The present cases concern restrictions on the freedom of expression and association of Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which have been categorised as \u201cforeign agents\u201d funded by \u201cforeign sources\u201d and exercising \u201cpolitical activity\u201d.<\/p>\n
Download PDF<\/a>, WORD<\/a> Document<\/p>\n THIRD SECTION Art 11 (read in light of Art 10) \u2022 Freedom of association \u2022 Application of Foreign Agents Act to applicant non-governmental organisations and their directors neither prescribed by law nor necessary in a democratic society \u2022 Concepts of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d and \u201cforeign funding\u201d insufficiently foreseeable and lacking sufficient safeguards against abuse \u2022 No relevant and sufficient reasons for creating special status of \u201cforeign agents\u201d, imposing additional requirements or restrictions on organisations registered as such and punishing breaches in unforeseeable and disproportionate manner \u2022 Legal regime placing significant chilling effect on choice to seek or accept any amount of foreign funding, especially in respect of sensitive or domestically unpopular topics STRASBOURG This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article\u00a044 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Ecodefence and Others v.\u00a0Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Having regard to:<\/p>\n the sixty-one applications against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article\u00a034 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by seventy-three Russian non-governmental organisations and their directors (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on the dates indicated in the Appendix;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the complaints concerning restrictions on the applicants\u2019 rights to freedom of expression and association and the protection against discrimination and undue pressure, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;<\/p>\n the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants;<\/p>\n the comments submitted by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (\u201cthe Commissioner\u201d) (Article\u00a036\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention);<\/p>\n the comments submitted by the following third-party interveners who were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section (Article\u00a036 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention): the Institute for Law and Public Policy (ILPP); the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (\u201cthe Special Rapporteur\u201d); the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR); the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ); Amnesty International; a group of Hungarian non-governmental organisations including the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Transparency International Hungary, Atlatszo.hu, and the E\u00f6tv\u00f6s K\u00e1roly Policy Institute (\u201cthe Hungarian NGOs\u201d); the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Poland); and the Media Legal Defence Initiative;<\/p>\n the decision of the President of the Chamber to appoint Judge G.A.\u00a0Serghides to sit as an ad hoc judge (Rule\u00a029 \u00a7\u00a02\u00a0(b) of the Rules of Court), Mr\u00a0Mikhail Lobov, the judge elected in respect of Russia, having withdrawn from sitting in the case (Rule\u00a028 \u00a7\u00a03), and none of three persons designated by the Government as eligible to serve as ad hoc judges making themselves available to the Court (Rule\u00a029 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) and 5);<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 17\u00a0May 2022,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The present cases concern restrictions on the freedom of expression and association of Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which have been categorised as \u201cforeign agents\u201d funded by \u201cforeign sources\u201d and exercising \u201cpolitical activity\u201d.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicants are Russian NGOs and, in some cases, their directors. The names of the applicants and their representatives are given in the Appendix.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were initially represented by Mr\u00a0A. Fedorov and Mr\u00a0M. Galperin, former Representatives of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by their successor in this office, Mr\u00a0M. Vinogradov.<\/p>\n 4. The applicant NGOs had operated for a long time under the same legal regime as any other Russian NGOs. They were active in civil society issues, human rights, the protection of the environment and cultural heritage, education, social security and migration.<\/p>\n 5. In 2012 the new Foreign Agents Act was enacted (for details, see the following section). It required Russian NGOs which were deemed to engage in \u201cpolitical activity\u201d and to have been in receipt of \u201cforeign funding\u201d to seek registration as \u201cforeign agents\u201d, under the threat of administrative and criminal sanctions. They were also required to label their publications as originating from a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation, post information on their activities on the Internet and submit to more extensive accounting and reporting requirements.<\/p>\n 6. Since 2012 the Foreign Agents Act has been updated several times. In June 2014 the Ministry of Justice was given the power to put organisations on the register of foreign agents at its own discretion. In 2016 the Foreign Agents Act was updated with a new definition of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d.<\/p>\n 7. After the Foreign Agents Act came into force, prosecutor\u2019s offices and local justice departments required the applicant organisations and their directors to submit documents for an audit. They examined the documents and concluded that the applicant organisations fell within the definition of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. The Ministry of Justice put most of the applicant organisations on the register of foreign agents. The facts specific to each case are set out in the Appendix.<\/p>\n 8. The applicants unsuccessfully challenged the decisions of the justice departments and prosecutor\u2019s offices before the domestic courts.<\/p>\n 9. The application of the Foreign Agents Act has resulted in the imposition of administrative fines, financial expenditure, restrictions on the applicant organisations\u2019 activities and the institution of criminal proceedings against the director of one organisation. Many applicant organisations were liquidated for violating the requirements applicable to \u201cforeign agents\u201d, or had to take decisions on self-liquidation because they were unable to pay the fines, or in order to avoid new sanctions.<\/p>\n 10. On 28 and 29\u00a0December 2021 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Moscow City Court, respectively, granted the prosecutor\u2019s applications for the liquidation of the applicant organisations International Memorial and the Memorial Human Rights Centre and their field offices. The courts considered it established that the organisations \u2013 which the Ministry of Justice had put on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d \u2013 had committed \u201cgross and repetitive\u201d violations of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d legislation by failing to label their Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and other online publications as originating with a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation. The courts held that, by \u201cconcealing [their] foreign-agent status\u201d, the organisations failed to ensure \u201ctransparency of [their] activities\u201d, prevented \u201cproper public scrutiny of [their activities]\u201d, and violated \u201cthe right of citizens to receive reliable information about [their] activities\u201d, in flagrant violation of Russian law.<\/p>\n 11. On 29\u00a0December 2021 the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court, that, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before it, the enforcement of the decisions to dissolve the two applicant organisations should be suspended for a period that would be necessary for the Court to consider the present case.<\/p>\n 12. On 28\u00a0February and 5\u00a0April 2022 the Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court and the First Court of Appeals, respectively, dismissed the two organisations\u2019 appeals against the dissolution orders.<\/p>\n 13. International Memorial applied to the Supreme Court for a stay of execution of the liquidation decision, as directed by the interim measure. On 22\u00a0March 2022 the Supreme Court refused the application, ruling that the enforcement of the liquidation decision did not \u201cprevent the organisation from exercising its rights under Article\u00a034 of the Convention\u201d, did not \u201ccreate a risk of loss of life, health or irreparable harm to the organisation or its members\u201d and did not \u201cviolate the constitutional right to freedom of association\u201d.<\/p>\n 14. On 5\u00a0April 2022 the liquidation decision was enforced and International Memorial was removed from the State Register of Legal Entities.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND MATERIAL<\/strong><\/p>\n I. THE FOREIGN AGENTS ACT<\/strong><\/p>\n A. Enactment of the Foreign Agents Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Definitions<\/em><\/p>\n 15. In 2012 the Russian authorities adopted a series of amendments to the legislation on NGOs, which are collectively known as the Foreign Agents Act (Law no.\u00a0121-FZ of 13\u00a0July 2012). The Act introduced the notion of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d in section\u00a02(6) of the Non-Commercial Organisations Act, Law no.\u00a07-FZ of 12\u00a0January 1996 (\u201cthe NCO Act\u201d), defining such an agent as:<\/p>\n \u201c… a Russian non-commercial organisation receiving funds and other property from foreign States, their governmental bodies, international and foreign organisations, foreign nationals, stateless persons or persons authorised by [any of the above], or Russian legal entities receiving funds and other property from the above-mentioned sources … (\u2018foreign sources\u2019) and which engages in political activity, including political activity carried out in the interests of foreign providers of funds, in the territory of the Russian Federation.\u201d<\/p>\n 16. The concept of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d was defined as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cA non-commercial organisation, except for a political party, is considered to carry out political activity if, regardless of its statutory goals and purposes, it participates (including financially) in the organisation and implementation of political actions in order to influence State authorities\u2019 decision-making process that affect State policy and public opinion.<\/p>\n Activities in the following fields shall be excluded from the scope of \u2018political activity\u2019: science, culture, the arts, healthcare, the prevention of diseases and the protection of health, social security, the protection of motherhood and childhood, the social support of disabled persons, the promotion of a healthy lifestyle, physical well\u2011being and sports, the protection of flora and fauna, charitable activities, and the assistance of charities and voluntary organisations.\u201d<\/p>\n 2. Additional requirements applicable to \u201cforeign agents\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n (a) Registration requirement<\/p>\n 17. All organisations deemed to fit the definition of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d were required to file an application with the Ministry of Justice to be included on the register of foreign agents (section\u00a032(7) of the NCO Act and section\u00a029 of the Public Associations Act, Federal Law no.\u00a082-FZ of 19\u00a0May 1995).<\/p>\n (b) Unscheduled inspections<\/p>\n 18. \u201cForeign agents\u201d were liable to have routine inspections by the Ministry of Justice, which were to be carried out at least once a year, and also to have unscheduled inspections in the circumstances listed in section\u00a032(4.2) of the NCO Act, in particular if the Ministry of Justice received information from an individual, organisation or State authority indicating that an NGO was engaged in political activity and was financed from abroad but had failed to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, and if a \u201cforeign agent\u201d organisation had asked to be deleted from the register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n (c) Labelling requirement<\/p>\n 19. \u201cForeign agents\u201d were required to label all the publications which they issued or distributed with a statement to the effect that those publications originated from an organisation which was listed as \u201cforeign agent\u201d (section\u00a024 of the NCO Act).<\/p>\n (d) Accounting and auditing requirements<\/p>\n 20. The Foreign Agents Act also introduced new accounting and auditing requirements. The financial reports of non-commercial organisations exercising the functions of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d were made subject to compulsory audits. The organisations were required to keep a separate statement of income or expenses obtained from foreign sources (section\u00a032(1) of the NCO Act):<\/p>\n \u201c3. … non-commercial organisations exercising the functions of a foreign agent shall submit an audit statement together with the above-mentioned documents. Moreover, the documents submitted by non-commercial organisations exercising the functions of a foreign agent shall contain information on the spending of funds and the use of other property received from foreign sources, and on their actual expenditure and use of property …<\/p>\n Non-commercial organisations exercising the functions of a foreign agent shall submit to a competent body [the Ministry of Justice] a report on their activities and the members of their management bodies every six months; every three months they shall submit documents containing information on the spending of funds and the use of other property, including funds and property received from foreign sources, and an audit statement shall be submitted every year\u201d.<\/p>\n (e) Reporting requirements<\/p>\n 21. \u201cForeign agents\u201d were required to publish biannual and annual reports:<\/p>\n \u201c3.2. … once a year, non-commercial organisations exercising the functions of a foreign agent shall publish on the Internet a report about their activities containing the same information as that submitted to a competent body [the Ministry of Justice] or its local department; and every six months the organisations will provide such a report for publication in the mass media.\u201d<\/p>\n 22. Government Regulation no.\u00a0212 of 15\u00a0April 2006 on the implementation of certain provisions of federal laws relating to non\u2011governmental organisations, prescribes that Russian NGOs are required to submit reports on their activities and the composition of their management bodies, and documents concerning their expenses and property every year (paragraph\u00a02 (a)).<\/p>\n B. Criminal and administrative liability<\/strong><\/p>\n 23. The Foreign Agents Act also created a new criminal offence of maliciously avoiding the obligation to submit documents required for registering an organisation as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d which is punishable with fines of up to 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) or up to two years\u2019 deprivation of liberty (Article\u00a0330.1 of the Criminal Code). On 30\u00a0December 2020 the maximum penalty under this provision was extended to five years\u2019 imprisonment (Law no.\u00a0525-FZ).<\/p>\n 24. On 12\u00a0November 2012 sanctions for a violation of the Foreign Agents Act were added to the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). The new Article\u00a019.7.5-2 established a fine of between RUB\u00a0100,000 and RUB\u00a0300,000 (2,490 to 7,470 euros (EUR) at the exchange rate on the date of enactment) which could be imposed in relation to a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation that submitted incomplete, incorrect or belated information to the State authorities. The new Article\u00a019.34 punished non-commercial organisations for carrying out activities without being registered on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d (paragraph\u00a01) or for failing to label publications as originating from a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation (paragraph\u00a02). The minimum fine for those offences was set at RUB\u00a0300,000, and the maximum fine at RUB\u00a0500,000 (EUR\u00a012,450).<\/p>\n 25. On 31\u00a0December 2014 the CAO was amended in line with a decision of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 40 below). In particular, in accordance with the amended Article\u00a04.1(2.2) and (3.2) of the CAO, by way of exception, where the nature and effects of an offender\u2019s administrative offence, personality or financial situation so require, the amount of the fine may be fixed below the minimum amount in the relevant provisions of the CAO, where the minimum amount of the fine amounts to at least RUB\u00a010,000 for individuals, RUB\u00a050,000 for officials, and RUB\u00a0100,000 for organisations. The amount of the fine may not be less than half of the minimum amount of the fine provided for by the relevant provisions of the CAO. On 3\u00a0November 2015 the statute of limitations for non-compliance with the \u201cforeign agent\u201d legislation was extended from three months to one year (Law no.\u00a0304-FZ).<\/p>\n C. Delegating to the Ministry of Justice the authority to add organisations to the list<\/strong><\/p>\n 26. On 4\u00a0June 2014 the NCO Act was amended to give the Ministry of Justice the power to add non-commercial organisations to the register of foreign agents if it considered that an organisation met the criteria set out in the Act (section\u00a032(7)).<\/p>\n D. Procedure for removing an organisation from the list<\/strong><\/p>\n 27. On 8\u00a0March 2015 a procedure for removing an organisation from the register of foreign agents was added to the NCO Act (section\u00a032(7.1)). An organisation may be deleted from the list if, in particular, it has been liquidated or reorganised, or an extraordinary inspection has established that the organisation has not received foreign funding or engaged in political activity in Russia for a period of one year before filing the request for deletion.<\/p>\n E. Updated definition of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 28. On 2\u00a0June 2016 the definition of political activity was updated to read:<\/p>\n \u201cA non-commercial organisation, except for a political party, is considered to carry out a political activity in Russian territory if, regardless of its statutory goals and purposes, it engages in activities in the fields of statehood, the protection of the Russian constitutional system, federalism, the protection of the Russian Federation\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, public security, national security and defence, external policy, the Russian Federation\u2019s social, economic and national development, the development of the political system, the structure of State and local authorities, [or] human rights, for the purpose of influencing State policy, the structure of State and local authorities, or their decisions and actions.<\/p>\n The above activity may be carried out in the following ways:<\/p>\n organising and holding public events such as meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches or pickets, or any combination of them, and organising and holding public debates, discussions, or speeches;<\/p>\n attempting to obtain specific outcomes in elections or referenda, acting as an election or referendum observer, establishing election or referendum commissions, engaging in the activities of political parties;<\/p>\n submitting public petitions to State and local authorities and officials, and performing other actions affecting [such public authorities and officials], including actions encouraging the adoption, amendment or repeal of laws or other legal acts;<\/p>\n disseminating, including via information networks, views on State authorities\u2019 decisions and policy;<\/p>\n shaping opinion on social and political issues by, in particular, organising public opinion polls and publishing the results, or conducting sociological research;<\/p>\n involving citizens, including minors, in the above activities;<\/p>\n financing the above activities.<\/p>\n The activities in the following fields shall be excluded from the scope of \u2018political activity\u2019: science, culture, the arts, healthcare, the prevention of disease and the protection of health, social security, the protection of motherhood and childhood, the social support of disabled persons, the promotion of a healthy lifestyle, physical well\u2011being and sports, the protection of flora and fauna, charity work.\u201d<\/p>\n F. Restrictions applicable to \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations<\/strong><\/p>\n 29. On 4\u00a0November 2014 Law no.\u00a0344-FZ established a simplified form of book-keeping which may be used by all non-commercial organisations with the exception of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations (sections\u00a06(4)(2) and 6(5)(12) of the Accounting Act, Law no.\u00a0402-FZ of 6\u00a0December 2011).<\/p>\n 30. On 24\u00a0November 2014 Law no.\u00a0355-FZ amended the Political Parties Act (Law no.\u00a095-FZ of 11\u00a0July 2001) to prohibit political parties from receiving donations from, or entering into transactions with, Russian \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations (sections\u00a030(3) and 31(4.1)).<\/p>\n 31. It also amended the Elections and Referenda Act (Law no.\u00a067-FZ of 12\u00a0June 2002) to establish that Russian NGOs which had been categorised as \u201cforeign agents\u201d could not take part in electoral campaigning or referenda in any form, along with foreign entities and individuals. It specifically prohibited such organisations from promoting or opposing candidates or lists of candidates in an election, initiating a referendum or campaigning for a referendum, working towards a specific outcome in an election or participating in the monitoring of an election or referendum, except in the capacity of a \u201cforeign (international) observer\u201d (section\u00a03.6). \u201cForeign-agent\u201d Russian organisations were also prohibited, alongside foreign individuals and entities, from making contributions to the electoral fund of a candidate in an election or the fund of a referendum.<\/p>\n 32. The State Duma Election Act (Law no.\u00a020-FZ of 22\u00a0February 2014) and the Presidential Election Act (Law no.\u00a019-FZ of 10\u00a0January 2003) were brought into line with the Elections and Referenda Act to prevent Russian \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations from in any way taking part in the preparation of an election, electoral campaigning, or the financing of an election.<\/p>\n 33. On 3\u00a0July 2016 Law no.\u00a0287-FZ created a new category of non\u2011commercial organisations which were \u201cproviders of socially useful services\u201d. Such non-commercial organisations were eligible for priority funding at federal and regional levels (section\u00a031.1 of the NCO Act). Section 2(2.2) of the NCO Act explicitly provided that \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations could not be recognised as \u201cproviders of socially useful services\u201d.<\/p>\n 34. Law no.\u00a0203-FZ of 19\u00a0July 2018 amended section\u00a010(3) of the Public Monitoring Boards (Penal Facilities) Act (Law no.\u00a076-FZ of 10\u00a0June 2008) to prohibit \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations from nominating candidates to public monitoring boards.<\/p>\n 35. Law no.\u00a0362-FZ of 11\u00a0October 2018 added section\u00a05(1.1) to the Anti\u2011corruption Assessment Act (Law no.\u00a0172-FZ of 17\u00a0July 2009), excluding Russian organisations with the status of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d from the list of civil society institutions entitled to carry out independent anti\u2011corruption assessment of draft legislation.<\/p>\n II. Constitutional Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 36. On 8\u00a0April 2014 the Constitutional Court affirmed the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Foreign Agents Act (Ruling no.\u00a010-P) and provided an interpretation of the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 37. Firstly, it set out which circumstances should be considered when determining whether an organisation was financed from abroad:<\/p>\n \u201c… There is no risk of arbitrary interpretation and application of the provisions on foreign funding, as it makes no difference for how long, in what amount or in what form foreign funds have been provided. However, it is important to bear in mind that relevant funds and other property should be not only transferred (remitted) to the non\u2011commercial organisation, but also received by it; if it refuses to receive them and returns them to the foreign source, in particular before starting political activity, the organisation is not obliged to file an application for registration as a foreign agent …\u201d<\/p>\n 38. It further described what actions constituted political activity:<\/p>\n \u201cThe forms of political activity can be diverse. In addition to meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets, political actions may include: elections and referendum campaigns; public appeals to State bodies; the dissemination of positions regarding decisions made and the policy pursued by State bodies, including dissemination via information networks; and other activities which cannot be exhaustively listed. When classifying as political actions some activities organised and carried out with the participation of non-commercial organisations … it is important to determine how they may affect (either directly or by influencing public opinion) the decision-making process of State bodies and State policy, and also to determine whether they will trigger a public reaction and attract the attention of State bodies or civil society.<\/p>\n The activities of a non-commercial organisation in such fields as science, culture, the arts, public health, preventive care and healthcare, social support and protection, the protection of motherhood and childhood, the social support of disabled persons, the promotion of a healthy lifestyle, physical exercise and sports, the protection of flora and fauna, charitable activities, and aid to charities and voluntary organisations shall not be considered political activity … even if the aim of these activities is to influence the decision-making process of State bodies and State policy, provided that this aim stays within the limits of the relevant field …\u201d<\/p>\n 39. When defining whether an organisation intends to carry out political activities, it is necessary to consider the following elements:<\/p>\n \u201c… if [a non-commercial organisation\u2019s members] participate in political activity on their own behalf and on their own initiative, in particular, in breach of instructions provided by this organisation (its management bodies or officials), [the provisions] of the Foreign Agents Act do not apply …<\/p>\n … The intention to participate in political activity in the territory of the Russian Federation may be confirmed by: the constituent documents, mission statement or other official documents of a non-commercial organisation; public statements by its directors (officials) containing an appeal to adopt, change or annul some decisions by State bodies; notices of assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, marches or pickets sent by a non-commercial organisation to a regional executive or municipal body; the preparation and presentation of legislative initiatives; and other public activities objectively demonstrating that the non-commercial organisation intends to arrange and hold political events in order to influence the decision-making process of State bodies and State policy.\u201d<\/p>\n 40. The Constitutional Court held that the sanctions in the CAO were compliant with the Constitution, except for the provision establishing the minimum amounts of fines in Article\u00a019.34 of the CAO, in so far as it prevented courts from giving due consideration to the nature of the offence, the extent to which the defendant was liable for the offence, the property and financial status of the defendant, and other elements which were relevant for meting out an individualised punishment:<\/p>\n \u201c4.2. … It becomes extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to ensure, as the Constitution requires, an individual approach to imposing an administrative fine whose minimum amount is 100,000 roubles for officials and 300,000 roubles for legal entities, especially because no alternative is provided for.<\/p>\n … Thus, the provision … that establishes the minimum amount of the administrative fine … does not conform to the Constitution of the Russian Federation…<\/p>\n 5. … pending the relevant amendments …, the court may reduce the amount of the fine below the minimum amount …if the amount of the fine as provided for by [the CAO] is not in line with the purpose of administrative punishment and obviously results in the excessive limitation of the offender\u2019s property rights.<\/p>\n 6. The court decisions on the cases of [Public Initiatives Support Centre] and Mr\u00a0Zamaryanov … shall be reviewed if … they were based on Article\u00a019.34 \u00a7\u00a01 of the CAO … \u201d<\/p>\n III. LEGAL MATERIAL REFERRED TO BY THE PARTIES<\/strong><\/p>\n 41. This section contains extracts from legal instruments to which the parties referred in their submissions.