The case mainly concerns complaints under Articles 2 and 14 of the Convention about the respondent State\u2019s failure to protect the applicants\u2019 next of kin from domestic violence and conduct an effective investigation into the matter.<\/p>\n
Download PDF<\/a>, WORD<\/a> Document<\/p>\n FIFTH SECTION Art 2 (substantive and procedural) (+ Art 14) \u2022 Discrimination \u2022 Positive obligations \u2022 Failure to prevent gender-based violence culminating in murder by a police officer and to investigate the response of law-enforcement authorities \u2022 Passive and even accommodating attitudes of law-enforcement, conducive to proliferating violence against women<\/p>\n STRASBOURG This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of A and B v. Georgia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary, President, Mattias Guyomar, judges, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a073975\/16) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by two Georgian nationals, A (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) and B (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d), on 16 September 2016;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice of the application to the Georgian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d);<\/p>\n the decision not to have the applicants\u2019 names disclosed;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 18 January 2022,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The case mainly concerns complaints under Articles 2 and 14 of the Convention about the respondent State\u2019s failure to protect the applicants\u2019 next of kin from domestic violence and conduct an effective investigation into the matter.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The first and second applicants were born in 1972 and 2013 respectively and live in Georgia. They were represented before the Court by five Georgian lawyers \u2013 Ms T. Dekanosidze, Ms T. Abazadze, Ms\u00a0N.\u00a0Jomarjidze, Ms A. Arganashvili and Ms A. Abashidze \u2013 and four British lawyers \u2013 Mr Ph. Leach, Ms K. Levin, Ms J. Evans and Ms J. Gavron.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n I. circumstances leading to C\u2019s killing<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. The first and second applicants are the mother and son of C, who was born on 24 November 1994 and killed by her partner, D, the second applicant\u2019s father, on 25 July 2014 (see paragraph 17\u00a0below).<\/p>\n 6. In 2011 C, who was seventeen years old, was kidnapped for marriage by D, a twenty-two years\u2019 old police officer serving in the small city where she lived. As C was under constant threat from D, she began cohabiting with him. The couple never registered their marriage.<\/p>\n 7. The couple\u2019s cohabitation, which was marked often by disputes fuelled by D\u2019s jealousy, lasted from December 2011 until June 2012, when C, exhausted by the physical and psychological harassment from her partner, returned to her parents\u2019 house. She was two months pregnant at the time.<\/p>\n 8. From December 2011, C and her family became the target of regular verbal and physical abuse from D. He threatened to kill C and her parents, referring to his official status as a police officer and strong connections within the police. The family members were afraid to report the majority of the incidents to the police but still managed to report a number of the most violent ones.<\/p>\n 9. On an unspecified date in July 2012 C called the police, complaining that D had threatened to kill her mother, the first applicant. She received no response to her complaint.<\/p>\n 10. According to the materials available in the case file, on 31 August 2013 D, following an altercation over child support payments, beat up C in her parents\u2019 house. The police were called and three patrol officers, all of whom were D\u2019s acquaintances, interviewed C in his presence. As confirmed by several independent eyewitnesses, such as neighbours, D was on good terms with the officers, who were his immediate colleagues, during the interview. One of the officers told C that wife-beating was commonplace and that not much importance need be attached to it. When the officers were interviewing C and she, who was bearing signs of recent physical abuse, started reporting the above\u2011mentioned details of her ill-treatment, D interfered in the process, mocking C\u2019s responses and shouting at her, but the officers did not attempt to stop him. Without interviewing the alleged abuser, the police officers drew up a report that did not accurately reflect the extent of the violence of the incident, referring to it as \u201ca minor family altercation related to child support payments\u201d. C initially refused to sign the report, but D forced her to do so, making threats to kill her, which were overheard by the police officers. Prior to leaving the house, one of the police officers told C not to contact them in the future without a valid reason or face being fined for wasting police time as they were busy with other, more serious matters. D left C\u2019s house with the officers and they drove away in the same car.