![\"INTRODUCTION\"](\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/INTRODUCTION.jpg\")
. The case concerns the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of judges in civil proceedings. The applicant alleged that two selection panels of the Supreme Court had not been impartial in view of the personal ties of certain judges to individuals who had a direct interest in the outcome of the proceedings.<\/p>\n
SECOND SECTION
\nCASE OF KAMINSKIEN\u0116 v. LITHUANIA
\n(Application no. 48314\/18)
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n12 January 2021<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Kaminskien\u0117 v. Lithuania,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Ale\u0161 Pejchal, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a048314\/18) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Lithuanian national, Ms Marija Kaminskien\u0117 (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 8\u00a0October 2018;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Lithuanian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention concerning the independence and impartiality of judges and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 1 December 2020,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n 1. The case concerns the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of judges in civil proceedings. The applicant alleged that two selection panels of the Supreme Court had not been impartial in view of the personal ties of certain judges to individuals who had a direct interest in the outcome of the proceedings.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Jonava. She was represented by Ms L. Me\u0161kauskien\u0117, a lawyer practising in Vilnius.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms\u00a0K.\u00a0Bubnyt\u0117\u2011\u0160irmen\u0117.<\/p>\n I. Proceedings between the applicant and COMPANY A.G.<\/strong><\/p>\n 4. The applicant held some shares in company A.G. In September 2014 she told the company that the number of her shares had been calculated incorrectly and that she should be retroactively paid additional dividends. The company disputed the applicant\u2019s assertion.<\/p>\n 5. In September 2014 the applicant and company A.G., represented by its acting chief executive officer (CEO), R.\u017d., signed an agreement to submit the dispute to an arbitration tribunal.<\/p>\n 6. R.\u017d. and several members of his family were shareholders in company A.G. Heserved as its acting CEO from May until September 2014.<\/p>\n A. Proceedings before the arbitration tribunal<\/strong><\/p>\n 7. In March 2016 the applicant lodged a claim against company A.G. with the arbitration tribunal for approximately twelve million euros\u00a0(EUR) in unpaid dividends, plus interest.<\/p>\n 8. The company lodged a counterclaim in which it sought, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement between it and the applicant be declared null and void. It submitted that, in signing the arbitration agreement, the acting CEO, R.\u017d., had overstepped his remit and had acted in bad faith and against the company\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n 9. In the arbitration proceedings and the subsequent court proceedings, company A.G. was represented by a lawyer, G.B.<\/p>\n 10. In March 2017 the arbitration tribunal, sitting as a single arbiter, dismissed both the applicant\u2019s claim and the company\u2019s counterclaim.<\/p>\n B. Proceedings before the Court of Appeal<\/strong><\/p>\n 11. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal against the arbitral award. She submitted, inter alia, that the arbiter had not been independent and impartial because, during the examination of the case, he had privately met with G.B., the lawyer of company A.G. (see paragraph 9 above). She asked the court to annul the arbitral award in its entirety.<\/p>\n 12. In February 2018 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the arbitral award.<\/p>\n C. Proceedings before the Supreme Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 13. In April 2018 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She asked the Supreme Court to quash the decision of the Court of Appeal, to annul the arbitral award, and to deliver a new decision in the case. On 17\u00a0April 2018 a three-judge selection panel of the Supreme Court declined to accept the appeal on points of law for examination, ruling that it raised no important legal issues. The rapporteur and chair of the selection panel was Judge E.L.<\/p>\n 14. In May 2018 the applicant lodged a second appeal on points of law. On 25 May 2018 a different three-judge selection panel declined to accept it for examination, ruling that it raised no important legal issues. The rapporteur was Judge D.\u0160.<\/p>\n 15. In August 2018 the applicant lodged a third appeal on points of law and asked the Supreme Court to renew the three-month time-limit for lodging it. In particular, she asked the court to consider that the admissibility of her first appeal on points of law had been decided by a selection panel that had been biased. She submitted that only after receiving that decision had she found out that the selection panel had included Judge E.L., who had previously withdrawn from another case that had concerned actions by R.\u017d. (see paragraph 22 below). The applicant pointed out that R.\u017d., his wife and son were shareholders in company A.G., and that they, together with R.\u017d.\u2019s mother-in-law and sister-in-law, controlled the majority of the company\u2019s shares. Furthermore, the counterclaim lodged by company A.G. had disputed the lawfulness of the arbitration agreement, which had been signed by R.