<\/p>\n A. Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe and Explanatory Memorandum, Strasbourg, 13\u00a0November 2002, and Recommendation CM\/Rec(2007)14 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers to member states on the legal status of non\u2011governmental organisations in Europe (10\u00a0October 2007)<\/strong><\/p>\n 42. NGOs may solicit and receive funding \u2013 cash or donations in kind \u2013 from another country, multilateral agencies or an institutional or individual donor, subject to generally applicable foreign exchange and customs laws (Point 50 of the Fundamental Principles and Committee of Ministers Recommendation). The possibility for NGOs to solicit donations in cash or in kind is a fundamental principle, a natural consequence of their non\u2011profit\u2011making nature. Such contributions, along with the proceeds of any economic activity, are an NGO\u2019s vital means of financing the pursuit of its objectives. However, this possibility for NGOs to collect funding is not absolute and may be subject to regulation, with a view to protecting the target audience (point\u00a056 of the Explanatory Memorandum).<\/p>\n 43. In the spirit of transparency and accountability, NGOs should submit an annual report to their members and directors. Such reports can also be required to be submitted to a designated supervising body, where any taxation privileges or other public support has been granted to the NGOs concerned. In particular, relevant books, records and activities of NGOs may, where specified by law or by contract, be subject to inspection by a supervising agency. NGOs should generally have their accounts audited by an institution or person independent of their management (points 60-65 of the Fundamental Principles and points 62-66 of the Committee of Ministers Recommendation).<\/p>\n B. The United States Foreign Agents Registration Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 44. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (\u201cthe FARA Act\u201d) of 1938 (52\u00a0Stat. 631-633), a US law as amended in 1942 and 1966 (22 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0611-621), was originally adopted to require that agents representing the interests of foreign powers in a \u201cpolitical or quasi-political capacity\u201d disclose their relationship with the foreign government, so that \u201cthe government and the American people\u201d could evaluate \u201cthe statements and activities of such persons\u201d. In 1966 the Act was amended to target agents actually working with foreign powers who sought economic or political advantage by influencing governmental decision-making. The amendments shifted the focus of the law from propaganda to political lobbying and narrowed the meaning of \u201cforeign agent\u201d. The current text provides:<\/p>\n \u201c\u00a7\u00a0611. Definitions<\/p>\n As used in and for the purposes of this subchapter\u2014<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (b) The term \u2018foreign principal\u2019 includes\u2014<\/p>\n (1) a government of a foreign country and a foreign political party;<\/p>\n (2) a person outside of the United States …; and<\/p>\n (3) a partnership, association, corporation, organisation, or other combination of persons organised under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.<\/p>\n (c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the term \u2018agent of a foreign principal\u2019 means \u2013<\/p>\n (1) any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal, and who directly or through any other person \u2013<\/p>\n (i) engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal;<\/p>\n (ii) acts within the United States as a public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal;<\/p>\n (iii)\u00a0within the United States solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal; or<\/p>\n (iv) within the United States represents the interests of such foreign principal before any agency or official of the Government of the United States; and<\/p>\n (2) any person who agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal as defined in clause (1) of this subsection.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (o) The term \u2018political activities\u2019 means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party …\u201d<\/p>\n C. Hungary\u2019s Transparency Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 45. Hungary\u2019s Act no. LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organisations Financed from Abroad (\u201cthe Transparency Act\u201d) required associations and foundations (except for sport and religious associations), political parties and ethnic minority associations to apply to be on a special register if the foreign funding part of their budget exceeded 7,200,000\u00a0Hungarian forints (HUF \u2013 approximately EUR\u00a022,100) annually, under the threat of fines or dissolution. Organisations financed from abroad were subject to additional labelling and reporting requirements.<\/p>\n 46. The Act was repealed in April 2021 following a finding by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) that it was contrary to EU law (see judgment of 18\u00a0June 2020, Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations), C\u201178\/18, EU:C:2020:476). The Court held in particular that the objective of increasing the transparency of the financing of associations, although legitimate, cannot justify the introduction of legislation based on a presumption \u2013 made on principle and applied indiscriminately \u2013 that any financial support paid by a non-national natural or legal person, and any civil society organisation receiving such financial support, were intrinsically liable to jeopardise the State\u2019s political and economic interests and the ability of its institutions to operate free from interference (\u00a7\u00a086). As concerns the grounds of public policy or public security, the Court found that the financial thresholds triggering the application of the obligations put in place by the Transparency Act were fixed at amounts which clearly did not appear to correspond with the scenario of a sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society which those obligations are supposed to prevent (\u00a7\u00a094).<\/p>\n 47. The Court further considered that the obligations put in place by Transparency Act constituted limitations on the right to freedom of association, inasmuch as they rendered significantly more difficult the operation of the targeted associations because of the dissuasive effect of such obligations and the penalties attached to any failure to comply with them (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a0115-16). Second, the systematic obligations imposed on the associations and foundations to register and present themselves under the designation \u201corganisation in receipt of support from abroad\u201d were also liable to have a deterrent effect on the participation of non-national donors in the financing of civil society and thus to hinder the activities of those organisations and the achievement of the aims which they pursue. Those obligations were furthermore of such a nature as to create a generalised climate of mistrust vis\u2011\u00e0-vis the associations and foundations at issue, in Hungary, and to stigmatise them (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a0118-19). The Court referred to its finding above that there was no justification for the introduction of those additional obligations (\u00a7\u00a0140).<\/p>\n D. Israel\u2019s Disclosure Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 48. Israel\u2019s Act on Disclosure Requirements for Recipients of Support from a Foreign State Entity (Statute book 5771-2011, 2\u00a0March 2011) establishes that an organisation which has received more than 50% of its funding from a foreign State or inter-State organisation must submit to the Ministry of Justice an online form specifying the identity of the donor, the amount of support received and the designation of the support, and the conditions under which the support was granted, including undertakings given by the recipient of the support to a foreign State entity. Additionally, an NGO that has received a donation from a foreign entity for the purpose of funding a special advertising campaign must publish, as part of its campaign, the fact that it has received the donation.<\/p>\n IV. RELEVANT LEGAL MATERIAL<\/strong><\/p>\n 49. This section sets out legal assessments of the Foreign Agents Act and its effect on Russian NGOs.<\/p>\n A. Intergovernmental organisations and advisory bodies<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The Venice Commission<\/em><\/p>\n 50. On 27\u00a0June 2014 the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) reached the following conclusions concerning the Foreign Agents Act (CDL-AD(2014)025).<\/p>\n \u201c132. … The use of the term \u2018foreign agent\u2019 is highly controversial. By bringing back the rhetoric used during the communist period, this term stigmatises the NCOs to which it is applied, tarnishing their reputation and seriously hampering their activities. The Venice Commission therefore recommends that the term be abandoned.<\/p>\n 133. The Venice Commission further considers that the legitimate aim of ensuring transparency of NCOs receiving funding from abroad cannot justify measures which hamper the activities of NCOs operating in the field of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It therefore recommends reconsidering the creation of a special regime with autonomous registration, special register and a host of additional legal obligations.<\/p>\n 134. If this specific legal regime is maintained, the power of the authorities to proceed with the registration of a NCO as \u2018foreign agent\u2019 (or other term) without that NCO\u2019s consent should be removed …<\/p>\n 135. Pursuant to the law under examination, the legal status of a foreign agent presupposes not only that a NCO receives foreign funding but also that it participates in \u2018political activities\u2019. This expression is however quite broad and vague and the practice of its interpretation by public authorities has been so far rather disparate, adding to the uncertainties surrounding the meaning of the term. The Venice Commission therefore calls upon the Russian authorities to work towards a clear definition of \u2018political activities\u2019…<\/p>\n 136. In addition to its text, the practical implementation of the Law on Non\u2011Commercial Organisations also gives rise to concerns. Reports indicate that NCOs have been subject to numerous extraordinary inspections, with the legal ground of these inspections remaining unclear and the extent of documents required during them differing quite substantively.\u201d<\/p>\n 2. Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe<\/em><\/p>\n 51. On 15\u00a0July 2013 the Commissioner issued an Opinion on the Legislation of the Russian Federation on Non-Commercial Organisations in light of Council of Europe Standards. The Commissioner stated that the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d carried with it a connotation of ostracism or stigma, that the definition of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d was broad and vague, and that the legislation regulating the activities of NGOs in Russia should be revised, with the aim of establishing a clear, coherent and consistent framework in line with applicable international standards. Reporting and accounting requirements should be the same for all NGOs, regardless of the sources of their income. They should be transparent and coherent and not interfere with NGOs\u2019 ongoing work. There should be no more than one governmental institution dealing with issues such as registering, reporting, regulating and overseeing the work of the NGOs. Other agencies should exercise their supervisory powers only in cases where there were reasonable and objective grounds to believe that the organisation in question had violated its legal obligations.<\/p>\n 52. On 9\u00a0July 2015 an update was issued, entitled \u201cLegislation and Practice in the Russian Federation on Non\u2011Commercial Organisations in light of Council of Europe Standards: an Update\u201d. The Commissioner analysed the domestic case-law and found that there had been at least 189 cases brought before first\u2011instance and appellate domestic courts in respect of the application of the legislation on \u201cforeign agents\u201d. Of those, at least twenty\u2011eight judicial decisions had been delivered in favour of the NGOs concerned, while at least 121 judicial decisions had found that the law had been correctly applied against the NGOs. In at least fifty-five of the cases, the judicial decisions had already become enforceable. As a result of the application of the legislation on \u201cforeign agents\u201d, at least twenty NGOs had ceased their activity either in full (for example, by terminating their operations voluntarily or suspending their activity) or in part (for example, by stopping specific projects). The Commissioner further noted that the recommendations in the previous Opinion had not been implemented, and made the following recommendations:<\/p>\n \u201cThe Commissioner calls on the Russian authorities to revise the legislation on non\u2011commercial organisations in order to establish a clear, coherent and consistent framework in line with applicable European and international standards … In particular, the legislative revision should entail:<\/p>\n \u00b7 the use of clear definitions in the legislation allowing to foresee the legal consequences of its implementation;<\/p>\n \u00b7 avoiding the use of stigmatising language such as \u2018foreign agent\u2019 towards NCOs;<\/p>\n \u00b7 non-discriminatory legal provisions, including in the field of reporting and sanctioning of NCOs, irrespective of the sources of their funding;<\/p>\n \u00b7 application of the \u2018pressing social need\u2019 criteria for any State interference with the freedoms of association and expression, including the imposition of sanctions;<\/p>\n \u00b7 limiting State interference in NCO activities to setting up clear and non\u2011biased standards of transparency and reporting;<\/p>\n \u00b7 application of sanctions only as measures of the last resort in full compliance with the principle of proportionality;<\/p>\n \u00b7 revocation of provisions establishing criminal prosecution of NCO staff in cases which normally fall under administrative procedures.\u201d<\/p>\n 3. United Nations<\/em><\/p>\n (a) The right of access to funding<\/p>\n 53. The UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (General Assembly Resolution 53\/144 of 8\u00a0March 1999) provides that \u201ceveryone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means in accordance with Article\u00a03 of the present Declaration\u201d (Article\u00a013). The right of access to funding is to be exercised within the juridical framework of domestic legislation \u2013 provided that such legislation is consistent with international human rights standards.<\/p>\n 54. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (General Assembly Resolution 36\/55 of 25\u00a0November 1981) indicates that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, in particular, the freedom \u201cto solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions\u201d (Article\u00a06 (f)).<\/p>\n 55. The Human Rights Council\u2019s Resolution 22\/6 on protecting human\u2011rights defenders (21\u00a0March 2013) urged the States \u201cto acknowledge publicly the important and legitimate role of human rights defenders … by respecting the independence of their organizations and by avoiding the stigmatization of their work\u201d and \u201cto ensure that reporting requirements placed on [associations] do not inhibit functional autonomy\u201d, that \u201crestrictions are not discriminatorily imposed on potential sources of funding\u201d, and that \u201cno law should criminalize or delegitimize activities in defence of human rights on account of the geographic origin of funding thereto\u201d (A\/HRC\/RES\/22\/6, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a05 and 9).<\/p>\n (b) Assessment of the Foreign Agents Act\u2019s compatibility with Russia\u2019s obligations under UN treaties<\/p>\n 56. In its concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation on the observance of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights dated 31\u00a0March 2015, the Human Rights Committee determined that the Russian Federation should, \u201cat the very least\u201d, remove the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d from the law, clarify the broad definition of \u201cpolitical activities\u201d, remove the power granted under the law to register non\u2011commercial organisations without their consent, and revisit the procedural requirements and sanctions applicable under the law to ensure their necessity and proportionality (CCPR\/C\/RUS\/7\/CO). Similar concerns were expressed by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, following consideration of the sixth periodic report of the Russian Federation. The Committee called on the Russian Government to, among other things, repeal the legislative provisions introduced by the Foreign Agents Act and create a safe and supportive environment for the work of NGOs and human rights defenders (E\/C.12\/RUS\/CO\/6, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a07-8, 16\u00a0October 2017).<\/p>\n 57. In its concluding remarks on the sixth periodic report of the Russian Federation dated 28\u00a0August 2018, the Committee against Torture expressed the view that the \u201cforeign-agent\u201d legislation was often used as a means of administrative harassment against human rights organisations, forcing them to reduce and eventually cease their activities (CAT\/C\/RUS\/CO\/6, paragraph\u00a028). It also expressed concern about a revision of rules on the composition of prison monitoring boards which had resulted in the exclusion of independent monitors (paragraph\u00a022).<\/p>\n B. Non-governmental organisations<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Amnesty International<\/em><\/p>\n 58. A report released by Amnesty International in November 2016 entitled \u201cAgents of the people: Four years of \u2018foreign agents\u2019 law in Russia\u201d highlighted the negative impact of the Foreign Agents Act on independent Russian NGOs.<\/p>\n 59. Amnesty International noted that the Russian authorities had implemented the Foreign Agents Act in such a way that almost any NGO which received foreign funds was likely to be registered as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, irrespective of its activities. The Foreign Agents Act had been used to undermine and discredit effective and active NGOs. It had contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of suspicion and intolerance. Many organisations which had made a significant contribution to the promotion of human rights, civil society and well-being had been forced to close down.<\/p>\n 60. NGOs faced a difficult choice: to accept funds from abroad and be labelled \u201cforeign agents\u201d, or to refuse foreign funding and rely exclusively on Russian sources, including presidential grants or grants from local authorities. However, NGOs funded by the Government might become less independent and more prone to self-censorship.<\/p>\n 61. Amnesty International recommended suspending and then repealing the Foreign Agents Act; publicly acknowledging the importance of NGOs in civil society; and protecting NGOs and human rights defenders against harassment and attacks.<\/p>\n 2. Human Rights Resource Centre<\/em><\/p>\n 62. \u201c\u2018Foreign Agents\u2019: Mythical Enemies and Russian Society\u2019s Real Losses\u201d, a research report released in March 2015 by the Human Rights Resource Centre, an information and legal services organisation for Russian NGOs in St Petersburg, reviewed cases where organisations had involuntarily been put on the register of foreign agents. The researchers concluded that the legislation on \u201cforeign agents\u201d had made the situation of NGOs worse. The domestic courts had adopted a very wide interpretation of the Foreign Agents Act by extending the term \u201cpolitical activity\u201d to include activities useful to society, the dissemination of information and the protection of human rights. This had resulted in a prejudicial attitude towards NGOs which had an active position in society and implemented projects helping to deal with social problems. This had also resulted in pressure being put on public leaders, impeding the leaders\u2019 activities and the daily work of NGOs.<\/p>\n 63. The researchers identified seventy grounds for classifying activities as \u201cpolitical\u201d, including activities that had taken place before the Foreign Agents Act had been adopted: organising educational campaigns, events, conferences, and seminars; posting information on the Internet about a speech by a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation\u2019s director; collecting signatures; signing petitions in support of an environmental activist; expressing an intention to participate in public events; a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation\u2019s members participating in events abroad; \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations\u2019 directors being involved in public monitoring bodies in their personal capacity; publishing information and preparing reports on human rights; supporting NGOs; submitting an expert opinion to the Constitutional Court; the expert assessment of laws; publishing a report on activities on a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation\u2019s website; financing an NGO; donating books to a library; releasing films; distributing flyers; posting information online on events organised by NGOs; NGOs organising events in the office of a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation; making recommendations to State authorities; participating in the activities of NGOs; organising a teleconference between Moscow and Tbilisi; publishing an analysis of Russian law on a website and criticising Russian law and authorities; holding meetings with politicians; allowing third parties to speak at an event organised by a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation; sharing information on a personal account on social media; providing legal assistance to activists; awarding prizes; scientific research; and posting information about a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation on a third party\u2019s website. In most cases, the activities did not concern any political issues. The researchers concluded that any actions of NGOs could be identified as political activity. The indication in the Foreign Agents Act that NGOs\u2019 activities in science, the protection of flora and fauna and other fields could not be considered political activity had not changed the situation.<\/p>\n 3. Centre for Economic and Politic Reform<\/em><\/p>\n 64. In December 2015 the Centre for Economic and Political Reform, an online platform for independent experts, released the findings of research into the allocation of presidential grants to NGOs. It found that financial support for NGOs aligned with the State had increased manyfold after the enactment of the Foreign Agents Act. Between 2013 and 2015 the largest beneficiaries of presidential grants had included the Russian Orthodox Church and its affiliated organisations; proponents of \u201cEurasianism\u201d \u2013 a domestically grown \u201cthird way\u201d ideology with strong anti-Western overtones; Kremlin-aligned youth organisations, such as the Russian Youth Union (RSM); various NGOs active in the annexed region of Crimea, and \u201cpet projects\u201d of State leaders, such as Prime Minister Medvedev\u2019s Lawyers\u2019 Association of Russia, and President Putin\u2019s Night Hockey League and a bikers\u2019 club he patronised. The report concluded that the financial support system served the interests of the State rather than those of civil society. In addition, in the absence of reporting requirements, most projects, in particular online projects, had never been implemented.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. MATTERS OF PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n A. Joinder of the applications<\/strong><\/p>\n 65. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.<\/p>\n B. Procedural succession in respect of the applicant organisations which have ceased to exist<\/p>\n 66. In order to consider the issue of succession in the cases of the applicant organisations that have ceased to exist, the Court asked the applicants to indicate whether any natural or legal persons had declared their intention to continue the proceedings in those cases. The applicants provided information on the founders, former directors, members and participants in the dissolved or liquidated applicant organisations who had expressed a wish to pursue the proceedings in their stead. This information was sent to the Government for comment and included in the relevant parts of the Appendix.<\/p>\n 67. The Government submitted that the fact that some applicant organisations went into voluntary dissolution because of their \u201cunwillingness to adapt to the existing legal realities\u201d of the foreign-agent legislation could not be a valid ground for recognising a violation of their rights or for continuing the Convention proceedings after their dissolution. Other applicant organisations had been liquidated for non-compliance with the legislation on non-commercial organisations, including violations of reporting and accounting requirements. Their liquidation was not the result of any pressure from State authorities.<\/p>\n 68. When ruling on the matter of procedural succession, the Court is not called upon to decide whether there has been an interference with the applicants\u2019 Convention rights which was attributable to the State or whether it was justified. The issue is a narrow one: whether the persons who expressed a wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court in relation to the applications lodged by the applicant associations that ceased to exist have standing to continue the proceedings in their stead. The Court reiterates that in determining this matter the decisive point is not whether the rights in question are transferable to the persons wishing to pursue the procedure, but whether the proposed successors can in principle claim a legitimate interest in requesting the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant\u2019s wish to exercise the right to lodge an individual application with the Court. Also, human rights cases before the Court generally have a moral dimension which it must take into account when considering whether to continue with the examination of an application after an applicant has ceased to exist. This is all the more so when the issues raised by the case transcend the person and the interests of an individual applicant, as the Court\u2019s judgments serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the States\u2019 observance of the engagements undertaken by them (see Capital Bank AD v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a049429\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a078-79, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011XII (extracts)).<\/p>\n 69. The Court reiterates that dissolution of an association affects both the association itself and also its presidents, founders and members (see Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a0302\/02, \u00a7\u00a0101, 10\u00a0June 2010, with further references). It follows that former directors and members of a dissolved or liquidated applicant association have a legitimate personal interest in requesting the Court to consider that association\u2019s complaint stemming from the allegation that its liquidation or dissolution had been a result of pressure which the State authorities had brought to bear on it. In addition, the issues raised in the present case transcend the interests of individual applicants concerning, as they do, the fundamental ability of non\u2011governmental organisation to function without undue interference from the State authorities. One of the central complaints in the present case is that by introducing new restrictive measures and burdensome requirements the State authorities were seeking to make it difficult or impossible for the applicant associations to continue their work as \u201cpublic watchdogs\u201d. Not considering the merits of the complaints merely on the basis that the applicant associations ceased to exist through voluntary dissolution or forced liquidation would defeat the purpose of their application to the Court (compare Uniya OOO and Belcourt Trading Company v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a04437\/03 and 13290\/03, \u00a7\u00a0264, 19\u00a0June 2014).<\/p>\n 70. Accordingly, the Court decides that the former chairpersons, presidents, founders, directors and members of the applicant associations that ceased to exist \u2013 whose names and titles are given in the Appendix \u2013 have standing to pursue the applications lodged by those associations.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 71. The applicants complained that the statutory requirements introduced by the \u201cforeign-agent\u201d legislation and the practice of its application amounted to unforeseeable and excessive restrictions on their freedom of expression and association under Articles\u00a010 and 11 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:<\/p>\n Article\u00a010<\/p>\n \u201c1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority …<\/p>\n 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others …\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a011<\/p>\n \u201c1. Everyone has the right to freedom … of association with others …<\/p>\n 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others…\u201d<\/p>\n 72. Given that the implementation of the principle of pluralism is impossible without an association being able to express freely its ideas and opinions, the Court has recognised that the protection of opinions and the freedom of expression within the meaning of Article\u00a010 of the Convention is one of the objectives of the freedom of association (see Gorzelik and Others v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no.