Courtwill proceed on the assumption that the searches in all applications were lawful in domestic terms and pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime. It remains to be ascertainedwhether the impugned measures were \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d, in particular, whether the relationship between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed can be considered proportionate (see Yuditskaya and Others v. Russia, no. 5678\/06, \u00a7\u00a026, 12\u00a0February 2015).<\/p>\n 125. The Court has repeatedly held that persecution and harassment of members of the legal profession strikes at the very heart of the Convention system. Therefore, searches of lawyers\u2019homes or offices should be subject to especially strict scrutiny (see El\u00e7i and Others v. Turkey, nos. 23145\/93 and 25091\/94, \u00a7 669, 13 November 2003; Xavier Da Silveira v. France, no.\u00a043757\/05, \u00a7 41, 21 January 2010; and Leotsakos v. Greece, no.\u00a030958\/13, \u00a7\u00a042, 4 October 2018; see also international legal materials on the protection of lawyer-client relationship,paragraphs 102-105 above). To determine whether the measures were \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d, the Court has to ascertain whether effective safeguards against abuse or arbitrariness were available under domestic law and how those safeguards operated in the specific cases under examination. Elements to be taken into consideration in this regard are the severity of the offence in connection with which the search and seizure were effected, whether they were carried out pursuant to anorder issued by a judge or a judicial officer or subjected to after-the-fact judicial scrutiny, whether the order was based on reasonable suspicion, and whether its scope was reasonably limited. The Court must also review the manner in which the search was executed, including \u2013 where a lawyer\u2019s office is concerned \u2013 whether it was carried out in the presence of an independent observer or whether other special safeguards were available to ensure that material covered by legal professional privilege was not removed. The Court must lastly take into account the extent of the possible repercussions on the work and the reputation of the persons affected by the search (see Yuditskaya, cited above, \u00a7 27).<\/p>\n 126. Turning to the present cases, the Court observes thatin only one of fifteen applications (application no. 11264\/04) was the applicant advocateofficially suspected of having committed a criminal offence \u2013libel of a judge. In the other fourteen applications the applicants werelawyerswho were not under criminal investigation. In two applications (application nos.\u00a032324\/06 and 26067\/08) the searches had been authorised in respect of the applicants\u2019 relatives,who were suspected of criminal offences. In the othertwelve applications, the lawyers\u2019 premises were searched because their clientswere under investigation and thus the lawyers might have been in possession of some useful information about them.<\/p>\n 127. The court search warrants, where issued,indicated that the material submitted from the criminal cases had provided sufficient grounds to believe that documents or objects relevant to the investigation could be located on the applicants\u2019 premises (see paragraphs 7, 12, 20, 24, 32, 37, 47, 56, 59, 67, 70, 74, 76 and 79 above). They did not however explain what those materials were or on what grounds the belief that the relevant evidence might be found at the premises to be searched was based (see, as a recent authority,Aliyev v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos. 68762\/14 and 71200\/14, \u00a7\u00a0184, 20 September 2018). The court search warrants were couched in very broad terms, giving the investigators unrestricted discretion as to how to carry out the searches. According to the Court\u2019s case-law, search warrants have to be drafted, as far as practicable, in a manner calculated to keep their impact within reasonable bounds (see Yuditskaya, cited above, \u00a7 29, with further references).<\/p>\n 128. Furthermore, as regards the applicants who were members of the Bar, the national courts appeared to believe that the only safeguard to be ensured during the search of the lawyers\u2019 premises was a prior judicial authorisation, and that that requirement was of a merely procedural character. The Court has previously held that judicial scrutiny in itself is not a sufficient safeguard against abuse (see Cronin v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 15848\/03, 6 January 2004, and Gerashchenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a020602\/05, \u00a7 130, 7 November 2013). At no point did the national courts attempt to weigh the obligation to protect lawyer-client confidentialityagainst the needs of criminal investigations. For instance, the courts did not examine the possibilities of obtaining the information sought from other sources (for instance, from the clients of the lawyers themselves). Furthermore, there is nothing to demonstrate that the courts had any rules by which to determine when it might be and when it might not be permissible to breach the confidentiality of legally privileged documents (see Sallinen and Others v. Finland, no. 50882\/99, \u00a7\u00a092, 27 September 2005). On the contrary, in issuing the search warrants, the courts seemed to imply that lawyer-client confidentiality could be breached in every case as long as there was a criminal investigation,evenwhere such investigation was not against the lawyers but against their clients.