\u017d. as its acting CEO (see paragraph\u00a08 above).Accordingly, the applicant argued that Judge E.L. had not been impartial and should not have sat in the case.<\/p>\n 16. On 27 August 2018 a different three-judge selection panel declined to accept the applicant\u2019s third appeal on points of law for examination. It found that she had missed the three-month time-limit without important reasons. It also pointed out that her second appeal on points of law had been rejected by a different selection panel than the first one (see paragraph\u00a014 above) and that there had been no doubts as to its impartiality. Lastly, it stated that the applicant\u2019s third appeal on points of law was based on essentially the same arguments as her two previous appeals and that it did not raise any important legal questions.<\/p>\n D. The applicant\u2019s request for the reopening of the proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 17. In April 2019 the applicant lodged a request for the Court of Appeal to reopen the proceedings. In June 2019 the court refused that request.<\/p>\n 18. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. The composition of the selection panel of the Supreme Court included Judge D.\u0160. (see paragraph\u00a014 above). He withdrew from the panel on the grounds that he had previously examined an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant in the same case. In his letter of withdrawal, D.\u0160. stated that neither he nor his family or relatives had any direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the case, or relations with any of the participants in the proceedings, but he was withdrawing in order to dispel any possible doubts as to the impartiality of the court.<\/p>\n 19. In September 2019 a three-judge selection panel declined to accept the appeal on points of law for examination.<\/p>\n II. As to WITHDRAWal of judges E.L. and D.\u0160. FROM other CASES<\/strong><\/p>\n 20. In January 2016 Judge E.L. withdrew from a selection panel in a case in which an appeal on points of law had been lodged by R.\u017d.\u2019s son and in which R.\u017d. participated, on the grounds that he and R.\u017d. had studied together at university and had thereafter maintained personal contact.<\/p>\n 21. In October 2017 Judge E.L. withdrew from a selection panel in a case in which company A.G. was the defendant and had lodged an appeal on points of law, and where R.\u017d. was a third party.<\/p>\n 22. In February 2018 he withdrew from a selection panel in a case concerning a claim lodged by company A.G. against the applicant and R.\u017d.\u2019s wife which concerned, in part, actions that R.\u017d. had undertaken while he had been the acting CEO of the company.<\/p>\n 23. In July 2018 Judge E.L. withdrew from a selection panel in a case lodged against company A.G. in which R.\u017d. was a third party.<\/p>\n 24. In July 2018 he sat on a selection panel in a case lodged by the applicant against company A.G. in which R.\u017d., his wife and son were third parties. According to the Government, the actions of the third parties did not form part of the subject matter of that case.<\/p>\n 25. In September 2018 Judge D.\u0160. withdrew from a selection panel in a case lodged against company A.G. in which G.B. (see paragraph\u00a09 above) was a third party, on the grounds that he and G.B. had studied together at university and had thereafter remained in personal contact.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/p>\n I. Code of Civil Procedure<\/p>\n A. Independence and impartiality of judges<\/strong><\/p>\n 26. Under Article 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judge may not participate in the examination of a case and must be removed from it if he or she has a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the case, or if there are any other circumstances that may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality.<\/p>\n 27. Article 65 \u00a7 1 lists the grounds for removing a judge from a case, such as having a personal interest in the outcome of the case or family links with the participants in the proceedings. Article 66 states that a judge must also withdraw, or be removed from the case, when there are any other circumstances that may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality.<\/p>\n 28. Under Article 68 \u00a7 1, when any of the aforementioned circumstances (see paragraph 27 above) have arisen, the judge in question must withdraw from the case in question. Moreover, the participants in the case have the right to request the removal of the judge on those grounds.<\/p>\n B. Appeals on points of law<\/strong><\/p>\n 29. Under Article 346 \u00a7 2, a case may be examined on points of law when at least one of the following grounds applies: (1) there has been a violation of substantive or procedural law, the rectification of which is essential for the uniform interpretation and application of the law, and that violation may have led to the adoption of an unlawful decision; (2)\u00a0the court that adopted the impugned decision departed from the Supreme Court\u2019s established case-law; (3) the case-law of the Supreme Court concerning the issue at hand is not consistent.<\/p>\n 30. Article 350 \u00a7 1 provides that the question of whether to accept an appeal on points of law for examination is decided by a three-judge selection panel composed by the President of the Supreme Court or the head of the Civil Division of that court. An appeal on points of law is accepted for examination when at least one of the three judges votes in favour of accepting it. The question of whether or not to accept an appeal on points of law is decided in written proceedings.