54915\/09<\/a>, 29 May 2018).\u00a0Particularly relevant to the subject matter of the present application, the Court should reiterate that it has expressed its misgivings as regards the use of civilian volunteers such as village guards in a quasi-police function (see, amongst others, SeyfettinAcar v. Turkey, no. 30742\/03, \u00a7\u00a034, 6\u00a0October 2009 and the cases cited therein; andAv\u015far v. Turkey, no.\u00a025657\/94, \u00a7 414, ECHR 2001\u2011VII (extracts)).<\/p>\n12.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that, in cases concerning persons who have disappeared or have been killed by unknown perpetrators and where there is prima facie evidence in the case file supporting allegations that the domestic investigation fell short of what is necessary under the Convention, a unilateral declaration should at the very least contain an admission to that effect, combined with an undertaking by the respondent Government to conduct an investigation that is in full compliance with the requirements of the Convention as defined by the Court in previous similar cases (seeTahsinAcar, cited above, \u00a7 84and the cases cited therein). Indeed, the Court has rejected unilateral declarations submitted by the respondent Governments in cases in which there were no such undertakings to reopen the investigations, on the ground that respect for human rights required that the examination of the case be pursued pursuant to the final sentence of Article\u00a037 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see Mishina v.\u00a0Russia, no. 30204\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a023-30, 3\u00a0October 2017 and the cases cited therein; see also, mutatis\u00a0mutandis,To\u011fcu v. Turkey, no. 27601\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a010\u201114, 31 May 2005).<\/p>\n
13.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts, however, that there may be situations where it is de jure or de facto impossible to reopen criminal investigations into the incidents giving rise to the applications being examined by the Court. Such situations may arise, for example, in cases in which the alleged perpetrators were acquitted and cannot be put on trial for the same offence, or in cases in which the criminal proceedings became time-barred on account of the statute of limitations set out in the national legislation.\u00a0Indeed, reopening of criminal proceedings which had been terminated on account of the expiry of the limitation period may raise issues concerning legal certainty (see Co\u00ebme and Others v. Belgium, nos. 32492\/96 and 4 others, \u00a7 145, ECHR 2000\u2011VII) and may thus have a bearing on a defendant\u2019s rights under Article\u00a07 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis,Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no.\u00a036376\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 228-233, ECHR 2010). In a similar vein, putting the same defendant on trial for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted may raise issues concerning that defendant\u2019s right not to be tried or punished twice, within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention (see Margu\u0161 v. Croatia[GC], no. 4455\/10, \u00a7\u00a0114, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).<\/p>\n
14.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the examples of de jure impossibilities mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Court cannot overlook the possibility that if a long time has passed since the incident took place, evidence might have disappeared, been destroyed or become untraceable and it may therefore in practice no longer be possible to reopen an investigation and conduct it in an effective fashion.<\/p>\n
15.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, whether a Member State is under an obligation to reopen criminal proceedings, and consequently whether a unilateral declaration should contain such an undertaking, will depend on the specific circumstances of the case, including the nature and the seriousness of the alleged violation, the identity of the alleged perpetrator, whether other persons not involved in the proceedings may have been implicated, the reason why the criminal proceedings were terminated, the shortcomings and any defects in the criminal proceedings preceding the decision to bring the criminal proceedings to an end, and whether the alleged perpetrator contributed to the shortcomings and defects that led to the criminal proceedings being brought to an end.<\/p>\n
16.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that, although the unilateral declaration contains an express acknowledgement by the Government that the use of lethal force resulting in the death of the applicant\u2019s son and the investigation conducted into the death did not meet the standards enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention, it does not contain any undertakings by the Government to reopen the investigation into the killing. The question therefore remains whether, in the light of the absence of such an undertaking, the Court can accept the Government\u2019s unilateral declaration.<\/p>\n
17.\u00a0\u00a0It should be observed in this connection that a number of village guards were put on trial for the killing of the applicant\u2019s son and were subsequently acquitted for having acted in self-defence by using proportionate force (see paragraph 3 above). Under Turkish law, a trial which ended in a definitive judgment can only be reopened to the detriment of a person convicted or acquitted in the previous proceedings if at least one of the conditions set out in section 314 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is satisfied (namely, if a document which was submitted during the trial in defence of the defendant or the convicted person and which had a bearing on the conclusion reached by the trial court had been forged; if any of the judges who had participated in the decision committed a fault while performing their duty, and provided that the fault was in favour of the accused or the convicted person and that it was of a nature necessitating a criminal prosecution or a conviction; or if the defendant, after having been acquitted, makes a reliable confession before a judge in relation to the offence). The Court observes that there is no information in the case file to suggest that any of those provisions is applicable to the village guards acquitted of the killing of the applicant\u2019s son in the present application. It is therefore de jure impossible to bring new criminal proceedings against them for the killing of the applicant\u2019s son.<\/p>\n
