{"id":11954,"date":"2020-05-11T16:50:35","date_gmt":"2020-05-11T16:50:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=11954"},"modified":"2020-05-11T20:50:59","modified_gmt":"2020-05-11T20:50:59","slug":"nasibullin-v-russia-european-court-of-human-rights","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=11954","title":{"rendered":"NASIBULLIN v. RUSSIA (European Court of Human Rights)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: center;\">THIRD SECTION<br \/>\nDECISION<br \/>\nApplication no. 64774\/09<br \/>\nGennadiy Rasimovich NASIBULLIN<br \/>\nagainst Russia<\/p>\n<p>The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 7\u00a0January 2020 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n<p>Georgios A. Serghides, President,<br \/>\nErik Wennerstr\u00f6m,<br \/>\nLorraine Schembri Orland, judges,<br \/>\nand Stephen Phillips,Section Registrar,<\/p>\n<p>Having regard to the above application lodged on 17 November 2009,<\/p>\n<p>Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n<p>Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Mr Gennadiy Rasimovich Nasibullin, is a Russian national, who was born in 1961 and lives in Izhevsk. He was represented before the Court by Mr R.K. Akhmetgaliyev, a lawyer practising in Kazan.<\/p>\n<p>2.\u00a0\u00a0The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n<p>3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Izhevsk, in the Republic of Udmurtiya.<\/p>\n<p>4.\u00a0\u00a0On 27\u00a0June 2005 the applicant\u2019s son, A.N., was conscripted into compulsory military service. He served in military unit no.\u00a039986.<\/p>\n<p>5.\u00a0\u00a0Psychological tests that A.N. took before his military service assigned him to category \u201c2K\u201d, which meant that there were \u201cinsignificant limitations on [his] carrying out combat roles, and garrison and sentry duties\u201d. Two subsequent psychological tests indicated that A.N. was not a suicide risk.<\/p>\n<p>6.\u00a0\u00a0On 8\u00a0December 2006 at 1.20 a.m. A.N. was found hanging from a noose made from a belt. A doctor attempted to resuscitate him, but was unsuccessful.<\/p>\n<p>7.\u00a0\u00a0Later that day a criminal investigation into the offence of incitement to suicide was initiated. A report on the examination of A.N.\u2019s body revealed that there was a strangulation mark on the neck and no other injuries. An on-site inspection found that there were no traces of a fight having taken place or a body having been dragged along on the snow. On 9\u00a0December 2006 experts performed a forensic medical examination of A.N.\u2019s body. The relevant report confirmed that there were no injuries other than the strangulation mark on the neck.<\/p>\n<p>8.\u00a0\u00a0The investigator questioned a number of witnesses. The doctor who had tried to resuscitate A.N. stated that on 7\u00a0December 2006 she had checked his health and he had had no injuries. During the resuscitation attempt she had also seen no injuries other than the marks of the belt on his neck.<\/p>\n<p>9.\u00a0\u00a0Fellow conscripts close to A.N. stated that he had been negatively affected by a break\u2011up with his girlfriend, and had become sad and distant.<\/p>\n<p>10.\u00a0\u00a0Lt. Colonel T., the military unit\u2019s psychologist, stated that he had had regular discussions with A.N. prior to his carrying out sentry duties (something he had done two or three times each month). According to Lt.\u00a0Colonel\u00a0T., A.N. had had no complaints and had shown no signs of depression.<\/p>\n<p>11.\u00a0\u00a0Lt. Colonel Z., the vice-commander of the military unit in charge of education, noted that on several occasions he had asked A.N. about his situation at home, but the latter had denied having any problems. Lt.\u00a0Colonel Z. thought that A.N. had been keeping something back.<\/p>\n<p>12.\u00a0\u00a0On 9\u00a0January 2007 the experts concluded that A.N. had died from mechanical asphyxia caused by hanging.<\/p>\n<p>13.\u00a0\u00a0On 30\u00a0January 2007, in their report, the psychologists held that A.N. had been suffering from a temporary adjustment disorder for nine months before his death.<\/p>\n<p>14.\u00a0\u00a0On 7\u00a0February 2007 the investigator issued a document on measures to be taken by the military command to eliminate the factors which had contributed to A.N.\u2019s suicide. He considered that A.N.\u2019s senior officers had failed to properly evaluate his personality and psychological state, and had failed to take any preventive measures.<\/p>\n<p>15.\u00a0\u00a0After the criminal case was reopened on one occasion, on 2\u00a0August 2007 it was closed for lack of corpus delicti. The decision closing the case relied on the records of the on-site inspection, the inspection of A.N.\u2019s body, the forensic examination reports, the psychological report, and a report on a graphological examination of A.N.\u2019s correspondence. It also relied on the statements of senior officers, including Lt.\u00a0Colonel Z. and Lt. Colonel T., and those of fellow conscripts from A.N.\u2019s division, A.N.\u2019s parents and four of his childhood friends. The investigator concluded that A.N. had committed suicide because of the break-up of his relationship, his subsequent temporary adjustment disorder, and prolonged depression.<\/p>\n<p>16.\u00a0\u00a0On 28\u00a0April 2008 the applicant requested that a criminal case be opened against the senior officers and the psychologists of military unit no.\u00a039986, who for nine months had failed to recognise A.N.\u2019s suicidal tendencies and provide him with proper assistance.<\/p>\n<p>17.\u00a0\u00a0On 26\u00a0June 2008 an investigator refused to grant the applicant\u2019s request. He found no evidence that the senior officers and the psychologists of the military unit had failed to comply with their duties in respect of A.N. He relied on the witness statements of the military unit\u2019s psychologists and the psychological report of 30 January 2007. According to the unit\u2019s psychologists, A.N. had undergone tests and obtained good results, and it had been declared that there was no risk of him committing suicide. He had had no permanent disorders and had showed no signs of depression, such as talking about suicide, giving his belongings away, producing suicide-related drawings, searching the Internet for ways to commit suicide, and so on. Owing to these circumstances, additional attention for A.N. had not been deemed necessary. One of the psychologists had written to A.N.