The case concerns alleged breaches of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the quashing of the final judgment recognising the applicant\u2019s ownership of a house on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances.<\/p>\n
THIRD SECTION This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Mutsayeva v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Darian Pavli, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Russian national, Ms Raisa Abdulovna Mutsayeva (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 8 December 2010;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the application;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n the decision to reject the Government\u2019s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 30 March 2021,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n 1. The case concerns alleged breaches of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the quashing of the final judgment recognising the applicant\u2019s ownership of a house on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/p>\n 2. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Grozny (Chechen Republic). She was represented by Mr I.Y. Timishev, a lawyer.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by Mr\u00a0M.\u00a0Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n I. FIRST SET OF PROCEEDINGS<\/p>\n 5. The applicant and a certain O.M. were in dispute regarding a house located in Grozny (\u201cthe house\u201d).<\/p>\n A. Two judgments concerning the same house<\/strong><\/p>\n 6. On 25\u00a0October 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), ruling in special non-contentious proceedings (\u0432 \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435) on O.M.\u2019s claim, established the fact of the latter\u2019s ownership of the house (\u201cthe first judgment\u201d). The applicant was not involved in those proceedings.<\/p>\n 7. On 1\u00a0March 2005 the District Court, ruling in non-contentious proceedings, granted the applicant\u2019s claim and established the fact of her ownership of the same house (\u201cthe second judgment\u201d). O.M. was not involved in those proceedings. The judgment was based on the testimony of witnesses H.U. and A.P.<\/p>\n B. Quashing of the two judgments<\/strong><\/p>\n 8. On 16\u00a0December 2005 the District Court granted O.M.\u2019s request and quashed its second judgment on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances, namely the first judgment.<\/p>\n 9. On 25\u00a0January 2006 the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s request and quashed its first judgment on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances, namely the second judgment.<\/p>\n II. SECOND SET OF PROCEEDINGS<\/p>\n 10. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a claim in contentious proceedings (\u0432 \u0438\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435) with the District Court against O.M. seeking to recognise her ownership of the disputed house. O.M. lodged a counterclaim to recognise her ownership of the house.<\/p>\n 11. On 4\u00a0May 2006 the District Court found for the applicant and dismissed O.M.\u2019s counterclaim. O.M. did not appeal. After the judgment had been delivered, O.M. asked to quash the judgment, submitting a decision of 3\u00a0April 2006 on institution of criminal proceedings against the applicant on the charge for falsification of evidence and fraud. On 23\u00a0May 2006 the District Court quashed its judgment of 4\u00a0May 2006 on the ground of newly discovered circumstances (institution of the criminal proceedings).<\/p>\n 12. On 26\u00a0February 2007 the District Court, having examined the case for the second time, found for the applicant and dismissed O.M.\u2019s counterclaim. On 14\u00a0August 2007 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed the judgment of 26\u00a0February 2007 on cassation, following the appeal of O.M., on the basis of lack of assessment of certain documents by the first\u2011instance court, and remitted the case for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 13. On 3\u00a0April 2008 the District Court again found for the applicant (for the third time), recognised her ownership of the disputed house and dismissed O.M.\u2019s counterclaim. In its judgment the court referred to the testimony of ten witnesses (M.U., A.U., R.U., D.A., T.A., L.D., and A.R. interviewed during the trial and the written testimony of H.U., L.De. and S.M.).<\/p>\n 14. On 29\u00a0July 2008 the Supreme Court of Chechnya dismissed O.M.\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of 3\u00a0April 2008 on cassation; the judgment became final.<\/p>\n III. THIRD SET OF PROCEEDINGS AND THE APPLICANT\u2019S CRIMINAL CONVICTION<\/p>\n 15. On 17 June 2010, the District Court granted O.M.\u2019s request and quashed the judgment of 3\u00a0April 2008 (paragraph\u00a013 above) on the ground of newly discovered circumstances, referring to an order of an investigator of 15\u00a0September 2008. In that order, the investigator declared the testimony of M.I. and A.V. false, as they had allegedly participated as witnesses in the non\u2011contentious proceedings initiated by the applicant in 2005 (paragraph\u00a07 above).<\/p>\n 16. On 12 October 2010, as a result of a fresh examination of the case, the District Court found for O.M. and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, referring to the same testimony as the judgment of 3\u00a0April 2008 (paragraph\u00a013 above), without any references to the criminal proceedings against the applicant or to any false testimony. On 28 December 2010 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld the judgment on cassation.<\/p>\n 17. On 31 December 2010 the Zavodskoy District Court of Grozny found the applicant guilty of fraud and falsification of evidence. The court referred to the false testimony of M.I. and A.V. (paragraph 15 above).<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/p>\n 18. Article 392 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d) entitled \u201cReconsideration of judgments on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances\u201d provides:<\/p>\n \u201cThe grounds for reconsideration (…) shall be:<\/p>\n 1) significant circumstances which were not and could not have been known to the party who applies for reconsideration; (…)\u201d<\/p>\n Other relevant provisions of the CCP on reconsideration of judgments on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances are exposed in the judgment of Baturlova v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a033188\/08, \u00a7\u00a019, 19\u00a0April 2011).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 19. The applicant complains about the quashing on 17\u00a0June 2010 of the final judgment delivered in her favour on 3\u00a0April 2008. She refers to Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 20. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 21. The Government submitted that M.I. and A.V. had testified during the court hearing held on 1\u00a0March 2005, and that the District Court in its judgment of 3\u00a0April 2008 referred to the same testimony. It also submitted that the fact of falsification had been established only after the delivery of the aforementioned judgments and thus constituted a newly discovered circumstance within the meaning of domestic legislation.