\u00a044158\/98, \u00a7\u00a091, ECHR 2004\u2011I, and Parti nationaliste basque \u2013 Organisation r\u00e9gionale d\u2019Iparralde v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a071251\/01, \u00a7\u00a033, ECHR 2007\u2011II). Such a link is particularly relevant where \u2013 as in these cases \u2013 the authorities\u2019 intervention against an association was, at least in part, in reaction to its views and statements (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v.\u00a0Bulgaria, nos.\u00a029221\/95 and 29225\/95, \u00a7\u00a085, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011IX, and The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a059491\/00, \u00a7\u00a059, 19\u00a0January 2006). The Court will therefore examine the present cases under Article\u00a011 interpreted in the light of Article\u00a010.<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Exhaustion of domestic remedies<\/em><\/p>\n 73. The Government raised a twofold non-exhaustion objection. They submitted that the Levada Centre, the Human Rights Academy, the Southern Human Rights Centre, the Chapayevsk Medical Association, Mr\u00a0Sergeyev, the Centre for Social and Labour Rights, Legal Mission, the School of the Conscript, the Sova Centre, Mr\u00a0Yukechev and Tak-Tak-Tak had not applied for further review of the decisions in the administrative-offence cases after they had become enforceable. The Government also claimed that some applicants had not applied for a judicial review of the Ministry of Justice\u2019s decision on their registration as \u201cforeign agents\u201d.<\/p>\n 74. As regards the first limb of the objection, the applicants relied on the Court\u2019s case-law, indicating that the procedure for reviewing the administrative-offence decisions under Article\u00a030.12 of the CAO was not an effective remedy. As regards the second limb, they pointed out that they had all been given fines under Article\u00a019.34 of the CAO for their alleged failure to register as \u201cforeign agents\u201d, and that their appeals against those decisions had been rejected.<\/p>\n 75. The Court agrees with the applicants. The review procedure under Article\u00a030.12 of the CAO is not an effective remedy which needs to be exhausted (see Smadikov v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no.\u00a010810\/15, \u00a7\u00a049, 31\u00a0January 2017). The applicant organisations also went through the chain of appeals in the proceedings in which they had been found liable for failing to seek registration as \u201cforeign agents\u201d. The applicant organisations\u2019 inclusion in the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d was sufficient evidence of interference, irrespective of any further action taken against them by the Ministry of Justice. The Government\u2019s objection is accordingly rejected.<\/p>\n 2. Victim status<\/em><\/p>\n 76. The Government considered that the complaints by some applicants were inadmissible ratione personae because they lacked status as \u201cvictims\u201d of the alleged violations. In their submission, the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Democratic Centre, ADC Memorial and Coming Out could not claim to be \u201cvictims\u201d because they had never been registered as \u201cforeign agents\u201d. Some other applicants had lost their status as \u201cvictims\u201d of the alleged violations on account of subsequent developments. The first group of such applicants, including the Humanist Youth Movement, Maximum Centre, Perm-36, Baikal Wave, the Committee against Torture and Golos-Povolzhye, had gone into voluntary dissolution to avoid paying fines. A second group made up of sixteen or more applicant organisations had been removed from the register of foreign agents. In the cases of the Golos Association and Ms\u00a0Shibanova, the decisions by which they had been deemed non-compliant and fined had been reversed, and the fines had been reimbursed.<\/p>\n 77. The applicants pointed out that, in accordance with the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, an individual who was confronted with the choice of either modifying his or her conduct or accepting a restriction on his or her rights might claim to be a \u201cvictim\u201d of the alleged violation, even in the absence of a specific instance of the impugned legislation being enforced. Despite the fact that some of the organisations had not been fined, and that some restrictive measures had been cancelled or not applied, they could still claim to be \u201cvictims\u201d of the alleged violations, as they remained under the threat of registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d or the imposition of sanctions under the Foreign Agents Act. In order to avert that risk, they had to refuse foreign funding and significantly reduce the scope of their activities, or take decisions on voluntary dissolution, being unable to secure alternative funding from Russian sources. The Moscow Helsinki Group emphasised that it had implemented staff cuts, cancelled annual human-rights training courses and scaled down human-rights monitoring activities in Russian regions. The Democratic Centre had been targeted by a prosecutor\u2019s warning advising it that it was potentially not complying with the Foreign Agents Act. Having refused foreign funding, it had had to stop paying office rent and salaries. Lastly, ADC Memorial and Coming Out had gone into liquidation, anticipating the Ministry of Justice\u2019s decision to put them on the register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 78. The Court will join the Government\u2019s objection as to the applicants\u2019 status as \u201cvictims\u201d of the alleged violations to the merits of the case. In the absence of any other grounds for inadmissibility, this part of the application must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Existence of interference<\/em><\/p>\n 78. The applicants submitted that by making them register as \u201cforeign agents\u201d, using the stigmatising label of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, restricting their access to foreign funding, subjecting them to numerous inspections and fines and excessive accounting requirements, and imposing on them the obligation to label their publications as originating from a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, the Russian authorities had interfered with their right to freedom of expression and association.<\/p>\n 79. The Government submitted that the obligation to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d established in the Foreign Agents Act did not prohibit or restrict the applicant organisations\u2019 ability to engage in free debate and political activities in Russia and to express their ideas. There had therefore been no interference with their right to freedom of expression and association under Articles\u00a010 and 11 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 80. The Court reiterates that persons or NGOs may claim to be victims of a violation if they are members of a group at risk of being directly affected by legislation. Even in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, an applicant may nevertheless argue that a law breaches his or her rights in the absence of a specific instance of enforcement, and thus claim to be a \u201cvictim\u201d, within the meaning of Article\u00a034, if he or she is required either to modify his or her conduct or risk being prosecuted for failure to comply with the law (see Burden v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a013378\/05, \u00a7\u00a034, ECHR 2008, and S.A.S. v.\u00a0France [GC], no.\u00a043835\/11, \u00a7\u00a057, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 81. Interference with the right to freedom of association can take a variety of forms, such as: requiring an existing association to submit to new registration procedures (see Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a072881\/01, \u00a7\u00a073, ECHR 2006\u2011XI); conducting inspections which have the effect of inhibiting an organisation\u2019s activities and imposing sanctions (see Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a019920\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a071-72, 26\u00a0April 2016 (extracts)); using objectionable terms to describe an association (see Leela F\u00f6rderkreis e.V. and Others v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a058911\/00, \u00a7\u00a084, 6\u00a0November 2008); imposing a prohibition on the foreign financing of a political party (see Parti nationaliste basque \u2013 Organisation r\u00e9gionale d\u2019Iparralde, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a037-38); or causing an association to go into dissolution (see Freedom and Democracy Party (\u00d6ZDEP) v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no.\u00a023885\/94, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a026-27, ECHR 1999\u2011VIII, and Tebieti M\u00fchafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no.\u00a037083\/03, \u00a7\u00a054, ECHR 2009).<\/p>\n 82. The Court observes that, prior to the enactment of the \u201cforeign-agent\u201d legislation, many applicant organisations had existed for a considerable period of time, and some of them \u2013 the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Memorial Human Rights Centre, the Movement For Human Rights, and Citizens\u2019 Watch \u2013 had been legally established as early as the 1990s, in the wake of a democratic transition in Russia. They had received funding from a variety of sources, including individual and institutional donors, both domestic and international.<\/p>\n 83. Following the enactment of the Foreign Agents Act, all the applicant organisations were subjected to unscheduled inspections on the part of the regulatory and law-enforcement authorities which sought to determine the sources of their financing and the scope of their activities (see paragraph 18 above). The inspections interfered with the operation of the applicant organisations, in so far as they took a long time and involved: repeated visits from prosecutors and officials from justice departments; the questioning of the applicant organisations\u2019 staff; and requests that the organisations produce large numbers of documents covering several years of activities, including charter and financial documentation, information about events organised by the applicant organisations, and other documents relating to their mission. Failure to comply with the requests for documentation was punishable by substantial fines (see paragraph 24 above). The Court has already found that such burdensome requirements which have the effect of inhibiting an organisation\u2019s activities may, in themselves, amount to an interference with the right to freedom of association (see Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a071, and Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses of Moscow and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0176).<\/p>\n 84. Once the domestic authorities determined that the applicant organisations had engaged in \u201cpolitical activities\u201d and received \u201cforeign financing\u201d within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Act, the organisations were given fines for failing to seek registration as \u201cforeign agents\u201d (see paragraphs 24 above and 355 and 514 below). They were also confronted with a choice between accepting the label of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, or continuing their work outside the confines of the Foreign Agents Act by rejecting any donations considered to be \u201cforeign financing\u201d (see paragraph 500 below). If they chose the former option, registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d entailed additional accounting, auditing, reporting and labelling requirements (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 above). The latter scenario involved a reduction in their budget. The financial difficulties following such a decision resulted in staff cuts and the freezing of projects. Both options required a significant adjustment on the part of an organisation as regards conduct, which amounted to interference with its right to freedom of association. Moreover, the case of the Movement For Human Rights \u2013 an organisation which was initially deleted from the register of foreign agents in 2015 before being reinstated in 2019 (see paragraph 513 below) \u2013 demonstrated that even organisations which sought to modify their conduct in compliance with the Foreign Agents Act continually faced the risk of being deemed non\u2011compliant and incurring sanctions.<\/p>\n 85. Some applicant organisations, including ADC Memorial and the LGBT organisation Coming Out, went into dissolution, fearing that they would be unable to pay fines and secure alternative funding for their core activities. The inspections, sanctions and other restrictions in respect of those organisations eventually resulted in their ceasing to exist as legal persons. The Court reiterates that, to the extent that leaders and members of an association resolve to dissolve their organisation in the hope of avoiding adverse effects of domestic legislation or actions by the domestic authorities, such decisions cannot be said to have been made freely, as they should be if they are to be recognised under Article\u00a011 (see Freedom and Democracy Party (\u00d6ZDEP), cited above, \u00a7\u00a026; see also, on continuing proceedings in the cases of organisations which have been dissolved, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no.\u00a014902\/04, \u00a7\u00a0443, 29\u00a0January 2009, and Zhdanov and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a012200\/08 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a0115, 16\u00a0July 2019). Dissolution of an association, whether effected by its members under duress or ordered by the domestic authorities \u2013 as it was, for instance, in the case of the Golos Association (see paragraph 354 below) \u2013 amounts to interference with the right to freedom of association.<\/p>\n 86. Lastly, in so far as the individual applicants \u2013 the directors of applicant organisations \u2013 are concerned, the interference with their rights resulted from the decisions by which they were fined for failing to file applications to register their organisations as \u201cforeign agents\u201d. Moreover, where an applicant organisation was dissolved out of necessity or on the orders of the authorities, the act of dissolution also interfered with the exercise of the right to freedom of association by its directors and members (see the cases of the Golos Association, Fund 19\/29, and the Democratic Centre).<\/p>\n 87. In sum, the Court finds that the applicant organisations and their directors have been directly affected by a combination of inspections, new registration requirements, sanctions and restrictions on sources of funding and the nature of the activities which were imposed by the Foreign Agents Act. They had to alter their conduct significantly to reduce the risk of facing further penalties under the Act, which, however, did not stop the authorities from issuing further fines while they were on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d. Those measures resulted in the dissolution of some applicant organisations. There has therefore been interference with the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of association under Article\u00a011 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article\u00a010. The Court also rejects the Government\u2019s objection as to the applicants\u2019 status as \u201cvictims\u201d of the alleged violations.<\/p>\n 2. Justification for the interference<\/em><\/p>\n (a) General principles<\/p>\n 88. While in the context of Article\u00a011 the Court has often referred to the essential role played by political parties in ensuring pluralism and democracy, associations formed for other purposes are also important to the proper functioning of democracy. For pluralism is also built on the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts. The harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social cohesion. It is only natural that, where a civil society functions in a healthy manner, the participation of citizens in the democratic process is to a large extent achieved through belonging to associations in which they may integrate with each other and pursue common objectives collectively (see Gorzelik and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a092, and Zhdanov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0139).<\/p>\n (b) \u201cPrescribed by law\u201d<\/p>\n 89. The Court will firstly examine whether the measures taken against the applicants can be said to have been \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d. The interference had its statutory basis in the provisions of the Foreign Agents Act, which established a framework regulation applicable to Russian non\u2011commercial organisations that were deemed to receive \u201cforeign financing\u201d and engage in \u201cpolitical activities\u201d.<\/p>\n 90. The Court reiterates, however, that the expression \u201cprescribed by law\u201d does not merely require that the measure should have a basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question. The law must be sufficiently clear and foreseeable in its terms to give individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are entitled to resort to the impugned measures. Domestic law must also afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights guaranteed by the Convention.<\/p>\n (i) Whether the interpretation of the term \u201cpolitical activity\u201d was sufficiently clear and foreseeable<\/p>\n (1) Submissions by the parties<\/p>\n 91. The applicants submitted that the Foreign Agents Act defined \u201cpolitical activity\u201d as activity including any joint effort to solve social problems which was made by citizens who were united in an organisation. Although the generally accepted meaning of political activity primarily concerned the struggle for power, Russian legislation had redefined this term to include most of the activities that constituted the core of the work of any non-commercial organisation, particularly socially active organisations. Within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Act, any activity that had public resonance and was capable of influencing public opinion was considered \u201cpolitical\u201d. Such a wide definition of political activity had been intentionally used by the authorities to restrict the activities of the applicant organisations and suppress the dissemination of ideas which deviated from or were critical of the official position.<\/p>\n 92. According to the Government, the concept of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d in the Foreign Agents Act had been clearly formulated from the outset, and activities in the fields of science, culture, the arts, healthcare, charity work and so on were excluded from its scope (see paragraph 15 above). The 2014 judgment of the Constitutional Court had provided clarification about the forms that political activities could take (see paragraph 38 above). In 2016 the definition had been updated to specify the forms and fields in which \u201cpolitical activity\u201d might take place and the aims of such activity (see paragraph 28 above). There was no uncertainty as to the scope of the term, because generally accepted definitions of political activity could also be found in Russian dictionaries, including a 1996 dictionary for the State, politics and the State service, a 2001 dictionary of politics, and a 2006 large encyclopaedic dictionary of law. Lastly, the Government submitted, by reference to the judgment in the case of Animal Defenders International v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom ([GC], no.\u00a048876\/08, \u00a7\u00a059, ECHR 2013 (extracts)), that the definition of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d in UK law was no more detailed, clear and precise than the equivalent concept in Russian law.<\/p>\n 93. The Commissioner submitted that the application of the Foreign Agents Act revealed a fundamental uncertainty surrounding the term \u201cpolitical activity\u201d as interpreted by executive, prosecutorial and judicial branches. For example, the authorities had determined that translating and analysing judgments of the Court (in the case of the Mass Media Defence Centre in Voronezh) or disseminating the Commissioner\u2019s opinions on the Foreign Agents Act via an association\u2019s website (the Soldiers\u2019 Mothers of St Petersburg) constituted \u201cpolitical activity\u201d, whereas all such activities fell within the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. The activities qualified as \u201cpolitical\u201d under the Foreign Agents Act were some of the most commonly practised, basic and natural methods which civil society institutions employed to perform their work. Moreover, they constituted important elements of the democratic process.<\/p>\n 94. The ISHR, the ICJ, Amnesty International, and the Media Legal Defence Initiative characterised the term \u201cpolitical activity\u201d as being too vague, and one which violated NGOs\u2019 right to communicate with international organisations and afforded authorities an overly broad discretion.<\/p>\n (2) The applicable principles<\/p>\n 95. The Court has accepted that conduct which may entail involvement in political activities cannot be defined with absolute precision, and may include participation in peaceful assemblies, making statements to the press, participating in radio or television programmes, publications, or joining trade unions, associations or other organisations representing and protecting various group interests (see Rekv\u00e9nyi v.\u00a0Hungary [GC], no.\u00a025390\/94, \u00a7\u00a036, ECHR 1999\u2011III). Admittedly, legal opinions on what aims should be considered \u201cpolitical\u201d may differ, on account of this being a wide notion open to very diverse interpretations (see Zhechev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a057045\/00, \u00a7\u00a039, 21\u00a0June 2007). Nevertheless, a norm cannot be regarded as a \u201claw\u201d unless it is formulated in such a manner as to enable the citizen to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, that certain conduct would lead to specific legal consequences or sanctions (see \u00d6zt\u00fcrk v.\u00a0Turkey\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a022479\/93, \u00a7\u00a054, ECHR 1999\u2011VI).<\/p>\n (3) Interpretation and application of the exceptions to the \u201cpolitical activities\u201d<\/p>\n 96. Even though certain fields of activity were explicitly excluded from the scope of \u201cpolitical activities\u201d in the Foreign Agents Act, Russian authorities and courts interpreted the term \u201cpolitical activities\u201d so widely that the usual activities of civil society organisations were included, in particular those in environmental, cultural or social fields. The authorities could label any activities which were in some way related to the normal functioning of a democratic society as \u201cpolitical\u201d, and accordingly order the relevant organisations to register as \u201cforeign agents\u201d or pay fines.<\/p>\n 97. In particular, the authorities put NGOs on the register of foreign agents for engaging in the following activities in the environmental field: organising a conference on the negative impact of hydraulic structures on rivers, protecting rivers, developing ecotourism, environmental education, and participating in public consultations on an environmental impact assessment (Baikal Wave); supporting an environmental activist (the Dront Centre); contributing to the development of environmental education and initiatives (Ecodefence); promoting the sustainable management of water resources, incentive measures for water consumers and environmental actions, and presenting the results of a sociological survey at a round-table discussion (the Ecology and Security Centre); cleaning the banks of local rivers and restoring forests (the Foundation For Nature); posting drawings on the subject of a nuclear waste dump on the Internet, and organising cycling events to promote environmental values (Green World Local); organising discussions on climate change, its impact on indigenous peoples, and the impact of mining operations on indigenous peoples\u2019 land (the Indigenous Peoples\u2019 Centre); being involved in a forest conservation campaign and informing the public about the state of the environment (the Movement For Nature); posting publications on environmental problems on the Internet (the Partnership for Development); promoting the use of clean energy (Planet of Hope); and implementing an initiative to support Greenpeace\u2019s members (the Siberian Environmental Centre) (see paragraphs 210, 283, 290, 297, 311, 381, 416, 519, 533, 554, and 631 below).<\/p>\n 98. Cultural and social activities were likewise deemed to constitute \u201cpolitical activity\u201d: a round-table discussion on stopping full-day groups in nursery schools (the Centre for Social and Labour Rights); recommendations concerning a centre for sports medicine, funeral services and assistance for homeless people; the distribution of free condoms and syringes (the Chapayevsk Medical Association); supporting a petition to a governor regarding a regional disability programme, and participating in a conference on social entrepreneurship (the Far East Centre); criticising a proposal to abolish a benefit paid to people with multiple children, and a prohibition on using drinking water to water gardens (Gagarin Park); the protection of cultural items and areas, preparing expert opinions on this subject, and collecting information on threats to items of cultural heritage (Green World and the Perm Human Rights Centre); monitoring social and economic developments and organising discussions on housing and social issues (the Levada Centre); issuing a publication on the right to spa-based therapy in Perm (the Perm Human Rights Centre); organising forums on pressing social issues (Perm-36); and training medical doctors on the prevention of HIV and sexually transmitted diseases in the homosexual community (Rakurs) (see paragraphs 222, 236, 304, 339, 374 451, 540, 547 and 575 below).<\/p>\n 99. Other applicant organisations, including the Centre for Social and Labour Rights, the Centre for Social Studies, Coming Out, the Human Rights Academy, Migration XXI Century, and the Women of the Don, were deemed not to have complied with the Foreign Agents Act in relation to activities in the field of the protection of human rights, because they had stood up for labour rights, LGBT and women\u2019s rights, and the rights of migrants. In other cases, commemorative events were considered to be \u201cpolitical activities\u201d, as in the cases of the Mass Media Defence Centre and the Southern Human Rights Centre (see paragraphs\u00a0473 and 653 below).<\/p>\n 100. The above examples demonstrate that the exclusions from the scope of the concept of \u201cpolitical activities\u201d \u2013 such as culture, social security, the protection of flora and fauna, and charity work \u2013 established in the Foreign Agents Act (see paragraph 28 above) have been rendered meaningless by the unforeseeable practice of the Act which has been endorsed by the Russian courts. For example, Baikal Wave, an environmental organisation active in the protection of flora and fauna, which is not considered to be political activity, was deemed to have engaged in \u201cpolitical activities\u201d once it had expressed an opinion on the decisions of State authorities on the protection of plants or another environmental matter, because \u201cexpressing opinions on decisions of State authorities\u201d does constitute \u201cpolitical\u201d activity (see paragraph 215 below).<\/p>\n (4) Distinguishing between the activities of an organisation and its staff<\/p>\n 101. The Constitutional Court required authorities to draw a distinction between the activities of members and directors of organisations which were undertaken in a personal capacity, and those which were carried out on behalf of an organisation. Only the latter activities, but not the former, could fall within the scope of \u201cpolitical activities\u201d under the Foreign Agents Act (see paragraph 39 above). In practice, however, any statements or positions by the directors of the applicant organisations were routinely attributed to the organisations themselves, without establishing whether they had been made in a personal capacity or on behalf of the organisation. In the cases of the Civil Education Centre, the Dront Centre, Legal Mission, the Mass Media Defence Centre, the Movement For Human Rights, Planet of Hope, the Renaissance Centre, the School of the Conscript, the Sova Centre and the Women of the Don, the authorities considered the statements which the organisations\u2019 directors had made in discussions, interviews or on websites, and their participation in projects, one of the aspects of the applicant organisations\u2019 \u201cpolitical activity\u201d (see paragraphs 257, 283, 444, 472, 512, 554, 596, 624, 659 and 689 below). In the cases of Baikal Wave and the Perm Human Rights Centre, the director\u2019s comments on a journalist\u2019s personal blog, a request to ban agricultural burning which had been submitted to the State authorities, and the founder\u2019s personal blog were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activity\u201d on the part of the organisations themselves (see paragraphs\u00a0210 and 540 below). In the case of Ryazan Memorial, the authorities considered photos posted by the applicant organisation\u2019s director on his personal page on a social network \u201cpolitical activity\u201d (see paragraph 603 below). It follows that, in the absence of any clear and foreseeable legal regulation, the applicant organisations had to countenance a risk that any statements by their directors, members or founders, even comments on their private accounts on social media, could be qualified as \u201cpolitical activity\u201d on the part of the organisations themselves.