<\/p>\n 31. Article 350 \u00a7 4 states that a decision on accepting an appeal on points of law for examination is final and not subject to any appeal.<\/p>\n 32. The Code of Civil Procedure does not contain any provisions on parties\u2019 right to be informed about the composition of the selection panel in their case or the date of the examination of their appeal on points of law by the selection panel, or the right to request the removal of judges from that panel.<\/p>\n II. Other legal instruments<\/strong><\/p>\n 33. The Rules on the composition of the Supreme Court\u2019s selection panels (hereinafter \u201cthe Rules\u201d) were adopted on 28 June 2018 by order no.\u00a0(1.4)-1T-26 of the President of the Supreme Court and subsequently amended several times.<\/p>\n 34. Under Rule 4 of the Rules, a selection panel is composed for a period of one month. At the time of the adoption of the Rules, the composition of a selection panel had to be announced on the Supreme Court\u2019s website no later than five working days before the beginning of the next calendar month; that time-limit was later changed to six working days.<\/p>\n 35. A selection panel is created automatically, using a special software program that generates a list of judges. Under Rule 5, when there are reasons for which a judge may not be appointed to a selection panel, he or she is replaced by the next judge on the list generated by the software.<\/p>\n 36. A judge who has been appointed to the selection panel may be replaced by another judge because of illness, an unforeseen official trip or other important reasons. Under Rule 7, a change in composition is published on the Supreme Court\u2019s website on the same day that such a decision is made.<\/p>\n 37. Under Rule 9, in civil cases, the judge who has worked at the Supreme Court the longest is appointed the chair of the selection panel.<\/p>\n 38. Under Rule 10, in exceptional circumstances, the rules on the composition of selection panels may be departed from if that is necessary to ensure a balanced distribution of workload among judges, or for other important reasons.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 39. The applicant complained that the selection panels of the Supreme Court that had refused to accept her first two appeals on points of law for examination had lacked independence and impartiality. She invoked Article\u00a06\u00a7\u00a01 and Article 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined solely under Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a) The Government<\/p>\n 40. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies. They firstly submitted that the composition of the selection panels was published on the Supreme Court\u2019s website every month. Even though, at the time when the applicant had lodged her first two appeals on points of law, the Rules on the composition of the Supreme Court\u2019s selection panels had not yet been adopted (see paragraphs\u00a013, 14 and\u00a033 above), the practice of publishing the composition of selection panels online had already been established. Therefore, the applicant, who had been represented by a lawyer throughout the proceedings, ought to have known how to find out about the composition of selection panels and could have requested the removal of Judges E.L. and D.\u0160.<\/p>\n 41. Secondly, the Government submitted that the applicant had not questioned the independence of Judge E.L. in her second appeal on points of law (see paragraph 14 above), or the independence of Judge D.\u0160. in her third appeal on points of law (see paragraph 15 above).<\/p>\n 42. Lastly, the applicant had not raised the question of the independence of judges in her request for the reopening of the proceedings (see paragraph\u00a017 above).<\/p>\n (b) The applicant<\/p>\n 43. The applicant submitted that, even though the composition of each selection panel was published online, parties were not informed of the date on which the acceptance of their respective appeals on points of law would be examined (see paragraph 32 above). Moreover, it was often the case that the composition of a selection panel changed in the course of a month, for various reasons (see paragraph\u00a036 above). Accordingly, she had not had any way of knowing the composition of the selection panel that would decide on her appeal.<\/p>\n 44. Furthermore, she submitted that the alleged lack of impartiality of a judge who had sat on a previous selection panel did not constitute grounds to accept a new appeal on points of law for examination (see paragraph\u00a029 above). She also stated that she had become aware of the lack of impartiality of Judge D.\u0160. only in September 2018, when he had disclosed his links to G.B. in the course of a different set of proceedings (see paragraph\u00a025 above).<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 45. The general principles concerning the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies have been summarised in Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a071-77, 25\u00a0March 2014).<\/p>\n 46. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court firstly reiterates its extensive case-law to the effect that an application for a retrial or the reopening of appeal proceedings or for a similar extraordinary remedy cannot, as a general rule, be taken into account for the purposes of applying Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see Nicholas v. Cyprus, no.\u00a063246\/10, \u00a7 37, 9 January 2018, and the cases cited therein). It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant should have raised her complaints in her request for the proceedings to be reopened.