Relying in particular on Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article\u00a013 (right to an effective remedy), the applicants complained that the measure taken by the Speaker of banning the first applicant\u2019s parliamentary speech had infringed the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression, and that there had been no remedy against that decision.<\/p>\n
FIRST SECTION This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Sz\u00e9l and Others v. Hungary,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a05078\/16) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by four Hungarian nationals, Ms\u00a0Bernadett Sz\u00e9l, Ms Erzs\u00e9bet Schmuck, Mr R\u00f3bert Benedek Sallai and Mr\u00a0Andr\u00e1s Schiffer (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 22 January 2016;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice of the application to the Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d);<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 9 November 2021,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Relying in particular on Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article\u00a013 (right to an effective remedy), the applicants complained that the measure taken by the Speaker of banning the first applicant\u2019s parliamentary speech had infringed the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression, and that there had been no remedy against that decision.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The first applicant, Ms Bernadett Sz\u00e9l, was born in 1977 and lives in Budakeszi. The second applicant, Ms Erzs\u00e9bet Schmuck, was born in 1954 and lives in Budapest. The third applicant, Mr R\u00f3bert Benedek Sallai, was born in 1974 and lives in T\u00farkeve. The fourth applicant, Mr Andr\u00e1s Schiffer, was born in 1971 and lives in Budapest. The applicants were represented by Mr\u00a0D.A. Karsai, a lawyer practising in Budapest.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, of the Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 5. At the material time the applicants were members of parliament belonging to the opposition party Lehet M\u00e1s a Politika (Politics can be different).<\/p>\n 6. At a parliamentary session on 6 July 2015 the first applicant made a speech\u00a0concerning\u00a0urgent and topical matters,\u00a0entitled “Workers are losing out every day with the current Government\u201d. In protest against the Government\u2019s policy on wage settlements, the first applicant also displayed a banner stating that “Hundreds of thousands have been forced to emigrate”. The other applicants also displayed banners reading “Start-ups, employees”, “Public sector employees, kindergarten, school employees, civil servants”, and “Social and health workers, nursery workers, nurses, doctors”.<\/p>\n 7. The Speaker of Parliament turned off Ms Sz\u00e9l\u2019s microphone and called on the applicants to remove the banners. He announced that he had withdrawn Ms\u00a0Sz\u00e9l\u2019s right to speak, and asked her to take her seat. The applicants removed the banners and the first applicant tried to carry on with her speech, but her microphone had been turned off. The speaker repeated that her right to speak had been withdrawn and called on her again to take her seat.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/p>\n 8. The Parliament Act (no. XXXVI of 2012) provided the following at the material time, in so far as relevant:<\/p>\n Section 38\/A<\/p>\n \u201c(1) No demonstration by way of showing objects, images or voice recordings (henceforth: \u201ca demonstration\u201d) shall be carried out during the sitting of the National Assembly or a committee, subject to the exceptions specified in subsections (2)-(3).<\/p>\n (2) A demonstration during the sitting of the National Assembly shall be permitted by the House Committee. A request for permission to hold a demonstration shall be submitted at the latest one hour before the commencement of the sitting of the House Committee.<\/p>\n (3) A demonstration during the sitting of the Parliamentary Committee shall be permitted by that committee. A request for permission to hold a demonstration shall be submitted at the latest one hour before the commencement of the sitting of that committee.<\/p>\n (4) Demonstrations permitted under subsections (2) or (3) shall be limited to the extent necessary to explain the speaker\u2019s position.\u201d<\/p>\n 8. Maintenance of order and disciplinary powers<\/p>\n Section 45<\/p>\n \u201cThe chair of the session shall ensure the orderly conduct of the session. To ensure the orderly conduct of the session he or she \u2013 at the request of the chair or the House Committee (H\u00e1zbizotts\u00e1g) \u2013 may take the measures listed in sections 46-51\/A.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 46<\/p>\n \u201c(1) The chair\u00a0of the session shall order any members who clearly digress from the point without any reason during their speech, or pointlessly repeat their own or other speakers\u2019\u00a0speeches during the same debate, to address the point, and shall at the same time warn them of the consequences of non-compliance.<\/p>\n (2) The chair of the session may withdraw the right of members to speak if during their speech they continue to behave in the manner specified in section 46(1) after being warned for the second time.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 47<\/p>\n \u201cThe chair of the session may withdraw the right of members to speak, giving reasons, if they have used up the time allotted to them or to their parliamentary group.