\nCASE OF S\u0141AWI\u0143SKI v. POLAND<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 61039\/16)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n15 April 2021<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of S\u0142awi\u0144ski v. Poland,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a061039\/16) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Polish national, Mr Mariusz Grzegorz S\u0142awi\u0144ski (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 11\u00a0October 2016;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the complaints concerning the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings and right to an effective remedy;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 16 March 2021,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n 1. The case concerns the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant and lack of an effective remedy to complain thereof.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Gniewkowo.<\/p>\n 3. The Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska and subsequently by Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n I. Criminal proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. In 2001 the Toru\u0144 District Prosecutor started an investigation into allegedly fraudulent activity of the applicant\u2019s company dealing with vindication of debts. The applicant and his business partner allegedly failed to transmit to a bank several hundreds of monthly instalment payments which they had received from individuals who had contracted consumption loans. On 26 February 2002 the applicant was charged with fraud and the prosecutor decided to place him under police supervision.<\/p>\n 6. On 24 June 2002 the applicant and one co-accused were indicted before the Toru\u0144 District Court.<\/p>\n 7. The trial court held the first hearing on 4 December 2003. Afterwards, the court held hearings at regular intervals; in total about 100 hearings took place. By 7 March 2006 the Toru\u0144 District Court had heard over 300 witnesses listed in the bill of indictment.<\/p>\n 8. On 30 October 2013 the Toru\u0144 District Court gave judgment. The applicant was found guilty of having defrauded payments he had received from over 300 persons. He was sentenced to one year and eight months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended on probation, and a fine. The applicant was served with the written reasons for the judgment on 23 April 2013; on 7\u00a0May 2013 he lodged an appeal.<\/p>\n 9. On 23 October 2014 the Toru\u0144 Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case.<\/p>\n 10. Between 9 April and 16 June 2015 the trial court held four hearings. On 22 June 2015 the Toru\u0144 District Court gave judgment in which it acquitted the applicant of some charges and convicted him of fraud in a more limited scope. The applicant was sentenced to one year\u2019s imprisonment, suspended on probation, and a fine. The applicant appealed.<\/p>\n 11. On 17 March 2016 the Toru\u0144 Regional Court gave judgment. It quashed the Toru\u0144 District Court\u2019s judgment in the part concerning the applicant\u2019s conviction, and discontinued the proceedings as the offences for which he had been convicted had become time-barred. The court gave the judgment at a hearing and the applicant and his lawyer were present. According to the minutes of the hearing the court informed the parties that the written reasons for the judgment would be prepared within fourteen days. The presiding judge set out the main grounds for the ruling orally. The parties were informed that the judgment was final and about the conditions for lodging a cassation appeal.<\/p>\n 12. On 12 April 2016 the applicant was served with the written grounds for the judgment of the Toru\u0144 Regional Court, containing a detailed summary of the facts of the case as established by the court and the court\u2019s reasoning as to the law.<\/p>\n II. Proceedings under the 2004 Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 13. On 6 July 2015 the applicant lodged a complaint under the Law of 17\u00a0June 2004 about the breach of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w\u00a0post\u0119powaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i post\u0119powaniu s\u0105dowym bez nieuzasadnionej zw\u0142oki – \u201cthe 2004 Act\u201d).<\/p>\n 14. On 20 August 2015 the Toru\u0144 Regional Court partly allowed his complaint and considered that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. It awarded the applicant 2,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation (approximately 475 euros (EUR) at the material time). The court noted that the first hearing had been scheduled almost eighteen months after the bill of indictment had been lodged with the trial court. Afterwards, the court held many hearings but all meaningful evidence had been gathered by 7\u00a0March 2006. Thus during the following seven and a half years the court had only heard four witnesses and had requested some evidence from a bank. That had amounted to a flagrant lack of procedural efficiency. The trial court should also have been more active in securing the attendance of the applicant and his lawyer at the hearings as they had contributed to some delays. Moreover, it had taken the trial court an excessively long period of time to prepare the written reasons for the judgment of 30\u00a0October 2013. The Toru\u0144 Regional Court examined further stages of the proceedings after the case had been remitted for reconsideration and considered that there had been no more delays attributable to the courts.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/p>\n 15. A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive length of judicial proceedings \u2013 in particular the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act \u2013 are presented in the Court\u2019s decisions in the cases of Charzy\u0144ski v.\u00a0Poland ((dec.), no.\u00a015212\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a012-23, ECHR 2005-V), and Ratajczyk v.\u00a0Poland ((dec.), no.\u00a011215\/02, ECHR 2005-VIII), and in its judgments in the cases of Krasuski v.\u00a0Poland (no.\u00a061444\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034-46, ECHR 2005-V) and, most recently, Rutkowski and Others v.