<\/p>\n 129. The Court concludes that in the cases where a court search warrant was issued, the national courts did not carry out a balancing exercise or examine whether the interference with the applicants\u2019 rights had answered a pressing social need and wasproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.<\/p>\n 130. Similarly, in cases where the applicants complained also or only about the manner of the execution of searches (applications nos. 11264\/04 (second search), 32324\/06, 26067\/08, 2397\/11 (first applicant), 14244\/11, 73629\/13, 19667\/16 (in respect of the office search) and 36833\/16), the national courts examined mainly whether the authorities\u2019 actions had complied with the relevant criminal procedural requirements (see paragraphs 17, 21, 44, 64, 72 and 78 above). However,the national courts did not assess the necessity and proportionality of the investigating authorities\u2019 actions.<\/p>\n 131. As for particular procedural safeguards available to the applicants during the searches or in their aftermath, the Court finds as follows.<\/p>\n 132. Russian law at the material time did not provide for procedural safeguards to prevent interference with professional secrecy, such as, for example, a prohibition on removing documents covered by lawyer-client confidentiality or supervision of the search by an independent observer capable of identifying, independently of the investigation team, which documents were covered by such confidentiality (seeYuditskaya, cited above, \u00a7 30, with further references). The lack of procedural safeguards at the material time is confirmed by the subsequent legislative amendments of 17 April 2017 (see paragraph94 above).These, however, did not affect the applicants\u2019 situations prior to that date. At the material time, there existed no possibility of ensuring the presence of a representative of a Bar association or of having an investigating judge decide whether or not particular documents or objects could be used by the investigation if the applicants objected to it on the grounds ofprofessional confidentiality (compare withRobathin v. Austria, no. 30457\/06, \u00a7 48, 3\u00a0July 2012). The presence of attesting witnesses was not a sufficient safeguard, as they were lay people without legal qualifications, unable to identify privileged material (seeYuditskaya, cited above, \u00a7 30, with further references).Moreover, as regards the data held on the applicants\u2019electronic devices which were seized by the investigators, it does not seem that any sort of sifting procedure was followed during the searches (ibid.).<\/p>\n 133. Even the existing safeguards, such as having recourse to legal assistance during a search, were unavailable to at least one applicant on the pretext that her lawyer had arrived at the scene belatedly when the search had already begun (application no. 32324\/06, see paragraph 17 above). It is not clear how a lawyer could have appeared at the beginning of a search, given that the applicant had not been notified about the search in advance and the time at which the search had started had not been chosen by her.<\/p>\n 134. In application no. 2397\/11 the procedure of theex post facto judicial review was deficient on account of the first-instance court\u2019s decision to bar MrBalyan, MrSokolov and MrSolovyevfrom making submissions to the court(see paragraph 42 above). The court offered a restrictive interpretation of Article 165 \u00a7 3 of the CCrP (see paragraph\u00a090 above). It did not take into account that the search had already taken place and that there was accordingly no need for the kind of secrecy required in ex parte proceedings. Moreover, that restrictive interpretation appears to have been at variance with the case-law of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 91 above), according to which that provision did not prevent those concerned from participating in a judicial review of the search. Thus the Court finds that MrBalyan, MrSokolov and MrSolovyevwere restricted in their right to participate in theex post facto judicial review of the search.<\/p>\n 135. In application no. 19667\/16 (second search), the appeal court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s appeal complaint against the court search warrant on the grounds that the criminal case against third persons, within the framework of which that warrant had been issued, had been by that moment sent for trial. The Court has not been provided with an explanation as to why the fact of pending criminal proceedings against third persons should have affected the applicant\u2019s right to verify the lawfulness of the court search warrant in respect of her home. It thus considers that in this case the applicant was deprived of the ex post facto judicial review of the court search warrant issued in respect of her home.