<\/p>\n 102. In other cases, the authorities linked the work of the applicant organisations\u2019 directors in State bodies \u2013 bodies to which they had been appointed in a personal or professional capacity, rather than as representatives of their respective organisations \u2013 to the activities of the organisations themselves. In the cases of the Agora Association, the Chapayevsk Medical Association, the Civil Education Centre, the Committee against Torture and the Mass Media Defence Centre, their directors\u2019 or founders\u2019 work in the President\u2019s Human Rights Council and regional bodies of government was considered by the authorities to be \u201cpolitical activity\u201d on the part of the applicant organisations themselves (see paragraphs 208, 236, 257, 270 and 472 below).<\/p>\n (5) Interpretations of the forms of \u201cpolitical activities\u201d<\/p>\n 103. The Constitutional Court also outlined the forms in which the intention to engage in political activities could manifest itself, and the evidence which made such an intention apparent. It also emphasised that the ultimate purpose of political activities was to influence the decision-making process of State organs and State policy (see paragraph 39 above). In practice, however, the authorities dispensed with the requirement to show that the opinions expressed had potentially had an impact on their decisions. In the case of Sakhalin Environment Watch, the authorities considered the signing of a letter addressed to the Ukrainian environmental organisations and activists and published on the website of the Wildlife Conservation Centre during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014 \u201cpolitical activity\u201d. The letter was not addressed to the authorities of any State, its addressees were exclusively environmental organisations and activists of Ukraine, and it did not contain any requests or demands addressed to the authorities (see paragraph 610 and 612 below). Nevertheless, the Russian courts considered the letter of solidarity to be \u201cpolitical activity\u201d on the part of the applicant organisation. In the case of the Levada Centre, the domestic courts held that the opinions on the political regime in Russia expressed by the applicant organisation\u2019s director and the head of a department in a lecture, in interviews and in articles published on a website, evidenced that the Levada Centre had exercised \u201cpolitical activity\u201d; the courts made that finding without analysing whether those opinions had encouraged a change in the authorities\u2019 policy (see paragraph 453 below).<\/p>\n (6) Conclusion<\/p>\n 104. Bearing in mind that the term \u201cpolitical\u201d is inherently vague and could be subject to diverse interpretations, the need for its stable, consistent and foreseeable interpretation was all the greater in these cases. Dictionaries, to which the Government referred, may be used to establish the ordinary meaning of words but they are not a substitute for legislative precision and well-established case-law. The Russian authorities applied an extensive and unforeseeable interpretation to the term \u201cpolitical activities\u201d which was used in the Foreign Agents Act, to include even activities which were specifically listed as being excluded from its scope, and they treated indiscriminately the activities of organisations themselves, those of their directors or members who were acting in a personal capacity, and those that lacked the requisite finality to influence State decisions and policy. Whereas the Foreign Agents Act required the purpose of influencing State policy in order to qualify as political activity (see paragraph 28 above), the practice of executive and other authorities extended the concept of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d to any form of public advocacy on an extremely wide set of issues, without establishing whether the organisation had pursued its activities with the aim of influencing State policy. The classification of NGOs\u2019 activities based on this criterion \u2013 whether they constituted \u201cpolitical activities\u201d \u2013 produced incoherent results and engendered uncertainty among NGOs wishing to engage in civil society activities relating to, in particular, human rights or the protection of the environment or charity work, especially since the domestic courts failed to provide consistent guidance as to what actions did or did not constitute \u201cpolitical activity\u201d (see Zhechev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055, and The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria (no.\u00a02), no.\u00a034960\/04, \u00a7\u00a039, 18\u00a0October 2011).<\/p>\n (ii) Whether the provisions on \u201cforeign funding\u201d are sufficiently foreseeable<\/p>\n (1) Submissions by the parties<\/p>\n 105. The applicants pointed out that the provisions on foreign financing contained in the Foreign Agents Act were not foreseeable and did not establish any particular amount, period or form of foreign funding required for an organisation to be declared a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. The Russian authorities had adopted an excessively broad and unpredictable interpretation of the term \u201cforeign funding\u201d. As the practical application of the Foreign Agents Act demonstrated, not only was the receipt of funds or other property by NGOs considered foreign financing, but also cash payments to their employees or members, and joint activities with other \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations. Even a refusal to accept foreign funding did not guarantee that an organisation that had refused such funding would not be branded a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. In addition, the recipients of funds did not have the opportunity to check the exact source of funding, since information about a donor\u2019s citizenship or a donor organisation\u2019s source of funds was not publicly available, and Russian legislation did not impose an obligation on organisations to verify the origin of funds transferred from another Russian organisation.<\/p>\n 106. The Government submitted that the term \u201cforeign funding\u201d was clearly defined in the Act and had additionally been clarified by the Constitutional Court. The specific parameters of such funding \u2013 whether temporal (relating to the duration or frequency of the funding), quantitative (relating to the amount or extent of the funding) or material (relating to whether the funding constituted a donation, grant or award) \u2013 did not matter, so long as the funds came from a foreign source. The law applied to funds and to any other property; the form in which funding was received \u2013 for example, a credit to a bank account or payment for events, services or other expenses \u2013 had no legal significance. Such funds and property must have been received after the date of enactment of the Foreign Agents Act. The law did not require the authorities to show that an organisation was aware of the foreign origin of funds it had accepted. Organisations engaging in \u201cpolitical activities\u201d were to bear the risk of their ignorance as to the origin of their financing. If the authorities were required to prove that a recipient was aware of the foreign origin of funds, this would render the enforcement of the provisions on indirect foreign financing difficult.<\/p>\n (2) Purpose of disbursements<\/p>\n 107. The Court notes that the Foreign Agents Act does not contain any rules as to the purpose of \u201cforeign funding\u201d and does not require the authorities to establish any link between such funding and the alleged \u201cpolitical activities\u201d of the organisation. The absence of any rules relating to the purpose of disbursements has led to absurd situations, such as the case of the Civil Education Centre, in which the Russian authorities and courts concluded that the organisation was \u201cfinanced\u201d by a \u201cforeign source\u201d because a hotel in Oslo had refunded it for paying too much to hire conference facilities and rooms (see paragraph 259 below).<\/p>\n (3) Distinguishing between the funds received by the organisation and those received by its staff<\/p>\n 108. The term \u201cforeign funding\u201d has also been used indiscriminately by the authorities to include any disbursements \u2013 not just those paid to the applicant organisations, but also those paid to its members or directors, even where they acted in a personal capacity without involving an organisation. For example, the Southern Human Rights Centre was recognised as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, in particular on the grounds that the head of the applicant organisation had received funds to purchase return airline tickets from Sochi to Moscow to visit the Goethe-Institut German cultural centre, where he had taken part in an event in his personal capacity rather than as the head of the applicant organisation (see paragraphs 652 and 654 below).<\/p>\n (4) Interpretation of \u201cforeign sources\u201d<\/p>\n 109. The Foreign Agents Act defines the term \u201cforeign source\u201d as one including both proper foreign sources, such as foreign States, institutions, associations and individuals, and any Russian entities \u201creceiving funds and other property from those sources\u201d (see paragraph 15 above). Such a Russian entity need not be designated as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d or otherwise identified as a \u201cforeign source\u201d at the moment when funds are made available. The law does not specify any criteria in accordance with which a Russian entity may be deemed to fall into this category, such as a threshold amount or a percentage of an annual budget or the use of designated foreign funds for sub\u2011granting to national organisations. This creates a situation of uncertainty, where a token donation from abroad may lead the authorities to classify a Russian entity as a foreign source of funds, and any organisations which have received funds from that entity as \u201cforeign agents\u201d. For example, Yekaterinburg Memorial had not received any financing from proper foreign sources. However, as another applicant organisation, International Memorial, had paid its insurance, utilities, electricity and telephone bills over a two-year period, the authorities considered that to be sufficient evidence of \u201cforeign financing\u201d, because International Memorial had been designated as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d (see paragraph 696 below). Gagarin Park was put on the register of foreign agents because it had received funds from a Russian charity foundation which, it subsequently transpired, had been financed from abroad (see paragraph 339 below). In the case of the School of the Conscript, the fact that another \u201cforeign-agent\u201d applicant organisation, Legal Mission, had paid for its website and office was considered evidence of \u201cforeign funding\u201d (see paragraph 624 below).<\/p>\n 110. The absence of clear and foreseeable criteria has given the authorities unfettered discretion to assert that the applicant organisations were in receipt of \u201cforeign funding\u201d, no matter how remote or tenuous their association with a purported \u201cforeign source\u201d was. The cases of the Golos Association and Tak-Tak-Tak provide an illustration of this. In both cases, the directors of the applicant organisations had also sat on the boards of some other organisations which had been branded \u201cforeign agents\u201d. The fact that those other organisations had received foreign financing was, for the Russian authorities, sufficient to link \u201cforeign sources\u201d to the applicant organisations via their directors (see paragraphs 355 and 666 below). The Court considers that the applicant organisations could not reasonably foresee that such implausible and arbitrary connections would be established and that the money they received would be considered tainted by its foreign origin no matter how many degrees of separation there were between the recipient organisation and the purported \u201cforeign source\u201d.<\/p>\n (5) Existence of a legal possibility to decline foreign funding<\/p>\n 111. Lastly, the Court finds that the circumstances in which a refusal of foreign funding could be considered valid were neither clear nor foreseeable. In the case of the Golos Association, the first-instance court found that, by refusing prize money from Norway, the Golos Association had validly refused foreign funding, which made the Foreign Agents Act inapplicable. However, shortly thereafter, during appeal proceedings, the same court found that the refusal of the same prize money had constituted the receipt of foreign funding, since by refusing to receive those funds, the Golos Association had taken a decision on its fate and demonstrated \u201cthe authority of an owner\u201d in respect of that amount (see paragraph 355 below). It was not until an extraordinary procedure was set in motion upon an application by the Ombudsman that that judgment was reviewed. Another example is that of Sakhalin Environment Watch, which refused foreign funding immediately after its inclusion on the register of foreign agents and asked to be removed from the register. However, the authorities refused to remove it from the register of foreign agents on the grounds that it was required to return all the funding it had received from foreign donors during the entire period of its activity, and not just from the date of its inclusion on the register of foreign agents (see paragraph 612 below).<\/p>\n (6) Conclusion<\/p>\n 112. As demonstrated by the above examples, the applicants were unable to envisage with a sufficient degree of foreseeability what funding and what sources of funding would qualify as \u201cforeign funding\u201d for the purposes of registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. The legal norm on foreign funding which allows for its overbroad and unpredictable interpretation in practice, as evident from the circumstances of the present cases, does not meet the \u201cquality of law\u201d requirement and deprives the applicants of the possibility to regulate their financial situation.<\/p>\n (iii) Whether the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d is sufficiently clear and foreseeable<\/p>\n (1) Submissions by the parties<\/p>\n 113. The applicants submitted that the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d was intentionally used in the Foreign Agents Act with the aim of creating the impression among the public that Russian NGOs were acting in Russia on the orders of and in the interests of \u201cforeign\u201d States or organisations. According to its generally accepted meaning, the term \u201cagent\u201d referred to a person performing assignments on behalf of another. According to the definition in the Russian Civil Code, one party to the agency agreement (the\u00a0agent) undertook to perform legal and other actions on the instructions of the other party (the principal) for remuneration. However, the term was given a wide and novel interpretation in the Foreign Agents Act and in the practical application of that Act, by the scope of the term being extended to include any Russian organisation engaging in political activity, not necessarily in the interests of a foreign provider of funds. The concept of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d used in the US FARA Act (the United States being the only other jurisdiction in which such a term existed), which the Government asserted was a relevant comparator for Russia\u2019s Foreign Agents Act, was fundamentally different. The FARA Act associated the status of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d with the exercise of activities \u201con the order, request or instructions or under the supervision\u201d of a foreign principal, and \u201cin the interests\u201d of such a principal. Both of those conditions were necessary for an entity to be registered as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 114. The Government submitted that the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d was sufficiently clear and its application in practice foreseeable, firstly because it was defined in the Foreign Agents Act, and secondly because it was in itself a well-established legal category. In the realm of civil law, an \u201cagent\u201d was an entity authorised to act on behalf of another or execute official and business orders of another. It was logical to apply that term to Russian NGOs receiving funding from foreign sources to implement certain activities. The Government considered that the definition of an \u201cagent of a foreign principal\u201d in the US FARA Act, which encompassed any person engaging in political activities and public relations or collecting and dispensing contributions, was essentially similar to that of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d in Russian law.<\/p>\n 115. The ILPP pointed out that the US FARA Act required evidence of a principal-agent relationship between the \u201cforeign agent\u201d and its \u201cforeign principal\u201d implying a high level of dependence and control between the domestic association and its foreign donor. By contrast, for a Russian NGO participating in \u201cpolitical activity\u201d, receiving funding from abroad was sufficient for the NGO to be considered a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. It was not necessary to prove that it was acting \u201cin the interests\u201d of any foreign entity.<\/p>\n 116. The Hungarian NGOs and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights submitted that the Russian Government\u2019s analogy with the US\u00a0FARA Act was deeply flawed, as the FARA Act was targeted not at civil society, but at professional lobbyists, that is, political players acting on behalf of governments, which was the opposite of what NGOs did.<\/p>\n (2) The Court\u2019s approach<\/p>\n 117. The Court considers that, whatever a generally accepted meaning or a legal definition of a particular term, the legislator is entitled to adopt a different meaning for the purposes of a particular legal act as long as it is formulated with sufficient precision and remains sufficiently clear and foreseeable in its application. The definition of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d used in the Foreign Agents Act has introduced a different concept of agency in which an agent might or might not be acting in the interests of the principal, as it apparent from the text of the document (see paragraph 15 above: \u201cincluding … activity carried out in the interests of foreign providers of funds\u201d). This definition encompasses all situations in which a Russian NGO received \u201cforeign funding\u201d and engaged in \u201cpolitical activities\u201d, including where the funding does not translate into donor\u2019s control and direction, and is apparently based on an assumption that \u201cforeign funding\u201d \u2013 irrespective of the amount or the modalities and conditions of its granting \u2013 equals foreign control. Such definition of an agency relationship may indeed be a wide and novel one, however, there is no uncertainty in the fact that any Russian NGOs receiving any amount of \u201cforeign\u201d funding may come within the scope of this legislation. Consequently, the Court finds that no issue of clarity or foreseeability of that definition arises and that this matter must be examined below from the standpoint of the necessity requirement.<\/p>\n (iv) Conclusion on the lawfulness requirement<\/p>\n 118. The Court has found above that two key concepts of the Foreign Agents Act, as formulated and interpreted in practice by the Russian authorities, fell short of the foreseeability requirement. The facts of the present cases demonstrate that judicial review failed to provide adequate and effective safeguards against the arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the wide discretion left to the executive (compare Lashmankin and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a057818\/09 and 14 others, \u00a7\u00a0430, 7\u00a0February 2017). This would be sufficient for a finding of a violation of Article\u00a011, interpreted in the light of Article\u00a010, on the basis that the interference was not prescribed by law. The Court notes, nevertheless, that the questions in this case are closely related to the broader issue of whether the interference was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d. In particular, the Court must verify whether the restrictions on the applicants\u2019 activities corresponded in principle to a \u201cpressing social need\u201d, and whether they were proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (see Koretskyy and Others v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a040269\/02, \u00a7\u00a049, 3\u00a0April 2008, and Tebieti M\u00fchafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a065).<\/p>\n (c) Legitimate aim<\/p>\n 119. The applicants conceded that the interference had pursued the valid objective of exercising control by society and the authorities over the spending of funds received from foreign sources.<\/p>\n 120. The Government submitted that the interference had aimed to ensure public control, security and greater transparency in respect of the political activities of foreign-funded NGOs.<\/p>\n 121. The third-party interveners, including the ILPP, the Special Rapporteur, the Hungarian NGOs, the ICJ and Amnesty International, submitted that the protection of sovereignty and security could not be relied upon as a lawful ground for imposing restrictions on civil society organisations.<\/p>\n 122. The Court accepts in principle that the objective of increasing the transparency with regard to the funding of civil society organisations may correspond to the legitimate aim of the protection of public order in paragraph\u00a02 of Article\u00a011.<\/p>\n (d) \u201cNecessary in a democratic society\u201d<\/p>\n (i) General principles<\/p>\n 123. The Court reiterates that citizens\u2019 ability to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning. The way in which national legislation enshrines this freedom and its practical application by the authorities reveal the state of democracy in the country concerned. Certainly States have a right to satisfy themselves that an association\u2019s aim and activities are in conformity with the rules laid down in legislation, but the State\u2019s power to protect its institutions and citizens from associations that might jeopardise them must be used sparingly, as exceptions to the rule of freedom of association are to be construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom. Any interference must correspond to a \u201cpressing social need\u201d; thus, the notion \u201cnecessary\u201d does not have the flexibility of such expressions as \u201cuseful\u201d or \u201cdesirable\u201d (see Sidiropoulos and Others v.\u00a0Greece, 10\u00a0July 1998, \u00a7\u00a040, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011IV, and Gorzelik and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a088 and 94-95).<\/p>\n 124. The Court has acknowledged that the function of creating various platforms for public debate is not limited to the press, but may also be exercised by, among others, NGOs, whose activities are an essential element of informed public debate. The Court has accepted that when an NGO draws attention to matters of public interest, it is exercising a public watchdog role of similar importance to that of the press and may be characterised as a social \u201cwatchdog\u201d warranting similar protection under the Convention as that afforded to the press. It has recognised that civil society makes an important contribution to the discussion of public affairs. The manner in which \u201cpublic watchdogs\u201d carry out their activities may have a significant impact on the proper functioning of a democratic society. It is in the interest of democratic society to enable the press to exercise its vital role of \u201cpublic watchdog\u201d in imparting information on matters of public concern, just as it is to enable NGOs scrutinising the State to do the same thing (see Magyar Helsinki Bizotts\u00e1g v.\u00a0Hungary [GC], no.\u00a018030\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0166-67, 8\u00a0November 2016, with further references).<\/p>\n 125. It is further relevant to recall that there is a wealth of historical, cultural and political differences within Europe so that it is for each State to mould its own democratic vision. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, their societies and their needs, the legislative and judicial authorities are best placed to assess the particular difficulties in safeguarding the democratic order in their State. The State must therefore be accorded some discretion as regards this country-specific and complex assessment which is of central relevance to the legislative choices such as are at issue in the present case (see Animal Defenders International, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0111).<\/p>\n (ii) Whether creating a special status of \u201cforeign agents\u201d was necessary in a democratic society<\/p>\n (1) Submissions by the parties<\/p>\n 126. The applicants submitted that the term \u201cagent\u201d itself, even without the adjective \u201cforeign\u201d, had an unambiguously negative connotation in the Russian context. Since the time of Stalin\u2019s regime, the word \u201cagent\u201d, used idiomatically, had been endowed with a markedly negative meaning placing it in the same semantic category as the words \u201csaboteur\u201d, \u201cspy\u201d and \u201ctraitor\u201d. The fact that the Russian authorities were fully aware of such negative connotations was apparent from their strong objection to having their representative at the Court referred to as the \u201cAgent of the Russian Government\u201d. The Court had accepted that, by contrast with representatives of other member States who were referred to as Agents, that term would not be used to describe the representative of the Russian Government. A large\u2011scale survey of the Russian population carried out in December 2016 found that 60% of the respondents had negative associations with the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d, 30% of the population reported having neutral associations, and only 3% reported positive associations. The State authorities themselves directly linked \u201cpolitical activity\u201d within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Act with anti-State actions and the undermining of the constitutional system. The label \u201cforeign agent\u201d was so shameful and offensive that some of the applicant organisations, in order to avoid public humiliation, had refused foreign funding and had consequently been forced to terminate their programmes and cease all or some of their activities, which was a typical manifestation of the \u201cchilling effect\u201d.<\/p>\n 127. The Government insisted that the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d did not have any negative undertones. They referred to the 2014 judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, according to which the designation of Russian NGOs as exercising the functions of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d was conditional on the receipt of funds and other property from foreign sources, and intended to identify them as \u201cspecific subjects of political activities carried out in the Russian territory\u201d. It did not suggest that those organisations posed a threat to the State or public institutions \u201ceven if they acted on the orders of or on behalf of foreign funders\u201d. \u201cAttempts to establish the negative context\u201d of the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d were a Soviet-era stereotype which was no longer meaningful in today\u2019s realities. The designation did not imply any negative assessment of any such organisation by the State and could not be interpreted as a manifestation of a lack of trust or a desire to discredit those organisations, or their aims or activities. The Government emphasised that the registration of the applicant organisations as \u201cnon\u2011commercial organisations exercising the functions of a foreign agent\u201d had in no way affected their ability to freely express their ideas and engage in political activities, including their ability to take part in debates. The Government attached decisive importance to the fact that the Foreign Agents Act did not provide for the liquidation of organisations for failure to apply for registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 128. The Commissioner observed that the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d carried with it strong negative connotations, since it had usually been associated in the Russian historical context with the notion of a \u201cforeign spy\u201d or a \u201ctraitor\u201d. Legislative amendments had restricted \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations\u2019 opportunity to interact with State officials and perform certain types of public activities. The use of the label \u201cforeign agent\u201d had not only affected the ability of non-commercial organisations to cooperate with State institutions, but also their relations with other partners and the general public. \u201cForeign-agent\u201d non-commercial organisations had also been the targets of a smear campaign in the media: the environmental organisation Planet of Hope had been charged with \u201cindustrial espionage funded by US money\u201d and its director had had to flee Russia.