The present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants \u2013 all of whom were sitting as judges or prosecutors at different types and\/or levels of court at the material time \u2013 on suspicion of their membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the\u00a0\u201cFetullahist Terrorist Organisation \/ Parallel State Structure\u201d (Fetullah\u00e7\u0131 Ter\u00f6r \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc \/ Paralel Devlet Yap\u0131lanmas\u0131, hereinafter referred to as \u201cFET\u00d6\/PDY\u201d), in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.<\/p>\n
SECOND SECTION Art 5 \u00a7 1 \u2022 Lawful detention \u2022 Pre-trial detention of judges suspected of membership of an illegal organisation following a coup attempt, on the basis of an unreasonable extension of the concept of\u00a0in flagrante delicto<\/p>\n STRASBOURG This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Turan and Others v. Turkey,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the applications (nos.\u00a075805\/16 and 426 others\u2013 see appended list) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by 427 Turkish nationals (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Turkish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the complaints under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 19 October 2021,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants \u2013 all of whom were sitting as judges or prosecutors at different types and\/or levels of court at the material time \u2013 on suspicion of their membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the\u00a0\u201cFetullahist Terrorist Organisation \/ Parallel State Structure\u201d (Fetullah\u00e7\u0131 Ter\u00f6r \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc \/ Paralel Devlet Yap\u0131lanmas\u0131, hereinafter referred to as \u201cFET\u00d6\/PDY\u201d), in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. At the time of the events giving rise to the present applications, they were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court, or served as judges in lower courts (hereinafter referred to as \u201cordinary judges\u201d) or as prosecutors.<\/p>\n 3. Some of the applicants were represented\u00a0by\u00a0lawyers, whose names are listed in the\u00a0appendix. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Hac\u0131 Ali A\u00e7\u0131kg\u00fcl, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Turkey.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n I. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE<\/p>\n A. Attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and declaration of a state of emergency<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the \u201cPeace at Home Council\u201d attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically installed National Assembly, government and President of Turkey. Further information regarding the events of that night may be found in the case of Ba\u015f v. Turkey (no. 66448\/17, \u00a7 7, 3 March 2020).<\/p>\n 6. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the attempt on the network linked to Fetullah G\u00fclen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of FET\u00d6\/PDY.<\/p>\n 7. On 16 July 2016 the Bureau for Crimes against the Constitutional Order at the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office initiated a criminal investigation ex proprio motu into, inter alios, the suspected members of FET\u00d6\/PDY within the judiciary. According to the information provided by the Government, this investigation against judges and prosecutors, including members of high courts, was initiated in accordance with the provisions of the ordinary law, on the ground that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling with the jurisdiction of the assize courts.<\/p>\n 8. In instructions issued to the Directorate General of Security on the same day, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor noted that the offence of attempting to overthrow the government and the constitutional order by force was still ongoing and that there was a risk that members of the FET\u00d6\/PDY terrorist organisation who were suspected of committing the offence in question might flee the country. He asked the Directorate General of Security to contact all the regional authorities with a view to taking into police custody all the judges and public prosecutors whose names were listed in the appendix to the instructions \u2013 including some of the applicants\u00a0\u2013, and to ensure that they were brought before a public prosecutor to be placed in pre-trial detention under Article\u00a0309 of the Criminal Code.<\/p>\n 9. On 20 July 2016 the Government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers.<\/p>\n 10. On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article\u00a015 (for the contents of the notice, see Alparslan Altan v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a012778\/17, \u00a7 66, 16 April 2019, or Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 109).<\/p>\n 11. During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers passed several legislative decrees under Article 121 of the Constitution (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 52). One of them, Legislative Decree no.\u00a0667, published in the Official Gazette on 23\u00a0July 2016, provided in its Article 3 that the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savc\u0131lar Y\u00fcksek Kurulu \u2011\u201cthe HSYK\u201d) was authorised to dismiss any judges or prosecutors who were considered to belong or to be affiliated or linked to terrorist organisations or organisations, structures or groups found by the National Security Council to have engaged in activities harmful to national security.<\/p>\n 12. On 18 July 2018 the state of emergency was lifted.<\/p>\n B. Suspensions and dismissals<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Suspensions of ordinary judges and prosecutors<\/em><\/p>\n 13. On 16 July 2016 the 3rd Chamber of the HSYK noted that, in accordance with the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor, a criminal investigation had been initiated in respect of judges and prosecutors suspected of being members of FET\u00d6\/PDY (see paragraph 7\u00a0above). It decided to submit a proposal to the chairman of the HSYK to approve the opening of an investigation, in accordance with section 82 of Law no.\u00a02802 on judges and prosecutors (\u201cLaw no.\u00a02802\u201d) (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a067, for the relevant section of Law no. 2802).<\/p>\n 14. On the same day, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK held an extraordinary meeting. It noted that the proposal by the 3rd Chamber for the opening of an investigation had been accepted by the chairman of the HSYK and that the presidency of the Inspection Board of the Ministry of Justice had appointed a chief inspector. On the basis of the report drawn up by the chief inspector, the 2nd\u00a0Chamber of the HSYK suspended 2,735 judges and prosecutors \u2013 including some of the applicants \u2013 from their duties for a period of three months, pursuant to sections 77(1) and 81(1) of Law no.\u00a02802, on the grounds that there was strong suspicion that they were members of the terrorist organisation that had instigated the attempted coup and that keeping them in their posts would hinder the progress of the investigation and undermine the authority and reputation of the judiciary. Its decision was based on information and documents in the investigation files that it had been sent prior to the coup attempt and on information obtained following research by the intelligence services. Further details regarding the HSYK\u2019s decision may be found in the Ba\u015f case (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 17-20).<\/p>\n 15. It appears from the information provided by the Government that by decisions taken on 19 and 22 July, 10 August and 13 October 2016, the\u00a0HSYK decided to suspend more judges and prosecutors from their duties \u2013including some of the applicants \u2013 on grounds similar to those in its earlier decision of 16\u00a0July 2016.<\/p>\n 2. Suspensions of members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court<\/em><\/p>\n 16. On 17 July 2016 the 1st Presidency Board of the Court of Cassation issued a decision (no. 244\/a) revoking the existing authorities of the members of the Court of Cassation whose names had been indicated by the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office, including some of the applicants. A\u00a0similar decision (no.\u00a02016\/27) was taken by the Presidency Board of the Supreme Administrative Court on the same date in respect of its members concerned, including, once again, some of the applicants.<\/p>\n 3. Dismissals<\/em><\/p>\n 17. On 24 August 2016, applying Article 3 of Legislative Decree no.\u00a0667 (noted in paragraph 11 above), the plenary HSYK dismissed 2,847 judges and prosecutors \u2013 including many of the applicants \u2013 considered to be members of or affiliated or linked to FET\u00d6\/PDY (decision no. 2016\/426). The HSYK found that the position of the judges and prosecutors concerned within structures that were incompatible with the principles of independence and impartiality and their activities within the organisation\u2019s hierarchy, coupled with their underlying sense of allegiance, were likely to undermine the reputation and authority of the judiciary. It held that the fact that judges and prosecutors obeyed the instructions of a hierarchical structure outside the State apparatus presented a genuine obstacle to the right of citizens to a fair trial.<\/p>\n 18. According to the information provided by the parties, a total of a further 1,393\u00a0judges and prosecutors were dismissed from the profession in the following months, including some of the applicants.<\/p>\n II. APPLICANTS\u2019 ARREST AND PRE-TRIAL DETENTION<\/p>\n A. Decisions for the applicants\u2019 arrest and pre-trial detention<\/strong><\/p>\n 19. Acting on the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (see paragraph 8 above), regional and provincial prosecutors\u2019 offices initiated criminal investigations in respect of individuals suspected of being involved in the coup attempt and\/or alleged to have links to the FET\u00d6\/PDY organisation, including the applicants.<\/p>\n 20. Following their arrest and detention in police custody, the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention on various dates between 18\u00a0July 2016 and 19\u00a0October 2016, mainly on suspicion of membership of the FET\u00d6\/PDY organisation, an offence punishable under Article 314 of the Criminal Code (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 58). The pre-trial detention orders were issued by the magistrates\u2019 courts located at the respective places of the applicants\u2019 arrest.<\/p>\n 21. When ordering the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention, the magistrates\u2019 courts relied mainly on the fact that the applicants had been suspended from their duties as judges or prosecutors on the grounds of their membership of the organisation that had instigated the attempted coup and that the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office had requested the launching of a criminal investigation in their regard. The magistrates noted the existence of further incriminating evidence in respect of some of the applicants, such as witness statements or evidence suggesting their use of the ByLock messaging system. Regard being had to the state of the evidence, the nature of the alleged offence or offences \u2013 which were among the so-called \u2018catalogue\u2019\u00a0offences listed in Article\u00a0100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) \u2013, the potential sentences and the ongoing investigations into the coup attempt across the country, the magistrates\u2019 courts held that pre-trial detention was a proportionate measure. In the majority of the decisions, it was noted specifically that the criminal investigation was governed by the ordinary rules, given that the offence of which the suspects were accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a\u00a0\u2019continuing offence\u2019\u00a0(temadi\u00a0olan\u00a0su\u00e7)\u00a0and that there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto governed by the relevant provisions of domestic law (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a067, as regards the relevant section 94 of Law\u00a0no.\u00a02802, and paragraphs\u00a030 and 31 below as regards Laws nos.\u00a02797 or 2575, respectively).<\/p>\n 22. On different dates the magistrates\u2019 courts dismissed the applicants\u2019 objections against the initial orders for their detention, mainly on the same grounds as those indicated in the initial detention orders.<\/p>\n 23. The applicants\u2019 continued pre-trial detention was reviewed automatically pursuant to Article 108 of the CCP, which provides for a review every thirty days (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 62). Their requests for release were examined at the same time as the automatic periodic review of their detention, as provided under Article\u00a03, paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(\u00e7), of Legislative Decree no.\u00a0668 (ibid., \u00a7 81). The reviews, which were carried out on the basis of the case files, were not conducted on an individual basis but concerned a large group of suspects. Both the decisions to prolong the pre\u2011trial detention and the dismissals of the applicants\u2019 objections to their detention essentially involved a repetition of the reasons put forth at the time of the initial pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n B. Decisions concerning the applicants\u2019 continued pre-trial detention, and their indictment, trial and conviction<\/strong><\/p>\n 24. According to the information provided by the parties, on various dates the applicants were charged with membership of a terrorist organisation under Article\u00a0314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. During the subsequent trial stage, the first-instance courts, ruling either at the scheduled hearings or at periodic reviews carried out between the hearings, ordered the applicants\u2019 continued detention and dismissed their requests for release on grounds similar to those noted above.<\/p>\n 25. According to the latest information in the case file, the first-instance courts have concluded their examinations regarding all applicants, except for a few. Most of the applicants were convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation, and some sixteen applicants were acquitted. For the most part, the appeal proceedings are still pending before the regional courts of appeal or the Court of Cassation, as relevant, except in the case of a few applicants whose convictions or acquittals have become final.<\/p>\n C. Individual applications to the Constitutional Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 26. In the meantime, the applicants lodged one or more individual applications with the Constitutional Court in respect of, inter alia, the alleged violation of their right to liberty and security on various accounts, all of which were declared inadmissible.<\/p>\n 27. Amongst the complaints lodged by the applicants was the one concerning their detention in alleged breach of the procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors in domestic law and the lack of jurisdiction of the magistrates\u2019 courts that had ordered their detention, which the Constitutional Court found to be inadmissible. It held essentially that in view of the nature of the alleged offence and the manner in which it had been committed, it had been appropriate to accept the jurisdiction of the magistrates who had ordered the applicants\u2019 detention. In many of the decisions, it further stated expressly that there had been no error of assessment or any arbitrariness as regards the application of the provisions relating to discovery in flagrante delicto.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n I. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n 28. The relevant domestic law and practice, including the pertinent case\u2011law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, have for the most part been set out in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a046-48, 50-55 and 59-64) and Ba\u015f v. Turkey (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a052\u201167, 70, 81-90, 98-99, 101-103). Further elements of relevant domestic law and practice are summarised below.<\/p>\n A. Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (Law no. 5271)<\/strong><\/p>\n 29. The relevant parts of Article 141 \u00a7 1 of the CCP provide:<\/p>\n \u201cCompensation for damage … may be claimed from the State by anyone …<\/p>\n (a) who has been arrested or taken into or kept in detention under conditions or in circumstances not complying with the law;<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (d) who, even if he or she was detained lawfully during the investigation or trial, has not been brought before a judicial authority within a reasonable time and has not obtained a judgment on the merits within a reasonable time;<\/p>\n (e) who, after being arrested or detained in accordance with the law, was not subsequently committed for trial or was acquitted; …\u201d<\/p>\n B. Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797)<\/strong><\/p>\n 30. The relevant provision of the Court of Cassation Act (Law no.\u00a02797) provides:<\/p>\n Preliminary examination, investigation and prosecution of offences<\/strong><\/p>\n Personal and duty-related offences<\/strong><\/p>\n Section 46<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThe opening of an investigation against the First President, the first deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Court of Cassation, as well as the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, in respect of offences related to their official duties or personal offences shall be subject to the decision of the First Presidency Board. However, in cases of discovery\u00a0in flagrante delicto\u00a0falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of ordinary law.