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 48<\/p>\n \u201c(1) The chair of the session shall call speakers to order if they use an expression that is indecent or offensive to the authority of Parliament or to a person or group, particularly any national, ethnic, racial or religious community, and shall at the same time warn them of the consequences of repeatedly using the offensive or indecent expression.<\/p>\n (2) The chair of the session shall withdraw the right of members to speak if they persist in using an offensive or indecent expression after being called to order.<\/p>\n (3) If during his or her speech a member uses an expression that is gravely offensive to the authority of Parliament or to any person or group, particularly any national, ethnic, racial or religious community, or the offensive expression used by him or her causes serious disorder, the chair of the session may propose, without calling the member to order or issuing a warning, the exclusion of the member from the remainder of that day\u2019s sitting and the imposition of a fine against him or her.<\/p>\n (4) Parliament shall decide without a debate on the proposal for the exclusion of the member. If Parliament does not have a quorum, the chair of the session shall decide on the exclusion. The chair of the session shall inform Parliament at its next sitting of the exclusion and the reasons for it. Parliament shall subsequently decide, without a debate, whether the decision of the chair of the session was legal.<\/p>\n (5) The member excluded from the sitting may not speak again during that sitting. A member excluded from the sitting day shall not be entitled to remuneration for the day of the exclusion.<\/p>\n (6) The chair of the session, in the absence of a proposal to apply any penalty referred to in subsection (3), may propose the imposition of a fine on the member within five days of his or her using the gravely offensive expression.<\/p>\n (7) Parliament shall decide on the proposal for the imposition of a fine referred to in subsections (3) and (6) during the session following the proposal, without a debate. The amount of the fine may not exceed one third of the member\u2019s monthly remuneration.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 49<\/p>\n \u201c(1) The chair of the session may withdraw, without a warning, the right of members to speak, if they object to any decision by the chair of the session or to his or her chairing of the session, except for procedural motions. A speaker whose\u00a0right to speak\u00a0has been\u00a0withdrawn\u00a0by the chair of the session without warning may request an individual resolution of the case by the committee responsible for the interpretation of the Rules of the House.<\/p>\n (2) Other than in the circumstances described in subsection (1), a member\u2019s right to speak shall not be withdrawn if the chair of the session has not warned him or her of the consequences of the call to order.<\/p>\n (3) Anyone whose right to speak\u00a0has been withdrawn\u00a0pursuant to subsection (1), section 46(2) or section 48(2) may not speak again during the same sitting day on the same matter.<\/p>\n (4) If a member\u2019s conduct is gravely offensive to the authority or order of Parliament, or violates the provisions of the Rules of Parliament concerning the order of debate, voting or displaying demonstration materials, the chair of the session may propose the exclusion of the member for the remainder of the sitting day without calling him or her to order or issuing a warning, and may propose the imposition of a fine on him or her. The proposal shall contain the reason for the measure and … the provision of the Rules of Parliament that has been violated.<\/p>\n (5) Parliament shall decide without a debate on the proposal for the exclusion of the member. If Parliament does not have a quorum, the chair of the session shall decide on the exclusion. The chair of the session shall inform Parliament at its next sitting of the exclusion and the reasons for it. Parliament shall subsequently decide without a debate whether the decision of the chair of the session was legal.<\/p>\n (6) The member excluded from the sitting day may not speak again during that sitting. A member excluded from the sitting day shall not be entitled to remuneration for the day of the exclusion.<\/p>\n (7) The chair of the session, in the absence of a proposal to apply any penalty referred to in subsection (4), may propose the imposition of a fine on the member within five days of his or her engaging in the conduct specified in subsection (4).<\/p>\n (8) Parliament shall decide on the proposal for the imposition of a fine referred to in subsections (4) and (7) during the session following the proposal, without a debate. The amount of the fine may not exceed one third of the member\u2019s monthly remuneration.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 51\/A<\/p>\n \u201c(1) Based on a proposal of any of its members, the House Committee [H\u00e1zbizotts\u00e1g] \u2013 in the absence of any other legal consequences \u2013 may order the reduction of a member\u2019s allowance within fifteen days of the conduct specified in sections 48(3), 49(4) and 50(1). The decision shall contain the reasons for the measure and, if the conduct violated the rules on debating, voting or …, the provision of the Rules of Parliament that was violated.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (3) The Speaker shall immediately inform the member concerned of the decision taken pursuant to subsection (1).