\nCASE OF EK\u015eIO\u011eLU AND MOSTURO\u011eLU v. TURKEY<\/strong>
\n(Applications nos. 2006\/13 and 2006\/13)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n15 June 2021<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Ek\u015fio\u011flu and Mosturo\u011flu v. Turkey,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Valeriu Gri\u0163co, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the applications (nos.\u00a02006\/13 and 10857\/13) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by two Turkish nationals, Mr \u0130lhan Y\u00fcksel Ek\u015fio\u011flu and Mehmet \u015eekip Mosturo\u011flu (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 30 November 2012;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Turkish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the complaints concerning independence and impartiality of the Arbitration Committee and access to a court, the use of intercepted telephone conversations in those proceedings and the applicants\u2019 right to presumption of innocence on account of the reasoning and the wording of the Arbitration Committee decision and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 18 May 2021,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n 1. The applicants are former executives of a football club in Turkey. The cases concern disciplinary proceedings against them before the Arbitration Committee of the Turkish Football Federation on the charge of influencing match results.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicants were born in 1966 and live in Istanbul. The first applicant was represented by Mr E. \u015een, a lawyer practising in Istanbul. The second applicant was represented by N. Karakaya, another lawyer practising in Istanbul.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by their Agent.<\/p>\n I. Circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n A. Background of the case: criminal proceedings against the applicants and telephone tapping measures<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. In the context of several criminal investigations initiated on an unspecified date in 2011 concerning an organised crime activity including match-fixing and fraudulent dealings within the football community, fixed and mobile telephone numbers of certain football players, coaches and club executives, including the applicants, were tapped pursuant to decisions of the Istanbul Assize Court. The tapping the first applicant\u2019s telephone lines was authorised on suspicion of the offence of setting up a criminal organisation and was granted initially for three months on 22\u00a0February 2011 and extended until 22 August 2011. It appears that the tapping of the second applicant\u2019s telephone line was also authorised on 15\u00a0March 2011 on suspicion of the offence of setting up a criminal organisation but the parties did not submit to the Court the relevant judicial decision or specify for how long the measure had been authorised.<\/p>\n 6. On 7 July 2011 the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n 7. On 2 November 2011 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment in respect of ninety-three suspects with the Istanbul Assize Court. The applicants were charged under Article 220 of the Criminal Code (Law\u00a0no. 5237) with setting up, or taking part in, an organisation with a view to committing offences, and under Article 158 \u00a7 1 (d) with aggravated fraud, and under section 11 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 4(b) and (c), and 5 of Law no. 6222 on the Prevention of Violence and Disorder in Sports with match-fixing in a number of matches played in the super league and giving incentive bonuses to players with a view to influencing the match results.<\/p>\n 8. On 2 July 2012 the Istanbul Assize Court sentenced the applicants to one year and three months\u2019 imprisonment pursuant to Articles 220 \u00a7 2 and\u00a062 of the Criminal Code for being members of a criminal organisation with a view to influencing match results in the Turkish professional super league. The court decided to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment in respect of those convictions. As to the charges of match-fixing and giving incentive bonuses under section 11 of Law no. 6222, it sentenced the first applicant to one year twenty-five months and fifteen days of imprisonment and a judicial fine of 900,000 Turkish liras (TRY) on account of fixing matches that had taken place on 15 and 22 May 2011 respectively and for providing incentive bonuses to players in respect of matches that had taken place on 17 and 22\u00a0April 2011 and 15 May 2011. The court sentenced the second applicant to one year four months and fourteen days of imprisonment and a judicial fine of TRY\u00a0100,000 on account of attempted fixing of the matches that had taken place on 8 and 15 May 2011 respectively, and of the offence of providing incentive bonuses in respect of the match of 22 April 2011. The court acquitted the applicants of the same charges in respect of matches that had taken place on various dates between 22 February to 9 April 2011 on account of the fact that Law no. 6222 which criminalised the act of match-fixing and providing incentive bonuses post-dated those matches. The court further banned the applicants from serving in the executive or supervisory organs of sports clubs and federations during the execution of their sentences.<\/p>\n 9. On 17 January 2014 the Court of Cassation upheld the first applicant\u2019s conviction of the offences under section 11 of Law no. 6222 and quashed the second applicant\u2019s conviction under Law no. 6222.<\/p>\n 10. In the meantime, by way of an amendment to Articles 135 and 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) on 21 February 2014, offences regulated under Article 220 of the Criminal Code were removed from of the catalogue list of offences for which interception, monitoring and recording of communications could be authorised.