<\/p>\n 136. Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the searches in the present cases impinged on professional confidentiality to an extent that was disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.<\/p>\n 137. As regards the three applicants who were practising lawyersbut not members of the Bar (applications nos. 58290\/08, 10825\/11 and 73629\/13), the Court further notes as follows. It is for States to determine who isauthorised to practise law within their jurisdiction, and under what conditions. Furthermore, it is also for States to establish a system of particular safeguards of professional secrecy in the interests of proper administration of justice,given lawyers\u2019 role as intermediaries between litigants and the courts (seeAndr\u00e9 and Another v. France, no.\u00a018603\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a041-42, 24 July 2008, andMichaud v. France, no. 12323\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0118-19, ECHR 2012).In Russia,irrespective of the area of law,legal advice,as well as representation in court proceedings,may be provided by advocatesand by\u201cother persons\u201d,with few limitations (see paragraphs 81-87 above). However, professional secrecy is protected only to the extent that advocates are involved, thus leaving exposed therelationships between clients and other kinds of legal advisers (see paragraph 87 above). The Court concedes that potential clients should be aware of the difference between the status of advocates and that of other legal advisers.Advocates enjoy additional privileges which correspond to the fact that their obligations towards clients are greater than those of other legal advisers (see paragraph 87 above).However, it would be incompatible with the rule of law to leave without any particular safeguards at all the entirety of relations between clients and legal advisers who, with few limitations, practise, professionally and often independently, in most areas of law, including representation of litigants before the courts. Therefore, the Court also considers that the searches of the premises of those applicants who were practising lawyers but not members of the Bar were conducted without sufficient procedural safeguards against arbitrariness.<\/p>\n 138. There has therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of all the applicants.In the light of this finding, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in these cases, there has also been a violation of Article 13.<\/p>\n III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No.\u00a01 TO THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 139. The applicants in six of the applications (nos. 32324\/06, 60648\/08, 2397\/11, 7101\/15, 29786\/15 and 36833\/16) complained under Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1 of a violation of their property rights resulting from theseizure and continued retention of their data-storage devices. They also complained that in breach of Article 13 of the Convention, taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they had had no effective remedies for that complaint. The relevant parts of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 1 of Protocol No. 1<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest …\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 140. The Government did not raise any objection as to the admissibility of this part of the application. Accordingly, the Court is not required to examine whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, an application to the courts under Article 125 of the CCrP could have resulted in adequate redress,as it did in other cases concerning continued retention of seized propertyby the investigation (seeLachikhina v. Russia, no. 38783\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a016\u201122, 10 October 2017; OOO KD-Konsalting v. Russia,no. 54184\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a016-22, 29 May 2018; and Barkanov v. Russia, no. 45825\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 27-30, 16\u00a0October 2018).<\/p>\n 141. The Court notes that these complaintsare not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that theyare not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 142. The applicants complained that the investigating authorities had had no reasons to seize and retain their data-storage devices. The investigators could have copied the information contained on the devices. The seizure and continued retention of the devices had undermined the applicants\u2019 ability to carry out their professional activities owing to the loss of access to the devices, professional software and client information.<\/p>\n 143. The Government submitted that the seizure and retention of the applicants\u2019objects had been lawful.