Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic authorities\u2019 refusal to grant him a special pension for his years of service with the prosecution authorities had breached his property rights and had been discriminatory. He also complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the domestic proceedings had been excessively lengthy.<\/p>\n
FIFTH SECTION Art 6 \u00a7 1 (civil) \u2022 Reasonable time \u2022 Excessive length of proceedings<\/p>\n STRASBOURG This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Ramiz Jafarov v. Azerbaijan,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a040424\/12) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by an Azerbaijani national, Mr Ramiz Ismayil oglu Jafarov (Ramiz \u0130smay\u0131l o\u011flu C\u0259f\u0259rov \u2013 \u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 14 June 2012;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Azerbaijani Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the complaints under Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the length of the domestic proceedings, the alleged breach of the applicant\u2019s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and the alleged discrimination in the enjoyment of this right, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having regard to the withdrawal of Judge L. H\u00fcseynov, the judge elected in respect of Azerbaijan (Rule 28 of the Rules of Court) and the decision of the President of the Chamber to designate Judge L. Chanturia to sit as an ad hoc judge (Rule 29 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Rules of Court)<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 17 May 2022,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic authorities\u2019 refusal to grant him a special pension for his years of service with the prosecution authorities had breached his property rights and had been discriminatory. He also complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the domestic proceedings had been excessively lengthy.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Baku. He was represented by Mr A. Layij, a lawyer based in Azerbaijan.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr \u00c7. \u018fsg\u0259rov.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 5. The applicant, who graduated from Baku State University\u2019s law faculty in 1977, held various positions (investigator, deputy prosecutor and prosecutor) between 1 August 1977 and 1\u00a0September 2000 (a total of twenty\u2011three years and one month). He worked as a judge from 1 September 2000 to 28 July 2007.<\/p>\n 6. In April 2007 the applicant, who had not yet reached pensionable age (sixty-two for men at the material time), applied to the State Social Protection Fund (D\u00f6vl\u0259t Sosial M\u00fcdafi\u0259 Fondu \u2013 \u201cthe SSPF\u201d) for a special pension for his years of service with the prosecution authorities.<\/p>\n 7. By a letter dated 22 May 2007, the SSPF dismissed his request, informing him that he had not completed the statutory minimum period of service with the prosecution authorities (twenty-five years at the material time) to be entitled to the pension claimed.<\/p>\n 8. On 20 November 2007 the applicant brought an action against the SSPF, asking the court to declare its refusal unlawful. He argued that the SSPF had incorrectly calculated his years of service with the prosecution authorities since it had not taken into account his five years at the law faculty between 1972 and 1977 and seven years serving as a judge between 2000 and 2007.<\/p>\n 9. On 17 December 2007 the Yasamal District Court partly allowed the applicant\u2019s claim, holding that his years of service as a judge should be taken into account in calculating his length of service with the prosecution authorities and that he should be granted a pension as an employee of the prosecution authorities as from 1 January 2006.<\/p>\n 10. Following an appeal by both parties, on 7 May 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the SSPF\u2019s appeal and partly allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The appellate court held that the applicant\u2019s years of service as a judge should be taken into account and that he should be granted 50% of the pension of an employee of the prosecution authorities for the period from 1 August 2002 to 27 June 2007 and the full amount as from 27\u00a0June 2007.<\/p>\n 11. Both parties appealed in cassation. On 26 September 2008 the Supreme Court allowed the SSPF\u2019s cassation appeal and remitted the case for fresh examination, finding that the lower court had failed to correctly apply the relevant law.<\/p>\n 12. On 14 January 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal quashed the Yasamal District Court\u2019s judgment of 17 December 2007 and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that, under Article 9.4 of the Law on Work Pensions and Article 32.4 of the Law on Service with the Prosecution Authorities, a person who had served at least twenty-five years with the prosecution authorities was entitled to an old-age pension for his years of service. However, the applicant had only served twenty-three years and one month with the prosecution authorities and, on his own initiative, had left that post in order to become a judge before reaching the requisite twenty-five years of service. The appellate court also found that domestic law did not at the material time provide for years of study to be taken into account for the purposes of calculating years of service with the prosecution authorities for entitlement to a pension. Lastly, it held that the applicant\u2019s years of service as a judge, his last place of work, should not be added to his years of service with the prosecution authorities, his former place of work; on the contrary, his years of service with the prosecution authorities should be added to the calculation of his years of service as a judge.<\/p>\n 13. On 21 April 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the appellate court\u2019s judgment of 14 January 2009 and remitted the case to the lower court for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 14. On 26 August 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal delivered a new judgment, again quashing the Yasamal District Court\u2019s judgment of 17\u00a0December 2007 and dismissing the applicant\u2019s claim. Its reasoning was similar to that of 14 January 2009.<\/p>\n 15. On 25 December 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the appellate court\u2019s judgment of 26 August 2009 and remitted the case to the lower court for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 16. On 3 February 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal delivered a new judgment, partly quashing the Yasamal District Court\u2019s judgment of 17\u00a0December 2007 and allowing the applicant\u2019s appeal in full. It held that the applicant\u2019s years of study at the law faculty and years of service as a judge should be taken into account in calculating his years of service with the prosecution authorities and that, accordingly, he was entitled to a pension for his years of service with the prosecution authorities as from 19 July 2001.<\/p>\n 17. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 3 February 2010.<\/p>\n 18. Following an additional cassation appeal by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, on 11 November 2010 the Plenum of the Supreme Court quashed the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 27 May 2010 and the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 3 February 2010 and remitted the case to the appellate court for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 19. On 10 February 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal delivered a new judgment, again quashing the Yasamal District Court\u2019s judgment of 17\u00a0December 2007 and dismissing the applicant\u2019s claim.<\/p>\n 20. On 8 June 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 10 February 2011 and delivered a new judgment on the merits. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for his years of study at the law faculty to be taken into account in calculating his years of service with the prosecution authorities, but found that his years of service as a judge should be taken into consideration in that calculation.<\/p>\n 21. Following a request by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, on 18 May 2012 the Constitutional Court delivered a decision on the constitutionality of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 8 June 2011. It held that the decision in question was contrary to the provisions of Article 32.5 of the Law on Service with the Prosecution Authorities and Article 9.4.1 of the Law on Work Pensions.<\/p>\n However, in the same decision, it also recommended to the Milli Mejlis (Parliament) of the Republic of Azerbaijan that it improve the legislation on social protection of employees of the prosecution authorities and judges in the light of the provisions of Article 14 of the Convention. The relevant part of its decision reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn that connection, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 32.4 of the Law on Service with the Prosecution Authorities, employees who have served with the prosecution authorities for at least twenty-five years before reaching the age limit are entitled to a pension for years of service and may be removed from service at their request. At the same time, Article 9 of the Law on Work Pensions, dealing with other persons entitled to a work pension on preferential terms, which subsequently entered into force, also establishes the right to a pension of employees of the prosecution authorities who have served with the prosecution authorities for at least twenty-five years (Article 9.4.1).<\/p>\n In order to clarify the notion of service with the prosecution authorities, it is necessary to have regard to Article 32.5 of the Law on Service with the Prosecution Authorities. Thus, under this provision, when employees of the prosecution authorities are transferred to the judiciary [the post of judge] or other law-enforcement bodies, their years of service with the prosecution authorities are included in the years of service with those bodies. The years of service of employees recruited from those bodies, as well as positions related to the coordination of law-enforcement agencies, legislative or organisational support, shall be included in the years of service with the prosecution authorities in accordance with the procedure established by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Azerbaijan.<\/p>\n Accordingly, the legislation provides for two possibilities for entitlement to a pension of employees of the prosecution authorities \u2013 twenty-five years of service with the prosecution authorities or the inclusion of the years of service with other relevant bodies, including the judiciary [the post of judge], when transferred to the prosecution authorities. In this case, when a former judge joins the prosecution authorities and his years of service in the judiciary [the post of judge] are included in the years of service with the prosecution authorities, that person may be entitled to a preferential right to a pension as an employee of the prosecution authorities. On the other hand, the above\u2011mentioned legislative acts do not provide a person who has worked most of the length of his service with the prosecution authorities but has moved from the prosecution authorities to other relevant bodies, including the judiciary [the post of judge], without having completed twenty-five years of service with the prosecution authorities with a preferential right to a pension as an employee of the prosecution authorities by merging his subsequent service as a judge with his years of service with the prosecution authorities.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n It appears from the above explanations that a privileged difference in terms of social security appeared between a person who had spent most of his service with the prosecution authorities but without reaching twenty-five years of service became a judge, and a person who was transferred from the judiciary [the post of judge] to the prosecution authorities.<\/p>\n In this connection, it should be kept in mind that in accordance with Article 14 of the Convention … the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n In this regard, the Plenum of the Constitutional Court notes that such a distinction in the matter of preferential pensions in social security between persons occupying a similar position within the judiciary power is not based on any objective and justified reasons.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Plenum of the Constitutional Court concludes that:<\/p>\n The Milli Mejlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan should be recommended to improve the provisions of the legislation on social security of employees of the prosecution authorities, as well as judges, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Constitution, as well as Article 14 of the Convention;<\/p>\n The decision of the Supreme Court\u2019s Civil Chamber dated 8 June 2011 in the civil case concerning R. Jafarov\u2019s claim should be considered contrary to Article 60 of the Constitution, as well as Article 32.5 of the Law on Service with the Prosecution Authorities and Article 9.4.1 of the Law on Work Pensions, and the case shall be reconsidered in accordance with this decision pursuant to the procedure established by the civil procedure legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan.<\/p>\n At the same time, as resolving the civil case in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution, as well as the Convention, makes it necessary to improve the regulation of the right to a preferential pension of employees of the prosecution authorities, the Plenum of the Constitutional Court considers that the civil case concerning R. Jafarov\u2019s claim should be reconsidered by the court following the improvement of the legislation by the legislature.\u201d<\/p>\n 22. It appears from the documents in the case file that in 2013 the Milli Mejlis discussed the matter but did not amend the legislation.