<\/p>\n 11. On an unspecified date the first applicant made a request for the reopening of the criminal proceedings on the basis of the amendments made to Articles 135 and 140 of the CCP.<\/p>\n 12. The Istanbul Assize Court granted the first applicant\u2019s request for reopening and continued the examination of the case against the applicants under the same file. On 9 October 2015 the court acquitted the applicants of the offences of match-fixing and providing incentive bonuses. At the time of the parties\u2019 submissions to the Court the appeal proceedings were ongoing before the domestic courts.<\/p>\n 13. Furthermore, criminal proceedings known as the \u201cconspiracy case\u201d (kumpas) were brought against the people allegedly involved in irregularities committed during the criminal proceedings against the applicants and other defendants. At the time of the parties\u2019 submissions to the Court this trial was ongoing before the domestic courts.<\/p>\n B. Proceedings relevant to the cases: disciplinary proceedings against the applicants before the Turkish Football Federation<\/strong><\/p>\n 14. By letters of 16 August 2011 and 3 January 2012 the Turkish Football Federation referred the applicants to its Professional Football Disciplinary Committee (PFDK) in connection with the criminal investigation against them concerning match-fixing charges.<\/p>\n 15. The applicants were asked to submit their defences in writing. Both applicants objected to the use of their tapped telephone recordings as evidence in the disciplinary proceedings. They argued in that respect that the act of match-fixing had not been a criminal offence before the enactment of Law no. 6222 on 14 April 2011 and that therefore any use of the records of their telephone conversations prior to that date had been unlawful. Secondly, for the period concerning 14 April 2011 to 3 July 2011 they submitted that the authorisation to intercept their communications had been given only for the offence of setting up a criminal organisation and not for match-fixing, and in this respect too, the obtaining and use of the communications had been unlawful. They further noted that the match referees\u2019 and observer reports and match recordings should have been the primary evidence for the proceedings in question but that the disciplinary investigation had made no use of them.<\/p>\n 16. On 6 May 2012 the PFDK decided by a majority to sanction the first applicant with three years\u2019 suspension for attempting to influence matches that had taken place on 7 March 2011, 22 April 2011 and 15 May 2011 and the second applicant with one year suspension for attempting to influence the match played on 22 April 2011, pursuant to section 58 \u00a7 2 of the Football Disciplinary Regulations. In finding the applicants culpable of the offence, the PFDK relied to a great extent on the intercepted telephone conversations between 28 February 2011 and 18 May 2011 in respect of the first applicant and the telephone conversations of 15 May 2011 in respect of the second applicant and the physical surveillance records of other individuals allegedly going into the office of the first applicant.<\/p>\n 17. On 19 May 2012 the applicants appealed against the decision of the PFDK to the Arbitration Committee. On an unspecified date the president of the Arbitration Committee recused himself from the case.<\/p>\n 18. On 4 June 2012 the Arbitration Committee unanimously dismissed the appeal, considering that the TFF authorities were not bound by any rules on evidence in disciplinary proceedings so long as the evidence in question was not unlawfully obtained. In that respect the Arbitration Committee considered that the use of intercepted telephone conversations of the applicants as evidence of influencing match results could not be qualified as unlawful on account of the provisions of the Criminal Code of Procedure (CPP), which allowed the use of evidence that had been obtained during surveillance of communications that did not relate to the measure for which surveillance was authorised but nevertheless gave rise to a suspicion that a catalogue offence had been committed. The Arbitration Committee considered therefore that even though the interception of the applicants\u2019 telephone conservations had been authorised on account of suspicion of setting up a criminal organisation, the evidence obtained during surveillance had given rise to suspicion of the offence of match-fixing, which was an offence for which surveillance could be authorised.<\/p>\n The Arbitration Board\u2019s decision was final and not subject to any judicial review pursuant to Article 59 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/p>\n I. Turkish football federation<\/strong><\/p>\n 19. The TFF was established in 1923 to govern football in Turkey. As the sport\u2019s national federation, it is the highest authority regulating and overseeing all aspects of professional and amateur football in the country. The relevant legal framework concerning the resolution of football disputes and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitration Committee of the TFF in the resolution of disputes relating to administration and discipline of football can be found in Ali R\u0131za and Others v. Turkey, nos. 30226\/10 and 4 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a045-\u00a022, 28 January 2020.