78638\/11, 6086\/14, 11402\/17 et al.<\/a><\/p>\nJudgment 19.1.2021 [Section III]<\/p>\n
Article 3<\/strong>
\nDegrading treatment<\/strong><\/p>\nInsufficient justification for prolonged systematic handcuffing of life prisoners without regular and individualised review of specific security concerns: violation<\/p>\n
Facts \u2013 The four applicants, all serving sentences of life imprisonment at various prison facilities, were systematically subjected to handcuffing every time they left their cells on the grounds that they had a life sentence, had disciplinary records or had been placed under surveillance as dangerous prisoners by a prison commission.<\/p>\n
Law \u2013 Article 3: The applicants had been handcuffed for long periods of time\u00a0every time they left their cells.\u00a0 Even though their handcuffing had not been exposed to the public, any such measure\u00a0that diminished self-esteem or self-image in the eyes of others, especially when lasting for extended periods of time, had\u00a0to be considered as potentially \u201cdegrading\u201d.<\/p>\n
The routine handcuffing of persons sentenced to life imprisonment did not seem to be based on domestic legislation. The relevant domestic provisions did not require that inmates sentenced to life imprisonment be handcuffed systematically when leaving their cells but presupposed discretion. It also transpired from domestic practice that this measure had not been applied\u00a0automatically in all detention facilities housing such inmates.\u00a0Nonetheless, when handcuffing had been applied routinely,\u00a0the prisoners concerned found it very difficult to obtain a change in their situations. Furthermore, although the applicable\u00a0domestic regulations provided that the use of restraint measures had to be regularly reviewed, there was no evidence that this had been systematically done during the applicants\u2019 detention. Nor had any evidence been submitted\u00a0of conduct that would have justified the use of the routine measure upon the applicants for extended periods of time. In the absence of evidence of any risk assessment by the authorities in charge of the applicants, it was unclear to the Court how the prison administration and domestic courts had reached and maintained their conclusions that the measure applied had been prompted by such a risk.<\/p>\n
Although the Court was mindful of the difficulties States might encounter in maintaining order and discipline in penal institutions and that disobedience of detainees might quickly degenerate into violence, a life sentence could not justify routine and prolonged handcuffing that was not based on specific security concerns and the inmate\u2019s personal circumstances and not be subject to regular review.\u00a0 Furthermore, restraint measures against life-sentenced prisoners could only be taken as a proportionate response to a specific risk for the time strictly necessary to counter that risk.<\/p>\n
The applicants in the present case had been handcuffed for prolonged periods every time they left their cells, without a proper evaluation of their individual situation and any regular assessment of whether the application of the measure in question was appropriate or pursued a specific aim.\u00a0 In view of this, their systematic handcuffing in a secure environment had been a measure which lacked sufficient justification and could thus be regarded as degrading treatment.<\/p>\n
Conclusion: violation (unanimously)<\/p>\n
The Court also held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions of the prison regime in which one of the applicants had been held, and of Article 6 \u00a7 1 on account of some of the applicants having been deprived of the opportunity to attend hearings in the proceedings they had instituted to challenge the practice of systematic handcuffing.<\/p>\n
Article 41: the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by one of the applicants; EUR 3,000 to another applicant and EUR 1,950 for each of the remaining two applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n
Article 46: respondent State invited to implement measures of a general character with regard to a violation of Article 3 (the practice of prolonged handcuffing of life prisoners).<\/p>\n
(See also Goriunov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 14466\/12, 29 May 2018; Yevdokimov and Others v. Russia, nos. 27236\/05 and 10 others, 16 February 2016, Legal Summary)<\/p>\n