The case concerns the expropriation of the applicants\u2019 property in the centre of Yerevan and the ensuing proceedings. The applicants raise complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n
FOURTH SECTION This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Ghukasyan and Others v. Armenia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Iulia Antoanella Motoc, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a032986\/10) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) on 9 June 2010 by three Armenian nationals and one legal entity established in Armenia (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), who were represented by Mr H. Alumyan and Mr\u00a0T.\u00a0Hayrapetyan, lawyers practising in Yerevan;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the expropriation of the applicants\u2019 property under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Armenian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d), represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 8 March 2022,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CASE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The case concerns the expropriation of the applicants\u2019 property in the centre of Yerevan and the ensuing proceedings. The applicants raise complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n 2. The applicants\u2019 details and the description of their expropriated property are indicated in the appended table.<\/p>\n 3. By Government Decree no. 108\u2011N dated 25 January 2007 the applicants\u2019 property was included in an expropriation zone. The acquirer of their property was \u201cAFMH\u201d, a private company (\u201cthe Company\u201d).<\/p>\n 4. The expropriation procedure gave rise to three sets of judicial proceedings concluded by the judgments of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dated 19 June 2008, 17 July and 15 September 2009, all of which were upheld upon appeal.<\/p>\n 5. During the proceedings concerning the expropriation of the fourth applicant\u2019s property, there was a dispute whether the compensation should include the market value of the building as consisting of two floors measuring 125,22 sq.m. each. Eventually, the District Court sought an expert evaluation of the market value of the fourth applicant\u2019s registered property. The ensuing expert report indicated that the building consisted of two floors each measuring 125.22 sq.m. and estimated its market value of the total surface of 250.44 sq.m. at AMD 398,314,000. The expert stated that the second floor was not an unlawful construction considering that the unauthorised constructions, including the attic and the basement, were marked in the ownership certificate with a special stamp whereas the second floor was not.<\/p>\n 6. By its judgment of 17 July 2009 the District Court granted the Company\u2019s claim, which had been filed against the first applicant, then director of the fourth applicant, ordering the expropriation of the first applicant\u2019s property for the payment of AMD 207,282,900 in compensation. The District Court relied on the valuation report produced by the Company and refused to accept that of the court-appointed expert stating that the latter had failed to determine the market value of the registered part of the property. It was subsequently clarified by the same court\u2019s decision of 26 August 2010, upheld upon appeal, that the operative part of the judgment of 17 July 2009 should be understood as concerning the fourth applicant.<\/p>\n 7. The first applicant complained under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the final judgment of 19 June 2008 had not been enforced.<\/p>\n 8. The first and second applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the expropriation of their joint property had been unlawful and without compensation.<\/p>\n 9. The third and fourth applicants complained under Article 6 that they were not involved in the proceedings concerning the expropriation of the fourth applicant\u2019s property.<\/p>\n 10. The fourth applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that it was deprived of its property (a two-storey building) without any judicial process filed against it, and that no compensation was provided for the second floor of the building.<\/p>\n THE COURT\u2019S ASSESSMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n I. LOCUS STANDI<\/p>\n 11. The first and second applicants died in 2021 and 2012 respectively.<\/p>\n A. As regards the complaints raised by the second applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 12. After the second applicant\u2019s death the first applicant, her son, had expressed his wish to pursue the proceedings on her behalf. The Government argued that the first applicant had failed to substantiate his standing to pursue the second applicant\u2019s application.<\/p>\n 13. The first applicant did not provide any document, such as a succession certificate, to confirm acceptance of the second applicant\u2019s succession or any statement confirming that he had accepted the succession of his deceased mother (contrast Romankevi\u010d v. Lithuania, no. 25747\/07, \u00a7 15, 2 December 2014), or any other document or detailed information which could be of relevance in his particular case (contrast Andreyeva v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a076737\/01, 16 October 2003).