FOURTH SECTION
\nDECISION<\/p>\n
Application no.6668\/14
\nZsoltZolt\u00e1n UJLAKI and Csaba PISKOTI
\nagainst Hungary<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 26\u00a0February 2019 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Georges Ravarani, President,
\nMarko Bo\u0161njak,
\nP\u00e9terPaczolay, judges,
\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 May 2014,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants, Mr ZsoltZolt\u00e1nUjlaki (hereinafter, \u201cthe first applicant\u201d) and Mr CsabaPisk\u00f3ti (hereinafter, \u201cthe second applicant\u201d), are Hungarian nationals, who were born in 1971 and 1973, and live in Ny\u00edregyh\u00e1za and \u00dajfeh\u00e9rt\u00f3, respectively. They were represented before the Court by Mr G.L. Magyarovics, a lawyer practising in Esztergom.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n The circumstances of the case<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 February 2009 the applicants, accomplices, were indicted as follows: the first applicant as perpetrator of the offence of abuse of public documents and for aiding and abetting the offences of abuse of office and forgery of public documents; the second applicant for aiding and abetting the offences of abuse of office and forgery of public documents.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The Szabolcs-Szatm\u00e1r-Bereg County Regional Court tried the applicants. They were assisted by defence counsels of their choice.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 September 2011 the Regional Court convicted the applicants.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of a fraudulent scheme of imitated tax inspections aimed at extorting bribes from businessmen, the first applicant was found guilty as perpetrator of eleven counts of abuse of public documents and of aiding and abetting the offences of abuse of office and forgery of public documents. The second applicant was found guilty of aiding and abetting the offences of abuse of office and forgery of public documents.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine, whereas the second applicant to two years\u2019 and ten months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0The court relied on testimonies given by the accused and witnesses, expert opinions, minutes of house searches and seizures, documents and technical evidence.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On appeal, the Debrecen Court of Appeal tried the applicants.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0In these proceedings, on 2 April 2012 the Debrecen Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office made a motion proposing the re-characterisation of the offences as fraud. On 9 May 2012 the Court of Appeal issued an order informing the defendants that a re-characterisation of their offences as fraud was possible.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0At the hearing of 3 December 2012 the Court of Appeal issued a similar warning, pointing to the possibility of re-characterising the offences as bribery.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0After a further hearing on 4 February, the Court of Appeal gave judgment on 11 February 2013. The applicants were convicted of three counts of aiding and abetting the offence of bribery. The court upheld the previous sentences.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0In the ensuing revision proceedings, on 8 October 2013 the K\u00faria gave judgment. It upheld the lower courts\u2019 judgment in essence. Observing that those courts had pointed out the possibility of a re-characterisation on two occasions (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above), the K\u00faria was satisfied that only the incriminated conducts included in the indictment were the subject matter of the trial, and explained that the applicants\u2019 offences were to be re-characterised as follows: the first applicant was guilty of four counts of aiding and abetting forgery of public documents, two counts of fraud and eleven counts of abuse of public documents; whereas the second applicant was guilty of three counts of forgery of public documents and two counts of fraud. The K\u00faria was satisfied that the sentences imposed on the applicants were lawful also in regard to the new characterisation of their offences.<\/p>\n COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants complained that their trial had not been fair in that the re-characterisation of the offences frustrated their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (a) and their right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence for the purposes of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their trial was not fair and their defence rights were infringed. They invoked Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as relevant, Article 6 provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had suffered no significant disadvantage. At any rate, the trial as a whole had not been unfair, given that the authorities had duly informed the applicants of the possibility of re-characterisation of the charges. The applicants, for their part, insisted that the K\u00faria, whose decision had not been sufficiently comprehensive in their view, upheld their conviction as one of fraud, although they had not been in a position to defend themselves in this regard.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, following the prosecution\u2019s motion to that end, on 9 May 2012 the Court of Appeal issued an order informing the applicants that a re-characterisation of their offences as fraud was possible (see paragraph 11 above); moreover, on 3 December 2012 it issued a similar order, pointing to the possibility of re-characterising the offences as bribery (see paragraph 12 above). Subsequently, that court found the applicants guilty of aiding and abetting bribery (see paragraph 13 above). In the ensuing proceedings, the K\u00faria ultimately re- characterised their offences as, inter alia, fraud (see paragraph 14 above).<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0For the Court, the authorities demonstrated due care in keeping the applicants informed of the evolution of the case against them and in formally drawing their attention, on two occasions, on the possibility of re\u2011characterisation of the charges. The applicants had thus the possibility to exercise their defence rights vis-\u00e0-vis all potential characterisations of the charges (as bribery and as fraud). In particular, they could do so both in the last phase of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and in the proceedings before the K\u00faria (see, mutatis mutandis, Dallos v.\u00a0Hungary, no.\u00a029082\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 48-53, ECHR 2001\u2011II, and D.C. v. Italy(dec.), no.\u00a055990\/00, 28 February 2002; see also, a contrario, Drassich v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a025575\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 35-43, 11 December 2007, where the re-characterisation of the charges was done by the domestic court of last instance without any previous notification of this possibility to the accused).<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicants\u2019 defence rights, as enshrined in Article 6 \u00a7 3 (a) and (b), read in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1, have been respected. There is no indication that the trial conducted against them, taken as a whole, was not fair. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 21 March 2019.<\/p>\n Andrea Tamietti\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Georges Ravarani
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n