<\/p>\n (4) Should the member disagree with the decision taken pursuant to subsection (1), he or she may request within five days of the notification specified in subsection (3) the Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials to overrule the decision taken pursuant to subsection (1). Should the member not request the overruling of the decision within the specified time-limit, his allowance shall be reduced by the amount specified in the decision.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (6) The Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials shall decide on the request submitted pursuant to subsection (4) … within fifteen days. Should the member request a hearing, the Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials shall hear the member in person.<\/p>\n (7) Should the Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials uphold the member\u2019s request, his allowance shall not be reduced and the proceedings specified in subsection (1) shall be discontinued.<\/p>\n (8) Should the Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials dismiss the member\u2019s request or not render a decision within the time-limit specified in subsection (6), the member\u2019s allowance shall be reduced by the amount specified in the decision taken pursuant to subsection (1).<\/p>\n (9) Should the Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials dismiss the member\u2019s request submitted pursuant to subsection (4) or not decide within the time-limit specified in subsection (6), the member may request Parliament to overrule the decision taken pursuant to subsection\u00a0(1).<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (11) The President of the Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials shall immediately inform the member concerned and the House Committee of its decision taken pursuant to subsection (8) … or of the expiry of the time-limit.<\/p>\n (12) A request under subsection (9) shall be submitted within five working days of the notice given by the President of the Committee on Immunities, Conflict of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials pursuant to subsection (11).<\/p>\n (13) Parliament shall rule on the decision taken pursuant to subsection (1) during the session following a request under subsection (9), without a debate. The amount of the fine may not exceed<\/p>\n (a) one-third of the member\u2019s monthly remuneration if the reduction was due to conduct specified in section 48(3) or 49(4),<\/p>\n (b) the member\u2019s monthly remuneration if the reduction was due to conduct specified in section 50(1).\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/p>\n I. strike out of the application in respect of the fourth applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 9. By a letter of 20 December 2019, Mr Schiffer\u2019s representative informed the Court that his client\u00a0wished to withdraw his application to the Court.<\/p>\n 10. In the light of the foregoing, and in the absence of any special circumstances regarding respect for the rights guaranteed by the Convention and the Protocols thereto, the Court, in accordance with Article\u00a037 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(a) of the Convention, considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the part of the application lodged by\u00a0Mr Schiffer.<\/p>\n 11. In view of the above, it is appropriate to\u00a0strike the part of the application lodged by Mr Schiffer out of the list.<\/p>\n II. alleged violation of article 10 of the convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 12. The remaining applicants complained that the measure of banning the first applicant\u2019s speech infringed their rights under Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.<\/p>\n 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. As regards the second and third applicants<\/em><\/p>\n 13. The Government raised an objection of inadmissibility on the grounds that the second and third applicants had suffered no interference with the exercise of their rights at all. Therefore, their complaints were manifestly ill\u2011founded and amounted to an abuse of the right of individual application.<\/p>\n 14. The applicants maintained that the banners displayed by the second and third applicants had constituted symbolic speech and were closely related to the topic of the first applicant\u2019s expression. The banners were only capable of conveying a message during the speech itself. The silencing of the first applicant had thus also had an impact on the second and third applicants\u2019 exercise of their right to freedom of expression in that their banners and the symbolic speech had become meaningless as a result.<\/p>\n 15. The Court reiterates its case-law, according to which certain circumstances which have a chilling effect on freedom of expression do in fact confer on those concerned, that is persons who have not been finally convicted, the status of victim of an interference in the exercise of their right to that freedom (see, Dilipak v. Turkey, no. 29680\/05, \u00a7 44, 15\u00a0September 2015, compare also its \u00a7\u00a7 45-47).<\/p>\n 16. The Court observes, however, that the facts referred to in the present case by the second and third applicants cannot be compared to those cases in which the existence of an interference has been found in the past.<\/p>\n 17. The Court notes that both the second and the third applicants did indeed display their banners, but neither of them was subject of any disciplinary measure or penalty by the Speaker of Parliament; in fact, they were simply called upon to put away the banners that they had held up during the first applicant\u2019s speech. On account of these elements, the Court cannot discern objective grounds to hold that the second and third applicants suffered adverse consequences. Nor can it be said that either their having been called to put away their banners or the withdrawal of the first applicant\u2019s right to speak had an impact on the second or third applicant which would have prevented them from expressing their opinion or conveying the same message through, for example, parliamentary speech.