\u201d<\/p>\n C. Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575)<\/strong><\/p>\n 31. The relevant parts of the Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no.\u00a02575) provide:<\/p>\n Investigation<\/strong><\/p>\n Section 76<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c1. The initial investigation in respect of offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Supreme Administrative Court in connection with or in the course of their official duties shall be conducted by a committee composed of a chamber president and two members selected by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n The procedure for the prosecution of personal offences<\/strong><\/p>\n Section 82<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c1. The proceedings regarding the personal offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Supreme Administrative Court shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions concerning the personal offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the members of the Court of Cassation.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n D. Case-law of the Court of Cassation<\/strong><\/p>\n 32. On 2 July 2019 the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation delivered a judgment (E. 2019\/9.MD-312, K.2019\/514) regarding a former member of the HSYK suspected of membership of FET\u00d6\/PDY, where it addressed, inter alia, the question of the compatibility with domestic law of the conduct of the preliminary investigation in accordance with the rules of ordinary law. After summarising its case law relating to the elements of the offence of membership of an armed organisation, which it noted was a personal offence, and to the notion of \u201ccontinuing offence\u201d (see, in this regard, Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 83-86 and 90), the Court of Cassation proceeded with the examination of the concept of \u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d and its application in the context of continuing offences. Referring to the prevalent view in Turkish legal doctrine, the Court of Cassation held that continuing offences could be committed in flagrante delicto, and that the situation of discovery in flagrante delicto would persist in respect of continuing offences as long as the offence continued to be committed. The Court of Cassation pronounced as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c… As indicated as part of the general remarks regarding membership of an organisation, in order to establish the presence of membership, it is sufficient that the perpetrator continually submits (…) to the hierarchy of the organisation by his concrete actions … Accordingly, membership (…) does not need to be demonstrated by other acts … On the other hand, in the event that the competent authorities have obtained evidence that raises a suspicion that the perpetrator is a member of a criminal organisation, and that the continuity of the membership can be established on the basis of that evidence …, it is not contrary to the law to … accept that the perpetrator had been [caught] while committing the offence [in question], within the meaning of Article 2 (j), paragraph\u00a01 of the CCP, and that, therefore, [he or she] may be subject to the terms of discovery in flagrante delicto. It is not necessary here that the perpetrator\u2019s criminal act be observed by the general public; it is sufficient that the competent authorities know at the time of arrest that the acts demonstrating the continuity of the membership of the organisation persist and that the perpetrator had not left the organisation.\u201d<\/p>\n 33. The Court of Cassation held that contrary to the Court\u2019s findings in the case of Alparslan Altan, its interpretation of the concept of \u201cdiscovery in flagrante delicto\u201d in the context of the arrest of judges and prosecutors for alleged membership of FET\u00d6\/PDY was not based on an unreasonable and arbitrary judicial interpretation. Its approach, which had also found acceptance by the Constitutional Court, was rather grounded in doctrine, on the theory of organised crime and, above all, on domestic legal provisions that had been enacted by the legislature in a consistent and harmonious manner, which the Strasbourg Court had not taken into account.<\/p>\n 34. Referring to Article 161 \u00a7 8 of the CCP, the Court of Cassation further stated that in view of their nature and gravity, the investigation of certain offences, including that of membership of an armed organisation, would be conducted directly by the public prosecutors in accordance with the terms of the ordinary law, even if the offence was committed during, or in connection with, the performance of an official duty. Accordingly, where such grave offences were concerned, the requirements of Article 161 \u00a7 8 of the CCP would prevail and the special investigatory procedures envisaged in certain laws \u2013 such as Law no. 2797 in respect of the members of the Court of Cassation \u2013, would not be applicable, regardless of whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto or not. The Court of Cassation contended that in its Alparslan Altan judgment, the Court had failed to assess the issue of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention from the standpoint of Article\u00a0161 \u00a7\u00a08 of the CCP.<\/p>\n 35. The Court of Cassation concluded, in the light of the foregoing, that the conduct of the investigation against the defendant under the terms of the ordinary law had been in accordance with the relevant legal framework, that it had not resulted from an extensive or arbitrary interpretation of the law, and that it had thus been compatible with the requirements of the \u201cquality of law\u201d.<\/p>\n E. Case-law of the Constitutional Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Selim \u00d6zt\u00fcrk decision (application no. 2017\/4834, 8 May 2019)<\/em><\/p>\n 36. In a decision delivered on 8 May 2019, the Constitutional Court examined a complaint relating to the alleged unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention on 21 July 2016 of Selim \u00d6zt\u00fcrk, who served as an ordinary judge subject to Law\u00a0no. 2802 at the material time. According to the excerpt provided in the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision, Mr \u00d6zt\u00fcrk\u2019s pre-trial detention was ordered by the Ankara Magistrates\u2019 Court on the basis of Articles\u00a0100 and 101 of the CCP, without any specific reference to section\u00a094 of Law no.\u00a02802 or to the existence of a situation of a discovery in flagrante delicto. When upholding the lawfulness of that detention order, the Constitutional Court nevertheless found that it was factually and legally tenable to hold that the judge in question had been caught in flagrante delicto, having regard to the Court of Cassation\u2019s consistent case-law on the matter, according to which the existence of a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto\u00a0was inferred at the moment of the arrest of judges and prosecutors suspected of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation \u2013, and to the fact that he had been detained amid efforts to quell the coup attempt for membership of the organisation behind that attempt.<\/p>\n 2. Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m Turan decision (application no. 2017\/10536, 4\u00a0June 2020)<\/em><\/p>\n 37. On 4 June 2020 the Plenary of the Constitutional Court delivered a decision of inadmissibility in the case of Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m Turan, which concerned the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge \u2013 subject to Law no. 2802 \u2013 in the aftermath of the coup attempt on suspicion of membership of FET\u00d6\/PDY. Like the present applicants, the applicant in that case complained, inter alia, that his pre-trial detention had been ordered without respect for the special procedural guarantees granted to the members of the judiciary in his position under Law no. 2802.<\/p>\n 38. The Constitutional Court stated at the outset that it had delivered many decisions where it had addressed this issue, both in respect of the members of the high courts (such as Alparslan Altan, no. 2016\/15586, 11\u00a0January 2018, Salih S\u00f6nmez, no.\u00a02016\/25431, 28 November 2018, and Hannan Y\u0131lba\u015f\u0131, no.\u00a02016\/37380, 17 July 2019, concerning members of the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, respectively) and ordinary judges (such as Adem T\u00fcrkel, no.\u00a02017\/632, 23\u00a0January 2019). Relying on the relevant legal framework and the case-law of the Court of Cassation, it had found in all those decisions that the offence in question \u2013 that is, membership of an armed terrorist organisation \u2013 was a personal offence of a continuing nature. This effectively meant that the commission of the crime had been continuing at the time of arrest, and that, therefore, there had been a situation entailing discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts in all the cases concerned, which had rendered inapplicable the special procedural guarantees envisaged under different laws governing the members of the judiciary in question.<\/p>\n 39. In two further judgments delivered on 31 October 2019 (namely, A.B., no.\u00a02016\/22702, and Mustafa \u00d6zterzi, no. 2016\/14597, concerning a member of the Court of Cassation and an ordinary judge, respectively), it had consolidated this case-law and had underlined the fact that the assessment regarding the existence of a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto in the prevailing circumstances could not be deemed unfounded, given that the persons arrested were considered to have an organisational relation with FET\u00d6\/PDY, which was behind the coup attempt, and that the arrests had taken place at a time when the efforts to avert that attempt were still ongoing and the threat against national security and public order persisted. The Constitutional Court therefore reiterated that in accepting the existence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto with respect to the members of the judiciary arrested after the attempted coup, its main reference point had been the coup attempt itself.<\/p>\n 40. The Constitutional Court then went on to review the judgment in the Ba\u015f case (cited above), where the Court had found a violation of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 on the basis of its earlier conclusions in Alparslan Altan (cited above) regarding the extensive interpretation of the concept of in flagrante delicto by the domestic courts. According to the Constitutional Court, the Court\u2019s findings in that case involved an assessment not of the application of the Convention, but of the interpretation of the relevant Turkish law. While it acknowledged the binding nature of the Court\u2019s judgments, the Constitutional Court stressed that it was up to the Turkish public authorities, and ultimately to the domestic courts, to interpret the provisions of domestic law relating to the pre-trial detention of members of the judiciary. It held that although the Court was entitled to consider whether the interpretation given by Turkish courts to domestic law violated the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, it should not replace the domestic courts and interpret domestic law first-hand. It therefore deemed it useful to recapitulate the relevant domestic legal framework and practice governing the investigation and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.<\/p>\n 41. The Constitutional Court noted essentially that the existence of the element of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts constituted an exception to the procedural safeguards afforded to all judges and prosecutors, regardless of the level or type of court in which they served. However, unlike the legal framework governing the members of high courts and the elected judicial members of the HSYK, where the distinction between personal and duty-related offences was immaterial for the application of the relevant procedural safeguards, the \u201cpersonal offences\u201d committed by ordinary judges and prosecutors within the meaning of section\u00a093 of Law no.\u00a02802 would fall outside the protection afforded to them under the same law by reason of their profession. Measures taken in respect of such offences would therefore be subject to the rules of ordinary law, whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto or not.<\/p>\n 42. Accordingly, when assessing the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge or prosecutor in the present context, it was of decisive importance to determine whether the offence attributed to him or her was a personal offence or an offence committed during or in connection with the performance of duties. Relying on a number of judgments delivered by the Court of Cassation in the aftermath of the attempted coup, as well as its own relevant case-law from the same period, it reiterated that the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation could not be committed by public officials as part of their duties and, for that reason, the initiation of a criminal investigation against Mr Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m Turan, and his pre-trial detention, were not subject to authorisation by an administrative authority. There was, therefore, no legal obstacle to his arrest pursuant to the terms of the ordinary law.<\/p>\n 43. That being so, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the question as to whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 had no bearing on the lawfulness of Mr\u00a0Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m Turan\u2019s arrest, but was only relevant for the determination of the judicial authority with jurisdiction ratione loci to carry out the investigation and order the pre-trial detention. It accordingly dismissed Mr\u00a0Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m Turan\u2019s allegation that his deprivation of liberty had lacked a legal basis.<\/p>\n II. INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL<\/p>\n 44. The Government referred to Recommendation CM\/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States, entitled \u201cJudges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities\u201d and adopted on 17\u00a0November 2010. The relevant parts of the Recommendation have been noted in the case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, \u00a7 65).<\/p>\n 45. They further brought to the Court\u2019s attention Opinion no.\u00a03 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the \u201cPrinciples and Rules Governing Judges\u2019 Professional Conduct, in Particular Ethics, Incompatible Behaviour and Impartiality\u201d, dated 19\u00a0November 2002, which provided as follows in its relevant part:<\/p>\n \u201cArticle 75: As regards criminal liability, the CCJE considers that:<\/p>\n i) judges should be criminally liable in ordinary law for offences committed\u00a0outside their judicial office;<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n III. NOTICE OF DEROGATION BY TURKEY<\/p>\n 46. On 21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe sent the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a notice of derogation (see, for the text of the notice of derogation, Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7 66, or Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 109).<\/p>\n 47. The notice of derogation was withdrawn on 8 August 2018, following the end of the state of emergency.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 48. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment, pursuant to Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n II. PRELIMINARY QUESTION CONCERNING THE DEROGATION BY TURKEY<\/p>\n 49. The Government emphasised at the outset that all of the applicants\u2019 complaints should be examined with due regard to the derogation of which the Secretary General of the Council of Europe had been notified on 21\u00a0July\u00a02016 under Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 provides:<\/p>\n \u201c1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.<\/p>\n 2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles\u00a03, 4 (paragraph\u00a01) and\u00a07 shall be made under this provision.<\/p>\n 3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.\u201d<\/p>\n 50. The parties made submissions regarding the derogation under Article\u00a015 of the Convention along the same lines as those noted in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 68-70) and Ba\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey (Ba\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0112-114).<\/p>\n 51. The Court notes that in Mehmet Hasan Altan v.\u00a0Turkey (no.\u00a013237\/17, \u00a7\u00a093, 20\u00a0March 2018) it held, in the light of the Constitutional Court\u2019s findings on this point and all the other material in its possession, that the attempted military coup had disclosed the existence of a \u201cpublic emergency threatening the life of the nation\u201d within the meaning of the Convention. With regard to the scope ratione temporis and ratione materiae of the derogation by Turkey \u2013 a question which the Court could raise of its own motion \u2013 the Court observes that the applicants were detained a short time after the coup attempt, the event that prompted the declaration of the state of emergency. It considers that this is undoubtedly a contextual factor that should be fully taken into account in interpreting and applying Article\u00a05 of the Convention in the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, Hassan v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a029750\/09, \u00a7 103, ECHR 2014, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a075).<\/p>\n 52. As to whether the measures taken in the present case were strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law, the Court considers it necessary to examine the applicants\u2019 complaints on the merits (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0116).