T.C. v. Italy – 54032\/18<\/a><\/p>\nJudgment 19.5.2022 [Section I]<\/p>\n
Article 14<\/strong>
\nDiscrimination<\/strong><\/p>\nRevocable and reviewable order prohibiting a Jehovah\u2019s Witness from actively involving his young child, brought up in Catholicism, in his religious practice: no violation<\/p>\n
Facts \u2013 In the context of child custody proceedings, a disagreement arose between the applicant, a Jehovah\u2019s Witness, and his daughter\u2019s mother, a Roman Catholic, for actively involving his daughter in his religious practice after their separation and the means he had been using in doing so. In particular, he had been concealing this from the mother and asking his daughter to also do so. The child had been baptised in the Roman Catholic Church and had been brought up since her birth in a Catholic family and social environment. She also participated in religious discussions and prayers at the applicant\u2019s home and attended Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses religious services from the age of 3 until the age of 8, when the domestic courts ordered the applicant to refrain from actively involving her in his religious practice. It remained open to him to communicate his beliefs to her.<\/p>\n
Law \u2013 Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: The domestic decisions had limited the applicant\u2019s relationship with his daughter, constituting thus an interference with his right to respect for family life. However, practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant\u2019s freedom to manifest his or her religion. Further, the priority aim was to take into account the best interests of children, which involved reconciling the educational choices of each parent and attempting to strike a satisfactory balance between the parents\u2019 individual conceptions, precluding any value judgments and, where necessary, laying down minimum rules on personal religious practices.<\/p>\n
The first question thus to be examined was whether the applicant could claim to have received different treatment from the mother of the child based on religion. The Court found that he could not for the following reasons.<\/p>\n
In their decisions the domestic courts had had regard above all to the child\u2019s interests. These lay primarily in the need to maintain and promote her development in an open and peaceful environment, reconciling as far as possible the rights and convictions of each of her parents. At the same time, both the expert\u2019s report and the domestic courts\u2019 decisions had referred to the fact that involving the child in the applicant\u2019s religious practices would have destabilised her in that she would be induced to abandon her Roman Catholic religious habits. They had also mentioned the applicant\u2019s behaviour and the means he had been using to involve his daughter in his religious practices.<\/p>\n
Even assuming that the parents could be considered to have been in comparable situations, the contested measure had had little influence on the applicant\u2019s religious practices and had in any event been aimed solely at resolving the conflict arising from the opposition between the two parents\u2019 educational concepts, with a view to safeguarding the child\u2019s best interests. Further, no measure had been adopted to prevent the applicant from using the educational principles he had opted for in relation to his daughter. Nor had he been prevented from taking part in the activities of the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses in a personal capacity. Rather, as demonstrated by the attenuated nature of the contested measure, the national authorities had attempted to reconcile the rights of each party.<\/p>\n
The Court also observed that the said order had not severely circumscribed his relationship with his daughter. In particular, he had suffered no restrictions on his custody and visiting rights. The reasons given by the domestic courts showed that they had focused solely on the child\u2019s interests, having decided to protect her from the purported stress exerted by the applicant\u2019s intensive efforts to involve her in his religious activities. Following the expert\u2019s report, the domestic courts had concluded that these efforts would have been harmful for her. Thus, unlike the case of Palau-Martinez v. France in which a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 was found on account of the fact that residence rights had been determined on the basis of the applicants\u2019 religious beliefs, in the present case, the sole purpose of the contested measure had been to preserve the child\u2019s freedom of choice by taking into account her father\u2019s educational views. Lastly, given that circumstances might change over time and the domestic decisions were not final and could therefore be revoked at any time, the applicant could reapply to the first instance court for a review of its decision on the matter.<\/p>\n
Conclusion: no violation (five votes to two)<\/p>\n
(See also Palau-Martinez v. France, 64927\/01, 16 December 2003, Legal Summary ; Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 15379\/16, 10 December 2021, Legal Summary)<\/p>\n