Neutral Citation Number: [2018] EWCA Civ 556<\/p>\n
Case No: C1\/2017\/0718<\/p>\n
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
\nON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
\nPLANNING COURT
\nMR JUSTICE DOVE
\n[2017] EWHC 467 (Admin)<\/p>\n
Royal Courts of Justice
\nStrand, London, WC2A 2LL
\nDate: 23 March 2018<\/p>\n
Before:
\nLady Justice Hallett
\nLord Justice Patten
\nand
\nLord Justice Lindblom
\n– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
\nBetween:
\nCarolyn Brown (an officer of the Hanwell
\nCommunity Forum)
\nAppellant
\n– and –
\nLondon Borough of Ealing Council
\nRespondent
\n– and –
\nQPR Holdings Ltd.
\nInterested Party
\n– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
\n– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
\nMr Marc Willers Q.C. and Ms Justine Compton (instructed by Richard Buxton Environmental and Public Law) for the Appellant
\nMr Stephen Whale (instructed by London Borough of Ealing Council) for the Respondent
\nMr Reuben Taylor Q.C. (instructed by Withers LLP) for the Interested Party
\nHearing date: 12 December 2017
\n– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
\nJudgment Approved by the court
\nfor handing down
\n(subject to editorial corrections)<\/p>\n
Lord Justice Lindblom:<\/strong><\/p>\n Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Did a local planning authority err in law in granting planning permission for a development of recreational facilities on Metropolitan Open Land, by misapplying or failing to apply relevant national policy and policies in the development plan? That is the basic question in this appeal. It does not raise any novel issue of law.<\/p>\n 2. The appellant, Ms Carolyn Brown, is the Chairperson of the Hanwell Community Forum. By a claim for judicial review she challenged the planning permission granted by the respondent, the London Borough of Ealing Council in June 2016 for development proposed by the interested party, QPR Holdings Ltd. (\u201cQPR\u201d), on a site of some 25 hectares to the north of Windmill Lane in Southall, which is known as Warren Farm. The appeal before us is against the order of Dove J., dated 23 March 2017, dismissing that claim.<\/p>\n 3. The site is within a large area of Metropolitan Open Land. It is also designated as Community Open Space under Policy 5.6 of the council\u2019s Development (or Core) Strategy 2026 (adopted in April 2012). From the mid-1960\u2019s until 2013 it had been used by members of the public for formal sport and recreation \u2013 football, cricket, netball, tennis and athletics, and since 2013 for informal recreation \u2013 such as walking and jogging. QPR\u2019s proposal, as described in the application for planning permission, was this:<\/p>\n \u201cRedevelopment of the site, following demolition of the existing buildings, to provide a first team training and academy facility for Queen\u2019s Park Rangers Football Club, incorporating a two-storey, with basement, training centre building and a three-storey multi-functional operations building, \u2026 an indoor hall building, a single storey maintenance building and single storey plant buildings, along with three first team pitches and eight academy\/youth pitches, plus the re-provision of community facilities incorporating a single storey community building linked to the indoor hall (shared with QPR), \u2026 and up to eleven football pitches, including one artificial pitch, and three cricket wickets. In addition, \u2026 associated developments including 263 permanent car parking spaces \u2026, flood lighting, \u2026 and engineering works to re-grade the site to provide level playing surfaces \u2026 .\u201d<\/p>\n 4. At its meeting on 16 September 2015 the council\u2019s Planning Committee, following the recommendation of the Head of Planning Services, resolved that, subject to referral to the Mayor of London and a section 106 obligation being entered into, planning permission was to be granted. Planning permission was eventually granted on 2 June 2016.<\/p>\n 5. The claim for judicial review was originally pursued on a single ground, on which Ouseley J. granted permission in November 2016. At the hearing before Dove J. a second ground was added, on which he refused permission. Permission to appeal against Dove J.\u2019s order was granted by Lewison L.J. on 3 July 2017. Lewison L.J. also granted permission to apply for judicial review on the second ground, and ordered that the claim on that ground be retained in this court to be heard with the appeal on the first.<\/p>\n 6. A full account of the relevant facts is provided in Dove J.\u2019s judgment (in paragraphs 3 to 17), which I gratefully adopt.<\/p>\n The issues before us<\/strong><\/p>\n 7. From the two grounds of appeal and the respondent\u2019s notice of 31 July 2017 these issues emerge:<\/p>\n (1) whether the officer\u2019s conclusion, accepted by the committee, that \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d existed to justify the grant of planning permission for \u201cinappropriate development\u201d on Metropolitan Open Land was bad in law; and<\/p>\n (2) whether the council failed to take into account the proposal\u2019s \u201cconflict\u201d with Policy 7.18 of the London Plan, which requires the \u201closs of protected open spaces\u201d to be \u201cresisted\u201d.<\/p>\n The planning officer\u2019s report<\/strong><\/p>\n 8. The officer\u2019s report to the Planning Committee for its meeting on 16 September 2015 began with an \u201cExecutive Summary\u201d, in which she acknowledged the site\u2019s designation as Metropolitan Open Land and Community Open Space, and, in the concluding paragraph, said this:<\/p>\n \u201cThis report concludes, as with the previous scheme [for which the council had granted planning permission on 20 December 2013], that \u2018very special circumstances\u2019 in support of the application, including: the compelling need for the development; lack of alternative \u2018brownfield\u2019 sites; benefits to the local community; and the proposed steps to mitigate any harm to the openness of the MOL, are sufficient to outweigh any harm. It is also considered that there are no other areas of demonstrable harm that would be sufficient to warrant refusal of the scheme and that permission should be granted, subject to an appropriate legal agreement, conditions and referral to the Mayor for his final consideration.\u201d<\/p>\n 9. In a section of the report where she set out her \u201cReasoned Justification\u201d, under the sub-heading \u201cPrinciple of Development\u201d, the officer acknowledged that the site \u201cconstitutes Ealing\u2019s largest sports ground, and is considered to be of strategic importance\u201d, and \u201c[as] a Council owned site it has until fairly recently operated as a community sports facility, which has been deteriorating over time, and does not meet current sporting facilities standards\u201d, and \u201c[therefore], due to lack of finance it no longer fulfils this role\u201d.<\/p>\n 10. As for the \u201cAppropriateness of Development on Metropolitan Open Land\u201d, the officer reminded the committee that \u201cthe whole site is designated as MOL and forms part of the wider area of Norwood Green\/Osterley Metropolitan Open Land as defined on the Council\u2019s Policies Map and in Policy 5.1 of the Council\u2019s Development (or Core) Strategy (April 2012)\u201d. She drew attention to the \u201cpurposes of MOL \u2026 defined in clause D of Policy 7.17 of the London Plan \u2026\u201d. She said \u201c\u2026 the site clearly fulfils its MOL status through: providing a key break in the built form; accommodating open recreation facilities of strategic importance; and forming a link in a wider green network\u201d. She referred to Policy 7.17 of the London Plan and government policy on Green Belt in paragraphs 79 to 92 of the National Planning Policy Framework (\u201cthe NPPF\u201d). She concluded that \u201c[when] considered collectively the proposed buildings are not considered to be of a \u2018small scale\u2019 and therefore the quantum of the proposed build of 14,465sqm is not considered to represent appropriate development in MOL policy terms\u201d. She went on:<\/p>\n \u201cHaving established that the built form is inappropriate by nature of its use (in part) and also by its scale, it is necessary to consider whether very special circumstances exist to support the development. Paragraph 88 of the NPPF states that very special circumstances will not exist unless the potential harm to the Green Belt (MOL in this instance) by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations.<\/p>\n There is no prescribed list of what might constitute \u2018Very Special [Circumstances]\u2019 (VSC). It may be that a single aspect of the proposal may itself be a VSC sufficient to justify development or it may be that a number of circumstances cumulatively amount to VSC.<\/p>\n The starting point in this assessment is first to establish the nature of the harm caused. This should focus primarily on the fundamental aim of the MOL, namely its contribution to openness. Any harm caused to this fundamental aim by reason of inappropriate development is given substantial weight. \u2026 .\u201d<\/p>\n The officer then considered the harm arising from the \u201cImpact of Buildings\u201d and the \u201cImpact of the Earthworks\u201d. On the \u201cImpact of Buildings\u201d, she said:<\/p>\n \u201cAs proposed the new buildings are focused around the existing built form and hardstanding, necessitating their removal\/demolition. The combined footprint of the proposed buildings is 14,465sqm, which is an increase of 12,612sqm over the existing situation, which is 1,853sqm, although a reduction of 1,763sqm from the previously consented scheme of 16,228sqm. As a proportion of the overall site, the built form amounts to a small percentage of [the] overall site.<\/p>\n As well as seeking to minimise impact on openness, the decision to cluster the new built form has also been driven by a number of other factors. \u2026<\/p>\n As well as assessing the extent of the built footprint and its siting it is also necessary to consider the impact of the height and massing of the proposed buildings on the open character. At present the existing buildings are largely one storey in height (plus flue stacks). As proposed, the buildings range in height from 5.9m to 12.5m or from 1 to 3 storeys. An increase from the present situation on the site, although in the context of these wider open environs, this increase is not deemed to be significantly intrusive to its open character. The proposed height is also considered to achieve an acceptable balance in respect of accommodating essential functional space, and minimising impact on the landscape. \u2026 .\u201d<\/p>\n As for the \u201cImpact of the Earthworks\u201d, she said:<\/p>\n \u201cIn addition to the built works assessed above the proposal involves extensive earthworks, which seek to raise the existing land, creating a single level plateau. \u2026<\/p>\n Whilst the formation of a plateau will clearly change the landform, its perceived impact on the openness of the site is considered to be minimal. \u2026 .\u201d<\/p>\n Under the heading \u201cVery Special Circumstances\u201d, she said:<\/p>\n \u201cHaving assessed harm, it is necessary to establish the benefits arising from the development and overriding circumstances justifying the proposal. These \u2018very special circumstances\u2019 can be summarised as follows: i) a compelling need for the development; ii) the lack of any \u2018brownfield\u2019 sites that are suitable, feasible and available; iii) and the overriding benefits for the local community \u2026 .\u201d<\/p>\n The officer then set out her conclusions on those three matters: first, the \u201cCompelling Need for the Development\u201d; secondly, \u201cLack of Alternative \u2018Brownfield\u2019 Sites\u201d; and thirdly, \u201cBenefits to the Local Community\u201d. In dealing with the \u201cCompelling Need for the Development\u201d she referred to several things, including this:<\/p>\n \u201cExisting facilities at Warren Farm have deteriorated due to lack of investment and reduction in public expenditure and therefore the strategic sports function ceased despite the requirement in Policy 5.6 of the Core Strategy 2012, to provide \u2018improved changing rooms, outdoor sports areas and social facilities\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n As for the \u201cBenefits to the Local Community\u201d she said:<\/p>\n \u201cThe benefits to the local community versus the perceived harm to the Green Belt have previously been assessed and the following was concluded that:<\/p>\n \u00b7 On balance, the benefits of encouraging [sports] participation for young people and health improvements form the basis of the argument in favour of the redevelopment of the site. The project is supported by the Community Sports Development Plan, which has been produced by the QPR Trust Organisation, and this includes the development of a variety of sporting and community activities (apart from football), which would be developed and take place at the site;<\/p>\n \u00b7 The development complies with and is pursuant to policies 3.1, 3.2 and 3.19 of the London Plan;<\/p>\n \u00b7 QPR\u2019s charitable trust aims to enhance life chances by working with partners to offer a range of sports, education, health, training, employment, social inclusion, diversity and community opportunities, which are considered to accord with adopted policy.\u201d<\/p>\n Under the heading \u201cConclusions\u201d in this part of her report she said:<\/p>\n \u201cOn balance, as with the previous scheme which had established the principle of this development, its benefits outweigh the perceived harm to the MOL and the proposal is therefore considered to be appropriate.\u201d<\/p>\n 11. The officer then turned to the \u201cAppropriateness of Development on Community Open Space\u201d, on which she said this:<\/p>\n \u201cAs noted above, the site is also designated as Community Open Space reflecting its use as a sports ground. This designation was added in April 2012, alongside the adoption of the Development (or Core) Strategy. As defined in the Local Plan Glossary (appendix 4 of the Core Strategy) Community Open Space is defined as land that is protected from development so that it is available as open space for the community, but not with full public access.<\/p>\n As noted above, DM Policy 2.18 outlines the LPAs approach to managing development on such land, and the assessment of this proposal against this policy in relation to MOL applies equally here, and so is not repeated.<\/p>\n With regards to its use as a sports ground, which is recognised through its COS designation, Policy 5.6 \u2018Outdoor Sports and Active Recreation\u2019 of the Development Strategy is also relevant as this sets out the LPAs approach to protecting and promoting the network of sports grounds in the Borough. Underpinned by the Council\u2019s Facilities Strategy, which has sought to identify priority sites for investment, the supporting text to this policy specifically identifies Warren Farm as being one of four key sports fields in the Borough where investment should be secured to improve changing rooms, outdoor sports areas and social facilities. The proposal clearly accords with these objectives.<\/p>\n Policy 3.19 \u2018Sports Facilities\u2019 of the London Plan is also relevant. This policy states that \u2018Development proposals that increase or enhance the provision of sports and recreation facilities will be supported\u2019. Whilst the proposal is consistent with this objective, consideration must be given to the level of community access achieved and how this compared with the previous\/present use of the site. To this end, the revised scheme offers better compliance with Policy 3.19 in that, as discussed in detail in forthcoming sections, the design and layout of the buildings would be improved and a level playing field formed. These amendments enhance the development. Furthermore, improved pedestrian and cycle access to the site would be secured under the revised scheme.