<\/p>\n III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION as regards the lawfulness of the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention<\/p>\n 53. The applicants complained mainly that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in breach of the domestic law governing the arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary, and disputed that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto for the purposes of section\u00a094 of Law no.\u00a02802 and section 46 of Law no. 2797. They further argued that the magistrates\u2019 courts had lacked competence and territorial jurisdiction to decide on their detention.<\/p>\n 54. The Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: …\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 55. The Government urged the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicants who had not made use of the relevant compensatory remedy under Article\u00a0141 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(a) of the CCP, which provided for an award of compensation to anyone who had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty, as well as the applicants whose claims under that provision were still pending before the domestic courts. The Government further claimed that one of the applicants (application no.\u00a055057\/17) had been granted compensation pursuant to Article\u00a0141 \u00a7 1 (e) of the CCP following his acquittal and had therefore lost his victim status. In the Government\u2019s view, any other applicants whose claims for compensation were pending before the competent courts could similarly obtain redress and lose their victim status, which the Court had to take into account in examining the admissibility of their complaints. The Government lastly asked the Court to declare the applications inadmissible for abuse of the right of application to the extent that the applicants had not informed the Court of the developments in their cases following the lodging of their applications.<\/p>\n 56. The applicants contested the Government\u2019s arguments.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a) Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies<\/p>\n 57. Referring to the general principles developed in its case-law regarding the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see, for instance, Sargsyan\u00a0v.\u00a0Azerbaijan [GC], no.\u00a040167\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0115-116, ECHR 2015), the Court reiterates firstly that for a remedy in respect of the lawfulness of an ongoing deprivation of liberty to be effective, it must offer a prospect of release (see Mustafa Avc\u0131 v. Turkey, no.\u00a039322\/12, \u00a7\u00a060, 23\u00a0May 2017). It notes in this respect that it has already found that the remedy provided for in Article\u00a0141 of the CCP is not capable of terminating the deprivation of liberty (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a084). It therefore rejects the Government\u2019s preliminary objection insofar as it concerns the applicants who are still deprived of their liberty for the purposes of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 58. Secondly, with regard to the remaining applicants who are no longer in pre-trial detention, the Court recalls that where an applicant, who is no longer in detention, complains that he or she was detained in breach of domestic law, a compensation claim capable of leading to an acknowledgment of the alleged violation and an award of compensation is in principle an effective remedy which needs to be pursued if its effectiveness in practice has been convincingly established (see Selahattin Demirta\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305\/17, \u00a7 208, 22 December 2020).<\/p>\n 59. The Government do not dispute the fact that the applicants have challenged the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention before various domestic instances, including the Constitutional Court, and that on none of those occasions was the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention acknowledged (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, the examples of case\u2011law provided by the Government regarding the domestic courts\u2019 interpretation of the concept of \u201cin flagranto delicto\u201d in the present context demonstrate unequivocally that the applicants\u2019 detention in accordance with the ordinary law provisions, as opposed to the special procedure pertaining to the detention of judges and prosecutors envisaged under the applicable laws, was considered to be compatible with the relevant domestic law by the highest courts of the land (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 32-43 below).<\/p>\n 60. The Court considers, in the light of the foregoing, that a compensation claim under Article\u00a0141 \u00a7 1 (a) of the CCP would have had no prospects of success in respect of the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 regarding the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicants were not required to make use of that compensatory remedy for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see, for a similar finding, Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 121, and Sabuncu and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a023199\/17, \u00a7\u00a0126, 10 November 2020).\u00a0It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection in this regard.<\/p>\n (b) Victim status<\/p>\n 61. As for the question whether the applicant in application no.\u00a055057\/17 may be considered to have lost his victim status on account of the compensation awarded to him under Article 141 \u00a7 1 (e) of the CCP, the Court refers to its consistent and well-established case-law to the effect that a favourable decision or measure is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive applicants of their status as a \u201cvictim\u201d for the purposes of Article\u00a034 of the Convention, unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, G\u00e4fgen v.\u00a0Germany\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0115, ECHR 2010, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a085).<\/p>\n 62. The Court notes in this connection that the award in question was made in view of the said applicant\u2019s acquittal and involved no acknowledgment of unlawfulness of his pre-trial detention. The wording of Article\u00a0141 \u00a7 1 (e) of the CCP is indeed very clear that compensation under that provision is awarded to those who have been acquitted after being arrested or detained \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d. For this reason, and bearing also in mind the assessment made in paragraph\u00a059 above regarding the domestic courts\u2019 consistent approach to the issue of \u201clawfulness\u201d in the present context, the award made to the applicant may not be considered as constituting an acknowledgement of the alleged breach of the right to liberty and removing his victim status. For that reason, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection in this regard, both in relation to application no.\u00a055057\/17 and to any other applicants who may have in the meantime received compensation on the same ground.<\/p>\n (c) Abuse of the right of application<\/p>\n 63. The Court reiterates that under Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, an application may be rejected for abuse if, among other reasons, it was knowingly based on untrue facts (see X and Others v. Bulgaria\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a022457\/16, \u00a7 145, 2 February 2021). Incomplete and therefore misleading information may also amount to abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation is given for the failure to disclose that information (see, for instance, Predescu v. Romania, no. 21447\/03, \u00a7 25, 2\u00a0December 2008). The same applies where new, significant developments occur during the proceedings before the Court and where \u2013 despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 \u00a7 6 of the Rules of Court \u2013 the applicant fails to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts. However, even in such cases, the applicant\u2019s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di\u00a0Stefano v. Italy\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a038433\/09, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2012).<\/p>\n 64. Having examined the case files and the parties\u2019 submissions in the light of the foregoing principles, the Court does not find any indication to lead it to conclude that the applicants have withheld information in a deliberate attempt to mislead it, or have otherwise abused the right of petition in respect of their complaint in question. The Government\u2019s objection in that connection should, therefore, be dismissed.<\/p>\n (d) Conclusion<\/p>\n 65. The Court notes accordingly that the applicants\u2019 complaint regarding the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article\u00a035 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a) The applicants<\/p>\n 66. The applicants claimed that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in breach of the special rules of procedure prescribed in domestic law in relation to the arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.<\/p>\n 67. The observations submitted by the applicants who were subject to Law no.\u00a02802 at the time of their detention \u2013 that is, ordinary judges and public prosecutors \u2013 were largely along the same lines as those noted in the case of Ba\u015f (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 133-135).<\/p>\n 68. As for the remaining applicants, who were members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court at the material time, they mainly noted that under the relevant provisions governing their respective status \u2013 namely section 46 of Law no. 2797 and section 76 of Law no.\u00a02575 \u2013 the opening of a criminal investigation in their regard was in principle subject to a decision of their relevant Presidency Boards. They accepted that in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigations in their respect could be conducted under the rules of ordinary law, but contested the finding that their detention involved a situation of discovery\u00a0in flagrante delicto. They therefore requested that the Court follow the approach it had taken in its judgment in Alparslan Altan (cited above). Some of the applicants stressed that while there was no doubt as to the \u201ccontinuing\u201d nature of the offence of membership of an armed organisation under Turkish law, the correlation made in the recent Court of Cassation judgments between such offences and the notion of \u201cdiscovery in flagrante delicto\u201d was quite far-fetched and even unlawful.<\/p>\n 69. Some applicants further added that the offence of which they had been accused could only have been committed in connection with the performance of their official duties, given that the offence was said to relate to judicial actions that they had allegedly carried out under the instructions of the terrorist organisation in question.<\/p>\n (b) The Government<\/p>\n 70. The Government largely repeated the observations that they had lodged in the cases of Alparslan Altan and Ba\u015f (both cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092-98 and \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0136-141 respectively), as relevant, and argued that, contrary to the Court\u2019s findings in those cases, the pre-trial detention of the applicants had been in compliance with the applicable domestic legislation.<\/p>\n 71. The Government stated at the outset that investigations had been\u00a0initiated and detention orders had been issued against the applicants pursuant to the general provisions of the CCP on the basis of the consideration that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto. The Government explained in particular that although Laws nos.\u00a02797 and 2575 provided for a special procedure for conducting criminal proceedings against members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize courts\u2019 jurisdiction, the investigations would be conducted in accordance with the rules of ordinary law and it would be possible to order preventive measures. Section\u00a094 of Law\u00a0no.\u00a02802 pertaining to ordinary judges and prosecutors similarly provided for the application of the rules of ordinary law in the event of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize courts\u2019 jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 72. The Government noted that in the present cases, the investigation conducted against the applicants had concerned their suspected membership of an armed terrorist organisation under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, which fell within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They further noted that, in view of the \u201ccontinuing\u201d nature of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the magistrates\u2019 courts had found that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the applicants\u2019 arrest and had accordingly ordered their detention in accordance with the rules of ordinary law \u2013 i.e. Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP \u2013 as per the relevant provisions of Laws nos. 2797, 2575 and 2802. In the context of the individual applications brought before it, the Constitutional Court had moreover not accepted the applicants\u2019 argument that the investigating authorities\u2019 assessment \u2013 that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation imputed to them \u2013 had lacked a factual and legal basis and had thus been arbitrary. The Government therefore considered that the primary issue to be resolved before the Court was whether there was a situation of \u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d in respect of the offence imputed to the applicants.<\/p>\n 73. Noting that it was incumbent on the domestic judicial authorities to interpret legal concepts provided in domestic law and to determine their scope, the Government claimed that the decisions of the magistrates\u2019 courts at issue had been in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation. They referred in this connection to the well-established practice of that court, according to which the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation was a \u201ccontinuing offence\u201d falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They also referred to the conclusion reached by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation in a leading judgment of 10\u00a0October 2017 (E.2017\/YYB-997, K.2017\/404), where it was held that \u201cthere is a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the arrest of judges suspected of the offence of membership of an armed organisation, and [consequently] the investigation must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of ordinary law\u201d (see Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a063; for a similar finding, see also the judgment delivered by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation on 26 September 2017 (E.\u00a02017\/16-956, K.\u00a02017\/370), noted in Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 88). The Government emphasised in this regard that the Court of Cassation\u2019s jurisprudence on the matter was by no means a product of the post-15 July 2016 period, as that court had interpreted the concepts of \u201ccontinuing offence\u201d and \u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d in a similar manner in cases that concerned the offence of membership of terrorist organisations other than FET\u00d6\/PDY and that predated the cases at issue. The application of those concepts in the present context had not, therefore, involved a new judicial interpretation that could be regarded as arbitrary.<\/p>\n 74. The Government moreover stressed that in accepting the existence of \u201cdiscovery in flagrante delicto\u201d in respect of the members of the judiciary placed in detention subsequent to the coup attempt of 15\u00a0July, the Constitutional Court had taken the coup attempt itself as its main reference point, rather than the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, having regard to the fact that the judges concerned were arrested at a time when the efforts to avert the coup attempt were still ongoing.<\/p>\n 75. Referring to the relevant international material (see paragraphs\u00a044-45 above), the Government further noted that judges and prosecutors were criminally liable for offences committed outside their judicial office in the same way as any other citizen. They submitted in this connection that the offence of which the applicants had been accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a personal offence, and not one that could be regarded as an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. They relied in support of this argument on a judgment delivered on 28\u00a0September 2010 by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation (E.2010\/162\u2011K.210\/179), where the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, of which the defendant had also been accused, had not been treated as an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties (see, for further information regarding that judgment, Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 137).<\/p>\n 76. The Government acknowledged that Laws nos.