<\/p>\n 129. The ICJ, Amnesty International, and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights emphasised the stigmatising effect of labelling NGOs \u201cforeign agents\u201d. Such measures interfered with the right to freedom of association under Article\u00a011 of the Convention. As they also affected the capacity of NGOs and their representatives to engage in public debate, they similarly interfered with the right to freedom of expression under Article\u00a010 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 130. The Hungarian NGOs submitted that the stigmatisation of NGOs served to discredit those who raised their voices against the detrimental activities of the authorities. Criticising the authorities was likened to criticising the nation itself.<\/p>\n (2) Choice of an allegedly stigmatising term<\/p>\n 131. The parties disagreed on the sentiment evoked by the expression \u201cforeign agent\u201d. For the applicants, third-party interveners and independent experts, including the Commissioner and the Venice Commission, it conveyed \u201ca connotation of ostracism or stigma\u201d across large sections of the Russian population, and could therefore be a threat to the free exercise of the activities of non-commercial organisations which had been labelled in that way (see paragraphs 50 and 51 above). The Venice Commission emphasised that, even without the specific Russian historical context, the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d always carried a negative connotation so long as it suggested that an organisation was acting \u201con behalf and in the interests of the foreign source\u201d, rather than in the interests of Russian society (paragraph\u00a055 of the Opinion). The Government claimed, by reference to the judgment of the Constitutional Court, that the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d had lost the negative connotation it had had in the past. The Court notes that the Government did not corroborate their assertion with any evidence, while the findings of a major opinion poll of the Russian population appear to suggest otherwise (see paragraph 126 above). Nor did the Government give any explanation or at least indication as to why the term \u201cforeign agent\u201d had been chosen, what alternatives had been considered, and whether the term\u2019s connotations had been taken into account.<\/p>\n 132. The Court has previously found that, even where measures taken by the authorities have not actually restricted the right of an association to carry out its activities, the use of stigmatising language to describe that association may have had adverse consequences for its operation. The use of hostile terms constitutes interference with an association\u2019s rights, and needs to be justified as being necessary in a democratic society (see Leela F\u00f6rderkreis e.V. and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a084-101, and compare Aliyev v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a068762\/14 and 71200\/14, \u00a7\u00a0210, 20\u00a0September 2018). The Court also notes the view of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the designation of civil society organisations as \u201corganisations in receipt of support from abroad\u201d is capable of creating a generalised climate of mistrust towards those organisations and stigmatising them (see paragraph 47 above).<\/p>\n 133. The parties appear to concur that the term \u201cagent\u201d, in its generally accepted meaning, designates a person or an entity which carries out certain work or tasks on the orders or instructions of another individual or entity (the \u201cprincipal\u201d) in return for remuneration in the framework of the principal-agent relationship. The term \u201cagent\u201d has consistently been used in that sense in Russian civil law, federal legislation and by-laws, and also in many other jurisdictions. Adding the adjective \u201cforeign\u201d implies that the principal is a foreign entity on behalf of which the agent is acting.<\/p>\n 134. As the Court noted in paragraph 117 above, the definition of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d in the Foreign Agents Act introduced a concept of agency in which the control of the donor over the recipient of funds was effectively presumed rather than established on a case-by-case basis, even in a situation where the recipient of funds retained full managerial and operational independence in terms of defining its programmes, policies and priorities. This presumption was moreover unrebuttable because any evidence of operational independence of the grantee from the donor was legally irrelevant for designation of the targeted organisation as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, the mere fact of receiving any amount of money from \u201cforeign sources\u201d sufficed.<\/p>\n 135. The administrative and judicial practice in the applicants\u2019 cases confirmed that interpretation of the agency relationship: neither the Ministry of Justice nor the courts considered it necessary to show that the applicant organisations had been acting in the interests of foreign sources, and deemed the fact that they had received foreign funding and had been carrying out political activities sufficient evidence of their being \u201cforeign agents\u201d. It has not been claimed or established in any of the applicants\u2019 cases that they had acted on behalf of, on the orders of, or in the interests of a foreign entity, or that they had been anything but independent actors in their respective fields of activity. For example, in the case of the Southern Human Rights Centre, the organisation received funds from another Russian NGO which had already been included on the register of foreign agents, for the purpose of creating its own website (see paragraph 652 below). Another applicant, Woman\u2019s World, received a donation from a Russian NGO to hold an awareness-raising event on the prevention of domestic violence, and yet another, Tak-Tak-Tak, used funds from the French Embassy in Moscow to hold a seminar on the security of human rights defenders (see paragraphs 666 and 680 below). In taking the decisions to register those organisations as \u201cforeign agents\u201d, neither the Ministry of Justice nor the courts concerned themselves with showing that they had acted as \u201cagents\u201d in the interests of the organisations indicated as being the sources of their foreign funding.<\/p>\n 136. The Court considers therefore that attaching the label of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d to any applicant organisations which have received any funds from foreign entities was unjustified and prejudicial and also liable to have a strong deterrent and stigmatising effect on their operations. That label coloured them as being under foreign control in disregard of the fact that they saw themselves as members of national civil society working to uphold respect for human rights, the rule of law, and human development for the benefit of Russian society and democratic system.<\/p>\n (3) Creation of a new category of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d NGOs<\/p>\n 137. The choice of a term for labelling a new category of Russian non\u2011commercial organisations is part of a broader question of whether the creation of such a status can be justified as being \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 138. The Court reiterates that a State can, consistently with the Convention, adopt general measures which apply to pre-defined situations regardless of the individual facts of each case even if this might result in individual hard cases. In order to determine the proportionality of a general measure, the Court must primarily assess the legislative choices underlying it and the quality of the parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure, attaching particular importance to the operation of the margin of appreciation (see Animal Defenders International, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0106\u201110).<\/p>\n 139. The democratic process is an ongoing one which needs to be continuously supported by free and pluralistic public debate and carried forward by many actors of civil society, including individual activists and NGOs (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0111). Where risks to that process have been identified, foreign involvement in some sensitive areas \u2013 such as elections or funding of political movements \u2013 may justify stricter regulation or restrictions by the State, as ensuring the transparency of NGOs receiving substantial foreign funding is a legitimate aim. Nevertheless, as the Court has found above, the scope of the Foreign Agents Act and, in particular, the definition of \u201cpolitical activities\u201d goes much further than what is customarily regarded as matters of national security or sensitive State interests. In essence, the regulation appears to be based on a notion that matters such as respect for human rights and the rule of law are \u201cinternal affairs\u201d of the State and that any external scrutiny of such matters is suspect and a potential threat to national interests. This notion is not compatible with the drafting history and underlying values of the Convention as an instrument of European public order and collective security: that the rights of all persons within the legal space of the Convention are a matter of concern to all member States of the Council of Europe.<\/p>\n 140. The Court recalls, in this respect, that even before the Foreign Agents Act, the legislation on non-commercial organisations contained mechanisms allowing the State and society to exercise scrutiny over the receipt and spending of funds by non-commercial organisations, including funds from foreign sources. The Government did not identify any shortcomings or risks of abuse in the previously existing legal framework which the creation of a new status of \u201cforeign agents\u201d sought to address which prevents the Court from assessing the rationale for the new regulation. Instead, it appears that the \u201cforeign-agent\u201d status was put in place to set the applicant organisations apart from other non-commercial organisations and to subject them and their activities to a much stricter State scrutiny.<\/p>\n 141. Once an organisation was assigned \u201cforeign-agent\u201d status, it was confronted with not only additional accounting and reporting requirements which the Court will address below but also a number of adverse consequences which went beyond merely legal consequences. The Commissioner and the Venice Commission observed that a non-commercial organisation labelled as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d would \u201cmost probably encounter an atmosphere of mistrust, fear and hostility making it difficult for it to operate\u201d. They cited an example of homeless people refusing the offer of shelter from representatives of a humanitarian NGO because they did not want help from \u201cforeign agents\u201d (paragraph\u00a054 of the Opinion).<\/p>\n 142. The Court is particularly concerned with the fact that \u201cforeign-agent\u201d status has severely curtailed the applicant organisations\u2019 ability to interact with the representatives of State authorities, including those with whom they had worked together for many years prior to their registration as \u201cforeign agents\u201d. The Commissioner and the Venice Commission noted that the representatives of State institutions would likely be reluctant to cooperate with \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations, in particular in discussions on possible changes to legislation or public policy (paragraph\u00a055 of the Opinion). Such a risk did, in fact, materialise. For example, in the case of Yekaterinburg Memorial, the Ministry for General and Professional Education in the Sverdlovsk Region sent a circular letter, no.\u00a002-01-82\/1861 of 10\u00a0March 2017, requiring the heads of secondary and higher-education institutions in the region \u201cto take measures to restrict the participation of educators and students\u201d in events organised by that \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation. The Civil Education Centre received letters from four State and municipal educational institutions stating that those institutions no longer wished to collaborate with the applicant organisation following its registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. Following its inclusion on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d, Sakhalin Environment Watch received a similar letter from the Sakhalin Regional Border Guard Department, with which it had previously successfully collaborated in preventing poaching.<\/p>\n 143. The executive authorities sought to distance themselves from \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations and sever any links to their directors or members. In the case of Woman\u2019s World, a decree of the governor of the Kaliningrad Region, no.\u00a0196 of 30\u00a0December 2015, prohibited members of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations from being members of the Governor\u2019s Socio\u2011Political Council, and the director of the applicant organisation was expelled from that council. On 14\u00a0September 2015 a lawyer with the Perm Human Rights Centre was prevented from participating in a meeting of a judicial qualifications board due to his links with the \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation. He was eventually able to continue his work, but not before adopting a different affiliation.<\/p>\n 144. Restrictions on the participation of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations in the political and social life of Russian society gradually found their way into federal legislation. A series of amendments to the electoral laws denied such organisations any form of involvement in any kind of election (see paragraph\u00a030 above). The applicant organisations which stand up for fair elections and act as \u201celection watchdogs\u201d \u2013 the Golos Association and the Golos Fund, among others \u2013were denied the opportunity to continue their missions as independent election monitors. The amended legislation likened the position of Russian \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations to that of foreign or international observers. The legislation established a procedure for extending an invitation to foreign or international observers but failed to define an equivalent procedure for inviting national organisations, which effectively thwarted any monitoring efforts by Russian organisations once they had been listed as \u201cforeign agents\u201d.<\/p>\n 145. In more recent developments, restrictions on the activities of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations were extended far outside the realm of politics to undercut their mission as independent monitors of State actors in other areas. The 2018 amendments withdrew the right of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations to nominate candidates to public monitoring bodies, which were the only civil society institutions with access to penal facilities and the authority to highlight issues concerning human rights compliance in places of detention (see paragraph 34 above, and Ananyev and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a042525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0105-106, 10\u00a0January 2012). Another law deprived \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations of the opportunity to expose the potential for graft and corruption which proposed draft legislation might offer State officials (see paragraph 35 above).<\/p>\n (4) Conclusion<\/p>\n 146. It follows that the creation of the new status severely restricted the ability of the applicant organisations to continue their activities, because of the negative attitude of their target groups and because of the regulatory and legislative restrictions on involving \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations in cooperation and monitoring projects. Their registration as \u201cforeign agents\u201d restricted their ability to participate in public life and engage in activities which they had been carrying out prior to the creation of the new category of \u201cforeign agents\u201d. The Government have not been able to adduce \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d reasons for creating that new category, or show that those measures furthered the declared goal of increasing transparency. The creation of that status as defined in domestic law was therefore not \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n (iii) Whether the additional auditing and reporting requirements were necessary in a democratic society<\/p>\n (1) Submissions by the parties<\/p>\n 147. The applicants submitted that the additional control and reporting requirements which were applicable to them on account of their status as \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations amounted a serious burden and drain on their time and resources. In the context of a shortage of resources, the main activities of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations tended to focus on providing the authorities with a variety of additional reports and preparing for inspections, meanwhile statutory activities had to be significantly scaled down. Their staff were expected to produce four times as many reports as other non\u2011commercial organisations, and also pay substantial amounts for the mandatory annual audit \u2013 between RUB\u00a050,000 and RUB\u00a0250,000 (EUR\u00a01,250 and 8,250 at the material time). Those fixed costs were not related to the amount of foreign funding received or an organisation\u2019s overall budget, and represented a disproportionate burden, especially for organisations with the least resources. There was also a constant risk of administrative prosecution, even for insignificant delays or superficial inaccuracies in the reports.<\/p>\n 148. The Government submitted that the mandatory auditing requirements extended to not just \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations, but also State-owned companies and corporations and local branches of foreign NGOs. The financial reporting requirements were comparable to those existing in other jurisdictions (they referred in particular to the\u00a0EU\u00a0Transparency Register and the Fundamental Principles). They did not impose an excessive burden on NGOs, and allowed the domestic authorities to ensure the transparency of their funding and receive up-to-date reports about their activities. The reporting requirements also sought to increase the protection of national security and \u201craise public awareness\u201d about the fact that foreign individuals and entities were involved in providing support to organisations which were engaged in political activities and exercised influence over Russian politics and foundations of the State. Lastly, the Government cited examples of domestic decisions in which the courts had discontinued administrative-offence proceedings instituted in respect of a charge of failure to submit the required reports.<\/p>\n 149. The ILPP submitted that the Foreign Agents Act had put additional financial and administrative burdens on those NGOs which received foreign funding. It was estimated that annually, \u201cforeign-agent\u201d NGOs were forced to spend an average amount of RUB\u00a0273,000 more than other NGOs. By way of comparison, disclosure and reporting requirements for lobbyists controlled by foreign principals, provided for by the US FARA Act, were fundamentally different, in that they focused on lobbying, consulting and public-relations services rather than civil society organisations, whereas Russia\u2019s Foreign Agents Act did focus on such organisations.<\/p>\n 150. The Special Rapporteur stated that registration authorities should be independent from the Government; that reporting obligations should be simple, uniform and predictable; that the organs in charge of registration and supervision should carry out inspections only during ordinary business hours, with adequate advance notice; and that powers should not be used arbitrarily and for the harassment or intimidation of organisations.<\/p>\n 151. The ISHR submitted that so long as \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations had to comply with cumbersome and more frequent reporting requirements, the practical consequences of being a \u201cforeign agent\u201d could be described as \u201cdebilitating\u201d. The ICJ and Amnesty International emphasised that measures restricting or imposing administrative burdens on NGOs had to be the least intrusive possible, with due regard to the significance of the interests at stake. The Hungarian NGOs stated that measures prescribed by the Foreign Agents Act were disproportionate to the declared aim of transparency, and the obligation to register and report on activities was not in line with the aim pursued, nor were extraordinary inspections.<\/p>\n (2) The Court\u2019s assessment<\/p>\n 152. The Court reiterates that States may establish in their legislation rules and requirements on corporate governance and management bodies, and ensure the compliance of legal entities with such rules and requirements. In fact, the domestic laws of many member States of the Council of Europe provide for such rules and requirements, with varying degrees of regulation (see Tebieti M\u00fchafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a072). However, in so far as legislative amendments impose new requirements on previously existing organisations, they need to be justified as being, in particular, \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d (see Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a073-77 et passim).<\/p>\n 153. From 2006 onwards all Russian non-commercial organisations were required to produce an annual report on their activities and sources of funding, including information on the use of funds, and submit that report to the Ministry of Justice in a pre-determined format, indicating their foreign funding sources in a special section of the report form. The report also needed to be made freely available to the public online, both on the website of the Ministry of Justice and the organisation\u2019s own website. Therefore, even prior to the adoption of the Foreign Agents Act, the activities of non\u2011commercial organisations, their financial situation and their sources of funding were public and transparent, and were also under the full control of the State authorities. The Government did not claim that that legal framework had been lacking or deficient in any respect.<\/p>\n 154. The Foreign Agents Act did not alter or extend the scope of information which \u201cforeign-agent\u201d non-commercial organisations ought to provide to the authorities or make public. However, it significantly increased the frequency of reporting, requiring up to four reports per year, where previously one had sufficed. Since their registration as \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations, the applicant organisations have been required to submit reports on their activities and the composition of their management boards, twice a year; reports on how foreign-source funds have been spent or property used, four times a year; and a certified audit report, once a year. The reports need to be uploaded to their websites and the Ministry of Justice\u2019s website twice as often as before. Compliance with those requirements has been enforced by the Ministry of Justice, and failure to comply has been sanctioned with fines which are many times higher than those applicable to non-compliance by non-commercial organisations which have not been included on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d. Those organisations may be fined between RUB\u00a03,000 and 5,000 for a failure to provide the required information to State or municipal authorities (Article\u00a019.7 of the CAO), whereas \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations will incur a fine of between RUB\u00a0100,000 and 300,000 for the same offence (Article\u00a019.7.5-2 of the CAO, see paragraph 24 above). Thus, solely because the organisation Woman\u2019s World was included on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d and had failed to promptly submit its \u201cforeign-agent\u201d reports for the second and fourth quarters of 2016, the domestic courts fined it RUB\u00a0100,000 (see paragraph 682 below).<\/p>\n 155. Since their classification as \u201cforeign agents\u201d, the applicant organisations have been subject to the additional obligation to undergo an annual audit. The Government insisted that that obligation was non\u2011discriminatory because it also applied to State-owned corporations. The Court does not consider that State corporations are a relevant comparator. They are large commercial operators managing public money, with substantial financial and human resources at their disposal; an audit of their spending is necessary to closely monitor the use of State funds and the fight against corruption, mismanagement and the wasteful allocation of resources. By contrast, non-commercial organisations had been submitting full financial reports, including their sources of funding, to the regulatory authorities even before the Foreign Agents Act. The Government did not explain how the new requirement increased the transparency of those organisations\u2019 activities and protected \u201cnational security\u201d. The Court also notes that auditing services are expensive and impose a significant financial and organisational burden on the applicant organisations (see paragraph 147 above). In the above-mentioned case of Woman\u2019s World, an additional ground for imposing the RUB\u00a0100,000 fine related to the organisation\u2019s failure to submit an audit report for 2016. The courts did not accept its explanation that it had not had the funds to pay for such a report.<\/p>\n 156. An additional obligation on \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations was introduced in 2017: all organisations required by law to undergo a mandatory audit \u2013 a category which included \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations \u2013 were required to enter the results of the mandatory audits into the Unified Federal Register of Information on the Activities of Legal Entities via the online portal fedresurs.ru. The audit results needed to be uploaded within three business days of their receipt, making this requirement particularly burdensome in terms of urgency, but also in terms of cost, because in order to gain access to fedresurs.ru and publish their audit statements, the applicant organisations were forced to incur additional expenses associated with obtaining another special electronic signature which was different from that used in the banking sector. The Court notes that no comparable requirements applied to other non-commercial or commercial organisations, even though the latter group\u2019s budget could significantly exceed the funding available to the applicant organisations.<\/p>\n 157. The Court also notes that \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations may not use a simplified form of book-keeping which all other non-commercial organisations are eligible to use (see paragraph 29 above). The Government did not explain why it was considered necessary to deny such organisations the benefit of access to a form of accounting capable of reducing their paperwork.<\/p>\n 158. Lastly, as regards the additional requirement to submit to inspections, the authorities carry out routine inspections of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations three times more often than inspections of other non\u2011commercial organisations, on a triannual rather than annual basis. The Government did not offer any reasons for that increased supervision of the applicant organisations. Regardless of the declared aims to enhance transparency which have apparently been pursued, any risk of wrongdoing on the part of an organisation is effectively countered by the Ministry of Justice\u2019s authority to conduct unscheduled inspections (see paragraph 18 above). While the important purpose served by inspections is undeniable, excessive use of the power to interfere with the operation of a civil society organisation should never be used as a tool to exercise control over NGOs.<\/p>\n 159. In sum, the Court finds that the Government have failed to put forward \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d reasons for imposing the additional requirements on the applicant organisations purely on account of their inclusion on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d. The Court is unable to find that the increased frequency of reporting and inspections, the obligation on \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations to undergo a mandatory audit and publish it on a dedicated website, or such organisations being denied the benefit of simplified book-keeping could substantially facilitate the provision of more transparent and complete information to the public, as the Government claimed it should. In any event, those additional measures imposed a significant and excessive financial and organisational burden on the applicant organisations and their staff, and undermined their capacity to engage in their core activities. The Court concludes that such additional requirements as provided for by the Foreign Agents Act and subsequent legislation were not \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d or proportionate to the declared aims.