<\/p>\n 20. Section 58 of the Football Disciplinary Directive, as in force at the relevant time, defined the disciplinary offence of influencing a match result as exerting or attempting to exert an unlawful or undue influence incompatible with sports ethics. Providing an incentive bonus to a player or a sports club was also considered as culpable behaviour in this context. The corresponding sanction for influencing a match result ranged from one year to three years of suspension for real persons and relegation to a lower league for sports clubs. Section 99 defined the scope of the sanction of suspension by stating that those who are banned cannot participate in football matches, cannot carry out administrative, sporting or any other activity relating to football and cannot enter stadiums.<\/p>\n II. relevant criminal law Provisions<\/strong><\/p>\n 21. The relevant provisions of Law no. 6222 on the Prevention of Violence and Disorder of Sports, which entered into force on 14 April 2011, provide as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c11- Match-Fixing and Incentive Bonus<\/p>\n 1. Any person who gives financial advantage or other gain for another person in exchange for influencing the result of a sporting competition shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of one to three years and a judicial fine of up to twenty thousand days. Those on whom a financial advantage or other gain is given shall be considered as accomplices. An agreement on financial advantage or other gain shall suffice for commission of the offence.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 3. If no agreement is reached but an offer to provide financial advantage or other gain is made, provisions relating to attempt shall apply.<\/p>\n 4. … the penalty should be increased by half in the event that the offence is committed<\/p>\n (b) by executives of the Federation or a sports club…<\/p>\n (c) within the activities of an organisation set up with a view to committing crimes.<\/p>\n 5. If the offence is committed by means of providing or promising an incentive bonus in order for a sports team to prevail in a match, the penalty shall be reduced by half.<\/p>\n ….<\/p>\n 9. The suspension of pronouncement of judgment provisions […] shall not be applicable in respect of the offences herein.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201c23 \u2013 Provisions regarding proceedings<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 2. Article 135 of the Criminal Code of Procedure shall be applicable in respect of the offences listed in section 11 of this law…\u201d<\/p>\n 22. Article 135 of the CPP (Law no. 5271) concerning the interception and recording of communications and Article 138\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 governing the case of \u201ccoincidental evidence\u201d obtained during interception that does not relate to the offence for which authorisation was given but to another catalogue offence listed in Article 135 can be found in the Karabeyo\u011flu v. Turkey (no.\u00a030083\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 39-48, 7 June 2016).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 23. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 AND 2 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 24. The first applicant, under Article 6, and the second applicant under Articles\u00a06 and 13 of the Convention, complained that the Arbitration Committee lacked independence and impartiality on account of the Turkish Football Federation\u2019s management and influence on the Board. They further complained that the recusal of the Arbitration Committee\u2019s president, without disclosing the reasons for doing so, had been incompatible with the same provision of the Convention. They further complained under Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention that their right to be presumed innocent had been violated in the proceedings before the Turkish Football Federation on account of the reasoning and wording employed by the Arbitration Committee before the criminal proceedings on identical charges were final. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 only (see Sukhorubchenko v. Russia, no. 69315\/01, \u00a7 60, 10 February 2005; mutatis mutandis, Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, \u00a7 187, ECHR 2004\u2011II; and Popov v. Moldova (no. 1), no. 74153\/01, \u00a7 58, 18 January 2005), the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal …<\/p>\n 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.\u201d<\/p>\n 25. The Government contested the applicants\u2019 complaints.<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Applicability ratione materiae of Article 6 \u00a7 1 to disciplinary proceedings before the TFF<\/em><\/p>\n 26. The Government considered that Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention was not applicable to the proceedings before the TFF. They submitted that disputes concerning the administration and discipline of sports activities were of exclusive concern to the sports community and could not be characterised as falling within the scope of civil rights or obligations.<\/p>\n 27. The applicants contended that the disciplinary proceedings concerned their civil rights in as much as they resulted in the temporary suspension from their executive duties.<\/p>\n 28. The Court notes that the proceedings at issue did not relate to the determination of a criminal charge, and for this reason the criminal limb of Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 does not apply (see, mutatis mutandis, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no.\u00a076639\/11, \u00a7 43, 25 September 2018).<\/p>\n 29. However, the Court has consistently held that disciplinary proceedings in which the right to continue to exercise a profession is at stake give rise to disputes (\u201ccontestations\u201d) over civil rights within the meaning of Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 (see, inter alia, K\u00f6nig v. Germany, 28 June 1978, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a087-95, Series\u00a0A no. 27, and Di Giovanni v. Italy, no. 51160\/06, \u00a7\u00a036, 9\u00a0July 2013). Since the applicants\u2019 right to continue to serve as executive officials in the sports club was at stake in the disciplinary proceedings against them, the Court considers that Article 6 \u00a7 1 is applicable under its civil head.