<\/p>\n 14. The Court therefore does not accept that the first applicant had standing to pursue the proceedings on behalf of the second applicant (see Piloyan v. Armenia [CTE], no. 112\/11, 19 November 2020). Therefore, no question arises whether the first applicant\u2019s wife, who has expressed her wish to pursue the application on behalf of the first applicant (see paragraph 16 below), could have standing to pursue the proceedings also in so far as the second applicant\u2019s complaints are concerned.<\/p>\n 15. Accordingly, the part of the application relating to the complaints lodged by the second applicant should be struck out pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7\u00a01 (c) of the Convention.<\/p>\n B. As regards the complaints raised by the first applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 16. After the first applicant\u2019s death, his wife, Ms Lilya Gevorgyan, requested to pursue the proceedings on his behalf. She submitted a certificate attested by a notary on accepting the first applicant\u2019s inheritance. The Government objected to Ms Gevorgyan\u2019s standing to pursue the first applicant\u2019s complaints. Having regard to its case-law (see Andreyeva and Piloyan, both cited above), the Court considers that the provided document is sufficient to prove the legal standing of Ms Gevorgyan. The Government\u2019s objection is therefore dismissed.<\/p>\n 17. Accordingly, the Court accepts that Ms Gevorgyan has standing to pursue the application on behalf of the first applicant in so far as the latter\u2019s own complaints are concerned (see paragraph 14 above). For convenience, the Court will continue to refer to Mr Ghukasyan as the first applicant.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 of protocol no. 1<\/p>\n 18. The Court notes that the fourth applicant\u2019s complaint (see paragraph\u00a010 above) is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other ground. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 19. It is not in dispute between the parties that there has been a \u201cdeprivation of possessions\u201d within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n 20. To be compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, an expropriation measure must fulfil three conditions: it must be carried out \u201csubject to the conditions provided for by law\u201d, which rules out any arbitrary action on the part of the national authorities, must be \u201cin the public interest\u201d, and must strike a fair balance between the owner\u2019s rights and the interests of the community\u00a0(see Visti\u0146\u0161 and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243\/01, \u00a7 94, 25\u00a0October 2012).<\/p>\n 21. In order for an interference to be lawful, it must be accompanied by sufficient procedural guarantees against arbitrariness including an opportunity to effectively challenge the measure in question (see Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, no. 49429\/99, \u00a7 134, ECHR 2005\u2011XII (extracts); Visti\u0146\u0161 and Perepjolkins, cited above, \u00a7 97; and Project-Trade d.o.o. v. Croatia, no.\u00a01920\/14, \u00a7 82, 19 November 2020).<\/p>\n 22. The Company lodged its claim seeking the expropriation of the fourth applicant\u2019s property against the first applicant (the fourth applicant\u2019s majority shareholder and director) personally, that is not against the fourth applicant, represented by the first applicant in his capacity as the latter\u2019s director. In its turn, the District Court did not involve the fourth applicant, a distinct legal entity which had sole ownership of the property in question, as a proper respondent in the proceedings although it eventually ordered the expropriation of its property. The fact that the District Court subsequently issued a clarification stating that the judgment of 17 July 2009 concerned the fourth applicant and its property (see paragraph 6 above) by no means compensated the major procedural handicap caused to the fourth applicant all the more so considering that it was not involved in the proceedings concerning the clarification of that judgment either.<\/p>\n 23. The Court therefore concludes that the deprivation of the fourth applicant\u2019s possessions was not accompanied by sufficient procedural guarantees against arbitrariness and was thus not lawful within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the Court to ascertain whether the other requirements of that provision have been complied with (see Minasyan and Semerjyan v. Armenia, no. 27651\/05, \u00a7 76, 23 June 2009).<\/p>\n 24. There has accordingly been a violation of Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the fourth applicant.<\/p>\n III. OTHER COMPLAINT<\/p>\n 25. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the fourth applicant complained that it was not involved in the proceedings concluded by the judgment of 17 July 2009. Having regard to its earlier findings (see paragraph\u00a023 above), the Court finds that it is not necessary to give a separate ruling on this complaint (see Hakobyan and Amirkhanyan v. Armenia, no.\u00a014156\/07, \u00a7\u00a056, 17 October 2019).<\/p>\n IV. REMAINING COMPLAINTS<\/p>\n 26. The first and third applicants raised several complaints under Article\u00a06 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above). The Court has examined that part of the application and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.<\/p>\n It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.<\/p>\n APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 27. The fourth applicant claimed EUR 2,430,350 in respect of pecuniary damage, including AMD 677,350,000 for the second floor, the attic and the basement of the expropriated building and its underlying plot of land and EUR\u00a0943,140 for loss of rental income. It also claimed EUR 6,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 28. The Government contested the claims in respect of pecuniary damage and considered that the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage was excessive.