<\/p>\n (iv) Whether restricting access to sources of funding was necessary in a democratic society<\/p>\n (1) Submissions by the parties<\/p>\n 160. The applicants pointed out that the Foreign Agents Act linked receiving foreign funding with a multitude of obligations, including more frequent reporting, keeping separate accounts for foreign funding, mandatory audits, the labelling of publications, more frequent inspections, and so on. The only way that they could escape the burden of the additional obligations was by completely refusing all foreign funding and returning any such funding previously awarded to their organisations. An increase in domestic funding over a seven-year period had been much less significant than the Government had claimed. Besides, the Government had only cited the total amounts allocated for all non-commercial organisations, without specifying the amount of funding allocated for activities in the areas in which the applicant organisations specialised. The Government had not specified the criteria for selecting applications for State funding, or indicated any safeguards capable of guaranteeing that applications for such funding were considered solely on their merits, rather than in terms of the compatibility of the applicant organisation\u2019s views and opinions with the prevailing State policy. The applicants pointed out that virtually all of the applicant organisations which had applied for State funding had been unsuccessful, as had the other organisations included on the \u201cforeign agents\u201d register.<\/p>\n 161. The Government submitted that the requirement to apply for registration as a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d did not prevent an organisation from receiving funds and property from foreign sources and international organisations. Nor were \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations in any way prevented from receiving support from the State. The State had launched a support programme to finance organisations implementing \u201cprojects of social importance\u201d and \u201cprojects in the field of the protection of rights and freedoms\u201d. Between 2011 and 2017 the total amount of State support had grown sevenfold, from RUB\u00a01 billion to RUB\u00a07 billion. In the 2018 budget, a total amount in excess of RUB\u00a08 billion had been allocated for the development of civil society institutions implementing \u201cprojects of social importance\u201d. Two applicant organisations, the Levada Centre and the Centre for Social and Labour Rights, had been awarded presidential grants in 2018 for research into palliative care and labour rights. Other applicant organisations, including Ryazan Memorial, Man and Law, the Chapayevsk Medical Association and Woman\u2019s World, had taken part in the competition for presidential grants, but had been unsuccessful. In the Government\u2019s view, this demonstrated that there were no obstacles for the applicant organisations which wished to apply for and receive State funding. Allocations and subsidies from the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, and the federal and regional governments and ministries, supplemented the financial support of socially active NGOs.<\/p>\n 162. The ILPP submitted that international law guaranteed access to resources for NGOs as an inherent part of their right to freedom of association (Article\u00a06(f) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and Article\u00a013 of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders). The Foreign Agents Act affected NGOs\u2019 right to access funding to the extent that it discouraged reliance on foreign funding through the use of the pejorative term \u201cforeign agent\u201d and additional financial and administrative burdens on those NGOs which used foreign funding.<\/p>\n 163. The Special Rapporteur submitted that freedom of association encompassed the right of NGOs to access financial resources. Without such resources, NGOs would not be able to enjoy freedom of association. The right to receive and use resources from foreign and international sources was recognised and protected in international law.<\/p>\n 164. The ISHR, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Media Legal Defence Initiative indicated that many organisations had avoided seeking foreign financial support or had shut down because they could not comply with the excessive requirements. The negative stigma attached to the label \u201cforeign agent\u201d had discouraged Russian donors from cooperating with such organisations.<\/p>\n (2) The Court\u2019s assessment<\/p>\n 165. The Court reiterates that where the domestic law restricts an association\u2019s ability to receive grants or other financial contributions which constitute one of the main sources of financing of NGOs, the association may fail to engage in activities which constitute the main purpose of its existence (see Ramazanova and Others v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no.\u00a044363\/02, \u00a7\u00a059, 1\u00a0February 2007). While States may have legitimate reasons to monitor financial operations in accordance with international law, with a view to preventing money laundering and terrorism and extremism financing, the ability of an association to solicit, receive and use funding in order to be able to promote and defend its cause constitutes an integral part of the right to freedom of association (see Aliyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0212). The limits placed on a generalised restriction on the right to freedom of association and the availability of alternatives are also important factors in the assessment of its proportionality (see Animal Defenders International, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0117).<\/p>\n 166. The Court concurs with the CJEU in that the objective of increasing the transparency of the financing of associations, although legitimate, cannot justify legislation which is based on a presumption, made on principle and applied indiscriminately, that any financial support by a non-national entity and any civil society organisation receiving such financial support are intrinsically liable to jeopardise the State\u2019s political and economic interests and the ability of its institutions to operate free from interference. A regulatory framework needs to correspond with the scenario of a sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society, which those obligations are supposed to prevent (see paragraphs 46-47 above).<\/p>\n 167. The Foreign Agents Act does not contain provisions prohibiting foreign funding altogether. However, it also does not establish a minimum amount or share of \u201cforeign funding\u201d in an organisation\u2019s budget, with the result that an organisation regularly funded from abroad, an organisation which has been awarded an international prize for its work, and an organisation receiving a computer or software licence from an international company would all indiscriminately be considered to be funded by \u201cforeign sources\u201d. If an organisation receiving such funding is also deemed to have engaged in \u201cpolitical activities\u201d, it is liable to be registered as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. The Court has established above that in practice the domestic authorities gave an extremely wide and unforeseeable interpretation of the concepts of \u201cforeign sources\u201d and \u201cpolitical activities\u201d. Even the usual activities of civil society organisations which were explicitly excluded from the scope of \u201cpolitical activity\u201d were construed in such a way that almost any actions were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activity\u201d (see paragraphs 96 to 100 above). This situation rendered it difficult for the applicants to foresee which specific actions on their part could lead to their registration as \u201cforeign agents\u201d, registration which would entail a host of additional reporting and accounting requirements inhibiting their ability to function because of the substantial amount of staff time and resources such requirements would demand of an organisation.<\/p>\n 168. In the absence of clear conditions for the applicability of the Foreign Agents Act, the only way for the applicant organisations to avoid the application of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d label and restrictions and continue their activities was to forego \u201cforeign funding\u201d altogether. The applicants were thus confronted with a choice between either refusing all \u201cforeign funding\u201d in the widest possible interpretation of the term, or incurring additional expenses relating to reporting, accounting and audit services and abiding by the other requirements, such as the labelling of publications and frequent inspections. By imposing that choice on the applicant organisations, the Foreign Agents Act made them opt for either exclusively domestic or foreign funding, thereby effectively restricting the available funding options.<\/p>\n 169. The Court considers that an enforced choice between accepting foreign funding and soliciting domestic State funding represents a false alternative. In order to ensure that NGOs are able to perform their role as the \u201cwatchdogs of society\u201d, they should be free to solicit and receive funding from a variety of sources. The diversity of these sources may enhance the independence of the recipients of such funding in a democratic society.<\/p>\n 170. Furthermore, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s assertion that the domestic grants and subsidies for non-commercial organisations implementing \u201cprojects of social importance\u201d could have adequately compensated for the previously available foreign and international funding.<\/p>\n 171. Firstly, the Government\u2019s reference to the existing support for \u201csocially-oriented\u201d organisations is not relevant to this case because, by virtue of a direct ban in the legislation, \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations \u2013 such as the applicant organisations \u2013 may not be granted the status of \u201cproviders of useful social services\u201d and apply for priority funding which is exclusively associated with that status (see paragraph 33 above). Unlike other non\u2011commercial organisations, organisations which have been recognised as \u201cforeign agents\u201d also cannot be considered \u201csocially-oriented\u201d and thus gain access to State financial support programmes, even though charity work is explicitly excluded from the scope of the Foreign Agents Act.<\/p>\n 172. Secondly, owing to the applicants\u2019 ineligibility to obtain financing as \u201csocially-oriented\u201d organisations, and the poorly developed private donor system in Russia, domestic financing may only come from the federal budget in the form of presidential grants. While the Government emphasised that there had been a significant increase in the amounts allocated for grants, they did not provide any indication as to the criteria for grant allocation and, most importantly, institutional guarantees confirming that grant operators would be independent and capable of ensuring that money was allocated to meritorious projects. Experts who studied the practice of grant allocation at the material time concluded that non-commercial organisations closely aligned with the State authorities were by far the largest beneficiaries of grants (see paragraph 64 above).<\/p>\n 173. The Government were unable to show that the applicant organisations which had been forced to refuse foreign funding under the threat of being included on the register of \u201cforeign agents\u201d could have secured access to domestic funding on a transparent and non-discriminatory basis. Nor did the Government put forward \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d reasons for causing the applicant organisations to choose between continuing their work while accepting foreign funding and the burdensome requirements of \u201cforeign-agent\u201d status, and significantly reducing their activities on account of insufficient domestic funding or a complete lack thereof. Without proper financing, the applicant organisations were unable to carry out activities constituting the main objective of their existence, and some of them had to be wound up. Neither the executive authorities nor the domestic courts considered the consequences of the \u201cforeign-funding\u201d provisions for the work of those organisations, or the accessibility of alternative funding in Russia. It follows that the restrictions on access to funding have not been shown to be necessary in a democratic society.<\/p>\n (v) Nature and severity of the penalties<\/p>\n (1) Submissions by the parties<\/p>\n 174. The applicant organisations contended that they had been fined for failing to submit the required application for registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d to the Ministry of Justice, since they had been unable to foresee that their activities would be deemed \u201cpolitical\u201d within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Act. However, their actions had not and could not have entailed any negative consequences, such as a threat to national security or public safety. The Government had not submitted any evidence showing that a real risk of harm to any of the values guaranteed by the Convention had existed as a result of the applicants\u2019 actions. Even assuming that there had been a danger in principle in a non-commercial organisation not registering as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, this had been completely neutralised by the power of the Ministry of Justice to include organisations on the register of foreign agents at its own discretion. The sanctions had been not just excessive, but also unpredictable, and the amounts of fines imposed on the applicant organisations and their directors had varied greatly. The legislation did not provide any indication as to what would constitute a less serious or more serious offence entailing less and more serious sanctions.<\/p>\n 175. The Government claimed that the sanctions for the violations of the Foreign Agents Act had been proportionate to the gravity of the offences. The provisions of the Act were accessible and foreseeable, and also clearly formulated without ambiguities or contradictions. Since the 2014 judgment of the Constitutional Court, it had been possible to reduce the amount of an administrative fine for \u201cforeign-agent\u201d offences under Article\u00a019.34 of the CAO below the lower limit provided for by that Article, and the domestic courts had applied lower fines in several cases. If the courts had not considered the potential impact of the relevant fines on the sustainability of the applicants\u2019 work, this was due to the applicant organisations\u2019 failure to plead financial difficulty and provide documentation concerning their financial situation. All sanctions imposed to date had been administrative in nature; the criminal liability provisions under Article\u00a0330.1 of the Criminal Code had not yet been applied. The Government also claimed that the legislation of other States provided for the imposition of sanctions comparable to those provided for by the Foreign Agents Act for similar offences.<\/p>\n 176. The Commissioner submitted that it was unclear what criteria were used by the Ministry of Justice when assessing the necessity of the application of administrative sanctions as opposed to other, less intrusive, measures. Bearing in mind that non-commercial organisations, by their very nature, were not engaged in profit-making activities, fines represented a major burden to many small Russian non-commercial organisations, and a significant portion of their annual budget. The imposition of administrative fines on individual managers was a reason for serious concern. In the case of the Partnership for Development, its former director Ms\u00a0Pitsunova had been deprived of half of her pension and disability payments in 2015 owing to her inability to pay an initial administrative fine of RUB\u00a0100,000 on time in 2014.<\/p>\n 177. The Special Rapporteur submitted that provisions on sanctions should provide for adequate warning and an opportunity to remedy violations, and that States should not criminalise or delegitimise activities in defence of human rights on account of the origin of funding.<\/p>\n 178. The ICJ, Amnesty International, and the Media Legal Defence Initiative stated that harsh punitive measures, including criminal sanctions, provided for by the Foreign Agents Act were bound to have a chilling effect on NGOs. They hardly constituted the least intrusive measures available to achieve the protection of the interests at stake, and were therefore likely to be disproportionate.<\/p>\n (2) The Court\u2019s assessment<\/p>\n 179. The Court reiterates that the nature and severity of the penalties imposed are important factors to be considered when assessing the proportionality of an interference (see B\u00e9dat v.\u00a0Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a056925\/08, \u00a7\u00a079, 29\u00a0March 2016, and Tebieti M\u00fchafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a082). The Court must be satisfied that the penalty does not amount to a form of censorship intended to discourage the applicants from expressing criticism or undermine civil society\u2019s important contribution to the administration of public affairs. By the same token, the penalty should not be such as to be liable to hamper NGOs in performing their task as independent monitors and \u201cpublic watchdogs\u201d (see T\u00e1rsas\u00e1g a Szabads\u00e1gjogok\u00e9rt v.\u00a0Hungary, no.\u00a037374\/05, \u00a7\u00a027, 14\u00a0April 2009, and Magyar Helsinki Bizotts\u00e1g, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0159).<\/p>\n 180. The Foreign Agents Act introduced fines of between RUB\u00a0100,000 and RUB\u00a0500,000 for continuing the activities of an organisation without registering as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, failing to comply with additional accounting or reporting requirements, and failing to label publications as originating from a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation (see paragraph 24 above). It also introduced criminal liability for individuals who deliberately omitted to provide documents for registration of an organisation as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d (see paragraph 23 above). Even in those cases where, further to the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment, the applicant organisations were sentenced to fines below the lower limit provided for by the CAO, the minimum amount was set at RUB\u00a0150,000 for a violation of Article\u00a019.34 of the CAO, since, in accordance with the law, the amount of the fine could not be less than half of the amount constituting the lower limit of the sanction.<\/p>\n 181. In order to put the financial impact of sanctions into perspective, the Court has previously considered it appropriate to use, as a relevant comparator, the monthly minimum salary, which is set and regularly reviewed by the Federal Assembly (see Tolmachev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a042182\/11, \u00a7\u00a054, 2\u00a0June 2020). Between 2013 and 2019 the monthly minimum salary went up from RUB\u00a05,205 to RUB\u00a011,280 (from EUR\u00a0129 to EUR\u00a0142 at the 1\u00a0January exchange rate). It follows that even the minimum amount of the relevant fine was set at a level exceeding the monthly minimum salary by a factor of between thirty (in 2013) and thirteen (in 2019) or, in other words, it was approximately equivalent to one to three years\u2019 subsistence income. Using the sanctions for other types of administrative offences as another relevant comparator, the Court notes that the sanctions applicable to \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisations were many times higher than the sanctions for analogous offences committed by non-commercial organisations which did not have the status of a \u201cforeign agent\u201d (see paragraph 154 above).<\/p>\n 182. The Court reiterates that sanctions of that magnitude will trigger heightened scrutiny of their proportionality (see Pakdemirli v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a035839\/97, \u00a7\u00a059, 22\u00a0February 2005). In order to be proportionate, the interference should correspond to the severity of the infringement, and the sanction to the gravity of the offence it is designed to punish (see Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v.\u00a0Ireland, no.\u00a055120\/00, \u00a7\u00a0110\u201113, ECHR 2005\u2011V (extracts), and Gyrlyan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a035943\/15, \u00a7\u00a028, 9\u00a0October 2018). The Government did not put forward any relevant and sufficient reasons for setting the fines for what were essentially regulatory offences at such a high level. They did not advance arguments as to why such punishment was not excessive or liable to turn the fines into an instrument for suppressing dissent. Taking into account that the amount of the fine cannot be reduced below half of the minimum amount of the fine under the CAO, and that some of the applicant organisations were fined multiple times, the fines were unaffordable for many of them. Some had to significantly scale down their activities or be wound up, as they were unable to pay the fines which had already been imposed or face further fines. Thus, as it was unable to pay fines totalling RUB\u00a0600,000 for a failure to label banners and several Internet publications, the Committee against Torture was driven into voluntary dissolution.<\/p>\n 183. The domestic courts failed to provide \u201crelevant and sufficient reasons\u201d for their choice of sanctions. They did not consider the proportionality of a fine in particular in relation to its impact on the organisation\u2019s ability to continue its work. For example, Yekaterinburg Memorial was fined three times for violations of the Foreign Agents Act \u2013 once for failing to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d, and twice for failing to label publications published on the organisation\u2019s website. The amount of each fine was RUB\u00a0300,000. The domestic courts gave no consideration to the fact that Yekaterinburg Memorial did not have any financial resources or property of its own. In another example, the publishing house Gagarin Park was fined RUB\u00a0300,000 for receiving cash funds in the amount of RUB\u00a0100,000 for the implementation of a project.<\/p>\n 184. The domestic case-law presented to the Court seems to indicate that the sanctions were also unpredictable. The Foreign Agents Act did not provide for any guidance as to what would amount to a more serious offence or a less serious one, or list relevant factors and criteria for judicial assessment. Nor did it determine with any degree of precision the circumstances in which a particular punishment bracket applied. For example, Man and Law was fined RUB\u00a0150,000 for a blog publication by a staff member published on the website of a popular regional periodical, while the Sakharov Centre was fined RUB\u00a0400,000 for publishing information on its own website, which had considerably fewer visitors. In some cases, like the case of Public Verdict, the applicant organisation was ordered to pay a single fine for several publications, while others, like MASHR, were fined separately for each unlabelled publication. The latter approach also resulted in excessive and burdensome fines, as illustrated by the case of the Golos Association, which paid three fines totalling RUB\u00a01,200,000. In the absence of any other factors which may explain the great variations in the fines imposed, the Court finds that the provisions governing the amounts of the fines left room for arbitrariness (compare Camilleri v.\u00a0Malta, no.\u00a042931\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a042-43, 22\u00a0January 2013).<\/p>\n 185. Taking into account the essentially regulatory nature of the offences, the substantial amounts of the administrative fines imposed and their frequent accumulation, and the fact that the applicants were not\u2011for\u2011profit civil society organisations which suffered a reduction in their budgets due to restrictions on foreign funding, the Court holds that the fines provided for by the Foreign Agents Act cannot be regarded as being proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. This finding would be applicable a fortiori to criminal sanctions, since a failure to comply with formal requirements relating to the re-registration of an NGO can hardly warrant a criminal conviction and is disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.<\/p>\n (vi) Conclusion on the necessity requirement<\/p>\n 186. The Court has found above that the Government have not shown relevant and sufficient reasons for creating a special status of \u201cforeign agents\u201d, imposing additional reporting and accounting requirements on organisations registered as \u201cforeign agents\u201d, restricting their access to funding options, and punishing any breaches of the Foreign Agents Act in an unforeseeable and disproportionately severe manner. The cumulative effect of these restrictions \u2013 whether by design or effect \u2013 is a legal regime that places a significant \u201cchilling effect\u201d on the choice to seek or accept any amount of foreign funding, however insignificant, in a context where opportunities for domestic funding are rather limited, especially in respect of politically or socially sensitive topics or domestically unpopular causes. The measures accordingly cannot be considered \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n (e) Overall conclusion<\/p>\n 187. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that the interference was neither prescribed by law nor necessary in a democratic society. Therefore, there has been a violation of Article\u00a011 of the Convention interpreted in the light of Article\u00a010.<\/p>\n III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 14 AND 18 TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 188. Some applicants also complained that they had been subjected to discrimination on account of their political position, and that their freedom of expression and association had been restricted for purposes other than those prescribed by the Convention. They relied on Articles\u00a014 and 18 taken in conjunction with Articles\u00a010 and 11 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 189. The Court considers that these complaints must be declared admissible. However, since it has already considered the claim that the applicant organisations were put into a separate category and singled out for a differential treatment on the basis of the source of their funding, it does not need to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article\u00a014 or 18.<\/p>\n IV. COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 190. As regards compliance with Article\u00a034 of the Convention, the Court will examine whether the enforcement of the dissolution order against the International Memorial (see paragraph 14 above) disclosed a failure to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule\u00a039 and violated its right of individual application. Article\u00a034 of the Convention reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d<\/p>\n 191. The Government did not reply to the Court\u2019s request for comments.<\/p>\n 192. The Court reiterates that, by virtue of Article\u00a034 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application, which has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the Convention system. According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, a respondent State\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure entails a violation of that right (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a046827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0102 and 125, ECHR 2005\u2011I, and Savriddin Dzhurayev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a071386\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0211-13, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 193. After the dissolution order against the International Memorial was issued at first instance, on 29\u00a0December 2021 the Court, having regard to the close connection of the grounds of dissolution and the subject matter of the present case, indicated an interim measure under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court. It held that, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before it, the enforcement of the order should be suspended for a period that would be necessary for the Court to consider the present case. After the order became final and enforceable on 28\u00a0February 2022 (see paragraph 12 above), the International Memorial asked the Supreme Court for a stay of execution by reference to the Court\u2019s indication of an interim measure. Its application was declined. On 5\u00a0April 2022 the International Memorial was liquidated, while the Court\u2019s interim measure was still in force.<\/p>\n 194. In view of the vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system, they must be strictly complied with by the State concerned (see Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0217). By allowing the dissolution of the International Memorial to proceed, the State frustrated the purpose of the interim measure which sought to maintain the status quo pending the Court\u2019s examination of the application. Since there is no procedure in Russian law for reinstating the legal-entity status of an organisation following its removal from the State Register of Legal Entities, the Court was prevented from securing the International Memorial\u2019s enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression and association under Articles\u00a010 and 11 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 195. Consequently, the Court concludes that the Russian authorities disregarded the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court, in violation of their obligation under Article\u00a034 of the Convention.<\/p>\n V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 196. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 197. The applicants claimed various amounts in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, and also costs and expenses. The particulars of their claims are set out in the Appendix. The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 claims were excessive or unsubstantiated. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court awards the applicants the amounts set out in the Appendix, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them.<\/p>\n 198. In the cases where the applicant organisations ceased to exist, the awards shall be payable into the bank accounts of their successors in the proceedings before the Court.<\/p>\n 199. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2. Decides that the former presidents, founders, directors and members of applicant associations have standing to pursue the proceedings initiated by the applicant organisations that ceased to exist;<\/p>\n 3. Joins the Government\u2019s objection ratione personae to the merits of the case and declares the case admissible;<\/p>\n 4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a011 of the Convention in respect of each applicant and rejects the Government\u2019s objection;<\/p>\n 5. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaints under Articles\u00a014 and 18 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Articles\u00a010 and 11;<\/p>\n 6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a034 of the Convention on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court;<\/p>\n 7. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants or, as the case may be, their procedural successors, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the amounts indicated in the Appendix, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 14\u00a0June 2022, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Milan Bla\u0161ko \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Georges Ravarani ___________<\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/strong><\/p>\n Facts of individual cases and claims for just satisfaction<\/strong><\/p>\n A1. ADC Memorial<\/strong><\/p>\n (ADC Memorial v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a048431\/14, lodged on 30\u00a0June 2014)<\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 200. The applicant organisation is ADC Memorial (\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u0447\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u043b\u0438\u0446, \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0433\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445\u0441\u044f \u0434\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, “\u0410\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0434\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 “\u041c\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in St\u00a0Petersburg. It was represented before the Court by O. Tseytlina. Following its liquidation, Ms\u00a0Stefania Kulayeva and Ms\u00a0Olga Abramenko, employees of the applicant organisation who continued working on the projects it had previously implemented, expressed a wish to pursue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 201. The mission of the applicant organisation: protecting the victims of discrimination and vulnerable groups.<\/p>\n 202. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Admiralteyskiy District of St Petersburg in March 2013. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation (OSIAF), Oak Foundation Ltd, CCFD, R\u00e4dda Barnens Riksf\u00f6rbund, the Roma Education Fund, and SIDA, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: publishing a report on police abuse of Roma and migrants in 2012 and submitting that report to the UN Committee Against Torture.<\/p>\n 203. The following judicial decision was adopted: 12\u00a0December 2013, Leninskiy District Court of St Petersburg (upheld on appeal on 8\u00a0April 2014), forced registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. It was established that the applicant had engaged in \u201cpolitical activity\u201d by campaigning for the protection of migrants, preparing a human rights report, and lobbying for amendments to legislation.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 204. The applicant organisation claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a04,900 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 205. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a03,500 (three thousand five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A2. Agora Association<\/strong><\/p>\n (Agora Association v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a024773\/15, lodged on 18\u00a0May 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 206. The applicant organisation is the Agora Association (\u041c\u0435\u0436\u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0410\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 “\u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0430\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Kazan. It was represented before the Court by I.\u00a0Khrunova. Following its liquidation, Mr\u00a0Igor Nikolayevich Sholokhov, president of the Kazan Human Rights Centre which was a founder of the applicant association expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 207. The mission of the applicant organisation: providing free legal assistance to organisations and individuals.<\/p>\n 208. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by: (1)\u00a0the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Vakhitovskiy District of Kazan in March-June 2014; (2) the Tatarstan Justice Department in October 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the British embassy, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Internews Network, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: contributing to the development of an Internet without censorship and to changing State Internet policy; monitoring freedom of expression online; publishing reports on human rights violations on the Internet, and reports on social control in detention facilities; contributing to the protection of Internet activists and NGOs; the education of human rights lawyers; making suggestions that Russian law\u2011enforcement authorities be restructured; and the applicant organisation\u2019s director participating in the work of the Russian President\u2019s Human Rights Council, which pursued political goals. The Agora Association had also been involved in an anti-corruption review of proposed legislation.<\/p>\n 209. On 21\u00a0July 2014 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On an unspecified date it was removed from the register because it had been liquidated.<\/p>\n 210. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 30\u00a0September 2014, Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan held that the prosecutor\u2019s actions were lawful; (2) 11\u00a0November 2015 (two judgments) and 14\u00a0December 2015 (three judgments), Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan, fines for failures to label publications; 30\u00a0June 2016, the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Tatarstan held that the publications had not been posted on the Internet on the applicant\u2019s behalf, and quashed the judgments of 14\u00a0December 2015; (3) 10\u00a0February 2016, Supreme Court of Tatarstan, liquidation at the Ministry of Justice\u2019s request for multiple failures to comply with the Foreign Agents Act, including a violation of the labelling requirement. In the proceedings concerning the violation of the labelling requirement, the court held that a \u201cforeign-agent\u201d organisation was required to label a publication, regardless of whether it had been posted on their own website or someone else\u2019s.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 211. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a09,970 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying for the fines and the audit. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a01,050 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 212. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a09,970 (nine thousand nine hundred and seventy euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,050 (one thousand and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A3. Baikal Wave<\/strong><\/p>\n (Rikhvanova and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a061699\/16, lodged on 13\u00a0October 2016)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 213. The applicants are members of the board of Baikal Wave (\u0418\u0440\u043a\u0443\u0442\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0411\u0430\u0439\u043a\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u042d\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0412\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0430”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Irkutsk. They are Marina Petrovna Rikhvanova, Vitaliy Valentinovich Ryabtsev and Maksim Viktorovich Vorontsov. They were represented before the Court by E. Mezak and S. Khromenkov.<\/p>\n 214. The mission of the applicant organisation: promoting the protection of the environment and sustainable development; informing the public of environmental challenges; and supporting environmental initiatives.<\/p>\n 215. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Justice Department of the Irkutsk Region in October 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by Global Greengrants, Pacific Environment, the Eurasia Foundation, and Norges Naturvernforbund, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: protesting against the Baikal paper mill by posting a publication on a blog and asking the Government to close the mill and Parliament to adopt laws protecting the environment in the Baikal area; organising a conference on the negative impact of hydraulic structures on rivers, on the protection of rivers, on the development of ecotourism, and on environmental education; issuing recommendations relating to the fight against poaching and corruption; participating in public consultations on an environmental impact assessment in respect of a solid waste dump; posting comments about the Foreign Agents Act made by one of Baikal Wave\u2019s directors on a journalist\u2019s personal blog; discussing the possibility of founding a drop-off depot for radioactive metallic waste; Baikal Wave\u2019s director making a request to ban agricultural burning and submitting it to the State authorities; and publishing an article on wildfire in the summer of 2015 which was critical of the authorities\u2019 failure to act.<\/p>\n 216. On 10\u00a0November 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On 1\u00a0August 2016 it was removed from the register because it had been liquidated.<\/p>\n 217. The following judicial decisions were adopted: 29\u00a0January 2016, Sverdlovskiy District Court of Irkutsk, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d (individual judgments in respect of Baikal Wave, Ms\u00a0Rikhvanova, Mr\u00a0Vorontsov and Mr\u00a0Ryabtsev).<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 218. The applicants claimed EUR\u00a018,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a04,350 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying the fines. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a0800 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 219. The Court awards the applicants EUR\u00a04,350 (four thousand three hundred and fifty euros) jointly in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a0800 (eight hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A4. Centre for Social and Labour Rights<\/strong><\/p>\n (Centre for Social and Labour Rights v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a061111\/17, lodged on 24\u00a0July 2017)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 220. The applicant organisation is the Centre for Social and Labour Rights (\u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e-\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Moscow. It was represented before the Court by Y. Ostrovskaya.<\/p>\n 221. The mission of the applicant organisation: the promotion of fair and balanced labour relations, decent work principles, and respect for freedom, equality and human dignity.<\/p>\n 222. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Moscow Justice Department in February 2016 and in May-June 2017. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by NED, the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), OSIAF, and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (European Commission), and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: promoting labour rights; organising a round-table discussion on stopping full-day groups in nursery schools and making recommendations to State authorities; organising a conference on the protection of labour rights and making recommendations to State authorities; suggesting amendments to labour laws in a book; and creating websites on labour rights.<\/p>\n 223. On 21\u00a0March 2016 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On 29\u00a0June 2017 it was removed from the register because it was no longer considered a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 224. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 28\u00a0June 2016, Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (upheld on appeal on 24\u00a0January 2017), fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d; (2) 18\u00a0October 2016, Zamoskvoretsky District Court of Moscow (upheld on appeal on 24\u00a0February 2017), challenging forced registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 225. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a020,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a05,000 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying for the fines and the audit. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a0154 for postal expenses and court fees.<\/p>\n 226. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a05,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a0154 (one hundred and fifty-four euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A5. Centre for Social Studies<\/strong><\/p>\n (Centre for Social Studies v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a010028\/16, lodged on 11\u00a0February 2016)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 227. The applicant organisation is the Centre for Social Studies (\u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u043d\u0435\u0437\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in St Petersburg. It was represented before the Court by D. Bartenev.<\/p>\n 228. The mission of the applicant organisation: conducting sociological research; disseminating information on social issues; and training sociologists and drafting manuals and scientific material in the fields of sociology, economy, politics and ecology.<\/p>\n 229. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the St Petersburg Justice Department in February-March 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the Consulate of the Netherlands and JSDF, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: printing books on independence, training and support for justices of the peace, and the Russian human rights movements in 2011-2013; promoting indigent defendants\u2019 access to justice; and posting a video on Russian trade unions and their influence on State policy on the Internet.<\/p>\n 230. On 22\u00a0June 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 231. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 5\u00a0June 2015, Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no.\u00a0206, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d (quashed on 11\u00a0April 2016 by Supreme Court of Russia because the limitation period had expired); (2) 9\u00a0June 2015, Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no.\u00a0206, fine for failure to comply with the St\u00a0Petersburg Justice Department\u2019s order to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d; (3) 7\u00a0December 2015, Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow, rejected a challenge to the decision on forced registration.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 232. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a03,640 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying for the fine and the audit. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a03,430 for court fees and legal costs.<\/p>\n 233. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a03,640 (three thousand six hundred and forty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a03,000 (three thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A6. Chapayevsk Medical Association<\/strong><\/p>\n (Chapayevsk Medical Association v.\u00a0Russia and Sergeyev v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a060569\/17 and 64181\/17, lodged on 6 and 21\u00a0August 2017)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 234. The applicants are the Chapayevsk Medical Association (\u0427\u0430\u043f\u0430\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0410\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u043d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0427\u0430\u043f\u0430\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0430”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Chapayevsk, and its director, Oleg Vladimirovich Sergeyev. They were represented before the Court by E. Pershakova and I.\u00a0Biryukova.<\/p>\n 235. The mission of the applicant organisation: research and projects in the field of medical care; and improving the quality of life in Chapayevsk.<\/p>\n 236. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Samara Regional Justice Department in September-October 2016. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, USA; the US embassy; the National Institutes of Health; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; and the European Commission, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: the applicant organisation\u2019s director and executive secretary participating in work relating to the promotion of a healthy way of living, sports and social services as part of the NGO Board of the Samara regional legislature; taking part in a discussion on a regional anti-tobacco initiative, and making recommendations to the Samara legislature in relation to a centre for sports medicine, funeral services and assistance for homeless people; discussing amendments to the Federal Healthcare Law; and participating in HIV prevention efforts and the distribution of free condoms and syringes.<\/p>\n 237. On 21\u00a0October 2016 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On 25\u00a0July 2019 it was removed from the register because it was no longer considered a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 238. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 8\u00a0November 2016, Chapayevsk Town Court (upheld on appeal on 6\u00a0February 2017), fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d imposed on the applicant organisation; (2) 22\u00a0November 2016, Chapayevsk Town Court (upheld on appeal on 21\u00a0February 2017), fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d imposed on the director. The courts held that the organisation had been involved in projects contrary to the interests of the Russian State, and its activities were contrary to State policy in the field of HIV prevention.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 239. The applicants claimed EUR\u00a030,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a06,500 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying for the fines and the audit. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a09,958 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 240. The Court awards the applicants jointly EUR\u00a06,500 (six thousand five hundred euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a03,000 (three thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A7. Citizens\u2019 Watch<\/strong><\/p>\n (Ecodefence and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a09988\/13, lodged on 6\u00a0February 2013)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 241. The applicant organisation is Citizens\u2019 Watch (\u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442-\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0413\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044c”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in St Petersburg. It was represented before the Court by P. Leach.<\/p>\n 242. The mission of the applicant organisation: protecting human rights, advancing the transparency of justice, access to justice, and the fight against xenophobia and racial intolerance.<\/p>\n 243. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Tsentralnyy district prosecutor in St Petersburg in March 2013. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the MacArthur Foundation, OSIAF, the Ministry for International Affairs of Denmark, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, the Fritt Ord Foundation, the British embassy, and the General Consulate of the Netherlands in St Petersburg, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: disseminating a publication on court mediation which was critical of Russian laws; organising a training session on probation taught by foreign professors, and a seminar on a transparent judicial system; and discussing and independently interpreting Russian laws and the implementation of rules on probation.<\/p>\n 244. On 30\u00a0December 2014 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 245. The following judicial decision was adopted: 13\u00a0April 2015, Smolninskiy District Court in St Petersburg, rejected a challenge to the decision on registration as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. The court rejected Citizens\u2019 Watch\u2019s argument that its publications presented research findings rather than opinions on political issues, and emphasised that the publications contained a negative assessment of Russian laws which aimed to shape public opinion and authorities\u2019 decisions. In the court\u2019s view, the assessment and interpretation of laws, and critical remarks about the effectiveness of the authorities\u2019 actions, did not fall within the notion of research. The court also rejected an argument that the criticism expressed by different speakers at a meeting was not that of the applicant organisation, but the speakers themselves.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 246. The applicant organisation asked the Court to determine the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a0153,000 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying for the audit and security costs, and also for the loss of earnings. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a03,430 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 247. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a04,180 (four thousand one hundred and eighty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a03,430 (three thousand four hundred and thirty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A8. Civic Assistance Committee<\/strong><\/p>\n (Ecodefence and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a09988\/13, lodged on 6\u00a0February 2013)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 248. The applicant organisation is the Civic Assistance Committee (\u0420\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u0438 \u0431\u0435\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0430\u043c \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043d\u0443\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0430\u043c “\u0413\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0435”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Moscow. It was represented before the Court by P. Leach.<\/p>\n 249. The mission of the applicant organisation: providing assistance for refugees and displaced persons.<\/p>\n 250. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Meshchanskiy district prosecutor in Moscow in March 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the European Commission, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Swedish Fund for Amnesty International, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and NED, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: organising events in Grozny, Nalchik, Fiagdon and Magas; organising seminars on the rehabilitation of former prisoners and on the detention of Muslims; organising protests against anti-immigration campaigns; supporting prisoners of conscience; and conducting research into corruption.<\/p>\n 251. On 20\u00a0April 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 252. The following judicial decision was adopted: 22\u00a0July 2014, Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow rejected the applicant\u2019s challenge to the prosecutor\u2019s findings.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 253. The applicant organisation asked the Court to determine the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 254. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A9. Civil Education Centre<\/strong><\/p>\n (Civil Education Centre v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a076854\/16, lodged on 1\u00a0December 2016)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 255. The applicant organisation is the Civil Education Centre (\u041c\u0435\u0436\u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u0447\u0435\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043a\u0430”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Perm. It was represented before the Court by K. Koroteyev.<\/p>\n 256. The mission of the applicant organisation: education about human rights and political repression; developing a non-State system of civic education; involving young people in charitable activities; contributing to research by young scholars; and cooperating with authorities and NGOs on education issues.<\/p>\n 257. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Justice Department of the Perm Region in January-February 2016. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by OSIAF, NED, the European Union, the Transatlantic Foundation, Anker Hotel Storgata in Oslo, and BST, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: organising seminars on education about human rights and political repression; organising visits to Geneva and Strasbourg to study the work of international mechanisms for human rights protection; promoting democratic values in a changing educational environment; teaching human rights in schools and universities; posting guides on participation in protest actions on the Internet; the Civic Education Centre\u2019s director participating in round-table discussions on freedom of assembly; preparing a presentation on human rights education in Russia, with the participation of the applicant organisation\u2019s director, at the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting; organising a seminar on prisoners of conscience and human rights; participating in the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, a network of thematically diverse NGOs from Russia and the European Union; monitoring human rights in educational institutions of the Perm Region and drafting recommendations for State authorities; the applicant organisation\u2019s director participating in the work of the Committee for Education of the State Duma; and organising presentations and distributing material on freedom of assembly.<\/p>\n 258. On 3\u00a0March 2016 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 259. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 29\u00a0April 2016, Motovilikhinskiy District Court of Perm, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d; (2) 10\u00a0August 2016, Leninskiy District Court of Perm held that the inspection was lawful. The court rejected the argument that Anker Hotel had refunded the overpayment for its services and therefore could not be considered a \u201cforeign source\u201d.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 260. The applicant organisation asked the Court to determine the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a05,650 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying for the fine, the audit and the electronic signature. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a0190 for court fees and postal expenses.<\/p>\n 261. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a05,650 (five thousand six hundred and fifty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a0190 (one hundred and ninety euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A10. Coming Out<\/strong><\/p>\n (Coming Out v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a04798\/15, lodged on 20\u00a0January 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 262. The applicant organisation is Coming Out (\u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e-\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0433 “\u041b\u0413\u0411\u0422 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0412\u044b\u0445\u043e\u0434”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in St Petersburg. It was represented before the Court by D. Bartenev. Following its liquidation, Ms\u00a0Anna Anisimova, director of the applicant organisation, expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 263. The mission of the applicant organisation: fighting for the universal recognition of human dignity and equal rights for all, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.<\/p>\n 264. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Tsentralnyy District of St Petersburg in October 2013. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the embassies of the Netherlands and Norway, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: protesting against the administrative offence of promoting homosexuality to minors; publishing guidelines on fighting against LGBT discrimination; and staging a protest against politicians who did not support the values of love, family and human dignity.