18.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection and in the circumstances of the present application the Court considers it to be relevant and important to take note of the fact that the identities of the perpetrators who killed the applicant\u2019s son are not in dispute; the village guards were not acquitted because there were doubts about whether or not they were the actual perpetrators of the killing of the applicant\u2019s son, but because it was held that they had acted in self-defence (see paragraph 3 above). There is moreover no allegation that other individuals had also been involved in the killing of the applicant\u2019s son. The Court therefore considers, like the Grand Chamber did in TahsinAcar, that further investigation of the facts either by domestic authorities or by the Court could be regarded as \u201cless pressing\u201d. To that end it is important to note that, in their unilateral declaration in the present application the respondent Government have also assumed liability for the killing under Article 2 of the Convention and undertaken to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that the right to life \u2013 including the obligation to carry out effective investigations \u2013 is respected in the future (see TahsinAcar, cited above, \u00a7\u00a082).<\/p>\n
19.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that a de jure impossibility to reopen proceedings in cases concerning complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention is not, in principle, an impediment for the Committee of Ministers to close its examinations under Article 46 of the Convention. For example, following the Grand Chamber\u2019s finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural aspect in the above-mentioned case of Jeronovi\u010ds, the applicant requested the national prosecutor to reopen the investigation into his allegations. His request was rejected on account of the expiry of the limitation period. In its Resolution concerning the Grand Chamber\u2019s judgment the Committee of Ministers considered that all the measures required by Article 46 \u00a7 1 of the Convention had been adopted, and decided to close its investigation (see\u00a0Resolution CM\/ResDH(2017)312).<\/p>\n
20.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers it relevant and important to note that the amount of compensation proposed by the Government in their unilateral declaration in the present application, namely 60,000 euros (see paragraph\u00a06 above), is comparable to the amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see, inter alia, G\u00fclbahar\u00d6zerand Others v. Turkey, no. 44125\/06, \u00a7\u00a085, 2\u00a0July 2013;Cang\u00f6z and Others v. Turkey, no. 7469\/06, \u00a7 173, 26 April 2016; and Karata\u015f and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0101).<\/p>\n
21.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the facts of the case, the nature of the admissions contained in the Government\u2019s declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed, the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c)). The Court stresses that its decision is without prejudice to the possibility for the applicants to exercise any other available remedies in order to obtain redress (see Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia (dec.), no. 547\/02, \u00a7 54, 10 February 2009, and, mutatis mutandis, Jeronovi\u010ds, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 116-118).<\/p>\n
22.\u00a0\u00a0As it has done in the above-mentioned judgment in the case of Jeronovi\u010ds (ibid, \u00a7 117), the Court deems it important to stress that the unilateral declaration procedure is an exceptional one. As such, when it comes to breaches of the most fundamental rights contained in the Convention, it is not intended either to circumvent\u00a0the applicant\u2019s opposition to a friendly settlement or to allow the Government to escape their responsibility for such breaches. In the present case, the Court has examined all the circumstances surrounding the killing of the applicant\u2019s son and the ensuing criminal proceedings into the killing in the light of the clear and extensive case-law on the topic mentioned above (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a011).<\/p>\n
23.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic referred to above, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine). In particular, the Court considers that the prevailing issues in Turkey in these kinds of cases, including the issue of organisation and control of operations by, inter alia, village guards which is the subject matter of the present application, have already been examined in a number of its judgments (see, mutatis mutandis, TahsinAcar, cited above, \u00a7\u00a081). Furthermore, the said prevailing issues in Turkey have also sufficiently been brought to the attention of the Committee of Ministers and they are being followed up under the terms of Article 46 \u00a7 2 of the Convention.<\/p>\n
24.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court emphasises that, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration, the application could be restored to the list in accordance with Article\u00a037 \u00a7 2 of the Convention (Josipovi\u0107 v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18369\/07, 4\u00a0March 2008).<\/p>\n
25.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list.<\/p>\n
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n
Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government\u2019s declaration under Article 2 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;<\/p>\n
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) of the Convention.<\/p>\n
Done in English and notified in writing on 4 April 2019.<\/p>\n
Stanley Naismith\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Robert Spano
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n