\u00a02797 and 2575 pertaining to the members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, as well as Law no. 6216 governing the members of the Constitutional Court as outlined by the Court in Alparslan Altan (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049 and 106-107), did not differentiate between offences committed in an official or personal capacity, and that the special procedures envisaged under the relevant laws would apply in both circumstances, unless there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto as indicated above. The situation was different, however, in respect of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to the provisions of Law no. 2802, which provided that personal offences governed by section 93 would be treated in accordance with the requirements of the ordinary law. Relying on the positions taken by the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in this regard (see, for instance, the references made in Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 137, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094, respectively, to the relevant courts\u2019 case-law; see also the judgments noted in paragraphs\u00a032-43 above), the Government therefore argued that even if the Court were to conclude that there had not been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of the ordinary judges and prosecutors in the present case, their detention would still be subject to the rules of ordinary law by reason of the \u201cpersonal\u201d nature of the offence imputed to them within the meaning of section 93 of Law\u00a0no. 2802. The Government therefore argued that the Court\u2019s reliance in Ba\u015f (cited above) on the conclusions that it had previously made in Alparslan Altan (cited above), in disregard of the clear distinction between the safeguards afforded to ordinary judges and prosecutors and the members of the Constitutional Court, had been erroneous.<\/p>\n 77. They further emphasised in this regard that the decisions taken by the HSYK on 16 July 2016 and afterwards on the suspension of these judges and prosecutors from office did not as such amount to an authorisation for the opening of a criminal investigation due to a duty-related offence; those decisions rather pertained to the disciplinary investigations initiated by the HSYK following the criminal investigation launched ex proprio motu by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office.<\/p>\n 78. The Government lastly contended that consideration should also be given to Article\u00a0161 \u00a7 8 of the CCP, which provided that investigations into certain offences \u2013 including the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation imputed to the applicants \u2013 would be conducted directly by the public prosecutor pursuant to general provisions, even if the offence had been committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. In other words, Article 161 \u00a7 8 would bar the application of the special procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors under various laws.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 79. The Court refers at the outset to the relevant principles established in its case-law regarding the right to liberty and security under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a099-103, and Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 143, and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n 80. It reiterates in particular that where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is at issue, including the question whether \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. The Court must further ascertain in this connection whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein, notably the principle of legal certainty (see Mooren v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 11364\/03, \u00a7 72, 9 July 2009, with further references).<\/p>\n 81. On this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of \u201clawfulness\u201d set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person \u2013 if need be, with appropriate advice \u2013 to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see, for instance, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483\/12, \u00a7 92, 15 December 2016, and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n 82. The Court notes, moreover, that it has on many occasions emphasised the special role in society of the judiciary, which, as the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value in a State governed by the rule of law, must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties (see Baka v.\u00a0Hungary [GC], no. 20261\/12, \u00a7 164, 23 June 2016, with further references). This consideration, set out in particular in cases concerning the right of judges to freedom of expression, is equally relevant in relation to the adoption of a measure affecting the right to liberty of a member of the judiciary. In particular, where domestic law has granted judicial protection to members of the judiciary in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, it is essential that such arrangements should be properly complied with. Given the prominent place that the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e S\u00e1 v.\u00a0Portugal [GC], nos. 55391\/13 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a0196, 6 November 2018), the Court must be particularly attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary when reviewing the manner in which a detention order was implemented from the standpoint of the provisions of the Convention (see Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7 102, and Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 144).<\/p>\n 83. Turning to the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court notes, and the parties do not dispute, that the applicants were all arrested and placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the rules of the ordinary law, more specifically, on the basis of Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP. The parties diverge, however, on the question of whether the initial pre-trial detention of the applicants \u2013 as serving judges and prosecutors enjoying a special status at the time of the events \u2013 under the rules of the ordinary law may be said to have satisfied the \u201cquality of the law\u201d requirement. Having regard to the different legal regulations applicable to ordinary judges and prosecutors and members of high courts, respectively, the Court will address this question separately for each group.<\/p>\n (a) Ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802<\/p>\n 84. The Court notes, as indicated above, that despite the special procedural safeguards flowing from their status as judges or prosecutors at the material time, the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the ordinary law, for they were deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, as per section 94 of Law no.\u00a02802. The Court further notes that the application of the notion of \u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d in the specific context of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge subject to Law no.\u00a02802 has already led to a finding of violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 in Ba\u015f, where the Court found that that notion had been interpreted by the national courts in an extensive manner that was not in conformity with the requirements of the Convention (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0145-162). Having reviewed the parties\u2019 submissions, as well as the recent judgments of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court on this matter (see paragraphs 32-43 above), the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings in the Ba\u015f case (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0145-162).<\/p>\n 85. The Court notes, as the Government have also pointed out, that in acknowledging the existence of \u201cdiscovery in flagrante delicto\u201d in the present circumstances, the Constitutional Court has adopted a slightly different approach from that followed by the Court of Cassation (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0150-156 for a detailed examination of the Court of Cassation\u2019s approach). More specifically, the Constitutional Court has taken the coup attempt as its main reference point, rather than relying solely on the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, in view of the factual context in which the relevant members of the judiciary had been arrested (see paragraph 39 above; see also the Government\u2019s argument noted in paragraph\u00a074 above). According to the Constitutional Court, the applicants, and all members of the judiciary caught in the aftermath of the coup attempt, could be considered to have been caught in flagrante delicto solely on the basis of their alleged organisational ties with the terrorist organisation behind that attempt. While the Court is aware of the unique circumstances that surrounded the applicants\u2019 arrest, it considers that the Constitutional Court\u2019s conjectural approach appears likewise to stretch the concept of\u00a0\u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d beyond the conventional definition provided in Article\u00a02 of the CCP (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 59 and 152), noting in particular the absence of an affirmation on the part of the Constitutional Court or the Government that the applicants were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention while in the process of, or immediately after, committing an act linked directly to the coup attempt (see, for a similar finding, ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0149 and 152).<\/p>\n 86. The Court further notes the Government\u2019s argument that the pre-trial detention of the relevant applicants under ordinary rules did not necessarily hinge on their discovery in flagrante delicto, but that it was also justified under section 93 of Law no. 2802, as the offence of which they had been accused was a personal offence governed by that section and not a duty\u2011related one. As indicated in the Ba\u015f case (ibid., \u00a7 158), it is not for the Court to determine into which category of offences the applicants\u2019 alleged conduct falls. The Court will therefore limit its examination to assessing whether the relevant law was applied in the present circumstances in a manner that complied with the requirements of legal certainty (ibid., \u00a7 158).<\/p>\n 87. The Court observes in this connection that in\u00a0the detention orders issued regarding the applicants, no position was taken on the \u201cpersonal\u201d or \u201cduty-related\u201d nature of the offence at issue and that reference was made, if any, only to section\u00a094 of the Law, which applies to both types of offences.\u00a0For the reasons enunciated in the Ba\u015f case (ibid.), the Court considers that the presence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto appears to have been decisive for depriving the applicants of the safeguards afforded under the relevant law. The Court further notes that even in those applications where the detention orders did not make an express reference to section\u00a094, it is clear from the relevant case-law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court that in the event of the arrest of a member of the judiciary for membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the conditions for \u201cdiscovery\u00a0in flagrante delicto\u00a0falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts\u201d within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 would be considered to have materialised at the time of apprehension, in view of the continuing nature of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation attributed to them (see, for instance, the leading Court of Cassation judgments referred to in Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 88 and 150, and in paragraph 73 above; see also the Constitutional Court judgment noted in paragraph 36 above, where the existence of a situation \u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d was endorsed by that court even in the absence of an express reference to section\u00a094 or a recognition of such situation in the detention order). The Government have moreover acknowledged in their observations that the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention had been conducted in accordance with the general provisions of the CCP on account of their apprehension in flagrante delicto (see paragraphs 71-72 above).<\/p>\n 88. The Court is, therefore, not convinced that the finding as regards the existence of a case of \u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d within the meaning of section\u00a094 of Law no. 2802 may foreseeably have been considered as relevant only for determining the jurisdiction ratione loci of the court ordering the detention, without any bearing on the lawfulness of that detention (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0158).<\/p>\n 89. The Court also notes the argument made by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs\u00a032-35 above), and repeated in the Government\u2019s observations (see paragraph\u00a078 above), that the special procedure set out in Law no.\u00a02802 would in any event not apply in the applicants\u2019 cases, since the investigation against them would be conducted directly by the public prosecutors by virtue of Article\u00a0161\u00a0\u00a7\u00a08 of the CCP, regardless of whether the offence had been committed in a personal or official capacity or whether they had been caught in flagrante delicto. The Court considers in this regard that the interplay between the relevant provisions of Law no.\u00a02802 and Article\u00a0161 \u00a7\u00a08, and the effect of the latter on preventive measures that can be taken against members of the judiciary, remains unclear in the present context, noting in particular that Article\u00a0161 \u00a7 8 appears to relate solely to the designation of the authority responsible for conducting a criminal investigation. The Court further observes from the material before it that this argument advanced under Article\u00a0161 \u00a7\u00a08 was not taken up by the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs\u00a037-43 above). In these circumstances, the Court may not take that provision into consideration for the purposes of determining the lawfulness of the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 90. The Court reiterates, as also indicated by the Government in their observations, that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. It also reiterates, however, that it falls ultimately to the Court to determine whether the way in which that law is interpreted and applied produces consequences that are consistent with the principles of the Convention (see, for instance, Gu\u00f0mundur Andri \u00c1str\u00e1\u00f0sson v.\u00a0Iceland [GC], no. 26374\/18, \u00a7 250, 1 December 2020, and the cases cited therein). As the Government rightly pointed out, the judicial protection provided under Law no. 2802 does not mean impunity. That said, having regard to the importance of the judiciary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law, and to the fact that protection of this kind is granted to judges and prosecutors not for their own personal benefit but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, the requirements of legal certainty become even more paramount where a member of the judiciary has been deprived of his or her liberty (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 158).<\/p>\n 91. Having regard to the foregoing, and to its considerations in the Ba\u015f case, the Court cannot conclude that the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were subject to Law no. 2802 took place in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law within the meaning of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. Moreover, for the reasons set out above, the Court considers that the measure at issue cannot be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 159-162).<\/p>\n 92. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 at the time of their detention.<\/p>\n (b) Members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law no. 2797 and Law no. 2575<\/p>\n 93. The Court notes that according to Article 46 of Law no.\u00a02797 governing the members of the Court of Cassation, which is also applicable to members of the Supreme Administrative Court, the initiation of an investigation against these high court judges is subject to the decision of their relevant Presidency Boards, unless in the case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, which triggers the application of the rules of the ordinary law (see paragraphs 30\u201131 above).<\/p>\n 94. The Court observes that the legal framework noted above is similar to that applicable to members of the Constitutional Court as laid out in the case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, \u00a7 49). It further observes that, just as in that case, the present applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention was carried out in accordance with the terms of the ordinary law by reason of the judicial authorities\u2019 finding that they had been caught in flagrante delicto.<\/p>\n 95. The Court notes that the extensive application of the notion of \u201cin flagrante delicto\u201d resulted in the finding of violation of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 in the aforementioned case of Alparslan Altan (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 104-115). Having regard to the information and documents before it, and to the argument in paragraphs\u00a085 and 89-90 above, as relevant, the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings in Alparslan Altan (cited above). It finds accordingly that the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their pre-trial detention were similarly not deprived of their liberty in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, as required under Article 5 \u00a7 1. The decision to place these applicants in pre-trial detention may not, moreover, be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 116-119).<\/p>\n 96. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law no. 2797 or Law no. 2575 at the time of their detention.<\/p>\n IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 97. Some of the applicants also complained under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) and 3 of the Convention that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in the absence of reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offence of which they had been accused, that the decisions for their detention had not been accompanied by relevant and sufficient reasons, and that the length of their pre-trial detention had been excessive. Some applicants further argued under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 that the reviews conducted by the domestic courts into their detention had not complied with certain procedural safeguards, and\/or under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a05 that there had been no effective domestic remedies to allow them to obtain compensation for the alleged breaches of their rights under Article\u00a05[1].