\u201d<\/p>\n 12. She also considered \u201cUnauthorised Access across the Site and Right of Way Application\u201d:<\/p>\n \u201cUnofficial access has been created at the north eastern corner of the site, where a hole in the fence was formed, allowing local residents to use the space for unofficial recreation and to access Windmill Lane from Trumpers Way and Hanwell. Unauthorised access has also been made across the level crossing (and over a locked gate) via Jubilee Meadows and Blackberry Corner, connecting to the canal and further afield.<\/p>\n For the purposes of addressing some of the objections to the revised scheme, it is noted that two applications to modify the Definitive Map to include Public Rights of Way across the centre of the Warren Farm site have been recently submitted and are yet to be determined. These applications have been made under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and have been submitted by members of the local community who have made statements detailing how they have accessed the secure site. Some of the activities mentioned include: dog walking; informal leisure; kite flying and as a short-cut from Hanwell towards Windmill Lane.<\/p>\n Community access to the site and the revised scheme have been cited in many letters of objection as a reason for the refusal of the proposed development. It must be noted at this point that this was, and still is, intended to be a secure site and subject to the outcome of the pending applications, there are no public rights of way currently registered across the site.<\/p>\n The determination of the applications for modification of the Definitive Map are running in parallel with the assessment of this planning application. The two processes, although linked, should not hinder the outcome of either of these applications. Although the pending applications should be noted, less weight can be given to them as material considerations.\u201d<\/p>\n 13. Under the heading \u201cPublic Access\u201d, she said:<\/p>\n \u201cA number of local residents have raised concerns on the basis that they consider the proposal will result in a loss of public access to a large proportion of the site and consider that this loss would have a detrimental effect on the area as \u201copen spaces are very limited and this will be another open space lost to the public.\u201d<\/p>\n Whilst public access would be restricted to around half of the 25 hectare site as a result of the development the area is not identified as having a deficiency of public open space provision and it is considered that there would remain appropriate open space provision for residents of Hanwell \u2013 for example, Long Wood; Brent River Park; Elthorne Park; and the area to the south of the River Brent\/Grand Union Canal \u2013 and Southall \u2013 for example, Glade Lane Canalside Park; Southall Park; and Osterley Sports Club. In addition further areas, such as Osterley Park; Brent Lodge Park; Norwood Green; Heston Park; London Playing Fields\/Boston Manor Playing Fields and Boston Manor Park are relatively close to the development site. It should also be noted that the site is designated as Community Open Space and not Public Open Space.<\/p>\n The improvement to the existing facilities, in conjunction with the availability of other open space areas in the general vicinity of the application site, is considered to outweigh the direct impact of the \u2018loss\u2019 of public access to the part of the development site entailed in the application proposal and the development is therefore considered to be acceptable in this respect.\u201d<\/p>\n Issue (1) \u2013 \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 14. Policy 7.17 of the London Plan (March 2016) concerns \u201cMetropolitan Open Land\u201d. It states:<\/p>\n \u201cStrategic<\/p>\n A The Mayor strongly supports the current extent of Metropolitan Open Land (MOL), its extension in appropriate circumstances and its protection from development having an adverse impact on the openness of MOL.<\/p>\n Planning decisions<\/strong><\/p>\n B The strongest protection should be given to London\u2019s Metropolitan Open Land and inappropriate development refused, except in very special circumstances, giving the same level of protection as in the Green Belt. \u2026<\/p>\n \u2026 .\u201d<\/p>\n 15. The supporting text in paragraph 7.56 states:<\/p>\n \u201c7.56 The policy guidance of paragraphs 79-92 of the NPPF on Green Belts applies equally to Metropolitan Open Land (MOL). MOL has an important role to play as part of London\u2019s multifunctional green infrastructure and the Mayor is keen to see improvements in its overall quality and accessibility. Such improvements are likely to help human health, biodiversity and quality of life. Development that involves the loss of MOL in return for the creation of new open space elsewhere will not be considered appropriate. Appropriate development should be limited to small scale structures to support outdoor open space uses and minimise any adverse impact on the openness of MOL. Green chains are important to London\u2019s open space network, recreation and biodiversity. They consist of footpaths and the open spaces that they link, which are accessible to the public. The open spaces and links within a Green Chain should be designated as MOL due to their Londonwide importance.\u201d<\/p>\n 16. Paragraph 87 of the NPPF says that \u201cinappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt and should not be approved except in very special circumstances\u201d. Paragraph 88 states:<\/p>\n \u201c88. When considering any planning application, local planning authorities should ensure that substantial weight is given to any harm to the Green Belt. \u2018Very special circumstances\u2019 will not exist unless any potential harm to the Green Belt by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations.\u201d<\/p>\n Paragraph 89 says that a local planning authority \u201cshould regard the construction of new buildings as inappropriate in Green Belt\u201d, but among the six identified \u201c[exceptions] to this\u201d is the \u201cprovision of appropriate facilities for outdoor sport, outdoor recreation and for cemeteries, as long as it preserves the openness of the Green Belt and does not conflict with the purposes of including land within it\u201d.<\/p>\n 17. There is plentiful authority on the meaning and application of policy for development in the Green Belt and on Metropolitan Open Land. This court considered the decision-maker\u2019s approach to development on Metropolitan Open Land in R. (on the application of Lensbury Ltd.) v Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [2016] EWCA Civ 814, [2017] J.P.L. 96, where Sales L.J. noted (in paragraph 31 of his judgment) that, under Policy 7.17 of the London Plan, \u201cthe protection to be afforded to the MOL is to be equivalent to, and no less than, the protection afforded to Green Belt in national policy\u201d. This is not in dispute here.<\/p>\n 18. The contentious issue in this case, which relates to the concept of \u201cany other harm\u201d in paragraph 88 of the NPPF, is also the subject of clear authority. In Redhill Aerodrome Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWCA Civ 1386, [2015] P.T.S.R. 274, Sullivan L.J., having referred to his own decisions at first instance in Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2002] J.P.L. 1509 and R. (on the application of Basildon District Council) v First Secretary of State [2005] J.P.L. 942, said (in paragraphs 18, 20 and 21 of his judgment):<\/p>\n \u201c18. \u2026 Not only are the words \u201cany other harm\u201d in the second sentence of [paragraph 88 of the NPPF] unqualified, they are contained within a paragraph that expressly refers, twice, to \u201charm to the Green Belt\u201d. When the policy wishes to restrict the type of harm to harm to the Green Belt it is careful to say so in terms.