<\/p>\n 11. On the same day, C filed a criminal complaint with a local public prosecutor\u2019s office. She complained about D, for physically abusing her, and the three police officers, for failing to carry out their duties with due diligence. In her complaint, she also pointed out that her former partner had been constantly harassing her, resorting to threats to kill and physical violence. He had also threatened to abduct their child. She asked the prosecution authority to take all the measures necessary to put an end to D\u2019s violent behaviour. She also added that since her abuser was a police officer, she could not trust that the police would come to her assistance, hence she had addressed her complaint to the public prosecutor\u2019s office.<\/p>\n 12. Following C\u2019s criminal complaint, on 4 September 2013 a public prosecutor interviewed C, D and one of the police officers regarding the incident of 31\u00a0August 2013, both of whom denied that C had been ill-treated in any way. D\u2019s version of events was that they had simply had an argument over child support payments. On 9 September 2013 D gave a written undertaking for the attention of the prosecution authority that he would never again verbally or physically abuse either C or her family members. The prosecution authority was satisfied with that undertaking and decided not to launch a criminal investigation.<\/p>\n 13. On 5 July 2014 C complained to the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe General Inspectorate\u201d), the division in charge of conducting disciplinary inquiries against police officers, that D had physically assaulted her twice in public, on 3 and 5 July 2014.<\/p>\n 14. According to the material available in the case file, numerous independent witnesses confirmed in their written statements that D had been using various attributes of his official position to commit abuse against C between April 2011 and July 2014. Notably, during that period, he had (i) intimidatingly flaunted his service pistol on at least seven occasions, (ii) regularly threatened to bring false charges against C\u2019s father and brother if she reported their altercations to the law-enforcement authorities and (iii) often said that he was not afraid of the law-enforcement machinery as he was part of it himself. All this information was made known to both the police and prosecution authority.<\/p>\n 15. On 20 July 2014 D was promoted to the rank of senior police lieutenant.<\/p>\n 16. On 25 July 2014 a representative of the General Inspectorate summoned C for an interview in relation to the two incidents referred to in her complaint of 5 July 2014 (see paragraph 13 above). During the interview she reiterated that D had been systematically subjecting her to physical and psychological harassment. Whilst she wanted the General Inspectorate to intervene and put an end to her former partner\u2019s violent behaviour, she asked it not to be too harsh with him because he was the father of her child.<\/p>\n 17. Shortly after C had left the interview, D stalked her in the street. Eyewitnesses saw them having a tense and loud argument in a public park. All of a sudden, D pulled his service pistol out and fired five shots at C\u2019s chest and stomach at close range. She died instantly.<\/p>\n II. criminal proceedings against D<\/strong><\/p>\n 18. On the same day, a criminal case was opened and D was charged with C\u2019s murder. When questioned the following day, he told the investigators that his relationship with C had been strained from the very beginning because she had always wanted to move to Tbilisi, the capital, to pursue a modelling career, to which he had strongly objected. He had become particularly jealous after their separation because he had started seeing her date other men. He also stated that what had served as a trigger for his rage, and what had made him use his gun on the day of the shooting, had been something C had said, in an intentionally provocative and vulgar way, namely that her private and sex life did not concern him at all. In his view, C had \u201chumiliated him\u201d, and that was why he had used a gun on her.<\/p>\n 19. By a judgment of 17 April 2015, the Kutaisi City Court found D\u00a0guilty of premeditated murder of a family member and sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. D pleaded insanity, claiming that he had shot C because of an episodic mental disorder caused by pathological jealousy. That line of defence was however dismantled by the results of a court-ordered forensic examination of D\u2019s mental health. The decision became final on 15\u00a0February 2016. The conviction did not refer to the possible role of gender-based discrimination in the commission of the crime (see paragraph\u00a029 below).<\/p>\n III. criminal COMPLAINTS against THE relevant LAW\u2011ENFORCement authorities<\/strong><\/p>\n 20. On 22 January 2015 the first applicant, acting on behalf of herself and the second applicant, filed a complaint with the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office, requesting that a criminal investigation be launched into the failure of the relevant police officers and public prosecutors to protect her daughter\u2019s life and give proper consideration to the repeated reports of domestic violence. The first applicant argued that the State agents\u2019 negligent conduct might have been influenced by gender-based discrimination.