Respect for private life<\/strong><\/p>\nInadequate response of domestic authorities to a high school teacher\u2019s verbal abuse of a student:\u00a0violation<\/p>\n
Facts\u00a0\u2013 The applicant, a student in a public high school at the relevant time, was subjected to several insults by his mathematics teacher (R.V.).\u00a0The teacher called the applicant,\u00a0inter alia, \u201ca moron, an idiot, a fool, hillbilly\u201d. The applicant underwent psychological treatment in relation to the events. His father complained to the school and several other relevant domestic bodies, including the Ministry of Education. The father\u2019s complaints resulted, notably, in interviews between the school psychologist, R.V. and the applicant, and an assessment of the situation by the Education Agency. The applicant also lodged an unsuccessful criminal complaint\u00a0with the police, alleging harassment by R.V.<\/p>\n
The applicant complained unsuccessfully before the Constitutional Court about the harassment by the teacher at school, and the inadequate response of the relevant domestic authorities.<\/p>\n
Law\u00a0\u2013 Article 8: (a)\u00a0Admissibility<\/p>\n
The Court examined the applicability of Article 8 to the present case. Measures taken in the field of education might, in certain circumstances, affect the right to respect for private life, but not every act or measure which might be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gave rise to such an interference (Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom).\u00a0However, since\u00a0Costello-Roberts,\u00a0there had been an evolution of social attitudes and legal standards concerning the application of measures of discipline towards children, emphasising the need of protection of children from any form of violence and abuse. That was reflected in various international instruments and the Court\u2019s case-law (e.g.\u00a0A, B and C v. Latvia;\u00a0V.K. v. Russia;\u00a0Wetjen and Others v. Germany).<\/p>\n
The insults to which the applicant had been subjected by R.V. had entailed his emotional disturbance, which had affected his psychological well-being, dignity and moral integrity. Moreover those insults had been uttered\u00a0in the classroom in front of other students and had thus been capable of humiliating and belittling the applicant in the eyes of others. The insults in question had been particularly disrespectful towards the applicant and had been perpetrated by a teacher\u00a0in a position of authority and control over him. In those circumstances, and taking into consideration that it was in the best interests of the applicant as a child, his classmates and the children in general to be effectively protected from any violence\u00a0or abuse in educational settings, the treatment complained of fell to be examined under the right to respect for private life, within the meaning of Article 8.<\/p>\n
Having found that Article 8 was applicable, and given the context of the case (namely the allegations of harassment in the school at the hands of a teacher, where any form of violence, however light, was considered unacceptable), the Court also found that\u00a0there could be no room for application of the non-significant disadvantage criterion. It therefore rejected the Government\u2019s objection in that regard.<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0Merits<\/p>\n
There was no doubt that the treatment entailing such consequences for the applicant, administered by a teacher in a public school while the applicant was under his control, had amounted to an interference under Article 8 (see,\u00a0mutatis mutandis,\u00a0V.K. v. Russia). It had to be determined whether such an interference was justified. In making that assessment, the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had complained of not only the harassment by the teacher, but also of the failure of the relevant authorities to react to his allegations of harassment:<\/p>\n
(i)\u00a0The applicant\u2019s allegations of harassment by the teacher<\/p>\n
While R.V.\u2019s first insults against the applicant had aimed at disciplining him and his classmates for allegedly being late for class, the two latter occasions could not be seen as anything but gratuitous verbal abuse against the applicant\u00a0amounting to his humiliation, belittling and ridiculing. In any case, no justification for R.V.\u2019s conduct could be provided. R.V., as a teacher, had been placed in a unique position of authority over the applicant, which had made his actions susceptible of having an important impact on the applicant\u2019s dignity, well-being and psychological development.<\/p>\n
The verbal abuse had not been at a very high scale of intensity and had not degenerated into further, more systemic, harassment. However, R.V., as a teacher,\u00a0had been expected to understand that the effects of verbal provocation and abuse might deeply affect students, particularly those who were more sensitive. Moreover, as a teacher, he should have been aware that any form of violence, including verbal abuse,\u00a0towards students, however mild, was not acceptable in an educational setting and that he had been required to interact with students with due respect for their dignity and moral integrity. Accordingly, having regard to a position of trust, authority and influence as well as the social responsibilities that teachers have, there was no room for tolerating any harassment by a teacher towards a student. Frequency, severity of harm and intent were not prerequisites for defining violence and abuse in an educational setting.<\/p>\n