<\/p>\n \u2026<\/p>\n 20. It is common ground that all \u201cother considerations\u201d, which will by definition be non-Green Belt factors \u2026 must be included in the weighing exercise. \u2026 If all of the \u201cother considerations\u201d in favour of granting permission, which will, by definition, be non-Green Belt factors, must go into the weighing exercise, there is no sensible reason why \u201cany other harm\u201d, whether it is Green Belt or non-Green Belt harm, should not also go into the weighing exercise.<\/p>\n 21. \u2026 There is no dispute that the underlying purpose of the policy was, and still is, to protect the essential characteristic of the Green Belt \u2013 its openness \u2013 but there is nothing illogical in requiring all non-Green Belt factors, and not simply those non-Green Belt factors in favour of granting permission, to be taken into account when deciding whether planning permission should be granted on what will be non-Green Belt grounds (\u201cvery special circumstances\u201d) for development that is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt.\u201d<\/p>\n 19. It is common ground before us that that analysis applies equally to decision-making on proposed development on Metropolitan Open Land.<\/p>\n 20. Dove J. was not persuaded that the officer\u2019s assessment revealed an unlawful approach, inconsistent with the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision in Redhill Aerodrome Ltd.. The concept of \u201cany other harm\u201d in paragraph 88 of the NPPF was, as he put it, \u201cresidual harm in respect of the various material considerations which may be relevant to the decision, after the benefits and dis-benefits relevant to a material consideration have been weighed and balanced and mitigation taken into account\u201d (paragraph 33 of the judgment). He acknowledged that the officer\u2019s conclusion on \u201cthe MOL issues\u201d appeared \u201ctowards the start of [her] conclusions\u201d, and that the relevant conclusion \u201cfollows on from a section which (having concluded the development was inappropriate) analysed the harm to MOL and then \u2026 set out the benefits relied upon \u2026\u201d (paragraph 34). The \u201creal concern\u201d expressed on behalf of Ms Brown had been that the \u201conly harm\u201d featuring in the officer\u2019s conclusion was \u201charm to MOL\u201d. The question here, therefore, was \u201cwhether or not there was \u201cany other harm\u201d which was left out of account and should have been included in the balance struck within [the officer\u2019s] conclusion\u201d. If there was, the policy in paragraph 88 of the NPPF \u201cwould have been misinterpreted and misapplied in the light of the Court of Appeal\u2019s interpretation in [Redhill Aerodrome Ltd.] which would amount to an error of law in the decision\u201d (paragraph 35).<\/p>\n 21. The judge went on to say (in paragraph 36):<\/p>\n \u201c36. Having considered the committee report I am satisfied that [the council] and [QPR] are correct when they observe that there was no other residual harm which was identified by the officers in that report. Dealing first with the question of public access, it is clear to me that the conclusion which was reached \u2026 was a balanced conclusion, but one which clearly identified that having balanced the relevant factors, there was no residual harm in this respect and that the development was acceptable in relation to public access. I recognise that the issue of public access to the site is one which was controversial and the subject of objection to the proposals. The officers acknowledged that whilst there were objections raised on the basis of public access and putative rights of way, they set out that they were bound to acknowledge that the site was \u201cintended to be a secure site\u201d over which, subject to the pending applications for footpath orders, there were no public rights of way. Thus the conclusion which the officers reached, which balanced the improvement to the existing facilities and the availability of other open space in the area against the restriction of access to around half of the site, weighed up the harm and benefits in respect of this topic and reached the conclusion that the development was acceptable. This conclusion clearly recognises that there was no residual harm in respect of this issue.\u201d<\/p>\n 22. On a \u201cproper reading\u201d of the officer\u2019s report, the judge was not satisfied that there was any \u201cother non-MOL harm to be taken into account on the basis of [her] planning evaluation of the other material considerations relevant to the decision\u201d. The officer\u2019s assessment could be challenged only on rationality grounds, and no such argument was advanced. Nor could it be suggested that the members had taken a different view from hers. The relevant conclusion in the report had been reached \u201cas a matter of planning judgment that the only harm to be weighed against the benefits of the proposal in applying paragraph 88 of [the NPPF] was the harm to MOL\u201d. Ground 1 of the claim therefore failed (paragraph 39).<\/p>\n 23. For Ms Brown, Mr Marc Willers Q.C. submitted that the judge\u2019s analysis cannot be reconciled with the approach described by Sullivan L.J. in Redhill Aerodrome Ltd.. The concluding paragraph of the \u201cExecutive Summary\u201d of the officer\u2019s report implied a two-stage approach, despite the reference to \u201cany harm\u201d at the end of the first sentence. The reference to there being \u201cno other areas of demonstrable harm \u2026 sufficient to warrant refusal \u2026\u201d suggested that, in considering whether \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d had been shown to exist, the officer had disregarded \u201cother areas of demonstrable harm\u201d. In the body of the report, she had separated her consideration of various kinds of planning harm, including the \u201closs\u201d of \u201cpublic access\u201d from her consideration of \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d. Before Dove J. Mr Willers had also raised concerns about the officer\u2019s treatment of two other forms of harm, namely \u201cNoise\u201d and \u201cLighting and Floodlighting\u201d, both of which were also considered separately from the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance, but those concerns were not rehearsed before us.<\/p>\n 24. Mr Willers submitted that in advising the committee on the acceptability of the proposed development on Metropolitan Open Land, the officer had to strike the relevant balance properly. She had to avoid \u201cdouble-counting\u201d. Otherwise, she would not be exercising her planning judgment lawfully, and the committee, if it followed her advice, would not be doing so either. Here, Mr Willers submitted, the officer did not strike the balance properly. She did make the mistake of \u201cdouble-counting\u201d. She weighed the benefit to the local community of improvements to the existing facilities against the \u201closs\u201d of public access, and concluded that, on balance, there would be no harm in this respect, having already deployed the same planning benefit, with the same force, in the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance against the harm to Metropolitan Open Land \u201cby reason of inappropriateness\u201d and the other harm she had identified \u2013 the harm attributable to the impact of the buildings and the impact of the earthworks. Logically, the \u201cmini-balancing exercise\u201d undertaken in the part of her report where she considered \u201cPublic Access\u201d ought to have come before her consideration of the acceptability of the development on Metropolitan Open Land. By structuring her report in the way that she did, she excluded the harm attributable to the \u201closs\u201d of public access from the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balancing exercise. Had she constructed her assessment correctly, she would have had to give the benefit of the improvements to the existing facilities less weight than she did in the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance because the \u201closs\u201d of public access had to be set against it. Her failure to do that, and in turn the committee\u2019s, was enough, Mr Willers submitted, to vitiate the council\u2019s grant of planning permission.