<\/p>\n 98. The Court has found above that the applicants\u2019 detention was not prescribed by law, which runs counter to the fundamental principle of the rule of law and to the purpose of Article 5 to protect every individual from arbitrariness. Having regard to the significance and implications of this finding, which goes to the heart of the protection afforded under Article 5 and entails a violation of one of the core rights guaranteed by the Convention, and to the accumulation of thousands of similar applications on its docket concerning detentions in the aftermath of the attempted coup d\u2019\u00e9tat in Turkey, which puts a considerable strain on its limited resources, the Court considers \u2013 as a matter of judicial policy \u2013 that it is justified in these compelling circumstances to dispense with the separate examination of the admissibility and merits of each remaining complaint raised by each individual applicant under Article 5. The Court also points out in this connection that an individualised examination of the remaining complaints brought by each applicant would significantly delay the processing of these cases, without a commensurate benefit to the applicants or contribution to the development of the case-law. It notes furthermore that it has already addressed the legal issues raised by these complaints for the most part (see, in particular, Selahattin Demirta\u015f (no\u00a02), Alparslan Altan and Ba\u015f, all cited above; Atilla Ta\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a072\/17, 19 January 2021). It is precisely within this exceptional context that the Court, guided by the overriding interest to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention system, which is under threat by the constantly growing inflow of applications (see, mutatis mutandis, Burmych and Others v.\u00a0Ukraine (striking out) [GC], nos.\u00a046852\/13 et al, \u00a7\u00a7 111, 119 et seq., 157 and 210, 12\u00a0October 2017), decides not to examine the applicants\u2019 remaining complaints under Article 5.<\/p>\n V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 99. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 100. The\u00a0applicants\u00a0requested\u00a0compensation in varying amounts in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage for the alleged violation of their rights under Article\u00a05.\u00a0Most of the\u00a0applicants also claimed pecuniary damage,\u00a0corresponding mainly to their loss of earnings resulting from their dismissal, as well as the legal costs\u00a0and\u00a0expenses\u00a0incurred\u00a0before the domestic courts and the Court.<\/p>\n 101. The Government considered that the applicants\u2019\u00a0claims were unsubstantiated and excessive.<\/p>\n A. Relevant general principles<\/strong><\/p>\n 102. The\u00a0Court\u00a0reiterates at the outset that Article 41 of the Convention empowers\u00a0it\u00a0to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see\u00a0Kar\u00e1csony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos.\u00a042461\/13 and 44357\/13, \u00a7 179, 17 May 2016).<\/p>\n 103. The Court also reiterates, however, that it is not its role under Article\u00a041 to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties (see Al\u00a0Jedda v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021\/08, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2011). The Court is an international judicial authority contingent on the consent of the States signatory to the Convention, and its principal task is to secure respect for human rights, rather than compensate applicants\u2019\u00a0losses minutely and exhaustively. Unlike in national jurisdictions, the emphasis of the\u00a0Court\u2019s activity is on passing public judgments that set human rights standards across Europe (see, mutatis mutandis, Goncharova and other \u201cPrivileged Pensioners\u201d cases v. Russia, nos. 23113\/08 and 68 others, \u00a7\u00a022, 15\u00a0October 2009, and Nosov and Others v. Russia, nos. 9117\/04 and 10441\/04, \u00a7\u00a068, 20\u00a0February 2014). Accordingly, the awarding of sums of money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the Court\u2019s main duties but is incidental to its task under Article\u00a019 of the Convention of ensuring the observance by States of their obligations under the Convention (see, for instance, Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589\/08, \u00a7\u00a064, 30 March 2017).<\/p>\n 104. The Court further notes that it enjoys a certain discretion in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 41, as is borne out by the adjective \u201cjust\u201d and the phrase \u201cif necessary\u201d (see, for instance, Arvanitaki\u2011Roboti and Others v.\u00a0Greece [GC], no. 27278\/03, \u00a7\u00a032, 15\u00a0February 2008). The exercise of such discretion encompasses such decisions as to refuse monetary compensation or to reduce the amount\u00a0that\u00a0it awards (see Arvanitaki\u2011Roboti and Others v.\u00a0Greece [GC], no. 27278\/03, \u00a7\u00a032, 15\u00a0February 2008). The Court\u2019s guiding principle in this respect is equity,\u00a0which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is\u00a0just, fair and reasonable\u00a0in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a016064\/90 and 8\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a0224, ECHR 2009, and Al-Jedda, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0114).<\/p>\n B. Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case<\/p>\n 105. As regards the applicants\u2019 request for pecuniary damage, which they claim to have sustained as a result of their loss of earnings following their dismissal, the Court observes that the present judgment concerns the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention and not their dismissal from the office of judge or prosecutor. Accordingly, it cannot discern a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, and it therefore rejects any claims under that head (see, for a similar finding, Alparslan Altan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0154, and Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 289).<\/p>\n 106. As for the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims for non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, the Court finds it appropriate to rule in equity and make a global and uniform assessment in that respect, having regard to the general principles noted above, as well as to the materials in its possession, its case-law, the repetitive nature of the legal issues examined in the present case and the number of similar applications pending before it. Accordingly, it considers it reasonable to award each of the applicants a lump sum of 5,000 euros (EUR), covering non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.<\/p>\n 107. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decides, unanimously, to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2. Declares, unanimously, the complaint under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention concerning the lawfulness of the applicants\u2019 initial pre-trial detention admissible;<\/p>\n 3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial detention of the applicants who were ordinary judges and prosecutors at the time of their detention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial detention of the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their detention;<\/p>\n 5. Holds, by six votes to one, that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of\u00a0the applicants\u2019 remaining complaints under Article 5 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 6. Holds, unanimously,<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts, which are to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 7. Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 November 2021, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro ___________<\/p>\n In accordance with Article 45 \u00a7 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:<\/p>\n (a) Concurring opinion of Judge Koskelo, joined by Judge Ranzoni;<\/p>\n (b) Partly concurring opinion of Judge Y\u00fcksel;<\/p>\n (c) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge K\u016bris.<\/p>\n J.F.K. CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO, JOINED BY JUDGE RANZONI<\/strong><\/p>\n 108. The present judgment is remarkable in an unusual and highly problematic sense. The Court concludes, in effect, that it is faced with a situation that renders it unable to fulfil its function, and this conclusion is reached, moreover, in the context of core aspects of core rights enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention. Having found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 on the ground of the unlawfulness, in terms of domestic law, of the applicants\u2019 initial pre-trial detention (points 3 and 4 of the operative provisions), the Court leaves the other complaints raised by the applicants under Article 5 unexamined (point 5).<\/p>\n 109. I have voted in favour of this extraordinary outcome, reluctantly and with great misgivings. Why so?<\/p>\n 110. It is well established that there are situations where complaints raised under different provisions of the Convention rely on a factual basis and on legal arguments which present similarities, to the extent that the Court may be justified in considering that, once a violation is found under one provision, it is not necessary to separately examine the issue from the standpoint of another provision also invoked by the applicant. The present joined cases, however, do not fall into that category of situations because, in this instance, the Court refrains from examining all other complaints raised under Article 5 apart from the issue of lawfulness. This exclusion covers, in particular, complaints pertaining to the requirement of reasonable suspicion, which under the Court\u2019s well-established case-law is an essential and necessary condition for pre-trial detention to be in accordance with Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention, and thus at the very core of one of the core rights. The issues raised under those complaints and the complaints based on the lack of lawfulness are not \u201coverlapping\u201d. In fact they concern Convention safeguards which are distinct and fundamentally important.<\/p>\n 111. Furthermore, based on the cases already examined by the Court, such as Alparslan Altan v.\u00a0Turkey and Ba\u015f v. Turkey (both cited in the present judgment), as well as the related circumstances transpiring from them, it must be presumed that many of those other complaints might be well\u2011founded.<\/p>\n 112. Nor can it be said, under such circumstances, that the present situation would fall within the criterion used by the Court in certain cases where it may find it appropriate to limit its examination to the \u201cmain legal questions\u201d raised by the complaints before it (see, for instance, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin\u00a0C\u00e2mpeanu\u00a0v. Romania\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7\u00a0156, ECHR\u00a02014).<\/p>\n 113. It is also quite clear that the present situation is not comparable with so-called pilot judgment proceedings, where the Court may strike out applications in the same series for the purpose of \u201creturning\u201d the issues to be addressed at the domestic level. In the present situation, it is already evident that the applicants\u2019 recourse to domestic remedies failed and that no further domestic action can be expected to address the alleged violations of Article 5.<\/p>\n 114. From a strictly legal point of view, there is hardly any plausible justification for leaving all the other complaints, including those relating to the core issue of reasonable suspicion, unexamined.<\/p>\n 115. Moreover, the complaints arise from the detention of judges and prosecutors in very large numbers, which makes the situation even more serious. At the same time, it is precisely the volume of the problem which lies at the heart of the Court\u2019s dilemma (see paragraph 98 of the judgment).<\/p>\n 116. The decision not to examine the applicants\u2019 other complaints raised under Article 5 of the Convention thus has a critically novel quality. I have nonetheless arrived at the conclusion that the time has come to acknowledge the reality as it presents itself: if alleged violations occur on a large scale and the rights concerned are no longer protected through domestic remedies, even the international supervision entrusted to the Court reaches its practical limits. The fact that core rights are at stake renders the state of affairs particularly sad and serious but cannot in itself change it. In circumstances where it has become clear that the complaints cannot, and therefore will not, be processed within a reasonable time-frame, or without paralysing the Court\u2019s activity more generally, it is better to make this impasse transparent rather than maintain illusions about the situation. Any further conclusions remain for other bodies to consider.<\/p>\n 117. For the reasons set out above (and in paragraph 98 of the judgment itself), the wording used in the operative provision (point 5 \u2013 \u201cno need to examine\u201d) is not, in my view, appropriate in the present context. Despite this, however, I voted in favour of this provision as I agree with its outcome.<\/p>\n 118. As a final point, I affirm my agreement with the finding of a violation on the grounds that the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention was not lawful within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1, albeit with one additional remark. It concerns the Government\u2019s argument that the lawfulness of the detention of those applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors did not, under the relevant domestic law, depend on the existence of discovery in flagrante delicto but on whether the offence in question was a \u201cpersonal\u201d offence or a \u201cduty-related\u201d one, i.e. an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties (see paragraphs 41 and 76 of the present judgment). The Government have submitted that under domestic law, the offence of membership in a terrorist organisation \u2013 of which the applicants were suspected \u2013 qualifies as a \u201cpersonal offence\u201d, rendering the specific procedural safeguards and rules governing ordinary judges and prosecutors inapplicable.<\/p>\n 119. While acknowledging that it is primarily a prerogative of the domestic courts to interpret domestic law, the position relied on by the Government nonetheless raises a fundamental question in the present context. In their observations before the Court, the Government have consistently described the organisation in question (\u201cFET\u00d6\/PDY\u201d) as one which had the aim of infiltrating various public institutions, including the judicial system, and of creating a \u201cparallel State\u201d, the latter expression being also used in the wording adopted by the Government to denote that organisation. More specifically, the Government have submitted that judges and prosecutors belonging to that organisation took instructions from its hierarchy when dealing with cases entrusted to them. It is difficult to understand how such submissions can be reconciled with the proposition that membership of this particular organisation nonetheless remains to be characterised as a \u201cpersonal offence\u201d which is not linked with the exercise of the suspects\u2019 duties as judges or prosecutors. In the specific circumstances of these cases, such an interpretation of domestic law appears neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty.<\/p>\n PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE Y\u00dcKSEL<\/strong><\/p>\n 120. In the present case, I voted with the other members of the Chamber to find a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as regards ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802. Nevertheless, and with all due respect to my colleagues, I submit this concurring opinion to: (a) share the reasons for which I am unable to agree with the Chamber\u2019s reasoning in reaching that conclusion; and (b) emphasise that the discord between the Court and the highest domestic courts on the question of the lawfulness of the detentions of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 remains unresolved.<\/p>\n 121. The Chamber\u2019s reasoning in the present case follows the findings of the majority in Ba\u015f v. Turkey (no. 66448\/17, 3 March 2020) in respect of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge pursuant to Law no. 2802. In Ba\u015f the Court held by a majority that the Turkish national courts\u2019 expansive interpretation of the scope of the concept of in flagrante delicto and their application of section 94 of Law no. 2802 was manifestly unreasonable and incompatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1. The Court held therefore that the applicant\u2019s detention had been unlawful (see Ba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0158).<\/p>\n 122. In my partly dissenting opinion in Ba\u015f, I set out the reasons for my disagreement with the majority\u2019s finding that the applicant\u2019s detention was unlawful. The crux of my reasoning was that I did not share the majority\u2019s view that the shortcomings in the applicant\u2019s case amounted to such a \u201cgross or obvious irregularity\u201d (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a011364\/03, \u00a7 84, 9 July 2009) as to render the detention unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. With the utmost respect to my colleagues, I maintain that my view as set out in my partly dissenting opinion in Ba\u015f is the legally correct interpretation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the context of detentions pursuant to Law no. 2802.