The applicant represented the plaintiff in civil proceedings concerning damages. The civil courts upheld the plaintiff\u2019s claim in part. In his appeal on the points of law, the applicant told a joke about a professor who expected his students to provide the names, and not only the number, of the victims of the bombing of Hiroshima, and stated that the second-instance court had treated him like the professor treated his students in that joke. On 22 November 2017 the Br\u010dko District Court of Appeal, acting as the third-instance court, rejected the appeal on the points of law. Furthermore, on 20 December 2017 the same court fined the applicant 1,000 convertible marks (approximately 510 euros) for contempt of court. It considered the applicant\u2019s remarks to be insulting. On 26 March 2018 and 26 March 2020, the Br\u010dko District Court of Appeal, in another formation, and the Constitutional Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 20 December 2017. They relied on \u017dugi\u0107 v. Croatia (no. 3699\/08, 31 May 2011), in which the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant paid the fine in 2018.<\/p>\n
Download PDF<\/a>, WORD<\/a> Document<\/p>\n FOURTH SECTION This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Simi\u0107 v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Tim Eicke, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a039764\/20) against Bosnia and Herzegovina lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) on 30 July 2020 by a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Mirko Simi\u0107, who lives in Br\u010dko (\u201cthe applicant\u201d) and who was represented by Mr A. Rami\u0107, a lawyer practising in Br\u010dko;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice of the application to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Government\u201d), represented by their Acting Agent, Ms\u00a0J. Cvijeti\u0107;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations.<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 26 April 2022,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The applicant represented the plaintiff in civil proceedings concerning damages. The civil courts upheld the plaintiff\u2019s claim in part. In his appeal on the points of law, the applicant told a joke about a professor who expected his students to provide the names, and not only the number, of the victims of the bombing of Hiroshima, and stated that the second-instance court had treated him like the professor treated his students in that joke. On 22 November 2017 the Br\u010dko District Court of Appeal, acting as the third-instance court, rejected the appeal on the points of law. Furthermore, on 20 December 2017 the same court fined the applicant 1,000 convertible marks (approximately 510 euros) for contempt of court. It considered the applicant\u2019s remarks to be insulting. On 26 March 2018 and 26 March 2020, the Br\u010dko District Court of Appeal, in another formation, and the Constitutional Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 20 December 2017. They relied on \u017dugi\u0107 v. Croatia (no. 3699\/08, 31 May 2011), in which the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant paid the fine in 2018.<\/p>\n THE COURT\u2019S ASSESSMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention because he had been fined for contempt of court.<\/p>\n 3. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 4. The parties agree that the applicant\u2019s punishment for contempt of court amounted to an interference with his right to freedom of expression, that the interference was prescribed by law and that it pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the authority of the judiciary. It remains therefore to be examined whether the interference was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. The general principles for assessing the necessity of an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression in this particular context were restated in Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 51000\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a056-61, 28 June 2016). Notably, the Court must look at the impugned interference in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the remarks held against the applicant and the context in which they were made. In particular, it must determine whether the interference in question was \u201cproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued\u201d and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article\u00a010 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.<\/p>\n 5. The Court first notes that the critical remarks, which were regarded as insulting by the domestic courts, were made by the applicant in the context of judicial proceedings. In other words, they were made in a forum where his client\u2019s rights were naturally to be vigorously defended (see Radobuljac, cited above, \u00a7 62, and other authorities cited therein). Moreover, the remarks were conveyed in an appeal, as opposed to criticism of a judge voiced in, for instance, the media (see Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0136-38, ECHR 2015). Thus, the general public were not aware of them. The domestic courts, in their examination of the case, failed to give sufficient weight to the context in which the remarks had been made.<\/p>\n 6. What is more, the Court is not convinced that the applicant\u2019s remarks, contrary to what has been argued by the Government, could be interpreted as gratuitous personal attacks with the sole intent to insult a court, or members of a court (see \u010ceferin v. Slovenia, no. 40975\/08, \u00a7 59, 16 January 2018, and contrast \u017dugi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 47). Indeed, his comments were aimed at the manner in which the second-instance court had applied the rules of evidence in his client\u2019s case. While it is true that the tone of the impugned remarks was caustic, or even sarcastic, the use of such a tone in remarks about judges has been regarded as compatible with Article 10 (see Morice, cited above, \u00a7 139).<\/p>\n 7. The Court agrees with the Government and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina that lawyers, as independent professionals, play a key role in ensuring that the courts enjoy public confidence. That special role of lawyers in the administration of justice entails a number of duties; notably, their professional conduct must be discreet, honest and dignified (see Morice, cited above, \u00a7 133). However, for members of the public to have confidence in the administration of justice they must have confidence in the ability of the legal profession to provide effective representation (ibid., \u00a7 132).<\/p>\n 8. The above elements lead the Court to conclude that the reasons adduced by the domestic courts to justify the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression were not \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d. The Court is mindful of the fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention system (see, for instance, Dubsk\u00e1 and Krejzov\u00e1 v. the Czech Republic [GC], nos.\u00a028859\/11 and 28473\/12, \u00a7 175, ECHR 2016). However, bearing in mind the failure of the domestic courts to\u00a0provide\u00a0relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the interference in question, the Court finds that they cannot be said to have applied standards that were \u201cin conformity with the principles embodied in Article\u00a010\u201d or to have \u201cbased their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts\u201d. The Court accordingly concludes that the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression was not \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 9. This finding makes it unnecessary for the Court to examine whether the amount of the fine in the present case was proportionate to the aim pursued.<\/p>\n 10. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 11. With regard to pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed 510 euros (EUR) corresponding to the fine he had been ordered to pay for contempt of court (see paragraph 1 above). He also claimed EUR 4,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,550 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court and this Court.<\/p>\n 12. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s claims.<\/p>\n 13. The Court has found that the imposition of the fine on the applicant for contempt of court was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. Therefore, there is a sufficient causal link between the alleged pecuniary damage and the violation found. The Court therefore accepts the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of pecuniary damage in the amount of the fine. Accordingly, it awards him EUR 510 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable. As concerns non-pecuniary damage, the Court awards the amount claimed by the applicant plus any tax that may be chargeable. Lastly, having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full amount claimed by the applicant in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the application admissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) EUR 510 (five hundred and ten euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (iii) EUR 2,550 (two thousand five hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 May 2022, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Ilse Freiwirth \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Tim Eicke
\nCASE OF SIMI\u0106 v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 39764\/20)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n17 May 2022<\/p>\n
\nFaris Vehabovi\u0107,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova, judges,
\nand Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n