\u00a0Poland (nos.\u00a072287\/10, 13927\/11 and\u00a046187\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a075-107, 7\u00a0July 2015).<\/p>\n 16. Article 457 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings provides that, when the second-instance court quashes the judgment and discontinues the case, the written reasons for the judgment shall be prepared automatically. The party shall nevertheless apply to be served with the reasoned judgment.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 17. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement, laid down in Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of … any criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal…\u201d<\/p>\n 18. The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n 19. The period to be taken into consideration began on 26\u00a0February 2002 and ended on 17 March 2016 (see paragraphs 5 and 11 above). It thus lasted fourteen years and one month at two levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 20. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to submit his case to the Court within the six-month time-limit provided for by Article\u00a035\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant and his lawyer had been present at the hearing of 17 March 2016 at which the court had delivered the final judgment. The applicant was not entitled to be served with the written grounds for the judgment automatically; he had to make a request to that effect.<\/p>\n 21. The applicant in general stated that his case was admissible and that there had been a violation of the Convention.<\/p>\n 22. The purpose of the six-month rule is to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, it is also meant to protect the authorities and other parties concerned from being left in a state of uncertainty for a prolonged period of time (see SabriG\u00fcnev.\u00a0Turkey\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a027396\/06, \u00a7\u00a039, 29June 2012).<\/p>\n 23. The Court has held in the past that where an applicant is entitled to be served automatically with the written final domestic decision the object and purpose of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention are best served by counting the six-month period as running from the date of service of the written judgment (see Worm v.\u00a0Austria, judgment of 29August 1997,Reports of Judgments and Decisions1997\u2011V, p.\u00a01547, \u00a7\u00a033, and Sernawit and Others v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a061967\/00, \u00a7\u00a039, 6November 2007). Where the domestic law does not provide for service, the Court considered it appropriate to take the date on which the decision was finalised as the starting-point, that being when the parties were definitely able to find out its content (see Papachelasv.\u00a0Greece[GC], no.\u00a031423\/96, \u00a7\u00a030, ECHR 1999-II, and Jakelaitis v.\u00a0Lithuania (dec.), no.\u00a017414\/05, 16December 2008).<\/p>\n 24. In the present case the court gave its final ruling on 17\u00a0March 2016 and informed the parties that it would prepare written reasons for the judgment within fourteen days (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above). Even accepting the Government\u2019s submission that the applicant was not entitled to be served the written judgment automatically, he must have promptly requested the service. The applicant was served the final judgment with written reasons on 12 April 2016 (see paragraph 12 above).<\/p>\n 25. The Court notes that the written grounds for the judgment contained a detailed summary of the facts of the case as established by the court and the court\u2019s reasoning as to the law (see paragraph 12 above). Consequently, the applicant was able to find out the full content of the judgment given in his case only after having received its reasoning in writing (see Pi\u0119tka v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a034216\/07, \u00a7\u00a045, 16October 2012). In view of the above and in the particular circumstances of the case the Court considers that the six\u2011month period started to run on the date when the applicant was served with the written grounds of the judgment (see Pastuszenia v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a046074\/07, \u00a7\u00a034, 21September 2010).<\/p>\n 26. The applicant submitted his application to the Court on 11\u00a0October 2016, less than six months after the final decision in the case had been served on him.<\/p>\n 27. It follows that the application cannot be declared inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month term within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and the Government\u2019s objection should be dismissed.<\/p>\n 28. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 29. The applicant argued that the length of the proceedings had been clearly in breach of the \u201creasonable time\u201d principle. The trial court was particularly inefficient and the proceedings at first-instance lasted an excessive period of almost ten years.<\/p>\n 30. The Government refrained from commenting on the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint.<\/p>\n 31. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and taking into account the criteria laid down in the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities. On the latter point, account must also be taken of what is at stake for the applicant (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a0124 ECHR 2000\u2011XI, for further case-law references see Rutkowski and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0126\u2011128).