<\/p>\n 25. I cannot accept that argument.<\/p>\n 26. This court has consistently emphasized the need for planning officer\u2019s reports to committee to be read with reasonable benevolence and realism, and not in an overly legalistic way (see my judgment in Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 1314, [2018] J.P.L. 176, at paragraphs 41 and 42). We must keep that in mind here.<\/p>\n 27. In my view this is not a case in which it can properly be submitted in the light of a planning officer\u2019s report to committee that a local planning authority, with the benefit of the officer\u2019s advice, has neglected any relevant planning issue or failed to have regard to any material consideration for the purposes of section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, or that, on any relevant issue, its exercise of planning judgment was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. The officer\u2019s report was comprehensive and thorough, the conclusions it contains clearly reasoned and, on their face, well within the ambit of lawful planning judgment.<\/p>\n 28. The essence of the exercise involved in a \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance is that no planning harm should be left out of account, nor should any planning benefit. The error to be avoided is to take into account only the harm to Metropolitan Open Land (or Green Belt) and to set this less than complete evaluation of harm against the whole range of planning benefits promised by the scheme. It follows that if the officer, in conducting the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance, neither failed to take into account anything that could realistically have made a difference to that exercise nor brought into account something that ought to have been omitted, the ultimate result will have been consistent with the approach indicated by Sullivan L.J. in Redhill Aerodrome Ltd.. The crucial question, therefore, is whether, on a fair reading of the officer\u2019s report as a whole, that error was avoided. In my view, in agreement with the judge, it was.<\/p>\n 29. I do not think that the sequence of issues tackled in the officer\u2019s planning assessment can be said to have prevented her from reaching a lawful conclusion on the question of whether there were \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d to justify the approval of development on Metropolitan Open Land. She did not, it is true, compose her report as she might have done to reflect the approach in Redhill Aerodrome Ltd.. It would probably have been better to have considered the question of whether \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d had been demonstrated, not where she did, but at the end of the report once her conclusions had emerged on all the other matters she had to deal with. Had she done that, her approach might have been easier to follow. This is not to say, however, that by constructing her report as she did, she made an error of law. If, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, as Mr Stephen Whale for the council and Mr Reuben Taylor Q.C. for QPR submitted, she took into account the entirety of the planning harm the development would cause \u2013 including the harm to the Metropolitan Open Land and \u201cany other harm\u201d \u2013 and weighed against that harm all the benefits of the proposal, without omission or double-counting, then, in substance, her assessment would comply with the approach indicated in Redhill Aerodrome Ltd..<\/p>\n 30. In my view the substance of the officer\u2019s assessment here is legally sound. She did not fall into the error of \u201cdouble-counting\u201d. That suggestion is mistaken.<\/p>\n 31. In principle, it is possible for a particular factor to be relevant, and to carry appropriate weight, in the consideration of more than one planning issue. It may serve to avoid or overcome or, at least, outweigh some real or potential planning harm, and it may also satisfy some planning need that would otherwise go unmet. Mr Willers did not submit otherwise.<\/p>\n 32. In this case I see no logical reason why the officer could not properly conclude, when considering the issue of \u201cPublic Access\u201d, that the \u201cimprovement to the existing facilities, in conjunction with the availability of other open space areas in the general vicinity of the application site\u201d would \u201coutweigh the direct impact of the \u2018loss\u2019 of public access to part of the development site \u2026\u201d, while also taking into account, under the heading \u201cCompelling Need for the Development\u201d in her \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance, the deterioration of the existing facilities at Warren Farm through lack of investment, and the requirement in Policy 5.6 of the core strategy to provide improved facilities generally, and specifically at Warren Farm.<\/p>\n 33. This was not, in any sense, \u201cdouble-counting\u201d. Rather, the officer\u2019s conclusions point up the two-fold relevance of the improvement to recreational facilities at Warren Farm as a material consideration \u2013 to which appropriate weight had to be given in two respects, not merely in one. The officer was entitled to conclude, as a matter of planning judgment, that in the context of \u201cPublic Access\u201d, given the availability of other publicly accessible open space nearby, the balance of relevant benefit \u2013 improved sports facilities for the local community \u2013 against disadvantage \u2013 the \u201closs\u201d of public access for recreation \u2013 fell in favour of the development. I do not accept that this benefit was immaterial in that particular context; it was, I think, plainly a relevant consideration there. The officer was also entitled to conclude, again as a matter of planning judgment, that in the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance itself, the ability of the development to meet a need identified in development plan policy \u2013 the general need for investment in improved sports facilities, and specifically the need for such investment at Warren Farm \u2013 was a consideration to which weight should be given on the positive side of that balance. These conclusions were not in tension or conflict with each other. They were distinct from each other, but mutually consistent. They do not show a material consideration being given double weight, only a single factor being given due weight in two different respects: first, outweighing a \u201closs\u201d that would be caused by the development itself; second, meeting an existing need that would not be satisfied without the development.<\/p>\n 34. Once that is accepted, Mr Willers\u2019 argument on this issue must fail. Because, in the exercise of their planning judgment, the officer \u2013 and so too the members \u2013 concluded that the improvement of the existing facilities at Warren Farm would serve, at least, to cancel out the weight that could be given to the \u201closs\u201d of public access, there was nothing here that could have caused the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance to tip against the proposal. The harm to public access, such as it was, did not escape the officer\u2019s planning assessment. It was included in that assessment, but was found to be outbalanced by relevant benefit, so that the proposal was \u201cconsidered to be acceptable in this respect\u201d. The result of that particular balancing exercise, relating to \u201cPublic Access\u201d, could not, therefore, have told against the proposal had it been explicitly added into the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance itself. At worst, the net effect on the \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d balance would have been neutral, at best more positive than the balance explicitly carried out. The harm inherent in the \u201closs\u201d of public access would certainly have made no difference to the outcome of that exercise.