<\/p>\n 265. The following judicial decisions were adopted: 21\u00a0July 2014, Vasileostrovskiy District Court of St Petersburg granted the prosecutor\u2019s claim for forced registration. The court held that the restrictions prescribed by the Foreign Agents Act did not breach the Convention, and that the guidelines on LGBT discrimination did not contain any direct appeal to influence State authorities\u2019 decisions and change the political line. However, they aimed to shape public opinion. The court further held that there was no need to prove that the organisation had actually influenced State authorities\u2019 decisions, as the mere assumption of potential influence was sufficient.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 266. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a02,100 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 267. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a02,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A11. Committee against Torture<\/strong><\/p>\n (Ecodefence and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a09988\/13, lodged on 6\u00a0February 2013)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 268. The applicant organisation is the Committee against Torture (\u041c\u0435\u0436\u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432 \u043f\u044b\u0442\u043e\u043a”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Nizhny Novgorod. It was represented before the Court by P. Leach. Following its liquidation, Mr\u00a0Igor Aleksandrovich Kalyapin, chairman of the applicant organisation, expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 269. The mission of the applicant organisation: fighting against torture and ill-treatment perpetrated by law-enforcement officers in Russia; providing legal, medical and social assistance to survivors of torture; monitoring torture; and raising awareness.<\/p>\n 270. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Nizhegorodskiy District of Nizhniy Novgorod in April 2013. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, the Sigrid Rausing Trust, DEMAS, the MacArthur Foundation, and Civil Rights Defenders, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: preparing pamphlets on torture and legal issues relating to torture in Russia; cooperating with regional and federal State bodies on human rights issues; participating in the EU-Russia Forum; publishing information about torture in police custody and ineffective investigations into torture; the organisation\u2019s director being appointed a member of the Russian President\u2019s Human Rights Council, and criticising the work of law-enforcement bodies; organising protests against the inaction of the Investigative Committee; making legislative proposals; calling for the punishment of police officers for abuses and for conducting effective investigations; and the organisation\u2019s director making comments about the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.<\/p>\n 271. On 16\u00a0January 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On 13\u00a0September 2016 it was removed from the register because it had been liquidated.<\/p>\n 272. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 3\u00a0April 2015, Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod dismissed a challenge to the prosecutor\u2019s findings; (2) 6 August, 11 and 25\u00a0September 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Nizhegorodskiy District of Nizhniy Novgorod, fine for a breach of labeling requirements. The Sovetskiy District Court held that the applicant had been specifically chosen by foreign providers of funds to promote their interests. Its articles of association made clear its intention to engage in political activity. It had used the Internet, and Russian and foreign media, to shape public opinion in a certain way in order to influence the Russian President, law-enforcement officers, and the political, social and religious establishment. It had accepted grants for political reasons, supported liberal ideas and promoted European values and political culture.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 273. The applicant organisation asked the Court to determine the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a012,860 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying the fines.<\/p>\n 274. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a012,860 (twelve thousand eight hundred and sixty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A12. Democratic Centre<\/strong><\/p>\n (Democratic Centre and Boldyrev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a045973\/14, lodged on 3\u00a0June 2014)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 275. The applicants are the Democratic Centre (\u0412\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0436\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0414\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Voronezh, and its director, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Boldyrev. They were represented before the Court by I. Sivoldayev. Following the liquidation of the applicant organisation, Mr\u00a0Aleksand Yevgenyevich Boldyrev, the second applicant and its director, expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 276. The mission of the applicant organisation: promoting human rights and personal security; and supporting democratic reforms and civil society.<\/p>\n 277. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Voronezh Region in April 2013. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by Management Systems International, Inc., and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: promoting human rights and personal security; supporting democratic reforms and civil society; supporting peace and social stability; providing political support for persons advocating market-oriented reforms; and monitoring elections to the State Duma in December 2011.<\/p>\n 278. The following judicial decision was adopted: 19\u00a0July 2013, Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh held that the prosecutor\u2019s determination had been lawful. The court held that the organisation\u2019s articles of association required it to take part in political life and to interfere with State affairs, and that by providing political support the organisation could shape public opinion. The judgment was upheld on appeal on 3\u00a0December 2013.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 279. The applicants asked the Court to determine the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 280. The Court awards the applicants EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A13. Dront Centre<\/strong><\/p>\n (Dront Centre v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a057310\/15, lodged on 13\u00a0November 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 281. The applicant organisation is the Dront Centre (\u041d\u0438\u0436\u0435\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u042d\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 “\u0414\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0442”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Nizhniy Novgorod. It was represented before the Court by I. Khrunova. Following its liquidation, Mr\u00a0Askhat Abdurakhmanovich Kayumov, chairman of the applicant organisation, expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 282. The mission of the applicant organisation: resolving environmental and social issues; and coordinating the activities of environmental NGOs.<\/p>\n 283. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Nizhniy Novgorod Justice Department in April-May 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by Foundation for Sustainable Development, USAID, International Fund for Animal Welfare and World Wide Life for Nature, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: supporting a referendum initiative in support of the direct election of town mayors; advocating for the release of a Russian environmental activist and a member of the political opposition, and organising a protest to support him; issuing publications about State policy and statements by the organisation\u2019s directors about local authorities\u2019 decisions and environmental principles of State governance; criticising State authorities and Russian laws in a newspaper publication; recommending the ratification of environmental treaties such as the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, in addition to the amendment of existing environmental laws, the adoption of a new law on environmental control, and the establishment of an effective system of environmental control; and participating in an impact assessment of a law amending the local Code of Administrative Offences.<\/p>\n 284. On 22\u00a0May 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On 23\u00a0August 2017 it was liquidated by decision of State authorities.<\/p>\n 285. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 22\u00a0June 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Nizhegorodskiy Court Circuit in Nizhniy Novgorod, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d; (2) 23\u00a0October 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Nizhegorodskiy Court Cicuit, fine for failure to label publications; (3) 9\u00a0December 2016, fine for the organisation\u2019s director for failure to liquidate the organisation; (4)\u00a023\u00a0August 2017, Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court, forced liquidation at the Ministry of Justice\u2019s request.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 286. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a02,140 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying the fine. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a01,050 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 287. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a02,140 (two thousand one hundred and forty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,050 (one thousand and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A14. Ecodefence<\/strong><\/p>\n (Ecodefence and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a09988\/13, lodged on 6\u00a0February 2013)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 288. The applicant organisation is Ecodefence (\u041a\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u042d\u043a\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u0430!-\u0416\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Kaliningrad. It was represented before the Court by P. Leach.<\/p>\n 289. The mission of the applicant organisation: raising awareness of environmental issues.<\/p>\n 290. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Justice Department of the Kaliningrad Region in June 2014. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by Ecoinitiative, the Heinrich B\u00f6ll Foundation, and the Nordic Council of Ministers, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: participating in protests against the construction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Station; advocating Russia\u2019s accession to the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, and the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context; and contributing to the development of education and initiatives in the environmental field.<\/p>\n 291. On 21\u00a0July 2014 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 292. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 8\u00a0September 2014, Justice of the Peace of the Moskovskiy District, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d; (2) 3\u00a0July 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Moskovskiy District, fines for the organisation and its director for failure to provide accounting documents; (3) 14 April, 12 July and 14\u00a0October 2016, 18 January, 17 April, 13 July and 12\u00a0October 2017, Justice of the Peace of the Moskovskiy District, warnings and fines for failures to provide accounting documents; (4) 19 January, 2 September and 26\u00a0December 2016, 7 June and 22\u00a0November 2017, fines for failures to provide accounting documents; (5) 13 and 14\u00a0July 2017, fines for failures to provide information to the Justice Department of the Kaliningrad Region.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 293. The applicant organisation asked the Court to determine the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a0140 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying the fine. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a04,280 for court fees, travel expenses and legal costs.<\/p>\n 294. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a0140 (one hundred and forty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a04,280 (four thousand two hundred and eighty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A15. Ecology and Security Centre<\/strong><\/p>\n (Ecology and Security Centre v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a042351\/15, lodged on 18\u00a0August 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 295. The applicant organisation is the Ecology and Security Centre (\u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u0447\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0434\u043e\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0444\u0435\u0441\u0441\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f “\u0423\u0447\u0435\u0431\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u044d\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0438 \u0438 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Samara. It was represented before the Court by I. Khrunova.<\/p>\n 296. The mission of the applicant organisation: protecting the environment and educating young people about nature protection; and promoting a healthy lifestyle.<\/p>\n 297. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Justice Department of the Samara Region in January 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by unidentified foreign funders, and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: promoting the sustainable management of water resources; suggesting amendments to existing laws, initiatives and measures in relation to water consumers, and environmental actions; presenting the results of a sociological survey at a round-table discussion with a State official on water consumption laws.<\/p>\n 298. On 20\u00a0March 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On 8\u00a0October 2015 it was removed from the register because it was no longer considered a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 299. The following judicial decision was adopted: 10\u00a0April 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Oktyabrskiy Court Circuit, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 300. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a02,140 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying the fine. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a01,050 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 301. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a02,140 (two thousand one hundred and forty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,050 (one thousand and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A16. Far East Centre<\/strong><\/p>\n (Far East Centre v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a053429\/16, lodged on 11\u00a0October 2016)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 302. The applicant organisation is the Far East Centre (\u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0414\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0438\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432 \u0438 \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043d\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430”), a Russian non\u2011commercial organisation founded in Vladivostok. It was represented before the Court by M. Olenichev.<\/p>\n 303. The mission of the applicant organisation: psychological and legal assistance for workers; improving legal awareness and knowledge; the rehabilitation of disabled, unemployed and vulnerable people; the promotion of tolerance; the fight against xenophobia, racism and discrimination.<\/p>\n 304. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Justice Department of the Primorskiy Region in October 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by the International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF Global), Oxfam, and the US Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law (USRF), and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: criticising the programme of social and economic development in the Primorskiy Region; making comments on draft laws relating to State officials\u2019 pay, the \u201cbasket of consumer goods\u201d, and the living wage and social assistance in the Primorskiy Region; making comments on draft guidelines for financial support for NGOs; supporting a petition submitted to the Governor of the Primorskiy Region regarding the regional disability programme; criticising the work of State authorities in the field of business support, including the Ministry of Economic Development; and participating in a conference on social entrepreneurship.<\/p>\n 305. On 13\u00a0October 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 306. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 25\u00a0December 2015, Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d; (2) 6\u00a0June 2016, Leninskiy District Court rejected a challenge to the findings of the inspection.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 307. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a035,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a03,970 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying for the fine and the audit. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a019,090 for court fees and legal costs.<\/p>\n 308. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a03,970 (three thousand nine hundred and seventy euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a02,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A17. Foundation For Nature<\/strong><\/p>\n (Foundation and Movement \u2018For Nature\u2019 v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03085\/16, lodged on 21\u00a0December 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 309. The applicant organisation is the Foundation For Nature (\u0427\u0435\u043b\u044f\u0431\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0431\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0444\u043e\u043d\u0434 “\u0417\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Chelyabinsk. It was represented before the Court by I. Khrunova. Following its liquidation, Mr\u00a0Andrey Aleksandrovich Talevlin, chairman of the applicant organisation, expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 310. The mission of the applicant organisation: the protection of the environment.<\/p>\n 311. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Justice Department of the Chelyabinsk Region in January-February 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by Norges Naturvernforbund and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: promoting the protection of environmental human rights, and activities relating to the protection of the environment and public control over the environment; promoting environment-friendly values, alternative energy sources, environmental education, and so on; organising events to discuss the safe use of nuclear energy; organising volunteers to clean up riverbanks; contributing to the restoration of forests; publishing articles on environmental issues; and analysing ecological situations and posting findings on a website.<\/p>\n 312. On 6\u00a0March 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On an unspecified date it was removed from the register owing to its liquidation for violations of the Foreign Agents Act.<\/p>\n 313. The following judicial decisions were adopted: (1) 25\u00a0December 2014, fine for failure to provide documents for inspection; (2) 13\u00a0May 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Tsentralnyy District, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d; (3) 15\u00a0July 2016, Justice of the Peace of the Tsentralnyy District, fine for failure to provide accounting documents; (4) 13\u00a0December 2016, Chelyabinsk Regional Court, forced liquidation owing to multiple violations of the Foreign Agents Act.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 314. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a01,570 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying the fines. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a01,050 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 315. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a01,570 (one thousand five hundred and seventy euros) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,050 (one thousand and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A18. Freedom of Information Fund<\/strong><\/p>\n (Freedom of Information Fund v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a025934\/15, lodged on 26\u00a0May 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 316. The applicant organisation is the Freedom of Information Fund (\u0424\u043e\u043d\u0434 “\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0420\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0421\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u044b \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438”), a Russian non\u2011commercial organisation founded in St Petersburg. It was represented before the Court by I. Khrunova.<\/p>\n 317. The mission of the applicant organisation: promoting freedom of information and the right to seek and receive information; and contributing to transparency in State governance.<\/p>\n 318. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Tsentralnyy District of St Petersburg in July 2013 and January 2014. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by NED and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: having a discussion with the US President about the political and social situation in Russia, the activities of the Open Governments Partnership (a multilateral initiative promoting government transparency), Russian laws on extremism, harmful information, children\u2019s rights and the protection of intellectual property; making information on the discussion available to the general public; posting a publication on its website on amendments to Russian laws on personal data, access to classified information and prosecutors\u2019 powers, comparing these laws with international standards and giving a negative assessment of the laws; organising voting to determine those who had contributed to freedom of information and those who had impeded transparency, and convincing the public that the State authorities were ineffective in this field; participating in a summit of the Open Governments Partnership and providing misleading information on State authorities to the partnership\u2019s members; and monitoring the State authorities\u2019 websites and making findings available to the public.<\/p>\n 319. On 28\u00a0August 2014 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 320. The following judicial decision was adopted: 5\u00a0September 2014, Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg held that the prosecutor\u2019s actions were lawful (upheld on appeal on 21\u00a0January 2015).<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 321. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a01,050 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 322. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,050 (one thousand and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A19. Freeinform<\/strong><\/p>\n (Freeinform v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a055272\/15, lodged on 3\u00a0November 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 323. The applicant organisation is Freeinform (\u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f “\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 “\u0424\u0420\u0418\u0418\u041d\u0424\u041e\u0420\u041c”), a Russian non-commercial organisation founded in Moscow. It was represented before the Court by I. Sharapov. Following its liquidation, Ms\u00a0Yuliya Yevgenyevna Galyamina, director of the applicant organisation, expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 324. The mission of the applicant organisation: supporting educational initiatives and providing information support.<\/p>\n 325. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Moscow Justice Department in April-May 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by NED and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: raising awareness about the terrorist attack in Beslan; and maintaining a web aggregator which enabled human rights defenders and other activists to publish their blogs.<\/p>\n 326. On 22\u00a0June 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents. On 21\u00a0June 2016 it was removed from the register because it had been liquidated owing to its inability to pay the fine.<\/p>\n 327. The following judicial decision was adopted: 29\u00a0June 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Zamoskvorechye District, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 328. The applicant organisation claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a01,050 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 329. The Court awards the applicant organisation EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,050 (one thousand and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A20. Fund 19\/29<\/strong><\/p>\n (Pasko and Fund 19\/29 v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a055280\/15, lodged on 3\u00a0November 2015)<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Facts<\/em><\/p>\n 330. The applicants are Fund 19\/29 (\u0424\u043e\u043d\u0434 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u043a\u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0436\u0443\u0440\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0438 – \u0424\u043e\u043d\u0434 19\/29), a Russian non\u2011commercial organisation founded in Moscow, and its director, Grigoriy Mikhaylovich Pasko. They were represented before the Court by I. Sharapov. Following the liquidation of the applicant organisation, Mr\u00a0Pasko, the second applicant and its director, expressed a wish to continue the proceedings in its stead.<\/p>\n 331. The mission of the applicant organisation: the protection of journalists\u2019 right to freedom of expression and right to receive information; and the development of civil society in Russia.<\/p>\n 332. An inspection of the applicant organisation was carried out by the Moscow Justice Department in April 2015. It was established that the applicant organisation was funded by NED and had engaged in the following actions which were taken to constitute \u201cpolitical activities\u201d: contributing to the education of bloggers on their rights, ethics, language and methods of investigative journalism; providing training on journalistic investigations and policies relating to blogging, ethics and blogging culture, and on relations with the authorities and the opposition; publishing training material on a website; criticising State authorities and the Russian President\u2019s policy; publishing information on journalistic investigations on its website; and also posting on the Internet the blogs of well-known opposition activists critical of the Russian political system, the situation in Ukraine, and relations between the authorities and journalists.<\/p>\n 333. On 24\u00a0April 2015 the applicant organisation was included on the Ministry of Justice\u2019s register of foreign agents.<\/p>\n 334. The following judicial decision was adopted: 8\u00a0June 2015, Justice of the Peace of the Presnenskiy District of Moscow, fine for failure to register as a \u201cforeign agent\u201d. It was established that the term \u201cforeign funding\u201d included any funds received by an NGO from a \u201cforeign source\u201d, irrespective of their classification under civil or tax law, and that, although Fund 19\/29\u2019s employees had not publicly expressed their political views, by disseminating the views of various politicians among the general public, Fund 19\/29 had influenced public opinion.<\/p>\n 2. Claims and awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 335. The applicants claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and sought the equivalent of EUR\u00a04,290 in respect of pecuniary damage sustained as a result of paying the fine. The claim in respect of costs and expenses amounted to EUR\u00a01,050 for legal costs.<\/p>\n 336. The Court awards the applicants EUR\u00a04,290 (four thousand two hundred and ninety euros) jointly in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a010,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR\u00a01,050 (one thousand and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n A21. Gagarin Park<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nCASE OF ECODEFENCE AND OTHERS v.\u00a0RUSSIA<\/strong>
\n(Applications nos.\u00a09988\/13 and 60 others \u2013 see appended list)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT<\/p>\n
\nArt 34 \u2022 Hinder the exercise of the right of petition \u2022 Failure to comply with interim measure indicated by the Court through enforcement of dissolution order against a non-governmental organisation<\/p>\n
\n14\u00a0June 2022<\/p>\n
\nGeorges Ravarani, President,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides,
\nDarian Pavli,
\nAnja Seibert-Fohr,
\nPeeter Roosma,
\nAndreas Z\u00fcnd,
\nFr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Krenc, judges,
\nand Milan Bla\u0161ko, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n