FOURTH SECTION
\nCASE OF HORHAT v. ROMANIA
\n(Application no. 53173\/10)
\nJUDGMENT
\n(Revision)
\nSTRASBOURG
\n20 April 2021<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Horhat v. Romania (revision of the judgment of 3 March 2020),<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Faris Vehabovi\u0107, President, Having deliberated in private on 23 March 2021,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/p>\n 1. The case originated in an application (no. 53173\/10) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Romanian national, Mr Ioan Horhat (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 4 August 2010.<\/p>\n 2. In a judgment delivered on 3\u00a0March 2020, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention on account of the applicant having been tried twice for the same offence. The Court also decided to award the applicant 5,000 euros (EUR) for non\u2011pecuniary damage and EUR 1,570 for costs and expenses and dismissed the remainder of the claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n 3. On 19 February 2020 the applicant\u2019s legal representative and his wife, Ms Iuliana Horhat, informed the Court that the applicant had died on 29\u00a0July 2018 and the applicant\u2019s wife expressed the wish to maintain the application in his stead.<\/p>\n 4. On 27 May 2020 the Government informed the Court that they had learned of the applicant\u2019s death on 6 and 8 April 2020 from the applicant\u2019s wife and from his legal representative. They accordingly requested revision of the judgment within the meaning of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n 5. On 23 June 2020 the Court considered the request for revision and decided to give the applicant\u2019s representative and widow an opportunity to submit any observations by 24 September 2020. Those observations were received on 27 August 2020. On 1 October 2020 the Government submitted their observations in reply.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/p>\n THE REQUEST FOR REVISION<\/p>\n 6. The Government requested revision of the judgment of 3\u00a0March 2020, which they had been unable to execute because the applicant had died before the judgment had been adopted. They argued that the applicant\u2019s widow or any other next of kin had failed to either inform the Court of the applicant\u2019s demise or express any interest in the case before the Court for almost a year and a half from the moment of his death. Eventually only the applicant\u2019s widow contacted the Court even though the applicant had two more heirs, namely his children. In any event, none of the applicant\u2019s heirs could claim to be indirect victims of the alleged violation because the right invoked by the applicant was deeply personal in nature and the alleged violation was not linked closely to his death. They considered, however, that in the light of the complex context in which this judgement was adopted, including the heirs\u2019 lack of interest in pursuing the application, the most appropriate manner for the Court to dispense with this case was to dismiss the applicant\u2019s just satisfaction claims. This approach would not affect the essence of the violation found.<\/p>\n 7. Ms Horhat submitted in reply that she wished to pursue the application as lodged by her husband in order to defend his memory. She submitted written statements of her and the applicant\u2019s two children attesting that they fully supported and agreed with her decision of pursuing the case.<\/p>\n 8. The Court normally permits the next of kin to pursue an application, provided he or she has a legitimate interest, where the original applicant has died after lodging the application with the Court (see, for example, Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 79, 26 April 2016, and Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 47039\/11 and 358\/12, \u00a7 71, ECHR 2012 (extracts), with further references).<\/p>\n 9. In the present case, the Court notes that the documents submitted to it indicate that Ms Horhat was the wife of the deceased applicant, that she is one of his three heirs, and that the remaining two heirs had agreed with and fully supported her decision to pursue the application before the Court.<\/p>\n 10. As to the Government\u2019s argument that the right at issue was not transferable, the Court notes that this criterion is of relevance when assessing whether relatives wishing to lodge an application after the death of the direct victim may be considered as indirect victims (see Hristozov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 73). The Court\u2019s approach to cases introduced by applicants themselves and only continued by their relatives after their deaths differs. The decisive point is not whether the rights in question were or were not transferable to the heirs wishing to pursue the proceedings, but whether the heirs could in principle claim a legitimate interest in requesting the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant\u2019s wish to exercise his or her individual and personal right to lodge an application (see paragraph 8 above; and, as a recent example, Provenzano v. Italy, no.\u00a055080\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 94-96, 25 October 2018). Cases before the Court generally also have a moral or principled dimension, and persons close to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in obtaining a ruling even after that applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a033071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII). This is also true in the present case, considering Ms Horhat\u2019s expressly stated intention of defending her late husband\u2019s memory. As a result, the Court cannot discern any reason why the deceased applicant\u2019s wife would lack standing to continue the proceedings before the Court in his stead.<\/p>\n 11. As regards the Government\u2019s submissions concerning Ms Horhat\u2019s failure to inform the Court of the applicant\u2019s death, the Court has on several occasions rejected similar arguments finding that the failure to inform had not hampered its examination of the case (see G\u00fclbahar \u00d6zer and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (revision), no. 44125\/06, \u00a7\u00a09, 10 June 2014; Benzer and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (revision), no. 23502\/06, \u00a7\u00a013, 13 January 2015; and Hagiescu and Others v. Romania (revision), no.\u00a07901\/02, \u00a7\u00a010, 15\u00a0November 2016). The Court does not see any reason to depart from this approach in the present case.<\/p>\n 12. The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s death is a fact that was not known to it and could not reasonably have been known to the Government when the judgment was delivered. It accepts the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s death had a decisive influence on the outcome of the judgment within the meaning of Rule\u00a080 of the Rules of Court, namely the allocation of the amount awarded under Article\u00a041 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 13. The Court considers that the judgment of 3 March 2020 should be revised pursuant to Rule\u00a080 of the Rules of Court, the relevant parts of which provide:<\/p>\n \u201cA party may, in the event of the discovery of a fact which might by its nature have a decisive influence and which, when a judgment was delivered, was unknown to the Court and could not reasonably have been known to that party, request the Court … to revise that judgment.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n 14. The Court accordingly decides to award Ms Horhat the amounts it previously awarded to the deceased applicant, namely EUR\u00a05,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,570, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses.<\/p>\n 15. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/p>\n 1. Decides to revise the judgment of 3 March 2020 in so far as it concerns the claims made by the deceased applicant under Article\u00a041 of the Convention,<\/p>\n accordingly,<\/p>\n 2. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay Ms Iuliana Horhat, within three\u00a0months, the following amounts,to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR 1,570 (one thousand five hundred and seventy euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 April 2021, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Ilse Freiwirth\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Faris Vehabovi\u0107
\nIulia Antoanella Motoc,
\nCarlo Ranzoni, judges,
\nand Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 President<\/p>\n