<\/p>\n 35. The officer\u2019s approach was, in my view, entirely unsurprising. Indeed, had she not taken the approach she did, she would have been open to the criticism that she had failed to have regard to a material consideration. In the event, however, her advice to the committee on \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d justifying \u201cinappropriate\u201d development on Metropolitan Open Land and on the issue of \u201cPublic Access\u201d cannot possibly be regarded as \u201csignificantly or seriously misleading \u2013 misleading in a material way \u2026\u201d (see paragraph 42(3) of my judgment in Mansell).<\/p>\n 36. I should add, finally here, that the officer\u2019s conclusion on the \u201cPublic Access\u201d issue was, as Mr Whale and Mr Taylor submitted, a contingent conclusion, in which some lawful public access to the site was assumed, and that this assumption was somewhat weakened by the subsequent decision of an inspector, in a decision letter dated 19 September 2017, dismissing appeals against the council\u2019s refusal of applications to add the two footpaths running across the site to the definitive map.<\/p>\n 37. The question before the inspector was whether use of these footpaths was \u201cas of right\u201d. He noted that on the access road to the site from Windmill Lane there were \u201csigns \u2026 stating for example that dogs are not allowed and that CCTV cameras are in operation\u201d (paragraph 13 of his decision letter). He said that in his view \u201callowing public access to a sports centre for people to participate in sports, to spectate or indeed for more general recreational use does not necessarily imply an intention to dedicate specific routes across the site as public rights of way\u201d (paragraph 14). He found that \u201cthe presence of the pitches would have brought public use of the paths into question whenever they were marked out and indicated a lack of intention on the part of the landowner to dedicate public rights of way\u201d (paragraph 44), and that \u201cby fencing the site and attempting to restrict access and by using land for formal sports, [the] landowners indicated that they did not intend to dedicate rights of way \u2026\u201d (paragraph 47). Mr Whale submitted to us, in the light of the inspector\u2019s decision, that there was no \u201cright\u201d of public access across Warren Farm, and that \u201c[access] by trespassers, whether to fly kites or otherwise, is not access by \u201cright\u201d\u201d.<\/p>\n 38. Those are not matters for us to grapple with in this appeal. It is enough to say that the inspector\u2019s decision does nothing to undermine the officer\u2019s observations in the section of her report headed \u201cUnauthorised Access across the Site and Right of Way Application\u201d or her conclusions on \u201cPublic Access\u201d. If anything, it reinforces those observations and conclusions. But in any event it does not upset the analysis I consider to be right on this issue in the appeal.<\/p>\n Issue (2) \u2013 Policy 7.18 of the London Plan<\/p>\n 39. Policy 7.18 of the London Plan is concerned with \u201cProtecting open space and addressing deficiency\u201d. It states:<\/p>\n \u201cStrategic<\/strong><\/p>\n A The Mayor supports the creation of new open space in London to ensure satisfactory levels of local provision to address areas of deficiency.<\/p>\n Planning decisions<\/strong><\/p>\n B The loss of protected open spaces must be resisted unless equivalent or better quality provision is made within the local catchment area. Replacement of one type of open space with another is unacceptable unless an up to date needs assessment shows that this would be appropriate.<\/p>\n LDF preparation<\/p>\n C When assessing local open space needs LDFs should:<\/p>\n a include appropriate designations and policies for the protection [of] open space to address deficiencies[.]<\/p>\n \u2026 .\u201d<\/p>\n The supporting text for this policy, in paragraph 7.57, says that \u201c[the] categorisation of open space in Table 7.2 provides a benchmark for boroughs to assess their own provision for the different categories of open space found throughout London\u201d. Table 7.2 sets out seven categories of open space: \u201cRegional Parks\u201d, \u201cMetropolitan Parks\u201d, \u201cDistrict Parks\u201d, \u201cLocal Parks and Open Spaces\u201d, \u201cSmall Open Spaces\u201d, \u201cPocket Parks\u201d and \u201cLinear Open Spaces\u201d. The Glossary in the London Plan defines \u201cProtected open space\u201d in this way:<\/p>\n \u201cMetropolitan open land and land that is subject to local designation under Policy 7.18 (which would include essential linear components of Green Infrastructure as referred to in Policy 2.18). This land is predominantly undeveloped other than by buildings or structures that are ancillary to the open space. The definition covers the broad range of types of open space within London, whether in public or private ownership and whether public access is unrestricted, limited or restricted. The value of open space not designated is considered as a material consideration that needs to be taken into account when development control decisions are made.\u201d<\/p>\n 40. Policy 2.18 of the London Plan, which concerns \u201cGreen Infrastructure: the Multi-Functional Network of Green and Open Spaces\u201d, says that \u201c[the] Mayor will work with all relevant strategic partners to protect, promote, expand and manage the extent and quality of, and access to, London\u2019s network of green infrastructure\u201d. The predecessor to this policy \u2013 Policy 2.18 of the London Plan (2011) \u2013 was incorporated into, and added to in, Policy 2.18, \u201cEaling Local Variation \u2013 Green Infrastructure: the Network of Open and Green Spaces\u201d of the London Borough of Ealing Development Management Development Plan Document (adopted in December 2013), under the heading \u201cPlanning Decisions\u201d. Part G of that policy says that \u201c[the] above Strategic principles will apply to the management of Ealing\u2019s defined network of Green Infrastructure \u2026\u201d. Part H states:<\/p>\n \u201cH \u2026 Only development ancillary to the open space will be permitted. The size of development within green and open spaces and its impact upon visual openness must be kept at a minimum.\u201d<\/p>\n Paragraph E2.18.1 says that \u201cGreen Infrastructure within Ealing includes \u2026 Metropolitan Open Land, \u2026 Community Open Space \u2026\u201d.<\/p>\n 41. Policy 5.6 of the core strategy, \u201cOutdoor Sports and Active Recreation\u201d, states:<\/p>\n \u201cThe council will:<\/p>\n (a) Protect and promote a network of sports grounds and other active recreation areas in the borough. Sites identified as being of strategic and local importance for outdoor sports will be protected and promoted primarily for this function.<\/p>\n \u2026\u201d.<\/p>\n The supporting text includes this:<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c\u2026 The following proposals have also been identified for key sports fields in the borough:<\/p>\n \u2026<\/p>\n \u00b7 Warren Farm \u2013 improved changing rooms, outdoor sports areas and social facilities.<\/p>\n All sports grounds in the borough are currently designated and safeguarded as Community Open Space.\u201d<\/p>\n The core strategy\u2019s Appendix Four: Local Plan Glossary of Terms says that \u201cCommunity Open Space is protected from development so that it is available as open space for the community, but not with full public access\u201d.