<\/p>\n 18. It follows that neither the measure taken by the Speaker withdrawing the first applicant\u2019s right to speak, nor his calling on the second and third applicants to put away their banners, constituted an \u201cinterference\u201d with the exercise by the second and third applicants of their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. In the absence of the second and third applicants\u2019 victim status, the complaints under Article\u00a010 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 2. As regards the first applicant<\/em><\/p>\n 19. The Court notes that the first applicant\u2019s\u00a0complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a) The first applicant<\/p>\n 20. The first applicant submitted that the measure in question had constituted a very severe and direct interference with her right to express political opinions as an elected member of parliament. The measure did not have a legal basis, since the Parliament Act did not provide for the penalty imposed on her. Nor did the measure serve a legitimate aim since displaying the banners had not caused any disruption to parliamentary work.<\/p>\n 21. The first applicant contended that the interference at issue had failed to meet the requirement of necessity in a democratic society. She emphasised that the symbolic speech had expressed the MPs\u2019 protest against the Government\u2019s policies and had been related to affairs of high public importance concerning the labour market. It was not only addressed to other MPs but also to voters. She argued that the opposition MPs had needed to use special means of communication to express their opinions effectively, since the governing coalition had made efforts to minimise their opportunities to participate in the parliamentary decision-making process.<\/p>\n 22. The first applicant also pointed out that the penalty had been imposed on her without any procedural safeguards.<\/p>\n (b) The Government<\/p>\n 23. The Government maintained that parliamentary immunity was a guarantee to ensure MPs\u2019 freedom of expression. The Speaker\u2019s power to impose disciplinary penalties on MPs ensured that abuses of that right were prevented. The Government argued that the first applicant had not been hindered in expressing her opinion, and the manner she had chosen to convey her message had clearly exceeded a permissible exercise of her free speech rights. In any event, the banners had added nothing to her speech. In the Government\u2019s opinion the sole purpose of the MPs\u2019 action had been to attract media attention and to disturb parliamentary order rather than to communicate any content or additional information. Nonetheless, the Government accepted that the contested measure interfered with the first applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression.<\/p>\n 24. The Government submitted that the measure had been prescribed by law, namely section 38\/A(1) of the Parliament Act, which required prior authorisation for any display of demonstration materials, and section 49(4) which provided for penalties for any conduct infringing the reputation or order of Parliament or breaching the rules of debating, voting or displaying demonstration materials. The MPs had been aware of the rules and could have assessed in advance the consequences of their conduct. The measure in question had also served the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others and ensuring the undisturbed functioning of the National Assembly. In the Government\u2019s understanding, the very fact that the MPs had broken the rules concerning the display of demonstration material amounted to a disturbance of parliamentary order. They pointed out that a prohibition on displaying banners is a common tradition of a number of Member States.<\/p>\n 25. As to the necessity of the interference, the Government emphasised that the Speaker had had a discretion to decide which disciplinary penalty to impose, and in the first applicant\u2019s case he had chosen the most lenient one. It had also been justified in the circumstances of the present case since an immediate measure had been necessary to prevent further and greater disturbance to order. Furthermore, the disciplinary penalty had not been imposed for the content of the first applicant\u2019s speech but for intentionally violating the rules regulating the manner in which political opinions could be expressed. The first applicant had had every opportunity to convey the same message in her parliamentary speech.<\/p>\n 26. The Government pointed out that the first applicant could have raised the issue via her political party with the committee responsible for the interpretation of rules of Parliament under section 61(3) of the Parliament Act, seeking the interpretation of the relevant rules, and should she have been dissatisfied with the position taken by the committee, she could have asked for a decision to be made by the plenary Parliament. In the Government\u2019s understanding, that procedure could have ensured respect for procedural guarantees.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a) Whether there was an interference<\/p>\n 27. The Court observes that the first applicant\u2019s right to speak at the parliamentary session was withdrawn as a penalty for the non-verbal expression which she and other members of parliament had made. Both parties agreed that this interfered with the first applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression and the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.