The case concerns alleged breaches of Article 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the non-enforcement of the final judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour.<\/p>\n
THIRD SECTION This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Paliy v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a042267\/15) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Russian national, Mr Ivan Ivanovich Paliy (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 5 August 2015;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the application;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 23 November 2021,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The case concerns alleged breaches of Article 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the non-enforcement of the final judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Sadovyy (Krasnodar Region); he was represented by Ms T.I. Sladkova.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by Mr\u00a0M.\u00a0Galperin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr\u00a0M. Vinogradov.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n I. THE JUDGMENT IN THE APPLICANT\u2019S FAVOUR AND THE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. On 28\u00a0April 2011 the Ministry of Defence of Russia upheld an order on liquidation of the Federal Budgetary Institution \u201cDirection of North\u2011Caucasian Military Circuit\u201d (\u0444\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0431\u044e\u0434\u0436\u0435\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u0447\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u201c\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e-\u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430\u201d) (\u201cthe Direction\u201d). This decision was not published anywhere.<\/p>\n 6. On 17\u00a0August 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) partially granted the applicant\u2019s claim against the Direction and awarded him 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (about 7,020\u00a0euros (EUR) on the date when the judgment became final) of moral damages caused by the death of the applicant\u2019s son in connection with the performance of his military service. The representative of the Direction was present at the hearing and objected to the merits of the claim.<\/p>\n 7. On 17\u00a0October 2011 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on cassation.<\/p>\n 8. On 31\u00a0October 2011 the District Court issued the writ of execution and sent it to the applicant.<\/p>\n 9. On 8\u00a0December 2011 the Tax Inspection made a record of the beginning of liquidation of the Direction in the State Register of Legal Entities.<\/p>\n 10. On 7\u00a0February 2012 the Ministry of Defence informed the applicant that the Direction had been liquidated and advised him to submit a request to change the debtor without any indication of a new debtor.<\/p>\n 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged with the District Court a request to change the debtor to the Ministry of Defence. In the hearing of 23\u00a0May 2012 the District Court established that the Direction had not been formally liquidated yet, and the applicant asked to terminate the proceedings for the debtor\u2019s replacement.<\/p>\n 12. On 28\u00a0June 2012 the bailiff refused to initiate the enforcement proceedings referring, inter alia, to Article\u00a0242.3 of the Budget Code (see paragraph\u00a020 below) that presupposed special order of execution for judgments against the State entities by the Federal Treasury.<\/p>\n 13. On 27\u00a0November 2013 the Federal Treasury of Rostov-on-Don returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the grounds that the Direction\u2019s account had been closed on 3\u00a0May 2011. The Treasury recommended that the applicant should initiate proceedings for changing the method of enforcement proceedings or for vicarious liability.<\/p>\n 14. On 13\u00a0February 2014 the Tax Inspection made a record of the liquidation of the Direction in the State Register of Legal Entities, and the organisation ceased to exist without determining any legal successor. According to the above-mentioned Register, the only founder of the Direction was the Ministry of Defence of Russia.<\/p>\n 15. On 11\u00a0June 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim to change the method of the enforcement proceedings and to oblige the Direction of Finance of the Ministry of Defence (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0444\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u044b) to enforce the judgment in question, having found that the applicant had requested in substance to reopen the initial proceedings for the recovery of moral damages.<\/p>\n II. THE PROCEEDINGS FOR CHANGING A DEBTOR<\/strong><\/p>\n 16. On 29\u00a0June 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim to change the debtor in the enforcement proceedings for the Federal State Institution \u201cJoint Strategic Command of the South Military Circuit\u201d (\u0424\u041a\u0423 \u201c\u041e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u042e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430\u201d), having established that, in accordance with the Civil Code, the liquidation did not imply any succession (see paragraph\u00a021 below). On 29\u00a0October 2015 and 22\u00a0April 2016 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment sitting as a court of appeal and the first cassation instance respectively.<\/p>\n III. THE COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS<\/strong><\/p>\n 17. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a compensation claim for non-enforcement of the judgment of 17\u00a0August 2011 (see paragraph\u00a05 above) on the basis of Federal Law no.\u00a068\u2011FZ \u201cOn Compensation for Violation of the Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time or the Right to Enforcement of a Judgment within a Reasonable Time\u201d of 30\u00a0April 2010 (\u201cCompensation Act\u201d) (see paragraph\u00a019 below). On 3\u00a0March 2015 the Rostov Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s compensation claim on the grounds that the applicant had once again not sent the writ of execution to the Ministry of Finance, neither had he challenged the notification of the Federal Treasury of 27\u00a0November 2013 (see paragraph\u00a013 above) and the decision of 11\u00a0June 2014 (see paragraph\u00a015 above). In addition, the court stated without any specific reasoning that the applicant had not lost the possibility of enforcement of the judgment of 17\u00a0August 2011.