<\/p>\n 123. In the present case, however, I made the decision to vote in favour of finding that the detention of the applicants subject to Law no. 2802 was unlawful and a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. While I maintain the validity of my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Ba\u015f, I cannot ignore the fact that the majority\u2019s view in Ba\u015f is now final and is the settled law of the Court for the time being on the issues presented in the present application. As a judge of this Court who believes that applications before the Court should be dealt with in a manner that sustains judicial integrity and the coherence of its case-law, and without prejudice to my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Ba\u015f, I\u00a0concur with the majority in the present case.<\/p>\n 124. I would nevertheless like to stress that the divergence that has emerged between this Court and the highest courts of Turkey on the question whether the arrest and pre-trial detention of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 have been effected in accordance with a \u201cprocedure prescribed by law\u201d, within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1, continues to persist (see, to this effect, the latest decision delivered by the Constitutional Court on 4 June 2020 in the case of Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m Turan, referred to in paragraphs 37-43 of the present judgment). Bearing particularly in mind the high number of applications pending before the Court which raise the same legal issue, I consider that it falls to the Grand Chamber, as the highest judicial formation of the Court, to address this state of contradiction and to clarify and consolidate the Court\u2019s position in this regard.<\/p>\n PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE K\u016aRIS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. I voted against point 5 of the operative part of the judgment. At the same time, I agree with the outcome, because, hard as I try, I am unable to propose any pragmatic alternative to the majority\u2019s audacious decision to terminate the examination of the numerous applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c), 5 \u00a7 3, 5 \u00a7 4 and 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention. My disagreement thus concerns not the very outcome but the wording of operative point 5: had it been worded without using the formula \u201cno need to examine\u201d, which it now contains, and had it thus corresponded to the reasoning intended to substantiate it (paragraph 98 of the judgment), I would have voted for it (and whatever misgivings, if any, I might have had, I would have expressed them in a much shorter concurring opinion). Regrettably, the formula \u201cno need to examine\u201d is certainly not adequate for the extraordinary situation in which the Court has found itself in the present case. That formula had to be avoided \u2013 and it could have been avoided at no cost. It is most unfortunate. It is faulty. It is misleading, because its employment in the operative part suggests that the respective complaints are not meritorious.<\/p>\n But they certainly are.<\/p>\n I<\/p>\n 2. The Court does not owe any examination of the admissibility, let alone of the merits, in response to all the complaints that it receives. There is a vast array of legal grounds \u2013 and good reasons \u2013 for leaving certain complaints, even whole applications, unexamined.<\/p>\n 3. To begin with, some non-examination is rather routine. Quite a lot of the complaints submitted to the Court do not meet the admissibility criteria defined in Article 35 and must be rejected on these formal grounds. Others are struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases, when the Court establishes that they meet the conditions set out in Article 37.<\/p>\n 4. Apart from the above, in the Court\u2019s practice there are also some not so routine, indeed quite exceptional, cases where the applications (or at least some complaints) are left unexamined.<\/p>\n 5. A telling example would be the so-called pilot-judgment procedure. It is undertaken when the Court finds a systemic (or structural) problem raised by the applicant\u2019s individual case and underlying the violation found in it. In view of the growing number of similar applications and of the potential finding of an analogous violation in the respective cases, the examination of those similar applications which have not yet been communicated to the respondent Government is adjourned until that State adopts the general measures aimed at resolving that systemic (structural) problem which gave rise to the violation found in the pilot judgment, and only those applications which have already been communicated continue to be examined under the normal procedure (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland (merits), [GC], no. 31443\/96, ECHR 2004-V; and, in the Turkish context, \u00dcmm\u00fchan Kaplan v. Turkey, no. 24240\/07, 20 March 2012). After the successful implementation of the general measures required by the pilot judgment, the adjourned applications are struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases, and the pilot-judgment procedure is closed. This procedure is therefore designed to assist the member States in resolving, at national level, the systemic (structural) problems found by the Court, securing to all actual and potential victims of the respective deficiencies the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, offering to them more rapid redress and easing the burden on the Court, which would otherwise have to take to judgment large numbers of applications which are similar in substance, as a rule, at the expense of other meritorious cases. The pilot-judgment procedure was conceived as a response to the growth in the Court\u2019s caseload, caused by a series of cases deriving from the same systemic (structural) dysfunction, and to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery.<\/p>\n 6. Alas, it does happen that the State fails to execute the pilot judgment. This may generate large numbers of follow-up applications which raise issues that are identical in substance to those raised in the case in which the pilot judgment was adopted. Perhaps the most well-known example of a pilot judgment which the respondent State failed to execute would be the one adopted in the case of Yuriy\u00a0Nikolayevich Ivanov v.\u00a0Ukraine (no.\u00a040450\/04, 15 October 2009), which otherwise would have been an inconspicuous case. That failure led the Court to adopt what it called a \u201cnew approach\u201d in dealing with the massive influx of as many as 12,143 Ivanov\u2011type follow-up applications, plus those of the five applicants specifically in the case of Burmych and Others v. Ukraine ((striking out) [GC], nos.\u00a046852\/13, 12 October 2017)). In Burmych and Others the Court proceeded in a thitherto unheard of and most extraordinary way. It concluded that the said Ivanov-type applications had to be dealt with in compliance with the respondent State\u2019s obligation deriving from the pilot judgment adopted in Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov, struck them out of its list of cases, considering that the circumstances justified such a course, and transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of execution of the above-mentioned pilot judgment. At the same time the Court underlined that this strike-out decision was without prejudice to its power to restore to the list of its cases, pursuant to Article\u00a037 \u00a7\u00a02, the respective applications \u201cor any other similar future applications, if the circumstances justify such a course\u201d. The Court also envisaged that it might be appropriate to reassess the situation within two years from the delivery of the Burmych and Others judgment \u201cwith a view to considering whether in the meantime there have occurred circumstances such as to justify its exercising this power\u201d (\u00a7 223).<\/p>\n 7. The Burmych and Others precedent was indeed instrumental for the purposes of substantially unclogging the Court\u2019s docket. Whether it was in any way instrumental also to the applicants, who sought justice in Strasbourg, but were sent back to their domestic authorities against whose (in)action they had complained, and thus whether it fulfilled its purpose, is yet to be seen. It will have successfully served its purpose if those applicants, whose applications the Court resolved not to examine, have received any tangible satisfaction at the domestic level. It is reported that today, with four years having passed since the adoption of the judgment in Burmych and Others, there are more indications to the contrary. Be that as it may, the above-mentioned \u201creassessment of the situation\u201d by the Court has not yet taken place.<\/p>\n But this is not my point here.<\/p>\n 8. My point \u2013 pertinent to the present case \u2013 is that, as was rightly pointed out by the seven dissenters in Burmych and Others (Judges Yudkivska, Saj\u00f3, Bianku, Karaka\u015f, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc), that judgment was one of judicial policy. The approach of the dissenters (which, in my reading, underlies their whole joint dissenting opinion) is that, as a matter of principle, judicial policy considerations cannot be a substitute for legal reasoning and, consequently, a judgment based on judicial policy considerations alone is per se incompatible with the \u201clegal interpretation of human rights\u201d (see paragraph 1 of their opinion).<\/p>\n Ideally, yes. In real life, it depends. In an ideal world, judgments indeed should be substantiated solely or at least primarily by legal argument. But the world is not a perfect place. When one proclaims the august, majestic maxim that fiat iustitia, pereat mundus, one should also ask oneself: what would iustitia be in a mundus which periit? What sense would iustitia make in such a mundus? Would it make any practical sense at all? And would it be at all possible?<\/p>\n In Burmych and Others the Court considered that it was left with no choice other than to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-processing and to disengage itself from thousands of potentially meritorious applications, the examination of which would have paralysed its activities, while still providing some (even if not, as it seems to have turned out, efficient) redress procedure to the applicants at the domestic level. The Court reasoned that any alternative would have been worse. If Burmych and Others was not legally justifiable, then it was at least explicable and therefore defensible from the standpoint of the pressing need to secure the broader mission of the Court. That course was taken grudgingly, nolens volens, the Court being cognisant of the possibility of fallouts of all sorts.<\/p>\n 9. It must be noted that the Burmych and Others judgment, just like the pilot judgments, does not contain the \u201cno need to examine\u201d (or its twin sister \u201cnot necessary to examine\u201d) formula. Nowhere in the whole text. The Court did not see the complaints which it resolved not to examine as undeserving, i.e. not requiring examination. Not at all. Rather, it considered that those complaints merited examination, but could not be effectively examined by the Court in those circumstances. It struck the unexamined applications out of its list of cases pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) and transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers \u201cin order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of execution of the [relevant, unimplemented] pilot judgment\u201d (point 4 of the operative part). Instead of using the formula \u201cno need to examine\u201d, the Court ratiocinated as to \u201cwhether it [was] justified to continue to examine [those] applications\u201d (\u00a7\u00a0175), i.e. employed the exact wording of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c). But even the word \u201cjustified\u201d, perhaps because it has a connotation of justice, the latter not being merely a formal legal term, does not appear in the operative part of the Burmych and Others judgment.<\/p>\n 10. What makes the Burmych and Others precedent so pertinent to the present case is that in that judgment the Court legitimised judicial policy as the principal or, rather, the sole ground for one of its judgments. And it not only decided to refrain from examining the respective complaints, but also openly and transparently conceptualised that decision. Whoever reproaches the Court for that unclogging of its docket, at least cannot reproach it for being evasive as to the reasons underlying that decision. From then on, the Court\u2019s resolve to leave certain complaints unexamined in principle can be substantiated \u2013 if not duly legally reasoned, then at least factually explained \u2013 by referring to judicial policy considerations pertaining to very exceptional circumstances occurring in the realm of real life, not in that of pure law. Such a course is, to put it mildly, not a neat one from the purely legal(istic) perspective. But now it is part of the Court\u2019s case-law. Needless to say that the circumstances in which the Court\u2019s recourse to this method is defensible must be exceptional, indeed extraordinary.<\/p>\n II<\/p>\n 11. The pilot judgments and the Burmych and Others precedent concern non-examination of certain complaints (applications) in very exceptional situations. However, the Court routinely, having examined one or several complaints, resolves not to examine certain \u201cother\u201d complaints raised in the same application.<\/p>\n 12. In particular situations the \u201cno need to examine\u201d approach is legally tenable and is legitimately professed by the Court. This is so when the \u201cother\u201d complaints, although formulated as separate, are interrelated, as they overlap with the complaint(s) already examined in that case. They overlap, because they either share the same factual background or invoke such provisions of the Convention which are interrelated. The overlapping of one or another kind allows or even requires the Court to treat such complaints as raising the same legal issue and not requiring their re\u2011examination from yet another angle, once that issue has already been examined from one angle, factual or legal.<\/p>\n 13. A \u201cfactual overlap\u201d of the complaints may prompt the Court to resolve that it would be pragmatic, and in that sense justified, not to examine anew what is essentially the same complaint, and that non\u2011examination would not be to the detriment of the applicant or of the development of Convention law.<\/p>\n The Court uses various techniques to establish, and various phraseologies to designate, this \u201cfactual overlap\u201d. Those techniques and phraseologies are so diverse that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to arrange them in any typology. Here are a couple of very recent examples from their infinite variety. In Dareskizb Ltd. v. Armenia (no. 61737\/08, \u00a7 93, 21\u00a0September 2021, not yet final), the Court decided that, having regard to its findings under Article 6 \u00a7 1 that the applicant company had been denied access to a court, it was \u201cnot necessary\u201d to examine whether, in that case, there had been a violation of that Article also as regards the composition of that court. In C. v. Croatia (no. 80117\/17, \u00a7 81, 8 October 2020), which concerned the right of a child to be heard in custody proceedings and the need to appoint a special guardian ad litem to protect the child\u2019s interests, the Court held that the combination of flawed representation and the failure to duly present and hear the applicant\u2019s views in the proceedings had irremediably undermined the decision-making process in the case and that obviated \u201cthe need … to examine whether the applicant\u2019s best interests were properly assessed by adopting the decision to grant custody to his father without any preparation or adaptation period or whether the enforcement of that decision had been compatible with Article\u00a08\u201d.<\/p>\n 14. A typical example of a \u201clegal overlap\u201d is the interrelatedness of ostensibly separate complaints, by which the Court is requested to assess the same factual situation under two different provisions of the Convention, one of which subsumes (or absorbs) the other at least in part, e.g. under Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 13, respectively as lex specialis and lex generalis; or Article 11, lex specialis, and Article 10, lex generalis. If a violation of the Convention based on its special provision is found, the re\u2011examination of the same matter under a general provision would normally be redundant.<\/p>\n 15. In deciding whether to take that self-restricting course, the Court has a discretion that is not narrow. The case-law in which the second, third, etc., of the overlapping complaints are left unexamined is abundant.<\/p>\n In such cases the formula \u201cno need to examine\u201d (or \u201cnot necessary to examine\u201d) means exactly what it says on the tin. It does not mislead or deceive, for it adequately represents the Court\u2019s approach and reasons behind its resolve not to examine certain complaints.<\/p>\n 16. In parallel, the formula \u201cno need to examine\u201d has been employed also in such instances where the examination of the applicants\u2019 complaints clearly merited examination.<\/p>\n Roughly, all such cases in which the formula in question is employed fall into one of three categories.<\/p>\n 17. The first category includes the politically sensitive cases, in which an applicant complains under Article 18. It happens that the Court, having found a violation of a Convention provision, nevertheless decides that it is \u201cnot necessary\u201d to examine whether that violation resulted from a \u201chidden agenda\u201d. If this question is answered in the affirmative (which is often too evident), this could trigger the formal finding of a violation of Article 18. This should be all the more so where the Court has found violations of not one but of several Convention provisions.