<\/p>\n 30. The Court therefore finds that Article 6 is applicable ratione materiae to the disputes forming the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings before the TFF to which the applicants were parties.<\/p>\n 2. Applicability of Article 6 \u00a7 2 in the context of the disciplinary proceedings before the TFF<\/em><\/p>\n 31. Article 6 \u00a7 2 safeguards the right to be \u201cpresumed innocent until proved guilty according to law\u201d. The Court has acknowledged in its case-law the existence of two aspects to the protection afforded by the presumption of innocence: a procedural aspect relating to the conduct of the criminal trial, and a second aspect which aims to ensure respect for the applicant\u2019s established innocence in the context of subsequent proceedings where there is a link with criminal proceedings which have ended with a result other than a conviction (see, generally, Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a025424\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a093-94, ECHR 2013). Under its first aspect, the principle of presumption of innocence prohibits public officials from making premature statements about the defendant\u2019s guilt and acts as a procedural guarantee to ensure the fairness of the criminal trial itself. However, it is not limited to a procedural safeguard in criminal matters: its scope is broader and requires that no representative of the State should say that a person is guilty of an offence before his guilt has been established by a court (Konstas v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a053466\/07, \u00a7 32, 24 May 2011). In that connection, the Court reiterates that Article 6 \u00a7 2 applies where a court decision, rendered in proceedings which were not directed against the person concerned in his or her capacity as an \u201caccused\u201d but nevertheless concerned and had a link with criminal proceedings simultaneously pending against him or her, may have implied a premature assessment of the person\u2019s guilt (see El Kaada v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a02130\/10, \u00a7 37, 12 November 2015 with further references).<\/p>\n 32. As to the period of time during which the presumption of innocence is applicable, the Court reiterates that Article 6 \u00a7 2 applies to everyone \u201ccharged with a criminal offence\u201d within the autonomous meaning of this notion in the Convention, that is to say as of the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he or she has committed a criminal offence (see Bikas v. Germany, no. 76607\/13, \u00a7\u00a030, 25\u00a0January 2018) or from the point at which his or her situation has been substantially affected by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against her or him (see Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a021980\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0110-11, 12 May 2017 and the case-law cited therein).<\/p>\n 33. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention on 7 July 2011 and charged with, inter alia, match-fixing offences in the bill of indictment lodged with the criminal court on 2 November 2011. Following their placement in pre-trial detention and the commencement of criminal proceedings, the TFF started a disciplinary investigation against the applicants. The Court notes in that connection that the parties do not dispute the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicants leading to their suspension from their executive duties were directly related to the events leading to the criminal proceedings. The fact that the disciplinary authorities of the TFF examined the criminal file and based their reasoning solely on its contents \u2013 and specifically on the transcripts of the applicants\u2019 tapped telephone conversations which had been authorised for the criminal proceedings \u2013 is sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that a strong link existed between the criminal and disciplinary proceedings that rendered Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 applicable in the context of the latter. Thus, the authorities in the disciplinary proceedings, including the Arbitration Committee, were under a duty not to call into question the applicants\u2019 innocence vis-\u00e0-vis the offences they had been charged in the criminal proceedings. It therefore follows that this part of the applications is not incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.<\/p>\n 3. Exhaustion of domestic remedies<\/em><\/p>\n 34. The Government argued that the applicants had not exhausted the available remedies against the Arbitration Committee\u2019s decision. While they admitted that the Arbitration Committee\u2019s decision had been final and not amenable to any appeal, they argued that the applicants could have requested the reopening of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 35. The applicants submitted that an application to reopen the proceedings could not be considered an effective remedy in their case. They argued that such applications were only admissible if there were valid grounds justifying the reopening of the proceedings. According to section 93 of the disciplinary regulations, only a situation where evidence previously relied on by the disciplinary authorities was perjured or new evidence came to light that could affect the outcome of the proceedings or amendments were made to legislation providing for favourable provisions could be considered as valid grounds. In their case, while their criminal conviction had been overturned, the proceedings before the criminal courts had still been ongoing and were not final and for this reason they could not request a retrial of the disciplinary proceedings.