\u2019s parents, asking them to fill in a form seeking information about their son\u2019s personality, but had never had the form back. Neither A.N. nor his friends had ever mentioned his relationship problems to any of the senior officers or the psychologists.<\/p>\n<p>18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the investigator\u2019s refusal before a court. On 30\u00a0March 2009 the 101 Garrison Military Court (\u201cthe Garrison Court\u201d) dismissed his action. The Garrison Court found: that the senior officers and the psychologists had properly monitored A.N.\u2019s psychological state; that A.N. had had all the necessary tests; and that he had obtained good results and had not presented a suicide risk. Each time A.N. had carried out sentry duties, prior to his carrying out his duties, the senior officers and the psychologists had also assessed his psychological state; he had not appeared to have any suicidal tendencies. On 18\u00a0May 2009 the Third Circuit Military Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the Garrison Court.<\/p>\n<p><strong>COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>19.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the senior officers and the psychologists of A.N.\u2019s military unit had failed to recognise A.N.\u2019s suicidal state and provide him with proper assistance. He also complained about the refusal to investigate the failure of the senior officers and the psychologists of A.N.\u2019s military unit to take steps to safeguard the life of his son. The relevant part of Article 2 of the Convention provides as follows:<\/p>\n<p>\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant asserted that, for the following reasons, the military authorities should have recognised that his son had been suicidal but had failed to do so. Firstly, the psychological assessment of A.N. carried out after his death had established that he had suffered from a temporary adjustment disorder for about nine months. Secondly, A.N. had undergone full psychological tests only twice during his military service, the most recent test had taken place almost six months before his suicide. Other psychological assistance had been perfunctory and had only involved discussions with A.N. Although the applicant\u2019s son had denied having any problems, his senior officers had known that he was a reserved person, and should have tried some alternative methods of psychological assistance. Other soldiers had noted a change in his behaviour, and that he had become sad and distant. The applicant also relied on the investigator\u2019s document of 7\u00a0February 2007, according to which the military officers had failed to identify A.N.\u2019s psychological difficulties. Furthermore, A.N. had been assigned to category \u201c2K\u201d, which meant \u201cinsignificant limitations on [his] carrying out combat roles, and garrison and sentry duties\u201d. However, he had been on sentry duty on 8\u00a0December 2006, when he had committed suicide.<\/p>\n<p>21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered that the investigation into his son\u2019s suicide had not been thorough and prompt. The investigating authorities had only opened a criminal investigation into the offence of incitement to suicide, but they had not investigated the inadequate psychological assistance given to A.N. until the applicant\u2019s request of 28\u00a0April 2008. The ensuing inquiry had also been inadequate, as it had not resolved inconsistencies between the statements of witnesses and psychologists, and had not assessed the perfunctory nature of the psychological assistance given to A.N.<\/p>\n<p>22.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that according to psychological tests, the applicant\u2019s son had not shown any suicidal tendencies. A psychologist had examined all servicemen carrying out sentry duties, including A.N. There had been no evidence to indicate that there was a risk that A.N. would commit suicide.<\/p>\n<p>23.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the investigation into A.N.\u2019s death had been effective. The criminal case had been closed as no corpus delicti had been established. The investigation had concluded that A.N. had committed suicide in the context of a temporary adjustment disorder, owing to the break-up of his relationship. The conclusion had relied on inspections of the scene of the incident and the deceased\u2019s body, statements of servicemen, and forensic examinations. The investigator had also examined the actions of the senior officers. He had found that the obligations to perform psychological testing and ensure further monitoring had been complied with. The information about the break-up of A.N.\u2019s relationship had been known only to his closest friends, and it had not been brought to the attention of the senior officers. Therefore, the Government believed that they had complied with the positive and procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has to examine whether the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk that A.N. would commit suicide, and, if so, whether they did all that could reasonably have been expected of them to avoid that risk materialising (see Malik Babayev v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 30500\/11, \u00a7 67, 1 June 2017).<\/p>\n<p>25.\u00a0\u00a0During his military service, over the course of a year and a half the applicant\u2019s son underwent psychological tests at least twice, and those tests revealed no risk of suicide (compare Tikhonova v. Russia, no. 13596\/05, \u00a7\u00a074, 30 April 2014). Discussions with the psychologist and senior officers, including discussions before A.N. carried out sentry duties, also did not indicate that there was a risk. The post-mortem psychological report indicated that A.N. had had only an adjustment disorder, but not that there had been a risk of suicide.<\/p>\n<p>26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s son was assigned to category \u201c2K\u201d, which meant that there were \u201cinsignificant limitations on [his] carrying out combat roles, and garrison and sentry duties\u201d, yet the parties did not provide an explanation as to what exact limitations that category implied. The facts indicate that the applicant\u2019s son regularly carried out sentry duties two or three times each month (see paragraph\u00a010 above). Thus, it cannot be said that he was completely prohibited from carrying out sentry duties or was assigned to them in breach of expert recommendations (compare Chember v.