<\/p>\n (b) Legal basis and legitimate aim<\/p>\n 28. The Court observes that the Government relied on sections 38\/A(1) and 49(4) of the Parliament Act, whereas in the first applicant\u2019s understanding the conditions set out in those provisions for applying the penalty in question were not met in her case.<\/p>\n 29. As to the legitimate aim of the interference, the Court refers to its conclusions on this point in Kar\u00e1csony and Others v. Hungary ([GC], nos.\u00a042461\/13 and 44357\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 128-29, 17 May 2016), where it found that it pursued the legitimate aim of the \u201cprevention of disorder\u201d as well as the \u201cprotection of the rights of others\u201d. However, it notes the first applicant\u2019s argument that these grounds were purely formal in that her conduct had had no disruptive impact on parliamentary work.<\/p>\n 30. The Court considers that the question of lawfulness and that of the legitimate aim pursued by the denial of the first applicant\u2019s right to speak are closely linked to the broader issues of whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society and proportionate (see, mutatis mutandis, Breyer v. Germany, no.\u00a050001\/12, \u00a7 85, 30 January 2020). The Court will take these circumstances into account when examining the necessity of banning the first applicant\u2019s speech.<\/p>\n (c) Necessary in a democratic society<\/p>\n 31. As regards the necessity of the interference, the principles governing this issue are outlined in Kar\u00e1csony and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 132-47). Moreover, in that judgment the Court also held that \u201cthe exercise of Parliament\u2019s power to sanction disorderly conduct of a member has to respect the principle of proportionality inherent in Article 10, including in its procedural aspect\u201d (ibid., \u00a7 152). It further accepted the distinction between immediate penalties, such as denial of the right to speak and exclusion from a session, which instantly prevent an MP from expressing his or her opinion, and those which were of an\u00a0ex post facto\u00a0nature. The Court considered that the procedural safeguards available regarding these different types of penalties may vary. Immediate penalties are imposed in the case of a grave disturbance of parliamentary order, and in terms of procedural safeguards they would require a warning before being imposed. However, in extreme cases no warning will be required. In this context, the justification would be that clearly abusive speech or conduct of an MP nullifies the protection of his or her right to freedom of expression or may be considered an abuse of the right (ibid., \u00a7 155). In this respect, the Court observed that a prior call to order or warning, at least once, was the European standard in the framework of parliamentary discipline (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a051 and 57).<\/p>\n 32. The Court notes that sections 46-51\/A of the Parliament Act provided for measures to ensure the orderly conduct of the session. Under section 49(2) the chair of the session could deny members of parliament the right to speak without a prior warning only in circumstances where the member in question had objected to a decision taken by the chair. In all other situations, including where a member digressed from a point without reason, pointlessly repeated his or her speech, or used offensive language, the Parliament Act required the Speaker to proceed with a prior warning before withdrawing the member\u2019s right to speak. For cases of members using gravely offensive language or engaging in conduct gravely offensive to the authority of Parliament or in violation the Rules of Parliament, including the rules concerning the display of demonstration materials, the chair of the session had the right to propose the exclusion of the member in question and the imposition of a fine, without a prior warning.<\/p>\n 33. The Court cannot but note that in the present case, the censorship was directly exercised, without being preceded by a prior call to order or warning. While it is true that the Parliament Act provided for immediate disciplinary measures, that is without prior warning, for breaches of the Rules of Parliament, the relevant penalties for such situations, in terms of section 49(4) were the member\u2019s exclusion from the session or the imposition of a fine, and not an immediate penalty, such as the denial of the right to speak, as was applied in the first applicant\u2019s case.<\/p>\n 34. Thus, it cannot be held that the measure in question was in compliance with the procedure provided for by the Parliament Act. In addition, it was censorship directly exercised, since it instantly prevented the first applicant from expressing her opinion, without applying or even having regard for less intrusive measures. The mere fact that, as pointed out by the Government, more severe measures were also provided for, in general, in the Parliament Act, did not mean in the particular circumstances of the present case that there had been any consideration of the application of less strict penalties. Indeed, the Speaker did not state his grounds, let alone give detailed reasons, for the conclusion that he could ensure the members\u2019 compliance with the standards of conduct only by denying the first applicant\u2019s right to speak.<\/p>\n 35. The Court further notes that in the case of immediate penalties, such as were at issue in the present case, it does not seem that any analysis as to the proportionality of the measure comes into play. In fact, the Speaker took his decision without any debate, which did not offer the member of the opposition any protection at the material time.