<\/p>\n 42. Policy 3.19 of the London Plan (2011), \u201cSports Facilities\u201d, and its successor in the London Plan (2016) states:<\/p>\n \u201c\u2026<\/p>\n Planning decisions<\/strong><\/p>\n B Development proposals that increase or enhance the provision of sports and recreation facilities will be supported. Proposals that result in a net loss of sports and recreation facilities, including playing fields should be resisted. \u2026<\/p>\n C Where sports facility developments are proposed on existing open space, they will need to be considered carefully in light of policies on Green Belt and protecting open space (Chapter 7) as well as the borough\u2019s own assessment of needs and opportunities for both sports facilities and for green multifunctional open space.\u201d<\/p>\n 43. The original contention here was that the council had failed to take into account the fact that Warren Farm was part of the Brent River Park and the proposal\u2019s alleged conflict with Policy 7.18 of the London Plan. The response from the council and QPR was that the site was not, in fact, subject to any formal planning designation as part of the Brent River Park. Policy 7.18 was one of the policies listed in the \u201cInformatives\u201d put forward by the officer for inclusion in the decision notice as those to which the council had had regard in deciding to grant planning permission. But it was, in fact, irrelevant. The site did not fall within the definition in the Glossary in the London Plan as being \u201csubject to local designation under Policy 7.18\u201d.<\/p>\n 44. In argument before us, as in the court below, Mr Willers concentrated on the assertion that Policy 7.18 was misinterpreted and misapplied. He argued that the officer had failed to address the requirement in Part B of the policy \u2013 to resist the loss of \u201cprotected open spaces \u2026 unless equivalent or better quality provision is made within the local catchment area\u201d.<\/p>\n 45. Dove J. was unimpressed by that argument. In his view it was clear that the officer had had Policy 7.18 of the London Plan in mind, because she had included it in the list of development plan policies said to be relevant to the proposal. But he saw no substance in the complaint that the officer had erred \u201cin failing to provide a detailed appraisal against [Policy] 7.18 in [her] report\u201d (paragraph 41 of the judgment). He went on to say that the site \u201cwas not subject to local designation\u201d under Policy 7.18, either as part of the Brent River Park or otherwise. It was \u201cdesignated as Community Open Space which is defined in [the council\u2019s] Local Plan Glossary as \u201cland that is protected from development so that it is available as open space for the community but not with full public access\u201d\u201d. The officer had assessed \u201cthe merits of the proposal against the relevant policy\u201d. She had noted that the policy was, as the judge put it, \u201cequivalent to the policy in relation to MOL\u201d, and \u201cthus [her] assessment of the MOL issues was said to be of equal application\u201d. No criticism could be made of this approach. The \u201ckey point\u201d here was that the site was not designated as \u201cprotected open space\u201d. In the absence of such designation there was no warrant for applying Policy 7.18 as Mr Willers had suggested (paragraph 42). The judge was \u201cnot satisfied that \u2026 there was any arguable misinterpretation or misapplication of policy 7.18 \u2026\u201d (paragraph 43).<\/p>\n 46. My analysis is somewhat different, but it leads to the same final conclusion.<\/p>\n 47. One must start with the strategic policy, Policy 7.18, which, in part C, looks to local development frameworks to \u201cinclude appropriate designations and policies for the protection [of] open space to address deficiencies\u201d \u2013 as the definition of \u201cProtected Open Space\u201d in the Glossary confirms. As Mr Whale put it, the policy \u201cdevolves\u201d to local planning authorities the task of creating their own regime of policy for achieving such protection of open space, at the local level. Where a local development framework has done this, the making of planning development control decisions must be guided by the relevant local policy. The broad strategic policy for \u201cPlanning decisions\u201d, in part B of Policy 7.18 \u2013 that \u201c[the] loss of protected open spaces must be resisted unless equivalent or better quality provision is made within the local catchment area\u201d \u2013 must be read and applied in the light of the specific terms in which protection is given to a particular area of open space at the local level in the relevant local development framework. Where the strategic objective under Policy 7.18 has been given effect in statutorily adopted policies at the local level, one must look to see whether those policies have been correctly interpreted and applied in the decision on a particular proposal. If they have, and unless there is some unusual feature in the case pointing away from this conclusion, Policy 7.18 itself will have been complied with.<\/p>\n 48. Here, the relevant policies at the local level, which appear to give effect to Policy 7.18 under the arrangements envisaged for \u201cLDF preparation\u201d in its part C, are Policy 5.6 of the core strategy and Policy 2.18 of the development management development plan document.<\/p>\n 49. Policy 5.6 of the core strategy was relevant because Warren Farm is one of the sites in the \u201cnetwork of sports grounds and other active recreation areas\u201d given protection under the policy, and one of the identified \u201ckey sports fields in the borough\u201d. And the specific requirement for improvements to the sports facilities on this site may be said to represent the particular form of \u201cbetter quality provision\u201d envisaged by Part B of Policy 7.18 of the London Plan.<\/p>\n 50. Policy 2.18 of the development management development plan document \u2013 read together with Policy 2.18 of the London Plan \u2013 was relevant, not only because the site was Metropolitan Open Land but also because, as a sports ground, it was \u201cdesignated and safeguarded as Community Open Space\u201d under Policy 5.6 of the core strategy \u2013 as is explained in the supporting text for that policy. Warren Farm can be said to have been subject to the protection of those policies, both as a sports ground and as Community Open Space.<\/p>\n 51. Also relevant was Policy 3.19 of the London Plan, because it applies to \u201cSports Facilities\u201d and, in part C, has a cross-reference to the other policies of the London Plan, including its provisions on \u201cprotecting open space\u201d \u2013 clearly a reference to Policy 7.18.<\/p>\n 52. How do these policies operate in a development control decision? The policies of the London Plan \u2013 Policy 7.18, Policy 2.18 and Policy 3.19 \u2013 are broadly strategic in content and purpose, the local policies \u2013 Policy 5.6 of the core strategy and Policy 2.18 of the development management development plan document \u2013 refining the strategic approach to the local circumstances in the borough of Ealing, and, in the case of Policy 5.6 of the core strategy, to Warren Farm itself. The strategic imperative in Part B of Policy 7.18, which relates explicitly to \u201cPlanning decisions\u201d, is that the \u201closs\u201d of \u201cprotected open spaces\u201d is generally to be \u201cresisted\u201d unless \u201cequivalent or better quality provision is made \u2026\u201d. Neither Policy 2.18 nor Policy 3.19 precludes development, in principle. Part B of Policy 3.19, in principle, supports development whose effect would be to \u201cincrease or enhance the provision of sports and recreation facilities\u201d, and resists development whose effect would be \u201ca net loss of sports and recreation facilities, including playing fields\u201d. Part C acknowledges the relevance of the local planning authority\u2019s own assessment of \u201cneeds and opportunities for \u2026 sports facilities\u201d. Neither of the two local policies is hostile to all development. Policy 5.6 of the core strategy, in general, seeks not merely to \u201cprotect\u201d but also to \u201cpromote\u201d the borough\u2019s network of sports grounds, and sites identified as being of \u201cstrategic and local importance for outdoor sports\u201d. And specifically at Warren Farm, it promotes development of a particular kind \u2013 \u201cimproved changing rooms, outdoor sports areas and social facilities\u201d, whilst acknowledging the designation and safeguarding of the borough\u2019s sports grounds as Community Open Space. Development of the specified kind is not treated as inimical to that safeguarding, but wholly consistent with it. Part H of Policy 2.18 of the development management development plan document countenances \u201cdevelopment ancillary to the open space\u201d, but emphasizes the need to keep the \u201csize\u201d of \u201cdevelopment within green and open spaces\u201d and its \u201cimpact upon visual openness\u201d to a \u201cminimum\u201d.