(ii)\u00a0The domestic authorities\u2019 response to the applicant\u2019s allegations of harassment<\/p>\n
The Court found that the domestic authorities, while enjoying a margin of appreciation, had to put in place appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to prohibit unequivocally any form of violence or abuse against children at all times and in all circumstances, and thus to ensure zero tolerance to any violence or abuse in educational institutions. That also related to the necessity of ensuring accountability through appropriate criminal, civil, administrative and professional avenues.<\/p>\n
The Court did not consider in the circumstances of the present case that the recourse to the criminal avenue had been critical to fulfil the State\u2019s\u00a0obligations under Article 8, and therefore further examined the manner in which the applicant\u2019s allegations had\u00a0 been addressed within the available administrative and professional avenues.<\/p>\n
Following the applicant\u2019s initial complaint to the head teacher\u00a0of harassment by R.V., no concrete measure had been taken by the school authorities until his father had sent letters also to various State authorities asking for the applicant to be protected from further harassment at school. In the meantime, the applicant had been subjected to two additional instances of verbal abuse by R.V.<\/p>\n
The school authorities had organised a reconciliation process between the applicant and R.V. In that process, the only measure taken with regard to R.V. had involved a verbal reproach from the school psychologist. However, no formal decision or measure had been adopted with regard to R.V.\u2019s conduct, nor had the relevant administrative professional procedures before the Ministry been set in motion. Such a reconciliation process had been manifestly ineffective. The domestic authorities had failed to recognise that what had been a stake had not merely been the settling of things between the applicant and R.V., but the necessity of confronting and addressing the problem posed by R.V.\u2019s inacceptable conduct that had affected not only the applicant but some other students as well. The school had also failed to respond in any way to the applicant\u2019s request to be removed to another class or to assign another math teacher to his class.<\/p>\n
The Ministry had reacted only following a specific request by the applicant\u2019s father. It had sent the case to the Education Agency for its pedagogical educational supervision. However, there was no indication that the Ministry\u2019s education inspectorate had considered taking any other measures within its competence to address the specific complaints made by the applicant, such as questioning the applicant or adopting the relevant measures to protect students, providing specific training for the teacher and, if appropriate, instituting the relevant proceedings. In the context of its pedagogical supervision, the Agency had focused on the manner of R.V.\u2019s delivery of mathematics lectures, without conducting an investigation into the impugned events. The conclusions reached by the Agency were open to doubt in view of the allegations that some students had not honestly answered the Agency\u2019s questionnaire due to a fear of reprisal. Moreover, in its conclusions the Agency had suggested that the matter be resolved in a further\u00a0discussion between the school authorities and the applicant\u2019s father: the Court failed to see how that could be considered an adequate measure.<\/p>\n
There was also no indication that the Agency or Ministry had followed up on further developments in the applicant\u2019s case or his situation in school. In that connection, it was difficult to accept that a single letter from the head teacher alleging that the applicant\u2019s father had stated that the matter had been settled could be considered sufficient. Indeed, there was no indication that the content of that letter had been authorised by the applicant\u2019s father. It should have been obvious to the State education administration that the type of impugned behaviour, and its effects on the applicant, had required a more diligent investment of knowledge and resources to understand its consequences and implications of failing to provide appropriate and expected care to the applicant at school.<\/p>\n
In sum, the State authorities had failed to respond with requisite diligence to the applicant\u2019s allegations of harassment at school.<\/p>\n
Conclusion: violation (4 votes to 3).<\/p>\n
Article 41: EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n
(See also\u00a0Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom,\u00a013134\/87, 25 March 1993,\u00a0Legal Summary;\u00a0A, B and C v. Latvia,\u00a030808\/11, 31\u00a0March 2016;\u00a0V.K. v. Russia,\u00a068059\/13, 7 March 2017,\u00a0Legal Summary;\u00a0Wetjen and Others v. Germany,\u00a068125\/14\u00a0and\u00a072204\/14, 22 March 2018,\u00a0Legal Summary)<\/p>\n