<\/p>\n 21. On 19 February 2015 the prosecution authority opened a criminal case into the police officers\u2019 alleged failure to properly respond to C\u2019s allegations of domestic violence and interviewed the three patrol officers who had attended the incident of 31 August 2013 (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). According to the officers, they did not think that the incident was of a violent nature. On 27 February 2015 the first applicant was interviewed and told the prosecution authority the entire history of the strained relationship between her daughter and D, including his repeated use of violence. As regards the incident of 31 August 2013, she confirmed the sequence of events as described above (see paragraph 10 above).<\/p>\n 22. Between March and August 2015, the public prosecutor\u2019s office interviewed five witnesses to the incident of 31 August 2013, who were either relatives of A and C or their neighbours. The majority of them gave evidence indicating that the incident was of a particularly violent nature.<\/p>\n 23. On 2 March, 29 April and 23 June 2015 and 21 January 2016 the first applicant repeatedly enquired with the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office about the progress of the investigation, if any, and on 20 March 2015 it replied that a criminal investigation had been launched into the alleged negligence of the police officers. The first applicant received no response to her complaint directed against the public prosecutors (see paragraph 20 above).<\/p>\n 24. By letters of 1 and 16 March 2016, a regional public prosecutor\u2019s office informed the first applicant that the criminal investigation into the alleged negligence of the police officers was pending, but that no charges had been pressed against anyone and it was not necessary to grant her victim status at that time. She received no response to her complaint directed against the public prosecutors.<\/p>\n 25. On 17 March 2016 the first applicant again enquired with the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office whether a criminal investigation into the actions of the public prosecutors had been launched. She received no response.<\/p>\n IV. civil ACTIONS against the law-enforcement authorities<\/strong><\/p>\n 26. On 22 January 2015 the first applicant, acting on behalf of herself and the second applicant, sued the Ministry of the Interior and Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office under Article 1005 of the Civil Code for failure to protect her daughter\u2019s life, claiming compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 120,000 Georgian laris (GEL \u2013 approximately 34,000 euros (EUR)).<\/p>\n 27. By a judgment of 24 July 2015, the Tbilisi City Court allowed the claim in part, awarding compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in the amount of GEL 20,000 (approximately EUR 7,000). The court found that there was a causal link between the inactivity of the relevant police officers and public prosecutors and C\u2019s killing. It emphasised, in that connection, that the public authorities were under an obligation to respond promptly and effectively to allegations of discrimination. That obligation had however been blatantly disregarded in the case in issue, in breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The court observed, referring to the incident of 31 August 2013, that the police officers had not interviewed C or the witnesses to the incident, had not issued a restraining order against D and had not taken measures aimed at restricting the use of his service pistol. As regards the role of the public prosecutors, the court noted that they had failed in their obligation to conduct an adequate criminal investigation into the violent incidents in question. The court concluded that the respondent authorities, who ought to be considered liable together with the relevant individual officials, had failed to take measures to put an end to the gender-based discrimination and protect C\u2019s life.<\/p>\n 28. The judgment of 24 July 2015 became final on 29 June 2017, when the Supreme Court of Georgia finally terminated the proceedings.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE<\/strong><\/p>\n 29. On 27 March 2012 an amendment to Article 53 of the Criminal Code of Georgia was adopted whereby discrimination was recognised as a bias motivation and an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a criminal offence. The relevant provision reads as follows:<\/p>\n Article 53 \u00a7 3 (1)<\/p>\n \u201cThe commission of any offence listed in this Code on the grounds of any type of discrimination, such as, for instance and not exclusively, that linked to race, skin colour, language, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity, age, religion, political and other views, disabilities, citizenship, national, ethnic or social background, origin, economic status or societal position or place of residence shall be an aggravating circumstance.\u201d<\/p>\n 30. Other relevant domestic law, as well as international material concerning violence against women in Georgia, is comprehensively summarised in paragraphs 25-40 of the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Tkhelidze v. Georgia (no. 33056\/17, 8 July 2021).