Article 10<\/strong><\/p>\nUnjustified sanctioning of NGO for disseminating election-monitoring material on the basis of statutory ban on all election-related publications during pre-election \u201csilence period\u201d: violation<\/p>\n
Facts \u2013 The first applicant was a not-for-profit association created by several non-governmental organisations aiming to provide short-term and long\u2011term monitoring of electoral campaigns. On an unspecified date in 2011, the first applicant launched a project, in partnership with an Internet news outlet, which consisted in creating a website called \u201cMap of Violations\u201d; its own website had textual or visual hyperlinks to this project website. Following a complaint by a group of State Duma members and the Chief Officer of the Central Elections Committee, administrative offence proceedings were instituted against the first applicant resulting in its conviction for the internet publication of election-related materials (including texts, visual material, an interactive map and a list of results following a key-word search) during the electoral campaign to the State Duma within the \u201csilence period\u201d prohibiting the dissemination of certain information during the five days preceding an election day provided by the Electoral Rights Act 2002. A fine was also imposed. The first applicant\u2019s appeal and subsequent request for review were dismissed as were the review requests made by the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman.<\/p>\n
The applicants complained under Article 10 that the proceedings against the first applicant had interfered \u2013 through the enforcement of the statutory ban on all election-related publications in the days preceding the election day \u2013 with the election monitoring project that they had been running or had otherwise engaged in.<\/p>\n
Law \u2013 Article 10:<\/p>\n
The dissemination of the impugned materials on both the NGO\u2019s and the project website and the provision of the project\u2019s Internet platform for user\u2011generated content had amounted to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 \u00a7 1. The first applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence constituted an \u201cinterference\u201d with its freedom of expression aimed at protecting the \u201crights of others\u201d. The interference, however, had not been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d. More specifically, the domestic courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for enforcing the temporal restriction in the present case, to apply standards in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 or to conduct an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. In particular, they had failed to discuss or even refer to any of the internet printouts that had been before them, to establish that the impugned materials had been uploaded or otherwise \u201cpublished\u201d within the relevant statutory five-day period, to specify what elements had led them to conclude that the impugned material fell within the scope of the notion of \u201cresearch report\u201d \u2013 one of the notions of material under the Electoral Rights Act – and to assess in any detail the content of various Internet publications on either website. The Court was not able to discern from their reasoning any element allowing them to reach the conclusion that any such material could reasonably amount to \u201cresearch reports\u201d \u201crelating to\u201d the ongoing election period.<\/p>\n
It appeared that the first applicant\u2019s conviction had been related to the printouts showing user-generated content, specifically texts alleging violations of the electoral legislation, and the interactive map of Russia. It was uncontested that this interactive and constantly updated map had been made available prior to the \u201csilence period\u201d. The application of that period to that technological tool and the first applicant\u2019s conviction meant, in substance, that it had been unlawful under domestic law to impart in this manner data on a matter of public interest. The domestic courts\u2019 reasoning had contained no elements disclosing whether that aspect of the interference was convincingly shown to have been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n
The first applicant, who had provided an Internet platform for users to generate content, specifically reports of alleged violations during the ongoing election period, had been punished, in substance, for continuing to run (for not suspending) \u2013 during the \u201csilence period\u201d \u2013 the Map of Violations online project, including the operation of the online interactive map. The unspecified nature of the charge against it in the administrative-offence report (deemed to constitute an act of accusation under the Federal Code of Administrative Offences) and the courts\u2019 rather superficial approach to assessing this charge had also created an unjustified \u201cchilling effect\u201d vis-\u00e0-vis the first applicant\u2019s exercise of its \u201csocial watchdog\u201d function. When an NGO drew attention to matters of public interest, it was exercising a \u201cpublic watchdog\u201d role of similar importance to that of the press and might be characterised as a \u201csocial watchdog\u201d warranting similar protection under the Convention as that afforded to the press.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, the overbroad reach of the electoral legislation on the \u201csilence period\u201d extending to all material \u201crelating to\u201d an ongoing election \u2013 as interpreted and applied by the domestic courts and as confirmed by the Government in the present case \u2013 had disproportionately interfered with the first applicant\u2019s exercise of the freedom to impart information and ideas on issues relating to the running of free and fair elections to the national legislature, specifically in so far as some publications had not been classified, for instance, as (last-minute) partisan or adverse political campaigning. In this connection, the Court considered that election observers should generally be able to draw the public\u2019s attention to potential violations of electoral laws and procedures as they occur, otherwise such reporting would lose much of its value and interest.<\/p>\n
There was little scope under Article 10 \u00a7 2 for restrictions on freedom of expression in the fields of political speech and other matters of public interest, including during electoral periods. Although, it could be assumed that the imposition of a short \u201csilence and reflection period\u201d on active campaigning before an election fell, in principle, within the scope of the State\u2019s discretion in regulating certain forms of electoral campaigning with a view to safeguarding the democratic order within their own political systems, in the present case it had been overstepped by the sanctioning of the dissemination during the silence period of all content that could be considered as \u201crelating to\u201d a forthcoming election.<\/p>\n
Conclusion: violation (unanimously) in respect of the first applicant.<\/p>\n
The Court also held, unanimously, that there was no need to examine the first applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6.<\/p>\n
Article 41: claims in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage dismissed.<\/p>\n
(See also Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 48876\/08, 22 April 2013, Legal Summary; Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, 42911\/08, 21 February 2017, Legal Summary; OOO Informatsionnoye Agentstvo Tambov-Inform v. Russia, 43351\/12, 18 May 2021)<\/p>\n