<\/p>\n 36. The Court refers to its well-established case law concerning the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies, as summarised, for instance, in Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos.\u00a017153\/11 and\u00a029 others, \u00a7\u00a7 69-77, 25 March 2014). The Court reiterates that Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, which sets out the rules on exhaustion of domestic remedies, provides for a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non\u2011exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. Once this burden of proof has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement.<\/p>\n 37. The Court notes that the decision of 4 June 2012 of the Arbitration Committee was not susceptible to appeal before any court, including the Constitutional Court, and therefore was final. The provisions allowing for reopening do not suggest that a non-final acquittal in the criminal proceedings could be considered as valid grounds for reopening of disciplinary proceedings arising out of the same events. Furthermore, the Government have not provided any example from the practice of the PFDK in which a plea based on non-final acquittal in criminal proceedings has been successfully relied on in a situation comparable to that of the applicants. The Court therefore rejects the Government\u2019s objection on the ground of non\u2013exhaustion.<\/p>\n 4. Conclusion as to admissibility<\/em><\/p>\n 38. The Court notes that the above-mentioned complaints made by the applicants are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Independence and impartiality of the Arbitration Committee<\/em><\/p>\n 39. The Court observes that it has already examined the same grievance in the case of Ali R\u0131za and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 201-222). In that judgment, the Court held that the Arbitration Committee could not be considered to have been independent and impartial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention because of the Board of Directors\u2019 \u2013 the executive body of the TFF\u00a0\u2013 had significant influence over the Arbitration Committee\u2019s organisation and functioning. The Court further noted that the TFF law did not provide appropriate safeguards to protect members of the Arbitration Committee from any outside pressure and neither was there a specific procedure to deal with challenges to an Arbitration Committee member on the ground of lack of independence and impartiality (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 212 and 215).<\/p>\n 40. The Court has examined the present case and finds no particular circumstances which would require it to depart from its findings in the aforementioned Ali R\u0131za and Others judgment (ibid., \u00a7 222).<\/p>\n 41. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 2. The fairness of the proceedings and presumption of innocence under Article 6 \u00a7 2<\/em><\/p>\n 42. Having regard to its finding that the Arbitration Committee did not satisfy the requirements of independence and impartiality under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, it considers that the applicants\u2019 complaints about the fairness of the proceedings before the Arbitration Committee, including the right of access to a court, and their right to respect for presumption of innocence do not need to be examined separately (see, Ali R\u0131za and Others, cited above, \u00a7 226 and, mutatis mutandis, Kar and Others v. Turkey, no.\u00a058756\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 27 and 32, 3 May 2007).<\/p>\n III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 43. The applicants complained that the interception of their telephone conservations had been unlawful in the context of the criminal investigation and that the use of the transcripts of their telephone conversations as evidence in the disciplinary proceedings before the PFDK and the Arbitration Committee had run counter to Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.<\/p>\n 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 44. The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies as required by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention since they had failed to lodge a compensation claim before the administrative court against public officials for unlawful interception of their communications.<\/p>\n 45. Relying on the Court\u2019s findings in Karabeyo\u011flu (cited above, \u00a7 60), the applicants argued that the remedy mentioned by the Government could not be considered effective for their grievances because administrative courts did not make any assessment with regard to the guarantees under Article 8 of the Convention when the impugned surveillance measure was authorised by a judicial measure.<\/p>\n 46. The Court refers to its findings in previous cases concerning administrative law compensation proceedings that such a remedy had not been shown to be effective for a surveillance measure authorised by a judicial decision (see Karabeyo\u011flu, cited above, \u00a7 60, and Mustafa Sezgin Tanr\u0131kulu v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 27473\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 24-28, 18 July 2017). The Government have presented no arguments, nor referred to any case-law of the domestic courts, which could lead the Court to a different conclusion.<\/p>\n 47. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 48. The Court further finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 49. The applicants maintained their arguments.