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLEs 2 and 14 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 31. Relying on Articles 2, 3 and 14 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the domestic authorities had failed to protect C from domestic violence and conduct an effective criminal investigation into the circumstances contributing to her death.<\/p>\n 32. Having regard to its case-law and the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case, considers that the issues raised in the present case should be examined solely from the perspective of the substantive positive and procedural aspects of Article 2 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 14 (compare Kurt v. Austria [GC], no.\u00a062903\/15, \u00a7 104, 15 June 2021). The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 2<\/p>\n \u201c1. Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 14<\/p>\n \u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex …, or other status.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 33. The Government submitted that the applicants had lost victim status for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention given the outcome of the criminal proceedings initiated against D (see paragraphs 18-19 above) and civil proceedings initiated against the law-enforcement authorities (see paragraphs 26-28 above). In particular, they submitted that since the perpetrator of C\u2019s killing had been promptly identified and sufficiently punished and the domestic civil courts had duly acknowledged the law-enforcement authorities\u2019 wrongful conduct and even awarded the applicants compensation, the application should be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4.<\/p>\n 34. The applicants disagreed with the Government\u2019s objection, arguing that the various domestic remedies pursued by them had not resulted in either sufficient acknowledgment of the violation of their various rights under the Convention or sufficient redress. They specified in this connection that the crux of their application was the inaction of the law-enforcement authorities, which had significantly contributed to the domestic violence and death of C, their next of kin.<\/p>\n 35. The Court observes that in the present case the question of possible loss by the applicants of their victim status on the basis of the outcome of the various sets of domestic proceedings is closely linked to the issue of the effectiveness of the investigation into the circumstances contributing to the death of their next of kin. The Court thus considers it appropriate to join this matter to the merits of the complaint made by the applicants under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention, read together with Article 14 (compare, for instance, Petrovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 40485\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 64 and 65, 15\u00a0July 2014, and \u00d6zcan and Others v. Turkey, no. 18893\/05, \u00a7 55, 20 April 2010).<\/p>\n 36. The Court further notes that the application is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 37. The applicants submitted that although they had been aware of the danger to C\u2019s life from D\u2019s violent behaviour, the police and prosecution authority had nevertheless failed to take the necessary preventive measures. They complained that the law-enforcement authorities had inadequately and inaccurately gathered and recorded evidence when dealing with the allegations of domestic violence. The applicants further submitted that the inappropriate and discriminatory responses of the police and prosecution authority to the complaints made by C about her partner\u2019s abusive behaviour, coupled with their failure to investigate the circumstances contributing to her death and hold the implicated law-enforcement agents criminally responsible for their failure to protect her life, were at the heart of the breach by the respondent State of its substantive positive obligations under Articles 2 and\u00a014 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 38. Without disputing the facts of the case as submitted by the applicants, and without contesting their legal arguments submitted on the merits of the relevant complaints, the Government limited their comments to providing the Court with an overview of various legislative, budgetary and administrative measures taken by the respondent State to tackle domestic violence and, more generally, violence committed against women from 2014 onwards. In that connection, they submitted information about various training and awareness-raising courses provided, between 2015 and 2017, to the judicial, prosecutorial and law-enforcement authorities on the problem of violence against women.