<\/p>\n 144. The Court reiterates that retention of material evidence may be necessary in the interests of proper administration of justice, which is a \u201clegitimate aim\u201d in the \u201cgeneral interest\u201d of the community.It observes, however, that there must also be a reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measures applied by the State, including measures designed to control the use of the individual\u2019s property (seeSmirnov v. Russia, no. 71362\/01, \u00a7\u00a057, 7\u00a0June 2007, and BENet Praha, spol.s r.o.v. the Czech Republic, no.\u00a033908\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 100-01, 24\u00a0February 2011).The Court has previously found that continued retention of seized data-storageelectronic devices had no apparent justification where the devices themselves were not an object, instrument or product of any criminal offence, and, thus,constituted a disproportionate interference with theright to peaceful enjoyment of possessions protected by Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 (see Smirnov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-59).<\/p>\n 145. These six applications(nos. 32324\/06, 60648\/08, 2397\/11, 7101\/15, 29786\/15 and 36833\/16)illustrate the issue.The data-storage devices seized were not in themselves an object, instrument or product of any criminal offence, so their continued retention had no apparent justification. There is nothing to explain why the investigating authorities could not have copied the information sought (see, for instance, Wieser and BicosBeteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, no. 74336\/01, \u00a7 11, ECHR 2007\u2011IV). The CCrPcurrently provides for such a possibility (see paragraph 97 above), butit did not exist at the material time. Furthermore, at least since 2012 the option of returning the devices after examining them (see paragraph 95 above) was available to the authorities, but apparently not used bythem in three of the present cases (applications nos. 7101\/15, 29785\/15 and 36833\/16) for unknown reasons. In the case of Ms Fast,the seized computer processing units were returned nine months later;Mr\u00a0Levchenko received his possessions a year and three months after the search;while in three other casesthe seized objects were never returned to the applicants. Even though the seized objects were returned to MsBuragaa month later, the expert had assessed the computerswithin two days of the seizure, and the authorities did not explain why they had needed to keep the computer units for much longer. Since 2016 (see paragraph 96 above) the legislature has established time-limits for the retention or return of seized objects, but they did not affect the situations ofMr\u00a0Balyan, MrSokolov and Mr\u00a0Solovyev, MrLazutkin, and MrParnachev, Mr\u00a0Prokhorov, MrPestov and MrRozhkov (applications nos. 2397\/11, 7101\/15 and 29785\/15), whose possessions continued to be retained for unexplained reasons even after the new legislative provisions had been introduced.<\/p>\n 146. Accordingly, the Court considers that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the applicants in each of the six cases. In the light of this finding, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in these cases, there has also been a violation of Article\u00a013.<\/p>\n IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 147. The Court has examined the other complaints submitted by one of the applicants (application no. 32324\/06). However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. This part of the application must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 148. Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 149. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table, and dismisses the remaining claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2. Declares application no. 14244\/11 inadmissible;<\/p>\n 3. Declaresthe complaints lodged by the remaining twenty-two applicants under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8, as well as the complaints lodged by eleven applicants (applications nos. 32324\/06, 60648\/08, 2397\/11, 7101\/15, 29786\/15 and 36833\/16) under Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention and Article 13 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 to the Convention admissibleand the remainder of the applications inadmissible;<\/p>\n 4. Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the twenty-two applicants whose complaints have been found admissible;<\/p>\n 5. Holdsthat there is no need to examine Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 6. Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of eleven applicants (applications nos. 32324\/06, 60648\/08, 2397\/11, 7101\/15, 29786\/15 and 36833\/16);<\/p>\n 7. Holds that there is no need to examine Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;<\/p>\n 8. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the amounts indicated in the Appendix,\u00a0to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the awarded amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 9. Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 February 2020, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Paul Lemmens <\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/strong><\/p>\n List of the applicants and awards made by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention<\/p>\n no. and date of introduction<\/strong><\/td>\n date of birth<\/strong><\/p>\n place of residence<\/strong><\/p>\n nationality<\/strong><\/td>\n 01\/03\/2004<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 30\/10\/1976<\/p>\n Samara<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n EUR 9,800 (nine thousand eight hundred euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 05\/06\/2006<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 03\/01\/1964<\/p>\n Yekaterinburg<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Costs and legal expenses: EUR 4,065<\/td>\n EUR 12,700(twelve thousand seven hundred euros)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 17\/03\/2008<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 18\/12\/1970<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Costs and legal expenses: EUR 10,000<\/td>\n EUR 9,800(nine thousand eight hundred euros)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 29\/10\/2008<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 12\/08\/1983<\/p>\n Cheboksary<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Costs and legal expenses:EUR 1,070<\/td>\n EUR7,100(seven thousand one hundred euros)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) (to be paid to the representative)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 01\/12\/2008<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 26\/07\/1974<\/p>\n Nizhniy Novgorod<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Pecuniary damages: EUR 5,600<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and legal expenses: EUR 5,470<\/td>\n EUR 12,700(twelve thousand seven hundred euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 21\/12\/2010<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 25\/12\/1969<\/p>\n Novosibirsk<\/p>\n Russian<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Sergey Anatolyevich SOKOLOV<\/strong><\/p>\n 07\/10\/1969<\/p>\n Moscow<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Ruslan Vladislavovich SOLOVYEV<\/strong><\/p>\n 28\/04\/1975<\/p>\n Cheboksary<\/td>\n Anna EdvardovnaStavitskaya<\/td>\n first applicant:<\/p>\n EUR 15,000<\/p>\n second and third applicants: EUR 10,000 each<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Pecuniary damages: EUR 11,174.37<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and legal expenses: EUR\u00a016,029.72<\/td>\n EUR 12,700(twelve thousand seven hundred euros) to each of the applicants<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 10\/02\/2011<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 25\/04\/1977<\/p>\n Yekaterinburg<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Costs and legal services: EUR 9,663<\/td>\n EUR 5,000(five thousand euros)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 1,000(one thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 05\/02\/2011<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 18\/12\/1970<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/p>\n Russian<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Nikita Nikolayevich SOKOLOV<\/strong><\/p>\n 15\/05\/1977<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Valeriy Vasilyevich BURYKIN<\/strong><\/p>\n 02\/12\/1953<\/p>\n Markovo<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Oleg Yuryevich MAKOVOZ<\/strong><\/p>\n 10\/08\/1968<\/p>\n St-Petersbourg<\/td>\n (representing the first, third and fourth applicants)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Maksim<\/p>\n Vladimirovich<\/p>\n SEMENOV<\/p>\n (representing the second applicant)<\/td>\n 07\/12\/2011<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 07\/10\/1983<\/p>\n Khabarovsk<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/td>\n EUR 2,000(two thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 26\/02\/2013<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 28\/08\/1973<\/p>\n Vladivostok<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n EUR 9,800 (nine thousand eight hundred euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 30\/10\/2013<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 10\/01\/1975<\/p>\n Orsk<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n EUR 9,800 (nine thousand eight hundred euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 27\/01\/2015<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 15\/05\/1974<\/p>\n Yekaterinburg<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Costs and legal expenses: EUR 1,222<\/td>\n EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 02\/06\/2015<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 27\/03\/1973<\/p>\n Novosibirsk<\/p>\n Russian<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Viktor Viktorovich PROKHOROV<\/strong><\/p>\n 30\/03\/1978<\/p>\n Novosibirsk<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Aleksey Vladimirovich PESTOV<\/strong><\/p>\n 22\/05\/1975<\/p>\n Novosibirsk<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Maksim Valeryevich