<\/p>\n 29. The Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the breach of the State\u2019s procedural obligations under that Article (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). While the fourth applicant\u2019s property was indeed expropriated, the Court cannot speculate as to what the eventual outcome might have been if the fourth applicant had been able to effectively participate in the relevant proceedings and submit its arguments, including with regard to the basis for the calculation of the compensation (see, mutatis mutandis, Capital Bank AD, \u00a7 144, and Project-Trade d.o.o., \u00a7 110, both cited above). As for the claim concerning lost income, it is of a speculative nature (see Vardanyan v. Armenia (just satisfaction), 8001\/07, \u00a7 37, 25 July 2019, and compare Hakobyan and Amirkhanyan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58 and 67). In these circumstances, the Court rejects the claims in respect of pecuniary damage. On the other hand, it awards the fourth applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 30. The applicants jointly claimed EUR 60,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court. In support of their claims they submitted an agreement whereby they were liable to pay their representatives 5% of the amount awarded to them by the Court in the event of a judgment in their favour, and in any event no less than EUR 10,000 and no more than EUR 60,000.<\/p>\n 31. The Government considered that the claims in respect of legal costs were excessive.<\/p>\n 32. The Court has previously recognised the validity of contingency fee agreements (see, for example, Asatryan v. Armenia, no. 3571\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 78-79, 27 April 2017, and Safaryan v. Armenia, no.\u00a0576\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 62-63, 21 January 2016). It sees no reason to depart from that approach in the present case. On the other hand, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the fact that a violation was found only in respect of the fourth applicant (see paragraph 24 above), the Court considers it reasonable to award the fourth applicant the sum of EUR 2,000 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n 33. The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decides to strike the application in its part relating to the complaints lodged by the second applicant out of its list of cases in accordance with the Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that Ms L. Gevorgyan has standing to pursue the application in the first applicant\u2019s stead;<\/p>\n 3. Declares the complaints concerning the expropriation of the fourth applicant\u2019s property admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the fourth applicant;<\/p>\n 5. Holds that there is no need to examine the fourth applicant\u2019s complaint under Article\u00a06 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 6. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the fourth applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 7. Dismisses the remainder of the fourth applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 March 2022, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Ilse Freiwirth \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Iulia Antoanella Motoc ____________<\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/p>\n Year of birth \/ Date of registration \/ Place of residence \/ Registered address<\/strong><\/td>\n The first applicant owned 95.875 % of the fourth applicant\u2019s shares and the second and third applicants owned respectively 2.625% and 1.5% of its shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
\nCASE OF GHUKASYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 32986\/10)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n29 March 2022<\/p>\n
\nGabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova, judges,
\nand Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n Details of the applicants and their expropriated property<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n \n 1.<\/td>\n Hovhannes GHUKASYAN
\n(\u201cthe first applicant\u201d)1957, Yerevan<\/td>\nThe first applicant owned a house measuring 147.03\u00a0sq. m. located at 4 Abovyan Street. He also owned, jointly with the second applicant, a house having 54 sq. m of living space and a 34.6 sq. m. terrace situated on a plot of land measuring 281\u00a0sq.\u00a0m., at 24 Arami Street.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n Zvart MRYAN
\n(\u201cthe second applicant\u201d)1935, Yerevan<\/td>\nThe second applicant was the first and third applicants\u2019 mother. She had joint ownership with the first applicant to the property situated at 24 Arami Street (see above).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n Lusik MRYAN
\n(\u201cthe third applicant\u201d)1951,Yerevan<\/td>\nThe third applicant, the first applicant\u2019s sister and the second applicant\u2019s daughter, owned 1.5% of the fourth applicant\u2019s shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n OLIMP PRODUCERS\u2019 COOPERATIVE
\n(\u201cthe fourth applicant\u201d)1995, Yerevan<\/td>\nIn 1995 the first, second and third applicants established the fourth applicant which acquired from the State a building located at 4 Abovyan Street. Prior to the expropriation of the building, it was used by the fourth applicant for business purposes.<\/p>\n