<\/p>\n 32. The Court does not have before it enough information to find that the case was of more than an average complexity. Although the trial court heard many witnesses there is no appearance that any expert evidence was required in the course of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 33. As regards the conduct of the domestic authorities the Court notes that the first hearing before the Toru\u0144 District Court was scheduled almost eighteen months after the bill of indictment had been brought against the applicant (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). There is no explanation for this delay. In total, the trial court examined the case for over eleven years during which it held about 100 hearings (see paragraph 7 above). In this context the Court would rely on the findings of the Toru\u0144 Regional Court which examined the applicant\u2019s complaint under the 2004 Act. The latter court considered that main evidence in the trial had been collected by 7\u00a0March 2006 and that the following period of over seven years had been characterised by the trial court\u2019s very low procedural activity (see paragraph 14 above). There is no doubt that such a delay should be considered excessive and that the first-instance court was clearly responsible for it. It should also be noted that it took the court about six months to prepare the written reasons for its judgment of 30\u00a0October 2013 (see paragraph 8 above)<\/p>\n 34. The Court takes note of the subsequent efforts of the appellate court and the Toru\u0144 District Court after the remittal, to finish the case against the applicant (see paragraphs 9 to 11 above). However, that final consolidation of the court\u2019s actions cannot make up for the previous delays (see Rutkowski and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0139).<\/p>\n 35. Lastly, the Court notes that it does not appear that the applicant substantially contributed to the overall length of the proceedings in his case.<\/p>\n 36. Accordingly, having regard in particular to the significant delays occurring at the trial stage of the proceedings, the Court considers that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention on account of the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a013 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 37. The applicant further submitted that he had no effective domestic remedy in respect of the protracted length of proceedings in his case. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that theviolation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n 38. The Government contested that there had been a breach of this provision of the Convention.<\/p>\n 39. The Government failed to comment on the applicant\u2019s complaint.<\/p>\n 40. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above; likewise, it must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 41. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0146-56). The relevant principles, as established in Kud\u0142a and the Court\u2019s subsequent judgments, has been set out in the Rutkowski pilot judgment (Rutkowski and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0126\u2011128).<\/p>\n 42. The Court has already found that that the applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention has not been respected (see paragraph 36 above). There is, therefore, no doubt that his complaint is \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 13 and that he was entitled to a remedy whereby he could obtain appropriate relief for the Convention breach before the domestic authority, including compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered on account of delays that had occurred in his case (seeKud\u0142a,cited above, \u00a7 157).<\/p>\n 43. The just satisfaction awarded to the applicant by the Toru\u0144 Regional Court amounted to approximately four per cent of what the Court would be likely to have awarded him at that time in accordance with its practice, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case. The domestic award must therefore be considered manifestly unreasonable in the light of the standards set by the Court (see paragraphs 173-174 above and Scordino (no.\u00a01), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0214 and 269-270).<\/p>\n 44. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that a complaint under the 2004 Act failed to provide the applicant with \u201cappropriate and sufficient redress\u201d in terms of adequate compensation for the excessive length of the proceedings in his case (see Scordino (no.\u00a01), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0181, and Rutkowski and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0183).<\/p>\n 45. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 46. Lastly, the applicant complained under several Articles of the Convention about the allegedly lengthy imposition of police supervision of him. He stated that the measure had been lifted only on 26 February 2015. He also complained about the outcome of the proceedings and that he had been prevented from proving his innocence because of the statute of limitations.<\/p>\n 47. In so far as the applicant complains about the situation which ended on 26 February 2015, this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 48. Moreover, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.<\/p>\n 49. Accordingly, the remainder of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and\u00a04 of the Convention.<\/p>\n IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 50. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 51. The applicant claimed EUR 35,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 52. The Government contested the claim.<\/p>\n 53. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B. Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 54. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 85 for translation expenses incurred before the Court.<\/p>\n 55. The Government left the matter to the Court\u2019s discretion.<\/p>\n 56. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 85 for the proceedings before the Court.<\/p>\n C. Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 57. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the complaints under Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 13 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR 85 (eighty-five euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5. Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 April 2021, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Liv Tigerstedt\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Krzysztof Wojtyczek
\nErik Wennerstr\u00f6m,
\nIoannis Ktistakis, judges,
\nand Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n![\"INTRODUCTION\"](\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/INTRODUCTION.jpg\")
<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n