<\/p>\n 22. The applicant argued that the judgment of 3\u00a0April 2008 had not been based on the testimony of those two witnesses, nor did the District Court refer to the judgment of 1\u00a0March 2005, as it had been already quashed.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 23. The Court reiterates that quashing of judgments because of newly discovered circumstances is not by itself incompatible with the requirement of fair hearing, but the manner of its application may be (see, mutatis mutandis, Baturlova v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a033188\/08, \u00a7\u00a045, 19\u00a0April 2011, with a further reference). The person applying for rescission should show that there was no opportunity to present an item of evidence at the final hearing and that the evidence is decisive (Pravednaya v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a069529\/01, \u00a7\u00a027, 18\u00a0November 2004, and also paragraph\u00a018 above). The Court reiterates also that it should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Bochan v.\u00a0Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no.\u00a022251\/08, \u00a7\u00a061, ECHR 2015, with further references). In particular, a judgment is manifestly unreasonable if it does not contain any connection between the established facts, the applicable law and the outcome of the proceedings (see An\u0111elkovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia, no.\u00a01401\/08, \u00a7\u00a027, 9\u00a0April 2013).<\/p>\n 24. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the final judgment of 3\u00a0April 2008 in the applicant\u2019s favour was quashed two years later, on 17\u00a0June 2010 (paragraph\u00a015 above) on the ground that M.I. and A.V. had provided false testimony in support of the applicant\u2019s position. It is conceivable that these circumstances were not known at the material time therefore, the first condition for rescission under Russian law (see paragraphs\u00a018 and 23 above) was respected in the present case. As for the second condition, namely the significant or decisive character of the evidence, the Court notes that the quashed judgment neither referred to the testimony of these two persons nor contained any reference to the already quashed judgment of 1\u00a0March 2005 which, in its turn, had not been based on that testimony (paragraphs\u00a07 and 9 above). Therefore, not only did the testimony not appear to be of a decisive or significant character, but it also lacked any evidentiary value and was not related to the case.<\/p>\n 25. In the light of the above, the Court cannot discern a connection between the established facts (false testimony of witnesses who were not mentioned in the judgment) and the grounds for quashing this judgment (see, mutatis mutandis, An\u0111elkovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a027, and Adikanko and Basov\u2011Grinev v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a02872\/09 and 20454\/12, \u00a7 50, 13\u00a0March 2018).<\/p>\n 26. Lastly, the Court notes that in the fresh examination of the case, the District Court in its judgment of 12\u00a0October 2010 gave a fundamentally different assessment of the factual background on the basis of the exactly same evidence as the previous set of proceedings, without having envisaged those allegedly \u201cnewly discovered circumstances\u201d (paragraph\u00a016 above).<\/p>\n 27. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the domestic courts, having quashed the final judgment of 3 April 2008 and subsequently reopened the proceedings which resulted in the opposite outcome to the previous sets of proceedings (see paragraph\u00a013 above), did not give the applicant\u2019s case a fair hearing. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a01 OF PROTOCOL No.\u00a01 TO THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 28. The applicant contended that she had been unlawfully deprived of her house as a result of quashing the final judgment in her favour. She relied upon Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01, which provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law (…)\u201d.<\/p>\n 29. Having regard to its conclusion under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see paragraph 27 above), the Court considers that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint submitted by the applicant under Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 separately, because it is closely linked to the complaint under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 and is based on the same facts (see S.C.\u00a0Britanic World S.R.L. v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a08602\/09, \u00a7\u00a050, 26\u00a0April 2016, and Magomedov and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a033636\/09 and 9\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a0103, 28\u00a0March 2017).<\/p>\n III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 30. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 31. The applicant claimed 47,552.16 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage (the amount allegedly constituting the market price of the house) and EUR\u00a07,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested this claim as being unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 32. The Court notes that the applicant did not submit any document or calculation whatsoever demonstrating the market price of the house at the material time, that is when the final judgment in her favour was quashed therefore, it does not make any award under this head.<\/p>\n 33. It further notes that the finding of a violation of the Convention by the Court in the present judgment opens the possibility for the applicant to request the reopening of the proceedings under Article 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see Yevdokimov and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a027236\/05 and 10\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a7 9 and 59, 16 February 2016, with further references). Consequently, reopening the civil proceedings and a review of the matter in the light of the conclusions reached by the Court in the present case would be the most appropriate means of affording reparation to the injured party.<\/p>\n 34. As regards non-pecuniary damage, the Court, having regard to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, accepting that the breach of Article 6 has caused the applicant non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated by the mere finding of a violation, considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 2,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.<\/p>\n 35. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the complaint under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention admissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the admissibility and merits of the complaint lodged under Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds<\/p>\n (a) That the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 May 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Olga Chernishova \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Darian Pavli
\nCASE OF MUTSAYEVA v. RUSSIA<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 1667\/11)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n11 May 2021<\/p>\n
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nPeeter Roosma, judges,
\nand Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n