<\/p>\n 18. On 25\u00a0May 2015 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment as a court of appeal, and on 16\u00a0October 2015 and 9\u00a0December 2015 the same Court and the Supreme Court respectively dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeals.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/p>\n 19. The relevant provisions of the Compensation Act are exposed in the judgment Gerasimov and Others v.\u00a0Russia (nos.\u00a029920\/05 and 10 others, \u00a7\u00a093, 1\u00a0July 2014).<\/p>\n 20. According to Article\u00a0242.3 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Budget Code, a writ of execution which provides for recovery of federal budget funds on the basis of obligations of a federal institution as a debtor shall be sent by a court upon request of a creditor or by a creditor himself to the body of the Federal Treasury where the institution\u2019s current account is opened.<\/p>\n 21. According to Article\u00a061 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Civil Code, liquidation of a legal entity shall entail its termination without the transfer of its rights and duties to other entities by way of succession.<\/p>\n 22. According to Article\u00a063 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 2 of the Civil Code, a liquidation commission shall take measures to find creditors and the recovery of debts, and shall notify them in written form about the liquidation of the legal entity. After the expiry of the term for submitting claims by the creditors, the liquidation commission shall prepare an interim liquidation balance sheet which contains information on the legal entity\u2019s property, on the list of the creditors\u2019 claims and on the results of their examination.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 AND ARTICLE\u00a013 OF THE CONVENTION and article\u00a01 of protocol no.\u00a01 TO THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 23. The applicant complained of the non-enforcement of the judgment in his favour and of a lack of any effective remedy in domestic law. He relied on Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 and Article\u00a013 of the Convention, and on Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01, which read as follows in their pertinent parts:<\/p>\n Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a013<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law …\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 24. The Government asked to declare the application inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded and did not submit any other objections as to the admissibility. The Court notes that the Direction, the sole founder of which was the State acting through the Ministry of Defence (see paragraph\u00a014 above), did not enjoy sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State and, in the absence of any submissions of the Government under this head, it concludes that the State is to be held responsible under the Convention for the judgment debt in the applicant\u2019s favour (see, mutatis mutandis, Liseytseva and Maslov v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a039483\/05 and 40527\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0214 and 219, 9\u00a0October 2014). The application is therefore compatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.<\/p>\n 25. The Court further notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article\u00a035 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 26. The applicant maintained his complaints, arguing that it had been the obligation of the State to execute the judgment in question.<\/p>\n 27. The Government stated that the enforcement of the judgment in question had become impossible due to the applicant\u2019s own behaviour. It referred to the domestic legislation and submitted that the authorities could not enforce the judgments in question, since the applicant had failed to cooperate with a view to the recovery of the awards, namely to submit the writ of execution to the competent authorities.<\/p>\n 28. The Court notes, at the outset, that, by virtue of the judgment of 17\u00a0August 2011 ordering monetary payment in the applicant\u2019s favour, the latter had a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d to acquire a pecuniary asset, which was sufficiently established to constitute a \u201cpossession\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01.<\/p>\n 29. The Court reiterates that an unreasonably long delay in the enforcement of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059498\/00, ECHR\u00a02002\u2011III). It has been the Court\u2019s constant position that a person who has obtained a judgment against the State may not be expected to bring separate enforcement proceedings (see, among many other authorities, Koltsov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a041304\/02, \u00a7\u00a016, 24\u00a0February 2005, with further references), and that the burden to ensure compliance with a judgment against the State lies primarily with the State authorities starting from the date on which the judgment becomes binding and enforceable (see Burdov v. Russia (no.\u00a02), no.\u00a033509\/04, \u00a7\u00a069, ECHR\u00a02009).<\/p>\n 30. In the present case, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the Direction has been liquidated without any legal succession (see paragraphs\u00a05, 9 and 14 above). At the moment of pronouncement of the judgment of 17\u00a0August 2011, the Ministry of Defence had already taken the decision on liquidation (see paragraph\u00a05 above) and the Direction\u2019s current account had been closed (see paragraph\u00a013 above), which, in the Court\u2019s view, excluded its enforcement in an ordinary course of proceedings established by the Budget Code (see paragraph\u00a020 above). However, the representative of the Direction did not inform the trial court of this fact but objected to the merits of the case (see paragraph\u00a06 above). Nor does it appear that the liquidation commission took any measures so as to notify the applicant of the liquidation and to include his claim in the interim liquidation balance sheet, as provided by the legislation (see paragraph\u00a022 above). The facts of the present case would suggest that the State authorities did not consider themselves bound by the obligation to honour the judgment debt after they had decided to liquidate the debtor. The Court has already ruled that such an attitude is difficult to reconcile with the State\u2019s obligations under the Convention to comply with domestic judicial decisions within a reasonable time (see, mutatis mutandis, Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0222).