<\/p>\n 50. The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 8 of the Convention. In any event, they considered the interference to have satisfied the lawfulness requirement on account of section 23 \u00a7 2 of Law no. 6222 which provided that telephone tapping measures could also be sought in case of the offence of match-fixing and that the relevant Article 135 of the CPP would apply. In as much as there had been a judicial authorisation for the interception of the applicants\u2019 communications covering the period from 14 April 2011, that is the period after Law no. 6222 came into force, the measure could not be said to have been devoid of legal basis. As regards the use of transcripts of those conversations as evidence in the disciplinary proceedings against the applicants, the Government did not point to a provision in domestic law where such use was authorised, but they considered that a reading of the provisions contained in Law no. 6222 together with disciplinary regulations and the overall duty of the TFF to combat match-fixing made such a use justified.<\/p>\n 51. The Court observes at the outset that telephone conversations are covered by the notions of \u201cprivate life\u201d and \u201ccorrespondence\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 (see, among other authorities, Craxi v. Italy (no.\u00a02), no.\u00a025337\/94, \u00a7 57, 17 July 2003, and Drak\u0161as v. Lithuania, no.\u00a036662\/04, \u00a7\u00a052, 31 July 2012). Therefore, the telephone tapping measures complained of by the applicants and the use of records of their conversations in the context of the impugned disciplinary proceedings constitute an interference within the meaning of that Article (see, for a similar conclusion, Karabeyo\u011flu, cited above, \u00a7 76).<\/p>\n 52. The Court further reiterates that in the Karabeyo\u011flu case (cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119) it found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the disciplinary authorities\u2019 reliance on the records of tapping of telephone conversations which had actually been authorised for the purpose of criminal proceedings. The Court noted in that case that such interference had not been \u201cprovided for by law\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7 119).<\/p>\n 53. The Court notes that the facts of the present case are similar to the ones examined in Karabeyo\u011flu (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0112-21). In that connection, it notes that the tapping of the applicants\u2019 telephone lines was authorised only for the purpose of a criminal investigation and in particular for the offence of setting up an organisation with a view to committing crimes. No provision of domestic law allowed for the use of such data as part of a disciplinary investigation. It therefore follows that the use of recordings of their tapped telephone conversations was not in conformity with domestic legislation.<\/p>\n 54. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention as regards the use, in the context of the disciplinary investigation, of the recordings of the telephone conversations of the applicants.<\/p>\n IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 55. Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 56. The first applicant did not make a claim for just satisfaction. Thus, the Court is not in a position to award him any amount.<\/p>\n 57. The second applicant claimed a total of 156,822 Euros (EUR) in respect of (i) loss of income he suffered as a result of his detention pending the criminal proceedings, (ii) loss of income on account of a loss of reputation as a result of the proceedings before the TFF, and (iii) costs and expenses incurred during the pre-trial detention period. He further claimed EUR\u00a087,000 for non-pecuniary damages in respect of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. As regards costs and expenses he claimed EUR 4,406.05 which consisted of the cost of his legal representation in the criminal proceedings and other expenses he had incurred in taking measures to protect his public image against press articles reporting the proceedings against him.<\/p>\n 58. The Government contested the claims, considering that there was no causal connection between the damage claimed by the applicant and the violations alleged. In any event, they considered the sums to be excessive.<\/p>\n 59. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the second applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR\u00a06,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.<\/p>\n 60. As regards the applicant\u2019s claim for costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that costs incurred in the domestic proceedings may only be reimbursed as far as they were necessary in order to prevent or redress the violation found (see, for instance, Moser v. Austria, no. 12643\/02, \u00a7 115, 21\u00a0September 2006). In the present case the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings were not related to the violations found. The Court therefore rejects those claims.<\/p>\n 61. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2. Declares the applications admissible;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints under Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 6. Holds that the respondent State is to pay the second applicant (\u015e.\u00a0Mosturo\u011flu), within three months, EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, and that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 7. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 June 2021, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stanley Naismith \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Valeriu Gri\u0163co
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nPauliine Koskelo, judges,
\nand Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n![\"INTRODUCTION\"](\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/INTRODUCTION.jpg\")
<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n