<\/p>\n One example (indeed one out of many) of such regrettable over\u2011reluctance to examine the applicants\u2019 well-founded complaints under Article\u00a018 would be Kasparov and Others v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 51988\/07, 13\u00a0December 2016), where the Court found violations of Articles 5 \u00a7 1, 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 and 11, which, in the Court\u2019s own words, \u201chad the effect of preventing and discouraging [the applicants] and others from … actively engaging in opposition politics\u201d. Then the Court pulled the brake. It concluded that \u201cin view of this\u201d it was \u201cnot necessary to examine whether … there has been a violation of Article 18\u201d (\u00a7 55).<\/p>\n Such evasive judgments have been adopted in some politically sensitive cases against Russia and Turkey. Regarding Turkey (which is the respondent State in the present case), one could mention, for example, \u015eahin Alpay v. Turkey (no. 16538\/17, 20 March 2018), Mehmet Hasan Altan\u00a0v.\u00a0Turkey (no. 13237\/17, 20 March 2018), or Atilla Ta\u015f v. Turkey (no.\u00a072\/17, 19 January 2021). I have made clear my disagreement with that approach in my partly dissenting opinions in Sabuncu v. Turkey (no.\u00a023199\/17, 10\u00a0November 2020) and Ahmet H\u00fcsrev Altan v. Turkey (no.\u00a013252\/17, 13\u00a0April 2021).<\/p>\n Yet, here this matter is touched upon for the sake of comprehensiveness only. The applicants in the present case did not complain under Article 18. This category of \u201cundeserving\u201d complaints therefore can be put aside.<\/p>\n 18. The second category of the Court\u2019s indisposition to the examination of duly substantiated complaints includes the cases which are, so to say, more mundane \u2013 in that sense that they are not related to alleged ulterior political motives prohibited by Article 18. These are not instances where the non-examination of the complaints is justified owing to their \u201cfactual\u201d or \u201clegal overlapping\u201d. They are left without examination solely because the Court has so decided, without providing (at least not explicitly) any reasons for such a course and often without such legitimate reasons being in place at all. The Court justifies this by the fact that it has already examined some of the applicant\u2019s complaints (and, as a rule, has found violations of some Convention provisions), so, bluntly put, it should be enough.<\/p>\n In such cases, the (in)famous C\u00e2mpeanu formula is employed. I refer to the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu ([GC], no. 47848\/08, 17 July 2014). That judgment gave the name to the formula in question, for it was that judgment in which this approach was consolidated. The formula goes that the Court, having examined certain \u201cmain\u201d legal questions raised by the applicants, leaves the \u201cremaining\u201d complaints unexamined. It is as if a dentist says to his patient: \u201cI fixed the big holes, so please do not overburden me also with small holes, for you will survive somehow\u201d. The examination of the \u201cmain\u201d legal questions ostensibly justifies the non-examination of the others, even if they are not interrelated with those actually examined.<\/p>\n Like the Burmych and Others solution, the C\u00e2mpeanu formula stems from a certain pragmatism in such situations, where the Court has to economise its human, time and other resources, and the respective judicial policy considerations. Even so, Burmych and Others was adopted in a situation which hardly anyone would deny was a truly exceptional one. In that judgment, the Court\u2019s stance is explained in great detail. One would find not the slightest trace of such open and detailed explanation either in Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu or in other judgments where the C\u00e2mpeanu formula is employed, in fact copy-pasted. That formula has become self-justifying. The seven dissenters in Burmych and Others criticised that judgment as being adopted for the sake of \u201cmomentary judicial convenience\u201d (\u00a7 39 of the joint dissenting opinion). Although there is a grain of truth \u2013 and not a tiny one at that \u2013 in such a characterisation, I would be quite reluctant to follow, at least to the end, that criticism regarding Burmych and Others itself, because, contrary to the assertions of those colleagues, that decision in fact did have something to do with \u201cjudicial economy, judicial efficiency, or the Brighton philosophy\u201d. But I think that this characterisation would indeed be congenial if applied to the C\u00e2mpeanu-type (non-)findings. There is nothing behind the C\u00e2mpeanu formula, except mere \u201cmomentary judicial convenience\u201d. Perhaps too momentary.<\/p>\n Luckily, the C\u00e2mpeanu formula is not accepted as a normal, justifiable judicial practice by all judges of the Court. On this I refer to Judge Pastor Vilanova\u2019s partly dissenting opinion in Popov and Others v. Russia (no.\u00a044560\/11, 27 November 2018), Judge Bo\u0161njak\u2019s partly dissenting opinion in Petukhov v. Ukraine (no. 2) (no. 41216\/13, 12 March 2019), and my own partly dissenting opinion in the latter case. There is therefore some hope, however slim, that one day the C\u00e2mpeanu formula may be abandoned. But that may be only my wishful thinking.<\/p>\n 19. The third category of cases in which the Court decides not to examine certain admissible \u201cother\u201d complaints includes judgments where the Court\u2019s resolve not to examine them, because there is \u201cno need\u201d to do so, is not accompanied by any explicit, even if succinct, reasoning, which would at least somehow explain its self-restraint to the readership. Not even is the \u201cmain legal question\u201d argument provided, as in C\u00e2mpeanu-type cases. This does not mean, in and of itself, that the non-examination would not be possible to justify. The problem is that readers are left to find out for themselves whether the Court\u2019s determination not to examine those complaints is justified owing to their overlapping with the complaints already examined or is a result of the Court\u2019s fiat.<\/p>\n Sometimes it is one, sometimes the other.<\/p>\n III<\/p>\n 20. When thoroughly compared with previous solutions, the present case does not fall into any of the above-provided types of termination of the examination of admissible complaints.<\/p>\n I begin by comparing the present case with the cases in which pilot judgments have been adopted or which, like the very exceptional case of Burmych and Others, are related to an earlier pilot judgment. Then I will turn to the comparison of the present case with those in which the examination of \u201cother\u201d complaints was terminated on the basis that, in the Court\u2019s own words, it was \u201cnot necessary\u201d. I leave aside Article 18 cases, because, as already mentioned, the applicants in the present case did not complain under that Article. However, two other categories, the second and the third, merit at least a sentence or two. After that I will look into whether the present case bears any resemblance with those in which the examination of \u201cother\u201d complaints was terminated owing to the overlapping of the \u201cundeserving\u201d complaints with those already examined.<\/p>\n 21. Firstly, the present judgment is not a pilot judgment. It does not mention any systemic (structural) problem, identified by the Court, in respect of which the respondent State must adopt any general measures rectifying the situation at the domestic level, and the examination of the relevant complaints has not been adjourned until the adoption of such measures; the Court has merely refused to examine them.<\/p>\n In addition, the complaints left unexamined in the present case are not those not yet communicated to the respondent Government. They were all duly communicated; therefore, even if this judgment had been a pilot judgment, the Court should have continued to examine them under the normal procedure. For the adjournment in the pilot-judgment procedure applies to complaints raised by \u201csimilar\u201d applications, not those which have been submitted in precisely that case.<\/p>\n 22. Nor does the present judgment bear any relation to a previous pilot judgment. The substantiation of the Court\u2019s resolve to leave hundreds of well-reasoned applications unexamined, as provided in paragraph 98 of the judgment, refers to Selahattin Demirta\u015f v. Turkey (no. 2) ([GC], no.\u00a014305\/17, 22 December 2020), Alparslan Altan v.\u00a0Turkey (no.\u00a012778\/17, 16 April 2019) and Ba\u015f v. Turkey (no. 66448\/17, 3 March 2020) as the judgments in which legal issues raised by complaints left unexamined have been \u201caddressed for the most part\u201d. This is true. And yet, \u201cfor the most part\u201d means \u201cnot all\u201d. Moreover, \u201caddressed\u201d does not amount to the identification of a systemic (structural) problem. On top of that, those \u201clegal issues\u201d do not encompass the \u201cfactual issues\u201d of the hundreds of applicants in the present case, which are at the root of their complaints. For those applicants did not apply to the Court for the reason that some \u201clegal issues\u201d could be \u201caddressed\u201d \u2013 they applied for the settlement of their \u201cfactual issues\u201d with the domestic authorities.<\/p>\n 23. Secondly, the present case is not a case of the Burmych and Others type. That case concerned a situation to which the Court\u2019s approach was in many respects different from its approach to the situation examined \u2013 or, rather, not examined \u2013 in the present case. Burmych and Others clearly instructed the respondent State to implement the Court\u2019s earlier pilot judgment, which the State had thus far failed to do. In the present case, there is nothing of that sort (and cannot be, because there is no related earlier pilot judgment). In Burmych and Others, the Court transmitted the non-examined applications \u2013 and thus the supervision over the State\u2019s progress or lack thereof \u2013 to the Committee of Ministers. There is nothing of the kind in this case (and cannot be for the same reason). In Burmych and Others a possibility of reassessment of the situation is postulated. There is not a hint of anything like that in the present judgment.<\/p>\n Thus there is one essential difference between the present case and Burmych and Others. Burmych and Others may be figuratively compared to such necessary surgical amputation of a limb, where not only the person\u2019s life is saved and, in addition, the hospital is sheltered from destruction, but also the ablated limb is replaced with a kind of prosthesis, however badly functioning, and the person is promised that one day the surgeon may revisit his condition. The present judgment rather looks like such an amputation where the loss of limb was not replaced by any surrogate, the surgeon sent the patient home for unattended treatment by someone who had allegedly inflicted the injuries on him, closed the hospital from within, and bade him farewell.<\/p>\n 24. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Burmych and Others does not speak at all of complaints that do not require examination. The \u201cno need to examine\u201d formula is not used in that judgment \u2013 unlike in the present one.<\/p>\n 25. Last but not least, in Burmych and Others the applications were struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases. In the present case they were not struck out \u2013 they were merely left unexamined. It is true that I do not find any realistic counter-arguments which would allow me to disagree with the majority that in the present case, like in Burmych and Others, there was a pressing need for the Court to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-processing so that the broader mission of the Court could be secured.<\/p>\n 26. I therefore do not find the reference in paragraph 98 to Burmych and Others, very bare and thus unqualified as it is, to be particularly apt for the present situation. That judgment could certainly be referred to \u2013 but perhaps with more provisos, i.e. with considerations not only of the similarities between the situations (\u201cconstantly growing inflow of applications\u201d), but of the difference in the Court\u2019s approach to them. The reference as it stands now does not strengthen the reasoning \u2013 it weakens it. For none of the safeguards employed in that 2017 case have been imported into the present judgment. The \u201cmutatis mutandis\u201d caveat does not help. It only disguises the fact that the only resemblance of this judgment to Burmych and Others is that the Court has adopted it also under the duress of reality, in which it has been left with no other choice, if the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery is to be ensured.<\/p>\n 27. On the other hand, when compared to Burmych and Others, the present judgment is more applicant-friendly in the sense that the applicants have won at least on one front: a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 has been found on account of the unlawfulness of their initial pre-trial detention. Not enough, but the five applicants in Burmych and Others did not receive even that.<\/p>\n 28. I turn now to the cases in which the Court has substantiated the non-examination of \u201cother\u201d complaints by resorting to the formula \u201cno need to examine\u201d (or \u201cnot necessary to examine\u201d).<\/p>\n 29. Regarding the cases falling into the second above-mentioned category of employment of the formula \u201cno need to examine\u201d, the present case is fundamentally different, because the C\u00e2mpeanu formula is not used in this judgment. In fact, hardly anyone would say that in this judgment the \u201cmain\u201d legal issues have been examined or that those not examined can be labelled as \u201csecondary\u201d in any sense.<\/p>\n 30. As to the third above-mentioned category of cases, the difference between them and the present one is also essential, because in this judgment an explanation is provided as to why the \u201cother\u201d complaints are left unexamined. Whether or not that explanation will be accepted as satisfactory by the applicants and the broader readership is another matter.<\/p>\n 31. It remains to be seen whether the unexamined complaints could be seen as overlapping with those actually examined.<\/p>\n But I am happy to be dispensed from the need to address this point, because this has been done by Judge Koskelo in her concurring opinion, joined by Judge Ranzoni. There it is convincingly shown that there is no overlapping of complaints. Indeed, the finding of a violation of Article 5 on account of a lack of basis in domestic law for the applicants\u2019 detention does not, in and of itself, imply that there has also been a violation of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 (c), or that there has been no such violation.<\/p>\n In order to answer that question the applicants\u2019 situation would have to be examined from the angle of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c).<\/p>\n IV<\/p>\n 32. To sum up, there clearly is a need to examine the complaints left without examination in the present case \u2013 even though in its operative part the Court has stated that there is no such need.<\/p>\n This is why I see point 5 of the operative part as misleading.<\/p>\n 33. What is more, the said need is a pressing one, particularly in view of the fact that, as can be seen from the concurring opinion of my distinguished colleague, one could presume that more than just a few of the complaints submitted in the present case under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) might be very well founded, in the light of such cases as Alparslan Altan v.\u00a0Turkey and Ba\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey (both cited above) and the circumstances transpiring from them. I would only add that, on the balance of probabilities, the presumption that there was no sufficient factual basis for the detention of at least some of the applicants is not at all futile, especially given the fact that the applicants so massively detained without a requisite legal basis were judges and prosecutors.<\/p>\n 34. The decision not to examine the lion\u2019s share of the complaints is an acknowledgment of the limits to the Court\u2019s capacity in the face of the massive influx of applications. The reference to \u201cjudicial policy\u201d (paragraph 98) means that the non-examination of complaints is determined not by any tenets of any Articles of the Convention, but by such reality, against which usual legal institutional and procedural mechanisms are helpless, unless the Court allows itself the dubious luxury of extending the examination of these complaints for at least a decade (but more likely for even longer) or (another most unattractive alternative) to postpone the examination of other meritorious complaints, at least those against the same State.<\/p>\n In that context it should be mentioned that today there are thousands of cases pending against Turkey which concern detentions and criminal convictions handed down in the aftermath of the 2016 attempted coup d\u2019\u00e9tat in that State. Every week their number increases by scores. The Court is in fact inundated with cases related to those events. In addition to that tsunami, there is a yet larger pool of pending unrelated cases against Turkey.