\u00a0Russia, no. 7188\/03, \u00a7 56, ECHR 2008).<\/p>\n<p>27.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, A.N. did not ask for psychological assistance and did not inform the senior officers about any complaints or difficulties. Even if his behaviour changed, it appears that there were no particular instances which could have alerted the military authorities to the fact that that change was so radical as to endanger his life. The Court reiterates that in this type of case, the unpredictability of human conduct must not be ignored, and the State\u2019s positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see, as a recent authority, Malik Babayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a074). In the circumstances, there is no sufficient evidence for the Court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to A.N.\u2019s life (see Tikhonova, cited above, \u00a7 75). The Court therefore finds that the particular circumstances leading to A.N.\u2019s death were not foreseeable to the domestic authorities. Thus, no obligation to take operational measures to prevent a risk to life arose in the present case.<\/p>\n<p>28.\u00a0\u00a0As for the effectiveness of the investigation into A.N.\u2019s death, the Court notes that the applicant was mostly dissatisfied about there being no criminal prosecution of psychologists and senior officers from A.N.\u2019s military unit. However, other than that, he did not indicate any particular omissions or deficiencies which could have rendered the investigation inadequate (see Baklanov v. Ukraine, no. 44425\/08, \u00a7 88, 24 October 2013).<\/p>\n<p>29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where a positive obligation to safeguard the life of persons in custody or in the army is at stake, the system required by Article 2 must provide for an independent and impartial official investigation that satisfies certain minimum standards as to effectiveness. In such cases, the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness, and must, of their own motion, initiate investigations capable of, firstly, ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, secondly, identifying the State officials or authorities involved. The requirement of public scrutiny is also relevant in this context (see, for instance, Marina Alekseyevav. Russia, no. 22490\/05, \u00a7 126, with further references, 19\u00a0December 2013). However, Article 2 does not entail the right for an applicant to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence, or an absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or a particular sentence (see \u00d6nery\u0131ld\u0131z v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939\/99, \u00a7\u00a096, ECHR 2004\u2011XII).<\/p>\n<p>30.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the authorities immediately opened a criminal investigation into A.N.\u2019s death, questioned a significant number of witnesses, and obtained relevant forensic examinations. The investigation established no elements of a criminal offence in the circumstances of A.N.\u2019s death, and the case was closed about eight months after being initiated. Thus, the investigation was sufficiently prompt. It established the relevant facts, and there is no reason to doubt the conclusions which it reached. There is no reason to question the independence of the investigation either. It appears that the applicant had no issues in accessing the material of the criminal investigation. At his request, the authorities carried out an additional inquiry into the quality of the psychological assistance provided to his son. Even though the investigator drew the attention of senior officers of A.N.\u2019s military unit to certain deficiencies in the psychological assistance given to servicemen (see paragraph 14 above), there is nothing to indicate that those deficiencies could have constituted a sufficient basis for establishing their criminal liability.<\/p>\n<p>31.\u00a0\u00a0Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the investigation into A.N.\u2019s death was effective.<\/p>\n<p>32.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 2 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n<p>Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n<p>Done in English and notified in writing on 30 January 2020.<\/p>\n<p>Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Georgios A. Serghides<br \/>\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n<div class=\"social-share-buttons\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer\/sharer.php?u=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=11954\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Facebook<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/intent\/tweet?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=11954&text=NASIBULLIN+v.+RUSSIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Twitter<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/shareArticle?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=11954&title=NASIBULLIN+v.+RUSSIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">LinkedIn<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/pinterest.com\/pin\/create\/button\/?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=11954&description=NASIBULLIN+v.+RUSSIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Pinterest<\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>THIRD SECTION DECISION Application no. 64774\/09 Gennadiy Rasimovich NASIBULLIN against Russia The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 7\u00a0January 2020 as a Committee composed of: Georgios A. Serghides, President, Erik Wennerstr\u00f6m, Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges, and Stephen&hellip;<\/p>\n<p class=\"more-link-p\"><a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=11954\">Read more &rarr;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11954","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-available-in-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11954","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=11954"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11954\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11955,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11954\/revisions\/11955"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=11954"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=11954"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=11954"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}