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 39. Having regard to the applicants\u2019 allegations that the authorities\u2019 double failure \u2013 the lack of protection of their next of kin from domestic violence and the absence of an effective investigation into the law-enforcement authorities\u2019 inaction \u2013 stemmed from their insufficient acknowledgment of the phenomenon of discrimination against women, the Court finds, firstly, that the most appropriate way to proceed would be to subject the complaints to a simultaneous dual examination under Article 2\u00a0taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (see Tkhelidze v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 33056\/17, \u00a7\u00a047, 8 July 2021, with further references). Secondly, given that the issue of the applicants\u2019 victim status has been joined to the merits of their complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court considers it appropriate to start its examination of the merits of the application with the latter complaint. Thirdly, the Court emphasises that the present case is not directly about the violent actions of D, which finally led to his criminal conviction following the murder of C., but rather about the authorities response, or a lack thereof, to his actions and C and her family\u2019s complaints prior to and after her murder. The fact that he was a serving police officer and\u00a0an acquaintance of those who had been investigating C\u2019s complaints may therefore be relevant to the Court\u2019s assessment of questions relating to the procedural and substantive limbs of Article 2 and alleged loss of victim status.<\/p>\n (a) General principles<\/p>\n 40. The Court reiterates that, under the principle of subsidiarity, it falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention. In this regard, the question whether an applicant can claim to be a victim of the violation alleged is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention. A decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him or her of his or her status as a \u201cvictim\u201d unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention. Only where both these conditions have been satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of the application (see Selahattin Demirta\u015f v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 14305\/17, \u00a7\u00a0218, 20 November 2018). The principle of subsidiarity does not mean renouncing all supervision of the result obtained from using domestic remedies, otherwise the rights guaranteed by the Convention would be devoid of any substance (see, for instance, Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a07888\/03, \u00a7 49, 20 December 2007).<\/p>\n 41. In cases concerning possible responsibility on the part of State officials for deaths occurring as a result of their alleged negligence, the obligation imposed by Article 2 to set up an effective judicial system does not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. However, there may be exceptional circumstances where only an effective criminal investigation would be capable of satisfying the procedural positive obligation imposed by Article 2. Such circumstances can be present, for example, where a life was lost or put at risk because of the conduct of a public authority that goes beyond an error of judgment or carelessness. Where it is established that the negligence attributable to State officials or bodies goes beyond an error of judgment or carelessness, in that the authorities in question \u2013 fully realising the likely consequences and disregarding the powers vested in them \u2013 failed to take measures that were necessary and sufficient to avert the risks, the fact that those responsible for endangering life have not been charged with a criminal offence or prosecuted may amount to a violation of Article 2, irrespective of any other types of remedy that individuals may exercise on their own initiative (see Tkhelidze, cited above, \u00a7 59).<\/p>\n 42. As regards the general principles concerning the State\u2019s relevant substantive positive obligations under Articles 2 and 14 of the Convention, they were comprehensively summarised in Tkhelidze, the first case exposing the State\u2019s failure to tackle domestic violence and violence against women in general (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 48-51). In addition, the Court further reiterates that a State\u2019s failure to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection before the law and that this failure need not be intentional. It has previously held that \u201cgeneral and discriminatory judicial passivity [creating] a climate … conducive to domestic violence\u201d amounts to a violation of Article 14 of the Convention (see Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 191 et seq., ECHR 2009). Such discriminatory treatment occurs where the authorities\u2019 actions are not a simple failure or delay in dealing with the violence in question, but amount to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflect a discriminatory attitude towards the complainant as a woman (see Talpis v. Italy, no. 41237\/14, \u00a7 141, 2 March 2017). Indeed, an immediate response to allegations of domestic violence is required from the authorities who must establish whether there exists a real and immediate risk to the life of one or more identified victims of domestic violence by carrying out an autonomous, proactive and comprehensive risk assessment (see Kurt, cited above, \u00a7 190).