<\/p>\n 47. The remaining arguments raised by the Government (see paragraphs\u00a040 and 41 above) are essentially identical to those that the Court examined and rejected in the case of Dainelien\u0117 v. Lithuania ([Committee], no.\u00a023532\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 26-27, 16 October 2018). In view of the similarities between the two cases, the Court sees no grounds for reaching a different conclusion in the present case. In particular, it notes that it has not been made aware of any provisions of domestic law or of any existing case-law that may enable applicants or their lawyers to receive information concerning the date on which their appeals on points of law are to be examined by a selection panel and thus to learn the composition of that specific panel (see paragraph\u00a032 above). In the Court\u2019s view, it would be unreasonable to expect the applicant to request the removal of a judge without knowing whether that judge had actually been appointed to decide whether her appeal is to be accepted (see, for a similar situation, Aviso Zeta AG v. Austria [Committee], no.\u00a05734\/14, \u00a7\u00a034, 21 June 2018).<\/p>\n 48. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 49. Lastly, it notes that the application is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article\u00a035 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a) The applicant<\/p>\n 50. The applicant submitted that Judge E.L. had acknowledged his personal ties to R.\u017d., the former acting CEO of company A.G., when withdrawing from selection panels in several other cases (see paragraphs\u00a020-23 above). She argued that even though R.\u017d. had not been a party to the case which she had brought against company A.G., he had had a direct interest in its outcome. In particular, that case concerned a substantial financial claim against the company (see paragraph 7 above), and R.\u017d., his wife, son, mother-in-law and sister\u2011in\u2011law were the company\u2019s majority shareholders. Furthermore, the company\u2019s counterclaim had contested the validity of the arbitration agreement signed by R.\u017d. (see paragraphs 5 and 8 above), and therefore his actions had constituted part of the subject matter of the case.<\/p>\n 51. The applicant further submitted that Judge D.\u0160. had acknowledged his own personal ties to G.B., the lawyer of company A.G., in another case (see paragraph 25 above). In the proceedings in question, G.B. had represented the company. Moreover, in her appeals the applicant had alleged that G.B. had privately met with the arbiter, thus demonstrating the arbiter\u2019s partiality, which should have constituted grounds for annulling the arbitral award (see paragraph\u00a011 above). Therefore, G.B.\u2019s actions had also constituted part of the subject matter of the case.<\/p>\n 52. She also pointed out that Judge E.L. had been the rapporteur and chair of the first panel, and that Judge D.\u0160. had been the rapporteur of the second panel; therefore, they had played an important role in deciding whether or not to accept her appeals.<\/p>\n 53. Lastly, she submitted that the third selection panel could not have remedied the lack of impartiality of the first two panels because, at the time that she had lodged her third appeal on points of law, the time\u2011limit had already expired and the panel had found no grounds for extending it.<\/p>\n (b) The Government<\/p>\n 54. The Government submitted that the sole fact that a judge had gone to university with another person was not sufficient to call into question his or her impartiality. Lithuania was a small country, and many lawyers and judges had gone to the same university, but that in itself did not indicate personal ties between them. Furthermore, Judges E.L. and D.\u0160. had graduated from university a long time ago. Therefore, the links between E.L. and R.\u017d., as well as those between D.\u0160. and G.B., had been too remote and weak to raise doubts as to the judges\u2019 impartiality.<\/p>\n 55. The Government submitted that Judge E.L. had only withdrawn from cases in which the actions of R.\u017d. had been the subject matter of the case, or where R.\u017d. or his family members had been parties to the proceedings (see paragraphs 20-24 above). In those cases R.\u017d. had had a direct interest in the outcome. By contrast, the proceedings instituted by the applicant had been brought against company A.G., where R.\u017d. had only served as acting CEO for a few months; he had subsequently been removed from that position and dismissed from the company. The only link between R.\u017d. and the proceedings had been the fact that he had signed the arbitration agreement (see paragraph\u00a05 above), the validity of which had been contested in the company\u2019s counterclaim (see paragraph\u00a08 above). However, the counterclaim had been dismissed by the Court of Appeal, and the applicant had not appealed against that part of the decision. Therefore, the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement had not constituted part of the dispute, before either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n 56. As for Judge D.\u0160., the Government submitted that he had withdrawn from a case in which G.B. had been a third party and had had a direct interest in the outcome of the case (see paragraph\u00a025 above). By contrast, in the proceedings brought by the applicant against the company, G.B. had been the company\u2019s lawyer and had only had a procedural interest in the case. The Government pointed out that, during the proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s reopening request, Judge D.