<\/p>\n 31. The Court observes, moreover, that the applicant took numerous steps aimed at the enforcement of the judgment in question (sending the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury and to the bailiffs, initiating separate proceedings for the changing of a method of enforcement and of a debtor in the enforcement proceedings) between 2012 and 2016, that is, during four years (see paragraphs\u00a011-16 above), mostly following the recommendations given by the authorities. However, none of those actions led to any outcome, owing to the liquidation of the debtor. The Court cannot therefore discern any failure from the applicant\u2019s part to take steps in order to recover the judgment debt. Nor did the Government mention any procedural tool that the applicant had failed to apply.<\/p>\n 32. The Court concludes that by failing to comply with the judgment of 17\u00a0August 2011 in the applicant\u2019s favour for more than ten years the domestic authorities violated his right to a court and prevented him from receiving the money he could reasonably have expected to receive.<\/p>\n 33. Regard being had to its well-established practice (see, among many other authorities, Tkhyegepso and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a044387\/04 and 11\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a018, 25\u00a0October 2011), the Court considers that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01.<\/p>\n 34. Having regard to this conclusion, the Court considers that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint submitted by the applicant under Article\u00a013 separately, because it is closely linked to the examined complaints and is based on the same facts (see, mutatis mutandis, Kin-Stib and Majki\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia, no.\u00a012312\/05, \u00a7\u00a090, 20\u00a0April 2010, with further references).<\/p>\n II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 35. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 36. The applicant claimed 11,690 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage: the main debt 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (EUR\u00a07,020 on the date of entry of the judgment into force) and EUR\u00a04,670 of compensation for the loss of value of that sum due to the loss of purchasing power of the rouble of 66,53%, according to the applicant\u2019s calculations. He further claimed EUR\u00a02,000 of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 37. The Government submitted that the claim for pecuniary damage was unsubstantiated and the claim for non-pecuniary damage was excessive.<\/p>\n 38. The Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress in respect of the violations found would be to put the applicant insofar as possible in the position he would have been if the Convention requirements had not been disregarded (see Piersack v.\u00a0Belgium (Article\u00a050), 26\u00a0October 1984, \u00a7\u00a012, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a085). Its constant approach is that the adequacy of the compensation would be diminished if it were to be paid without reference to various circumstances liable to reduce its value (see, mutatis mutandis, Gizzatova v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a05124\/03, \u00a7\u00a028, 13\u00a0January 2005).<\/p>\n 39. The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint for non-enforcement concerned the unpaid amount in accordance with the judgment of 17\u00a0August 2011. It further notes that the applicant has attached to his claims for just satisfaction the official inflation rates confirming the loss of purchase power of the rouble. Nevertheless, the Court cannot discern any link between loss of purchase power of the rouble and the loss of value of the judgment debt calculated in euros. Therefore, it awards the applicant the equivalent in euros of the amount he would have received if the judgment in his favour had been enforced, that is, EUR\u00a07,020 in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable (see, for the same approach, Tkhyegepso and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a044387\/04 and 11\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a030, 25\u00a0October 2011), and rejects the remainder of the claim as manifestly ill-founded. The Court also deems this award to be a sufficient redress for the loss of value of the judgment debt.<\/p>\n 40. As to the non-pecuniary damage, the Court accepts that the applicant must have suffered distress and frustration resulting from the State authorities\u2019 failure to enforce the judgment in his favour in good time. It awards him the claimed sum, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n 41. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n 42. The applicant did not submit any claims for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court will not make any award under this head.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the application admissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article\u00a013 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) EUR\u00a07,020 (seven thousand twenty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR\u00a02,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 14\u00a0December 2021, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Olga Chernishova \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui
\nCASE OF PALIY v. RUSSIA<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 42267\/15)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n14 December 2021<\/p>\n
\nDarian Pavli,
\nFr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Krenc, judges,
\nand Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 President<\/p>\n