<\/p>\n (b) Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case<\/p>\n (i) Procedural obligations and victim status<\/p>\n 43. The Court observes that, since the crux of the application is that the inactivity and negligence of the law-enforcement authorities was one of the main reasons why the domestic abuse was allowed to escalate, culminating in C\u2019s murder, and given that the authorities knew or should have known of the high level of risk faced by her if they failed to discharge their policing duties properly \u2013 as she was complaining about a fellow police officer, with access to a firearm \u2013 and were thus in a position to establish whether he had been involved in similar incidents in the past or his propensity to violence, the Court considers that their inactivity and negligence went beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Consequently, amongst the remedies used by the applicants at domestic level, the most pertinent for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention were the criminal proceedings instituted against the police officers and public prosecutors involved (see paragraphs\u00a020-25 above and compare Tkhelidze, cited above, \u00a7 60).<\/p>\n 44. However, the Court notes with concern that the competent investigative authority neither made an attempt to establish responsibility on the part of the police officers for their failure to respond properly to the multiple incidents of gender-based violence occurring prior to C\u2019s murder nor deem it necessary to grant the applicants victim status. No disciplinary inquiry into the police\u2019s alleged inaction was even opened, and no steps were taken to train the police officers in question on how to respond properly to allegations of domestic violence in the future. As regards the part of the applicants\u2019 complaint calling into question the inaction of the public prosecutors, no response was received whatsoever \u2013 the applicants repeatedly sought but failed to receive information from the investigative authority on this aspect of their criminal complaint. However, in the light of the relevant circumstances of the case, in particular the existence of indices pointing to possible gender based discrimination as at least partly informing the response of law enforcement to the complainant and the complaints and the fact that they permitted the alleged perpetrator to participate in the questioning of the complainant and victim of the alleged domestic abuse, the Court considers that there was a pressing need to conduct a meaningful investigation into the response of law enforcement and their inaction, which might have been motivated by gender-based discrimination, in the face of C\u2019s complaints (compare Tkhelidze, cited above, \u00a7 60). The fact that the alleged perpetrator of the violence of the abuse was a member of law enforcement himself, and that the threats he had used against the victim and her family referred to this fact and what he considered to be his impunity, rendered the need for a proper investigation all the more pressing.<\/p>\n 45. Although the above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a breach by the respondent State of its procedural obligations under Article 2 read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 58-60), it notes in addition the insufficiency of the redress offered by the two other sets of domestic proceedings \u2013 the criminal prosecution of the perpetrator and civil proceedings brought by the applicants against the law-enforcement authorities. With respect to the former, the Court notes that D\u2019s trial and conviction did not involve any examination of the possible role of gender-based discrimination in the commission of the crime (see paragraph\u00a019 above). As regards the latter, whilst it was undoubtedly positive that the domestic courts acknowledged the law-enforcement authorities\u2019 failure to take measures aimed at putting an end to the gender-based discrimination and protect C\u2019s life, the Court notes that they did not expand their scrutiny to the question of whether the official tolerance of incidents of domestic violence might have been conditioned by the same gender bias. Nor have the courts addressed the question of whether there had been indications of the relevant law-enforcement officers\u2019 acquiescence or connivance in the gender-motivated abuses perpetrated by their colleague, D. These gaps in the response of the domestic courts do not sit well with the respondent State\u2019s heightened duty to tackle prejudice-motivated crimes.<\/p>\n 46. The Court thus concludes that, in the particular circumstances of the present case and having regard to the nature and quantum of the pecuniary award, the applicants, the applicants have retained their victim status within the meaning of Article 34 (see paragraph 35 above) and that there has been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 read in conjunction with Article\u00a014 of the Convention.