\u0160. had withdrawn not because he had had any personal interest in the outcome of the case but only because he had already examined an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant in the same case (see paragraph\u00a018 above).<\/p>\n 57. The Government further contended that, in any event, the applicant\u2019s right to a fair hearing had been ensured by the third selection panel, whose independence and impartiality she was not calling into question. Even though her third appeal on points of law had been lodged out of time, the panel had addressed its arguments, which had been essentially the same as those raised in her two previous appeals on points of law, and had found that it had not raised important legal issues (see paragraph 16 above).<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 58. The relevant general principles concerning the independence and impartiality of judges have been summarised in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e S\u00e1 v. Portugal ([GC], nos. 55391\/13 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0144-150, 6\u00a0November 2018, and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n 59. The Court considers that, in the present case, no evidence has been produced to call into question the subjective impartiality of Judges E.L. and D.\u0160. Therefore, the case must be examined from the perspective of the objective impartiality test (see Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a073\u201178, ECHR 2015). More specifically, the Court must address the question of whether the applicant\u2019s doubts may be regarded as objectively justified in the circumstances of the case (see Dainelien\u0117, cited above, \u00a7 42).<\/p>\n 60. In the Court\u2019s view, the issue before it is not whether the fact that a judge had gone to university together with a protagonist in the case should automatically constitute grounds for the removal of that judge (see the Government\u2019s observations in paragraph 54 above). It emphasises that Judges E.L. and D.\u0160. themselves declared their personal ties to R.\u017d. and G.B., respectively, which they considered as precluding them from hearing certain cases in which those individuals were involved (see paragraphs\u00a020\u201123 and 25 above). Therefore, those judges acknowledged that their relationships with the aforementioned individuals went beyond a mere acquaintance as former fellow students (compare and contrast Steck-Risch and Others v.\u00a0Liechtenstein, no.\u00a063151\/00, \u00a7 48, 19 May 2005).<\/p>\n 61. The Court also observes that some of the proceedings from which Judges E.L. and D.\u0160. withdrew were separated by only a few months from the proceedings in which they were called to decide whether to accept the applicant\u2019s appeals on points of law (see paragraphs 13, 14, 22, 23 and 25 above; compare and contrast Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and\u00a0Others v.\u00a0Georgia, no.\u00a016812\/17, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0356 and 361, 18 July 2019). Therefore, the ties between the judges and R.\u017d. and G.B., which had existed at the time of the other proceedings, must have also existed at the time of the examination of the applicant\u2019s appeals on points of law.<\/p>\n 62. The Government submitted that the other cases from which the two judges had withdrawn could be distinguished from the case between the applicant and company A.G. (see paragraphs 55 and\u00a056 above).<\/p>\n 63. However, the Court is not persuaded that the cases in question were so different as to make the applicant\u2019s doubts regarding the judges\u2019 impartiality devoid of merit. It observes that the defendant in the case brought by the applicant was company A.G., in which R.\u017d. and several members of his family held a substantial number of shares (see paragraphs\u00a06, 15 and 50 above). In view of the high value of the claim lodged by the applicant (see paragraph 7 above), it could be reasonably assumed that, had the claim been allowed, the company and its major shareholders would have suffered a significant financial loss. Even though, according to the Government, R.\u017d. was eventually dismissed by company A.G. (see paragraph 55 above), there is nothing in the case file indicating that he or his family members gave up their shares in the company.<\/p>\n 64. Furthermore, company A.G. in its counterclaim argued that the arbitration agreement, which R.\u017d. had signed in his capacity as the acting CEO, should have been declared null and void because R.\u017d. had overstepped his remit and had acted in bad faith (see paragraph\u00a08 above). Had the applicant\u2019s appeals been upheld and the arbitral award annulled (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above), the claim and the counterclaim, including R.\u017d.\u2019s actions when signing the arbitration agreement, would have had to be examined afresh, thereby forming part of the subject matter of the case.<\/p>\n 65. The Court further observes that G.B. was an active participant in the proceedings, as the lawyer of company A.G. (see paragraph\u00a09 above). It has previously found that ties between a judge and the representative of the opposing party may call the impartiality of that judge into question (see, mutatis mutandis, Koulias v.\u00a0Cyprus, no.\u00a048781\/12, \u00a7 64, 26 May 2020, and Ramljak v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a05856\/13, \u00a7\u00a037, 27 June 2017). In addition, in the domestic proceedings the applicant also alleged that G.B. had privately met with the arbiter, thereby compromising the impartiality of the arbitration process (see paragraph\u00a011 above). This meant that G.B.