<\/p>\n 36. The Court has previously accepted that certain conduct involving the expression of MPs\u2019 opinions in an unconventional manner disrupts the order of parliament (see Kar\u00e1csony and Others, cited above, \u00a7 149), and has recognised the importance of orderly conduct in parliament and of respect for constitutional institutions in a democratic society (see Szanyi v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 35493\/13, \u00a7 40, 8 November 2016). However, in the present case neither the Speaker nor the Government adduced cogent reasons justifying the measure, applied so as to protect Parliament\u2019s authority and the rights of other MPs, by demonstrating the impact that the MPs\u2019 symbolic expression \u2013 displayed at the same time as the first applicant\u2019s speech \u2013 had had on the functioning of Parliament.<\/p>\n 37. Finally, while section 51\/A of the Parliament Act ensured members\u2019 right to challenge a decision concerning the imposition of fines before the Committee on Immunities, Conflicts of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Credentials, those procedural safeguards have not been put in place in respect of immediate penalties. The Government asserted in this connection that the first applicant, through her parliamentary group, could have requested the interpretation of the provisions in question before a parliamentary committee. However, the Court has already found that that option did not offer an applicant an effective means of challenging the measure taken by the Speaker (see Kar\u00e1csony and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0159).<\/p>\n 38. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the case the interference with the first applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression was not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued because it was not accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards.<\/p>\n 39. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 40. The first applicant complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 10, as under domestic law no remedy lay against the decisions\u00a0complained of.<\/p>\n Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n 48. The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n 49. The Court considers that, while this complaint is also admissible, it is not necessary to examine it separately (see Kar\u00e1csony and Others, cited above, \u00a7 174), having regard to its conclusion under Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph\u00a040 above).<\/p>\n IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 41. Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 42. The first applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage relating to the violation of her rights under Articles\u00a010 and\u00a013 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 43. The Government contested this claim.<\/p>\n 44. The Court, having regard to the particular circumstances of the present case, considers that the finding of a violation of Article\u00a010 constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the first applicant.<\/p>\n B. Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 45. The first applicant also claimed EUR 5,800, plus 27% VAT, for the legal fees incurred before the Court. This sum corresponds to 29 hours of legal work billable by her lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR 200.<\/p>\n 46. The Government contested this claim.<\/p>\n 47. According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the first applicant.<\/p>\n C. Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 48. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decides to strike the application out of its list in so far as the fourth applicant is concerned;<\/p>\n 2. Declares the application concerning the first applicant admissible and the remainder of the application concerning the second and third applicants inadmissible;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant;<\/p>\n 4. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article\u00a013 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the first applicant;<\/p>\n 6. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three months, the sum of EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the first applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 7. Dismisses the remainder of the first applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 December 2021, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Liv Tigerstedt \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1 ___________<\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/strong><\/p>\n List of Applicants<\/p>\n
\nCASE OF SZ\u00c9L AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 5078\/16)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n2 December 2021<\/p>\n
\nP\u00e9ter Paczolay,
\nRaffaele Sabato, judges,
\nand Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant\u2019s Name<\/strong><\/td>\n Year of birth<\/strong><\/td>\n Place of residence<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n \n 1.<\/td>\n Bernadett SZ\u00c9L<\/td>\n 1977<\/td>\n Budakeszi<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n Erzs\u00e9bet SCHMUCK<\/td>\n 1954<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n R\u00f3bert Benedek SALLAI<\/td>\n 1974<\/td>\n T\u00farkeve<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n Andr\u00e1s SCHIFFER<\/td>\n 1971<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n