<\/p>\n 53. Did the officer misconstrue these policies, including Policy 7.18 of the London Plan, and did she fail to apply them lawfully? In my view it is quite clear that she did not commit either of those errors.<\/p>\n 54. It is necessary to read the officer\u2019s advice under the heading \u201cAppropriateness of Development on Community Open Space\u201d with her corresponding conclusions on the \u201cAppropriateness of Development on Metropolitan Open Land\u201d, where she had confirmed that the site was \u201cdesignated open space\u201d as Metropolitan Open Land and Community Open Space, and noted the protection afforded to it by Policy 2.18 of the development management development plan document. She went on, in dealing with \u201cVery Special Circumstances\u201d, to refer to the fact that existing facilities at Warren Farm had deteriorated through lack of investment and the \u201cstrategic sports function\u201d had ceased, despite the requirement for improved facilities in Policy 5.6 of the core strategy.<\/p>\n 55. When she returned to the site\u2019s status as Community Open Space, she explained the meaning and significance of that designation, referring to its definition in the \u201cLocal Plan Glossary (appendix 4 of the Core Strategy)\u201d as land \u201cprotected from development so that it is available as open space for the community, but not with full public access\u201d. She referred back to her previous advice on the approach to managing development on such land under Policy 2.18. She told the committee that her assessment of the proposal against that policy as it related to Metropolitan Open Land applied equally here, and did not have to be repeated. This was all perfectly clear advice, consistent with a correct understanding and lawful application of development plan policy. It cannot be criticized here. And indeed, Mr Willers did not seek to do so.<\/p>\n 56. The officer then focused on the policy of the development plan that contained specific provisions for decision-making on proposals for development at Warren Farm \u2013 Policy 5.6 of the core strategy. Again, in my view, her approach and conclusions are unassailable. She obviously grasped that under Policy 5.6 the site was safeguarded from development other than the required improvement to its facilities as a sports ground. This was correct. She acknowledged that the site\u2019s \u201cuse as a sports ground\u201d was \u201crecognised through its [Community Open Space] designation\u201d. She then summarized the relevant provisions in Policy 5.6. She did that accurately. She stressed the council\u2019s approach, under the policy, of \u201cprotecting and promoting\u201d the network of sports grounds in the borough, the identification of \u201cpriority sites for investment\u201d in the council\u2019s Facilities Strategy, and the fact that Warren Farm was one of the \u201ckey sports fields\u201d in the borough \u201cwhere investment should be secured to improve changing rooms, outdoor sports areas and social facilities\u201d. This was a true summary. The officer advised the committee that the proposal \u201cclearly accords with these objectives\u201d. As an exercise of planning judgment under Policy 5.6, this too is beyond criticism in a legal challenge. Development of the kind proposed \u2013 as she saw \u2013 was not at odds with the protection of the site under Policy 5.6, both as a sports ground and as Community Open Space. It was explicitly compatible with that protection, and inherent in it. In fact, it was positively required.<\/p>\n 57. Lastly, the officer considered the effect of Policy 3.19 of the London Plan. Her advice here was that the proposed development was consistent with the objective of the policy to \u201cincrease or enhance the provision of sports and recreation facilities\u201d, and that, so far as \u201ccommunity access\u201d was concerned, the revised scheme complied better with the policy than the previous proposal because \u201cthe design and layout of the buildings would be improved and a level playing field formed\u201d. Once again, the advice given to the committee was unimpeachable. It demonstrated a lawful exercise of planning judgment, giving effect to Policy 3.19, properly construed.<\/p>\n 58. There are, in my view, three conclusions to be drawn.<\/p>\n 59. First, the officer\u2019s advice shows a true understanding and lawful application of every policy in the development plan bearing on the acceptability of this development on Community Open Space and an existing sports ground, including the relevant protective provisions in those policies. To argue the contrary would be impossible.<\/p>\n 60. Secondly, therefore, although the officer did not refer in her conclusions to Policy 7.18 of the London Plan, her assessment and advice reflected a true understanding and lawful application of that policy, including its objective, in Part B, to resist the \u201closs of protected open spaces\u201d in decision-making on applications for planning permission, and its instruction to local planning authorities, in Part C, to include in their local development frameworks \u201cappropriate designations and policies for the protection [of] open space to address deficiencies\u201d. We heard no cogent submission to suggest that any relevant provision in Policy 7.18 is not fully embodied in the policies to which the officer did refer in her assessment. Such a submission would have been untenable. The officer obviously understood that if the proposal complied with the policies to which she referred \u2013 in particular, Policy 5.6 of the core strategy with its requirement for improved facilities at Warren Farm \u2013 it necessarily complied with Policy 7.18 as well \u2013 including the requirement in Part B of that policy for \u201cbetter quality provision\u201d to justify a \u201closs of protected open [space]\u201d. In the circumstances, the fact that she did not mention Policy 7.18 in her conclusions is not a flaw in her report that could possibly invalidate the council\u2019s grant of planning permission. In so far as it was relevant to QPR\u2019s proposal, Policy 7.18 was, in substance, lawfully applied in the making of the council\u2019s decision.<\/p>\n 61. And thirdly, whether on the judge\u2019s analysis or mine, it follows that this ground of the claim for judicial review is misconceived. As the judge rightly concluded, there was no misinterpretation or misapplication of Policy 7.18, or of any other development plan policy relevant to QPR\u2019s proposal.<\/p>\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n 62. For the reasons I have given, I would uphold the judge\u2019s decision on ground 1 of the claim for judicial review, dismiss the appeal, and also dismiss the claim on ground 2.<\/p>\n Lord Justice Patten<\/strong><\/p>\n 63. I agree.<\/p>\n Lady Justice Hallett<\/strong><\/p>\n 64. I also agree.<\/p>\n