<\/p>\n (ii) Substantive positive obligations<\/p>\n 47. Like the leading case of Tkhelidze, the circumstances of the present application confirm that there was clearly a lasting situation of domestic violence, which means that there could be no doubt about the immediacy of the danger to the victim, and that the police knew or certainly ought to have known of the nature of that situation. Although they were put on alert about the seriousness of the risks, the police failed to display the requisite special diligence and committed major failings in their work such as inaccurate, incomplete or even misleading evidence gathering and not attempting to conduct a proper analysis of what the potential trigger factors for the violence could be (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above and compare with Tkhelidze, cited above, \u00a7 53). In this connection, the Court reiterates that shortcomings in the gathering of evidence in response to a reported incident of domestic violence can result in an underestimation of the level of violence actually committed, can have deleterious effects on the prospects of opening a criminal investigation and even discourage victims of domestic abuse, who are often already under pressure from society, from reporting an abusive family member to the authorities in the future (ibid., \u00a7 54).<\/p>\n 48. The Court also observes that whilst the domestic legislative framework provided for various temporary restrictive measures in respect of alleged abusers (compare Tkhelidze, cited above, 55), the relevant domestic authorities did not resort to them at all. It does not appear from the various reports and records drawn up by the police officers that the victim was ever advised by the police of her procedural rights and of the various legislative and administrative measures of protection available to her. The Court further considers that the inactivity of the domestic law-enforcement authorities appears to be even more concerning when assessed against the fact that the abuser was himself a police officer. What is more, whilst the law-enforcement authorities were perfectly aware that he was using various attributes of his official position to commit abuse against C (intimidating her with his service pistol on many occasions, repeatedly claiming impunity for his acts on account of his belonging to the law-enforcement machinery, threatening to bring false charges against C\u2019s father and brother if the victim reported the abuse to the police, and so on), not only did the police not put an end to that demonstration of ultimate impunity and arbitrariness (see Ushakov and\u00a0Ushakova v. Ukraine, no. 10705\/12, \u00a7 83, 18 June 2015), they, on the contrary, allowed the alleged abuser to participate in the questioning of his victim and soon after promoted the abuser to a higher police rank (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). The Court finds this aspect of the case to be particularly troubling because it expects Member States to be all the more stringent when investigating and, where appropriate, punishing their own law-enforcement officers for the commission of serious crimes, including domestic violence and violence against women in general, than they are with ordinary offenders, because what is at stake is not only the issue of the individual criminal-law liability of the perpetrators but also the State\u2019s duty to combat any sense of impunity felt by the offenders by virtue of their very office, and maintain public confidence in and respect for the law-enforcement system (see, mutatis mutandis, Vazagashvili and Shanava v. Georgia, no.\u00a050375\/07, \u00a7 92, 18 July 2019, and Makuchyan and Minasyan v.\u00a0Azerbaijan and Hungary, no. 17247\/13, \u00a7 157, 26 May 2020).<\/p>\n 49. The Court thus concludes that the present case can be seen as yet another vivid example of how general and discriminatory passivity of the law-enforcement authorities in the face of allegations of domestic violence can create a climate conducive to a further proliferation of violence committed against victims merely because they are women. In disregard of the panoply of various protective measures that were directly available, the authorities did not prevent gender-based violence against the applicants\u2019 next-of-kin, which culminated in her death, and they compounded this failure with an attitude of passivity, even accommodation, as regards the alleged perpetrator, later convicted of the victim\u2019s murder. The respondent State has thus breached its substantive positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention read in in conjunction with Article 14.<\/p>\n II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 50. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 51. The applicants claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. They further requested that the Court indicate to the respondent State that there was a need to implement the following two general measures \u2013 (i) to put in place a mechanism for \u201cthe institutional responsibility of the State organs for preventing and adequately responding to femicide\u201d and (ii) to take legislative measures in order \u201cto explicitly criminalise femicide and ensure that all killings of women are investigated from a gender perspective\u201d.<\/p>\n 52. The Government submitted that the amounts claimed were not justified in the circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n 53. The Court accepts that the applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. It finds it appropriate to award them EUR 35,000 under this head (compare Tkhelidze, cited above, \u00a7 65).