\u2019s actions had constituted part of the subject matter of the case.<\/p>\n 66. In the above circumstances, the Court is of the view that R.\u017d. and G.B. were sufficiently involved in the proceedings between the applicant and company A.G. for those proceedings to affect their interests. In view of the personal ties between those two individuals and Judges E.L. and D.\u0160., acknowledged by the judges themselves, it accepts that the impartiality of the two judges might have appeared to be in doubt (see, for a similar situation, Aviso Zeta AG, cited above, \u00a7\u00a050, and \u0160krlj v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a032953\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a038-42, 11 July 2019).<\/p>\n 67. Furthermore, the Court observes that Judge E.L. was the rapporteur and chair of the first selection panel, and that Judge D.\u0160. was the rapporteur of the second panel (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above). In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant had grounds to believe that each of those judges had played an important role in delivering the decisions not to accept her appeals on points of law, and that the impartiality of the Supreme Court could have been open to genuine doubt (see Dainelien\u0117, cited above, \u00a7\u00a048, and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n 68. The Court has already found that the applicant was not informed about the specific compositions of the selection panels that would decide whether to accept her appeals on points of law (see paragraph\u00a047 above). As a result, she did not have the possibility to have her doubts with regard to the impartiality of the two judges addressed and dispelled at the domestic level (see Nicholas, cited above, \u00a7 64).<\/p>\n 69. Lastly, the Court considers that the third selection panel, the impartiality of which the applicant did not call into question, could not have remedied the lack of objective impartiality of the first two panels. It notes that when the applicant lodged her third appeal on points of law, the time-limit provided by law had already expired and that the Supreme Court did not find any important reasons to renew it (see paragraphs\u00a015 and 16 above). Given those circumstances, even if that appeal had contained grounds for cassation, in the absence of important reasons for renewing the missed time-limit, the Supreme Court would not have been able to accept it for examination. In addition, the Court emphasises that the applicant lodged two appeals on points of law within the three-month period provided by law, and that she could not reasonably have been expected to continue lodging appeals on points of law to the same court (see Dainelien\u0117, cited above, \u00a7\u00a026).<\/p>\n 70. The Court therefore finds that the applicant\u2019s doubts regarding the impartiality of Judges E.L. and D.\u0160. could be seen as being objectively justified and that the domestic law and practice did not provide sufficient procedural safeguards for those doubts to be dissipated.<\/p>\n 71. There has accordingly been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 72. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 73. The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the frustration and stress suffered as a result of the violation of her right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal.<\/p>\n 74. The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s claim was excessive and unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 75. The Court considers that the violation of the applicant\u2019s rights, found in the present judgment, must have caused her distress and inconvenience. However, it finds the amount claimed by the applicant to be excessive. Making its award on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a04,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.<\/p>\n B. Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 76. The applicant claimed EUR 31,705 in respect of costs and expenses sustained before the domestic authorities \u2013 namely, the court fees for lodging an appeal against the arbitral award before the Court of Appeal and her lawyers\u2019 fees for preparing the appeal against the arbitral award, for representing her in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and for preparing the first appeal on points of law.<\/p>\n 77. The Government submitted that the costs and expenses claimed by the applicant had not been incurred in her attempt to seek redress for the violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention alleged before the Court. They therefore asked the Court to reject the applicant\u2019s claim.<\/p>\n 78. According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The Court observes that in the present case it found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in view of the fact that the two selection panels of the Supreme Court that declined to accept the applicant\u2019s appeals on points of law for examination had lacked impartiality. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the costs and expenses claimed by the applicant were not linked to the violation found in the present case. It therefore rejects that claim.<\/p>\n C. Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 79. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the application admissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 January 2021, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ale\u0161 Pejchal
\nEgidijus K\u016bris,
\nCarlo Ranzoni, judges,
\nand Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 President<\/p>\n