<\/p>\n 35. In such circumstances, the decision not to examine the complaints that consume the most time, effort and other resources is the only pragmatic way out. From the purely legal(istic) perspective, it is not a satisfactory one, and not easily defensible. But it can be explained by reference to reality. That decision is not a judicial fiat. That explanation is provided here in paragraph 98. It is fairly stated at the end of that paragraph that the Court \u201cdecides not to examine the applicants\u2019 remaining complaints under Article 5\u201d (emphasis added), and that that decision has been adopted within the \u201cexceptional context\u201d of the case. There is not the slightest hint about the\u00a0\u201cremaining\u201d complaints not meriting examination (\u201cno need to examine\u201d) \u2013 only the grudging acknowledgment of the impracticality and inappropriateness of such examination in the face of the need to ensure the\u00a0Court\u2019s overall long-standing mission. This is an expediency justification \u2013 not a fully-fledged justification in the purely legal sense, perhaps not in the moral sense either, but still some justification of the untoward, intrusive choice, where all alternatives were worse. And, as has been shown, since Burmych and Others judicial policy considerations in principle may provide some substantiation, and in that sense some justification, for the Court\u2019s decision to leave certain complaints unexamined in certain extraordinary circumstances. This judgment is the application of that methodological principle, inapplicable in normal circumstances, but already entrenched in the Court\u2019s case-law.<\/p>\n 36. Whatever the explanation in paragraph 98, the \u201cno need to examine\u201d formula employed in point 5 of the operative part virtually brings it to naught. The findings of the operative part should be read in conjunction with the reasoning leading to them. But this particular finding does not correspond, either in letter or in spirit, to the explanation provided in paragraph 98. This is why I did not vote for it, even though I agree with the outcome of the non-examination of the \u201cremaining\u201d complaints.<\/p>\n 37. What happened is that the Chamber took the standard formula (as shown, already used too indiscriminately in a number of cases) and applied it in the most non-standard situation \u2013 one never encountered before.<\/p>\n For the situation faced by the Court in the present case is unprecedented. It therefore commands an unprecedented solution. Usual tools would not work. That has been explained in paragraph 98 \u2013 and abandoned in point 5 of the operative part. But when a judgment is adopted, it is not the paragraphs of the reasoning part that are voted on, but the points of the operative part.<\/p>\n I cannot cease to wonder why four years ago the Grand Chamber found an adequate way of referring to the exceptionality of the situation in the operative part of Burmych and Others, whilst the Chamber has not followed the Grand Chamber\u2019s example when formulating point 5 of the operative part of the present judgment.<\/p>\n V<\/p>\n 38. There is a risk that some may read this judgment, by which so many complaints of so many applicants have been denied examination, as a signal that a member State can escape responsibility for violating the Convention en masse, since the Court may be flooded with complaints against that State to such an extent that it becomes unable to cope with them and decides not to examine them.<\/p>\n To be frank: if a regime decides to go rogue, it should do it in a big way. And if responsibility can be escaped by \u201cdoing it big\u201d, why not give it a try?<\/p>\n 39. Recently the Court dealt with an attempt to drastically increase the number of applications to the Court, unambiguously aimed at causing it to become \u201ccongested, saturated and flooded\u201d and at \u201cparalysing its operations\u201d (Zambrano v. France (dec.), no. 41994\/21, \u00a7 36, 21 September 2021). In that case it was noted that the right of application was being abused by applicants pursuing a strategy of flooding the Court with a tsunami of applications and thus with the aim of paralysing it.<\/p>\n 40. But what if a similar strategy is pursued not by a group of applicants, whatever their motives may be, but by the Government of a member State, seeking to escape responsibility for violations of the Convention?<\/p>\n The question remains, and even becomes more pertinent: can the course adopted in this case be adopted again in an increasing number of cases? How many times can this be before such situations are no longer regarded as \u201cexceptional\u201d?<\/p>\n 41. To conclude, the situation encountered by the Court in the present case is indeed unprecedented and exceptional by all standards applicable hitherto, or at best \u2013 or, rather, worst \u2013 is comparable only to Burmych and Others. But a similar exceptionality in principle can be \u201crepeated\u201d. Thus, as in addition to this exceptional situation there may be others, a remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance must be found \u2013 and applied. Needless to say, that remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance, cannot and must not be judicial.<\/p>\n To that effect, I can but agree with Judge Koskelo that \u201c[a]ny further conclusions remain for other bodies to consider\u201d.<\/p>\n VI<\/p>\n 42. I follow Judge Koskelo\u2019s remarks as to the dubious categorisation, in Turkish law, of the offences allegedly committed by the applicants in the present case as \u201cpersonal offences\u201d. The contradiction between the judges and prosecutors allegedly receiving instructions from the supposedly illegal organisation\u2019s hierarchy, on the one hand, and their alleged membership in that organisation being categorised as a \u201cpersonal offence\u201d, on the other, is striking. Indeed, \u201csuch an interpretation of domestic law appears neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty\u201d.<\/p>\n 43. In this context, I must admit that I should have been more critical in Ba\u015f (cited above), where the Chamber, of which I was part, stated that \u201cit [was] not for the Court to determine into which category of offences the applicant\u2019s alleged conduct [fell]\u201d (\u00a7 158).<\/p>\n Perhaps it was. Or at least that statement had to be accompanied by an appropriate proviso.<\/p>\n 44. Finally, I seize this opportunity to admit that today I would also differently assess some of the other complaints in Ba\u015f, namely those under Article 5 \u00a7 4, regarding the restriction of Mr Ba\u015f\u2019s access to the investigation file and the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the magistrates\u2019 courts.<\/p>\n Of course, this confession is post factum, but still offers some relief.<\/p>\n ____________<\/p>\n [1] For a full list of the complaints raised by the applicants, see the communication report of 17 May 2019 in the case of Altun v. Turkey (no. 60065\/16) and 545 others.<\/p>\n ___________<\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n
\nCASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY<\/strong>
\n(Applications nos. 75805\/16 and 426 others \u2013 see appended list)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT<\/p>\n
\n23 November 2021<\/p>\n
\nCarlo Ranzoni,
\nEgidijus K\u016bris,
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nPauliine Koskelo,
\nMarko Bo\u0161njak,
\nSaadet Y\u00fcksel, judges,
\nand Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n
\nH.B.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Application no.<\/strong><\/td>\n Case name<\/strong><\/td>\n Lodged on<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant
\nYear of Birth<\/strong><\/td>\nRepresented by<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant\u2019s status at the time of pre-trial detention<\/strong><\/p>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n 75805\/16<\/td>\n Turan v. Turkey<\/td>\n 24\/11\/2016<\/td>\n Ersin TURAN<\/strong>
\n1983<\/td>\nBilal Eren MASKAN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n 75794\/16<\/td>\n Demirta\u015f v. Turkey<\/td>\n 30\/11\/2016<\/td>\n Hasan DEM\u0130RTA\u015e<\/strong>
\n1989<\/td>\n\u0130rem TATLIDEDE<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n 6556\/17<\/td>\n Ka\u015f\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 20\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Muhammet Ali KA\u015eIK\u00c7I<\/strong>
\n1979<\/td>\nG\u00fcl\u015fen ZENG\u0130N<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n 11888\/17<\/td>\n K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck v. Turkey<\/td>\n 06\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Bekir K\u00dc\u00c7\u00dcK<\/strong>
\n1974<\/td>\nSariye YE\u015e\u0130L TOZKOPARAN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n 12991\/17<\/td>\n Erel v. Turkey<\/td>\n 04\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Kemalettin EREL<\/strong>
\n1972<\/td>\nKarar Koray ATAK<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n 13875\/17<\/td>\n Polater v. Turkey<\/td>\n 09\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Yusuf Ziya POLATER<\/strong>
\n1983<\/td>\n\u0130smail G\u00dcLER<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n 14126\/17<\/td>\n \u00c7etin v. Turkey<\/td>\n 06\/01\/2017<\/td>\n \u0130lker \u00c7ET\u0130N<\/strong>
\n1970<\/td>\nSemih ERKEN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 8.<\/td>\n 15011\/17<\/td>\n Ulup\u0131nar v. Turkey<\/td>\n 02\/02\/2017<\/td>\n Aziz ULUPINAR<\/strong>
\n1982<\/td>\nRukiye CO\u015eGUN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 9.<\/td>\n 15048\/17<\/td>\n Karademir v. Turkey<\/td>\n 19\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Mehmet KARADEM\u0130R<\/strong>
\n1971<\/td>\nKarar Koray ATAK<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 10.<\/td>\n 15066\/17<\/td>\n K\u0131l\u0131n\u00e7 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 16\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Bahad\u0131r KILIN\u00c7<\/strong>
\n1972<\/td>\nHanife Ruveyda KILIN\u00c7<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 11.<\/td>\n 15098\/17<\/td>\n Alt\u0131nta\u015f v. Turkey<\/td>\n 02\/02\/2017<\/td>\n Yusuf ALTINTA\u015e<\/strong>
\n1975<\/td>\nRukiye CO\u015eGUN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 12.<\/td>\n 15124\/17<\/td>\n Ulup\u0131nar v. Turkey<\/td>\n 19\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Atilla ULUPINAR<\/strong>
\n1968<\/td>\nP\u0131nar BA\u015eBU\u011eA<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 13.<\/td>\n 15290\/17<\/td>\n Dalk\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 17\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Erdem DALKILI\u00c7<\/strong>
\n1978<\/td>\nElvan BA\u011e CANBAZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 14.<\/td>\n 15494\/17<\/td>\n Hamurcu v. Turkey<\/td>\n 16\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Bayram HAMURCU<\/strong>
\n1989<\/td>\nZehra KILI\u00c7<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 15.<\/td>\n 28551\/17<\/td>\n Cihangiro\u011flu v. Turkey<\/td>\n 29\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Bircan C\u0130HANG\u0130RO\u011eLU<\/strong>
\n1973<\/td>\nMehmet Fatih \u0130\u00c7ER<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 16.<\/td>\n 28570\/17<\/td>\n Miralay v. Turkey<\/td>\n 16\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Necati M\u0130RALAY<\/strong>
\n1980<\/td>\nMetin G\u00dc\u00c7L\u00dc<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 17.<\/td>\n 29073\/17<\/td>\n Mercan v. Turkey<\/td>\n 05\/06\/2018<\/td>\n Halil MERCAN<\/strong>
\n1985<\/td>\n\u0130hsan MAKAS<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 18.<\/td>\n 31217\/17<\/td>\n Efe v. Turkey<\/td>\n 22\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Metin EFE<\/strong>
\n1976<\/td>\nMerve Elif G\u00dcRACAR<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 19.<\/td>\n 33987\/17<\/td>\n Kay\u0131 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 17\/01\/2017<\/td>\n Halil \u0130brahim KAYI<\/strong>
\n1974<\/td>\nR\u0131za ALBAY<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 20.<\/td>\n 34014\/17<\/td>\n K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 24\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Erdal KILI\u00c7<\/strong>
\n1974<\/td>\nTufan YILMAZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 21.<\/td>\n 34028\/17<\/td>\n Y\u0131lmaz v. Turkey<\/td>\n 23\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Serdar YILMAZ<\/strong>
\n1983<\/td>\nTufan YILMAZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 22.<\/td>\n 34357\/17<\/td>\n G\u00fcnd\u00fcz v. Turkey<\/td>\n 18\/04\/2017<\/td>\n Kas\u0131m G\u00dcND\u00dcZ<\/strong>
\n1990<\/td>\nElif Nurbanu OR<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 23.<\/td>\n 36845\/17<\/td>\n A\u011fr\u0131 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 10\/01\/2017<\/td>\n U\u011fur A\u011eRI<\/strong>
\n1978<\/td>\nYasemin BAL<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 24.<\/td>\n 39593\/17<\/td>\n K\u00f6ksal v. Turkey<\/td>\n 22\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Mustafa K\u00d6KSAL<\/strong>
\n1978<\/td>\nEmre AKARYILDIZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 25.<\/td>\n 40053\/17<\/td>\n G\u00f6lyeri v. Turkey<\/td>\n 16\/05\/2017<\/td>\n Murat G\u00d6LYERI<\/strong>
\n1980<\/td>\nMerve Elif G\u00dcRACAR<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 26.<\/td>\n 40097\/17<\/td>\n \u00c7okmutlu v. Turkey<\/td>\n 05\/05\/2017<\/td>\n Metin \u00c7OKMUTLU<\/strong>
\n1983<\/td>\nArife ASLAN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 27.<\/td>\n 40277\/17<\/td>\n Evren v. Turkey<\/td>\n 28\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Enver EVREN<\/strong>
\n1977<\/td>\nFatih D\u00d6NMEZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 28.<\/td>\n 40565\/17<\/td>\n \u00d6zen v. Turkey<\/td>\n 15\/03\/2017<\/td>\n G\u00f6khan \u00d6ZEN<\/strong>
\n1988<\/td>\nMustafa TEMEL<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 29.<\/td>\n 40937\/17<\/td>\n Kaya v. Turkey<\/td>\n 27\/02\/2017<\/td>\n \u00d6mer KAYA<\/strong>
\n1980<\/td>\nMerve Elif G\u00dcRACAR<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 30.<\/td>\n 41286\/17<\/td>\n Aydo\u011fmu\u015f v. Turkey<\/td>\n 31\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Tahir AYDO\u011eMU\u015e<\/strong>
\n1981<\/td>\n\u0130rem TATLIDEDE<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 31.<\/td>\n 41525\/17<\/td>\n \u00d6zkan v. Turkey<\/td>\n 13\/04\/2017<\/td>\n Mustafa \u00d6ZKAN<\/strong>
\n1983<\/td>\nOsman BA\u015eER<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 32.<\/td>\n 41770\/17<\/td>\n \u00d6rer v. Turkey<\/td>\n 07\/04\/2017<\/td>\n Vedat \u00d6RER<\/strong>
\n1973<\/td>\n\u0130rem TATLIDEDE<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 33.<\/td>\n 41772\/17<\/td>\n Tosun v. Turkey<\/td>\n 29\/12\/2016<\/td>\n Tahsin TOSUN<\/strong>
\n1980<\/td>\n\u0130hsan MAKAS<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 34.<\/td>\n 41886\/17<\/td>\n Alkan v. Turkey<\/td>\n 06\/04\/2017<\/td>\n G\u00f6khan ALKAN<\/strong>
\n1989<\/td>\nFatma Aybike \u00c7INARG\u0130L \u015eAN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 35.<\/td>\n 42314\/17<\/td>\n Tosun v. Turkey<\/td>\n 18\/04\/2017<\/td>\n Kenan TOSUN<\/strong>
\n1987<\/td>\n\u0130hsan MAKAS<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 36.<\/td>\n 43668\/17<\/td>\n Teke v. Turkey<\/td>\n 20\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Hasan Ali TEKE<\/strong>
\n1988<\/td>\nSultan TEKE SOYD\u0130N\u00c7<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 37.<\/td>\n 43681\/17<\/td>\n Ko\u00e7ak v. Turkey<\/td>\n 03\/04\/2017<\/td>\n \u00c7ET\u0130N KO\u00c7AK<\/strong>
\n1980<\/td>\nArzu BEYAZIT<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 38.<\/td>\n 43710\/17<\/td>\n Deliveli v. Turkey<\/td>\n 31\/03\/2017<\/td>\n Hasan DEL\u0130VEL\u0130<\/strong>
\n1978<\/td>\nEmre AKARYILDIZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 39.<\/td>\n 43715\/17<\/td>\n Ayd\u0131n v. Turkey<\/td>\n 04\/04\/2017<\/td>\n Zafer AYDIN<\/strong>
\n1980<\/td>\nEmre AKARYILDIZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 40.<\/td>\n 43733\/17<\/td>\n \u015eam v. Turkey<\/td>\n 09\/05\/2017<\/td>\n Abdullah \u015eAM<\/strong>
\n1981<\/td>\n\u0130rem TATLIDEDE<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 41.<\/td>\n 43753\/17<\/td>\n Eken v. Turkey<\/td>\n 09\/05\/2017<\/td>\n \u0130smail EKEN<\/strong>
\n1976<\/td>\nMurat EKEN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 42.<\/td>\n 44833\/17<\/td>\n Yalva\u00e7 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 02\/05\/2017<\/td>\n \u0130brahim YALVA\u00c7<\/strong>
\n1988<\/td>\nArife ASLAN<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 43.<\/td>\n 44867\/17<\/td>\n G\u00fcven\u00e7 v. Turkey<\/td>\n 24\/05\/2017<\/td>\n \u0130smail G\u00dcVEN\u00c7<\/strong>
\n1985<\/td>\nCahit \u00c7\u0130FT\u00c7\u0130<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 44.<\/td>\n 44881\/17<\/td>\n K\u0131z\u0131l v. Turkey<\/td>\n 22\/05\/2017<\/td>\n Bahtiyar KIZIL<\/strong>
\n1986<\/td>\n\u0130rem TATLIDEDE<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 45.<\/td>\n 44907\/17<\/td>\n Yal\u0131m v. Turkey<\/td>\n 03\/05\/2017<\/td>\n Cemalettin YALIM<\/strong>
\n1971<\/td>\nHasan Celil G\u00dcNEN\u00c7<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 46.<\/td>\n 45079\/17<\/td>\n Dan\u0131\u015f v. Turkey<\/td>\n 11\/04\/2017<\/td>\n Muhammed Arif DANI\u015e<\/strong>
\n1986<\/td>\nCahit \u00c7\u0130FT\u00c7\u0130<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 47.<\/td>\n 45080\/17<\/td>\n Akg\u00fcl v. Turkey<\/td>\n 04\/05\/2017<\/td>\n Mustafa AKG\u00dcL<\/strong>
\n1973<\/td>\nK\u00fcr\u015fat Orhan \u015eIM\u015eEK<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 48.<\/td>\n 45129\/17<\/td>\n Bahad\u0131r v. Turkey<\/td>\n 23\/06\/2017<\/td>\n Mehmet BAHADIR<\/strong>
\n1976<\/td>\n\u0130rem TATLIDEDE<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 49.<\/td>\n 46907\/17<\/td>\n Kur\u015fun v. Turkey<\/td>\n 20\/02\/2017<\/td>\n \u00d6mer Faruk KUR\u015eUN<\/strong>
\n1977<\/td>\nMehmet ARI (not lawyer)<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 50.<\/td>\n 46938\/17<\/td>\n Tufano\u011flu v. Turkey<\/td>\n 23\/03\/2017<\/td>\n \u0130shak TUFANO\u011eLU<\/strong>
\n1987<\/td>\nRegaip DEM\u0130R<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 51.<\/td>\n 47039\/17<\/td>\n Acar v. Turkey<\/td>\n 22\/03\/2017<\/td>\n G\u00fcrcan ACAR<\/strong>
\n1966<\/td>\nTufan YILMAZ<\/td>\n Ordinary judge or public prosecutor<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 52.<\/td>\n 47043\/17<\/td>\n G\u00fcven v. Turkey<\/td>\n 24\/03\/2017<\/td>\n