<\/p>\n 54. As regards the applicants\u2019 request for additional measures to be indicated to the respondent State, the Court considers that, in the case at hand, it would be for the respondent State to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the exact means to be used in its domestic legal order to discharge its obligations under the Convention, including those in relation to the problem of the discriminatory passivity of the law-enforcement authorities in the face of allegations of violence against women (see Abu\u00a0Zubaydah v. Lithuania, no. 46454\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 682 and 683, 31 May 2018, and Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, no. 7224\/11, \u00a7 57, 8 October 2020).<\/p>\n B. Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 55. On 10 May 2019, within the time-limit allocated by the Court for the submission of just satisfaction claims under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, the applicants claimed EUR 22,817.60 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court by two of their British lawyers. No claim was made with respect to the applicant\u2019s representation by the remaining seven (five Georgian and two British) lawyers (see paragraph 2 above). No copies of legal service contracts, invoices, vouchers or any other supporting financial documents were submitted. The amount claimed was based on the number of hours spent by the British lawyers in question on the case (ninety-eight hours and thirty minutes) and the lawyers\u2019 hourly rate (GBP 150) and included, in addition, a claim for postal, translation and other administrative expenses incurred by them.<\/p>\n 56. On 24 June 2019 the Government replied that the claims were unsubstantiated and excessive. They stated, in particular, that no copy of the legal service contract between the applicants and two British lawyers had been submitted.<\/p>\n 57. On 21 August 2019 the applicants, without being invited by the Court to do so and without being given any additional time for this submission, supplemented their previous claims with a legal service contract dated 5\u00a0August 2019 signed by them and their British lawyers.<\/p>\n 58. The Court observes, at the outset, that the applicants\u2019 submissions of 21 August 2019 were submitted in breach of the relevant procedural requirement contained in Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. That is to say, the submissions reached the Court outside the relevant time-limit, and no extension of time was requested before the expiry of that period. Furthermore, the submissions consisted of a legal service contract signed and dated after the applicants had formally filed their just satisfaction claims with the Court (compare paragraphs 56 and 58), and no explanation for this discrepancy was given. In these circumstances, the submissions of 21 August 2019 cannot be taken into consideration by the Court (compare, amongst other authorities, Kov\u00e1\u010dik v. Slovakia, no. 50903\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 91-93, 29 November 2011, and Stavebn\u00e1 spolo\u010dnos\u0165 TATRY Poprad, s.r.o. v. Slovakia, no. 7261\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a055\u201156, 3 May 2011).<\/p>\n 59. As regards the applicants\u2019 claims submitted under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court on 10 May 2019, the Court observes that they did not contain documents showing that they had paid or were under a legal obligation to pay the fees charged by their two British representatives. In the absence of such documents, the Court finds no basis on which to accept that the costs and expenses claimed by the applicants have actually been incurred (see Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508\/13, \u00a7 371, 28 November 2017, and, as a recent authority, Tkhelidze, cited above, \u00a7 68).<\/p>\n 60. It follows that the claims must be rejected.<\/p>\n C. Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 61. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Joins to the merits the question relating to the applicants\u2019 victim status;<\/p>\n 2. Declares the application admissible;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that the applicants may claim to be victims for the purposes of Article 34 and that there has been a violation of Article 2 under its substantive positive and procedural limbs taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants jointly, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, EUR 35,000 (thirty\u2011five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; and<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 February 2022, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Martina Keller \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary
\nCASE OF A AND B v. GEORGIA<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 73975\/16)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT<\/p>\n
\n10 February 2022<\/p>\n
\nGanna Yudkivska,
\nSt\u00e9phanie Mourou-Vikstr\u00f6m,
\nL\u0259tif H\u00fcseynov,
\nLado Chanturia,
\nArnfinn B\u00e5rdsen,<\/p>\n
\nand Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n