ROZHKOV<\/strong><\/p>\n 30\/10\/1980<\/p>\n Tomsk<\/td>\n Valentina AleksandrovnaBokareva<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n first applicant: EUR 25,200<\/p>\n second applicant:EUR 16,733<\/p>\n thirdapplicant: EUR 10,944<\/p>\n fourth applicant: EUR 10,604<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses: EUR 18,078<\/td>\n EUR 9,800(nine thousand eight hundred euros) each of the applicants<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n EUR 1,600 (one thousand six hundred euros) each of the applicants<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 31\/03\/2016<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 13\/10\/1981<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Pecuniary damages: EUR 50,626<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses: EUR 8,859<\/td>\n 9,800 EUR(nine thousand eight hundred euros)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Costs and expenses:<\/p>\n EUR 1,000(one thousand euros)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 15\/06\/2016<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 28\/02\/1970<\/p>\n Orenburg<\/p>\n Russian<\/td>\n 24\/06\/2016<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 07\/05\/1953<\/p>\n Krasnodar<\/p>\n Russian<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Danila Aleksandrovich PRIVALOV<\/strong><\/p>\n 21\/01\/1985<\/p>\n Krasnodar<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Yevgeniy Anatolyevich LEVIN<\/strong><\/p>\n 26\/01\/1969<\/p>\n Krasnodar<\/td>\n <\/td>\n 9,800 EUR (nine thousand eight hundred euros) each of the applicants<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
\nPaul Lemmens, President,
\nPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui,
\nGilberto Felici,
\nLorraine Schembri Orland, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Application<\/strong><\/p>\n Applicant name<\/strong><\/p>\n Represented by<\/strong><\/td>\n Just satisfaction claims<\/strong><\/td>\n Award under Article\u00a041<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n \n 1.<\/td>\n 11264\/04<\/p>\n Aleksandr Gennadyevich KRUGLOV (formerly KRUG)<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR\u00a01,000,000<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n 32324\/06<\/p>\n Irina Yuryevna BURAGA<\/strong><\/p>\n Sergey Vyacheslavovich KOLOSOVSKIY<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 100,000<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n 26067\/08<\/p>\n Marina Aleksandrovna BELINSKAYA<\/strong><\/p>\n Olga Andreyevna STASYUK<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 100,000<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n 58290\/08<\/p>\n Denis Valerianovich FEDOROV<\/strong><\/p>\n Aleksey Vladimirovich GLUKHOV<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 7,143<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n 60648\/08<\/p>\n Irina Aleksandrovna FAST<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 15,000<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n 2397\/11<\/p>\n Aleksandr Vanovich BALYAN<\/strong><\/p>\n KarinnaAkopovna MOSKALENKO<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n 10825\/11<\/p>\n Aleksey Vladimirovich SILIVANOV<\/strong><\/p>\n Anton Leonidovich BURKOV<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 5,000<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 8.<\/td>\n 14244\/11<\/p>\n Marina Aleksandrovna BELINSKAYA<\/strong><\/p>\n Tatyana Fedorovna KLYKOVA<\/p>\n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 9.<\/td>\n 78187\/11<\/p>\n Tatyana Aleksandrovna BULYCHEVA<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 2,000<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 10.<\/td>\n 18403\/13<\/p>\n OlesyaPetrovna MOISEYEVA<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 100,000<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 11.<\/td>\n 73629\/13<\/p>\n Sergey Vilyevich MEZENTSEV<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 50,000<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 12.<\/td>\n 7101\/15<\/p>\n Konstantin Viktorovich LAZUTKIN<\/strong><\/p>\n Konstantin Gennadyevich KRASILNIKOV<\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 5,000<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 13.<\/td>\n 29786\/15<\/p>\n Vladimir Vladimirovich PARNACHEV<\/strong><\/p>\n KarinnaAkopovna MOSKALENKO<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 20,000 each of the applicants<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 14.<\/td>\n 19667\/16<\/p>\n Svetlana Aleksandrovna PONYAYEVA<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 100,000<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n \n 15.<\/td>\n 36833\/16<\/p>\n Oleg Ariyevich LEVCHENKO<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n The applicant seeks only a finding of violations of his rights.<\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 16.<\/td>\n 39456\/16<\/p>\n Tatyana Aleksandrovna PASHKINA<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n Non-pecuniary damages: EUR 143,000 each of the applicants<\/p>\n Non-pecuniary damages:<\/p>\n