<\/p>\n 23. By a decision of 30 October 2015, the Plenum of the Supreme Court, referring to the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 18 May 2012 (see paragraph 21 above), quashed the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 8 June 2011 and the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 10 February 2011 and remitted the case to the appellate court for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 24. On 28 January 2016 the Baku Court of Appeal delivered a new judgment on the merits. The appellate court quashed the Yasamal District Court\u2019s judgment of 17 December 2007 and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, finding that he was not entitled to the special pension claimed under the relevant domestic law.<\/p>\n 25. On 6 March 2017 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 28 January 2016.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE<\/strong><\/p>\n I. Constitution of the republic of azerbaijan<\/strong><\/p>\n 26. The relevant part of Article 7 of the Constitution provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIII. State power in the Republic of Azerbaijan shall be based on the principle of separation of powers: legislative power shall be exercised by the Milli Mejlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan; executive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan; judicial power shall be exercised by the courts of the Republic of Azerbaijan.<\/p>\n IV. In accordance with the provisions of the present Constitution the legislative, executive and judicial power interact and are independent within the limits of their respective authority.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 60 of the Constitution read, at the material time, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cI. The rights and liberties of everyone are guaranteed in courts.<\/p>\n II. Everyone may appeal against the decision and actions (or inaction) of state bodies, political parties, trade unions and other public associations and their officials in courts.\u201d<\/p>\n II. Law of 29\u00a0June 2001 on service WITH the prosecutiON authorities<\/strong><\/p>\n 27. The relevant part of Article 32 (age limit of service with the prosecution authorities) of the Law on Service with the Prosecution Authorities read, at the material time, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c32.4. Employees of the prosecution authorities who have served with the prosecution authorities for at least twenty-five years before reaching the age limit are entitled to a pension for years of service and may be removed from service at their request.<\/p>\n 32.5. Employees of the prosecution authorities, when transferred to the judiciary [the post of judge] or other law-enforcement bodies, including the emergency services, their years of service with the prosecution authorities are included in their years of service with those bodies. The years of service of employees recruited from those bodies, as well as from positions related to the coordination of law-enforcement agencies, legislative or organisational support, shall be included in the years of service with the prosecution authorities in accordance with the procedure established by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Azerbaijan.\u201d<\/p>\n III. Law of 7 February 2006 on WORK Pensions<\/strong><\/p>\n 28. The relevant part of Article 9 (other persons entitled to a work pension on preferential terms) of the Law on Work Pensions read, at the material time, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c9.4. The following persons who have served with the prosecution authorities have the right to an old-age pension (ya\u015fa g\u00f6r\u0259 \u0259m\u0259k pensiyas\u0131):<\/p>\n 9.4.1. Employees of the prosecution authorities who have served with the prosecution authorities for at least twenty-five years;\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. Scope of the application<\/strong><\/p>\n 29. In his observations in reply to those of the Government, submitted on 23 July 2019, the applicant appeared to complain of a breach of the legal certainty principle under Article 6 of the Convention on account of the domestic courts\u2019 contradictory judgments in his case.<\/p>\n 30. However, the Court observes that on 13 December 2018 the Government were given notice of the applicant\u2019s original complaint, raised in his application under Article 6 of the Convention, concerning the length of the domestic proceedings. The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the alleged breach of the legal certainty principle cannot be regarded as an elaboration on his original complaint under Article 6 of the Convention concerning the length of the domestic proceedings. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to take up this matter in the context of the present case (see Aliyeva and Others v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos. 66249\/16 and 6 others, \u00a7\u00a7 94-96, 21 September 2021).<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 to THE CONVENTION taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 31. The applicant complained that the domestic authorities\u2019 refusal to grant him a special pension for his years of service with the prosecution authorities had breached his property rights and had been discriminatory. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 14 of the Convention, which read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 1 of Protocol No. 1<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 14<\/p>\n \u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d<\/p>\n 32. The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n 33. The applicant maintained his complaint.<\/p>\n 34. The Court observes that the Government did not raise any plea of inadmissibility before it regarding compatibility ratione materiae with the Convention and the Protocols thereto. However, it considers that this question concerns a matter which goes to its jurisdiction and that, as such, it is not prevented from examining it of its own motion (see B\u00e9l\u00e1n\u00e9 Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no.\u00a053080\/13, \u00a7 71, 13 December 2016).<\/p>\n 35. Accordingly, the main question which the Court must determine at the outset is whether the domestic authorities\u2019 refusal to grant the applicant the special pension in question in the particular circumstances of the present case amounted to an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention.<\/p>\n 36. The Court reiterates that the concept of \u201cpossession\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of material goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as \u201cproperty rights\u201d, and thus as \u201cpossessions\u201d for the purposes of this provision (see Iatridis v.\u00a0Greece [GC], no.\u00a031107\/96, \u00a7\u00a054, ECHR 1999-II).<\/p>\n 37. Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applies only to a person\u2019s existing possessions and does not create a right to acquire property (see Stummer v. Austria [GC], no. 37452\/02, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2011), in certain circumstances a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d of obtaining an asset may also enjoy the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 (see, among many authorities, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049\/01, \u00a7\u00a065, ECHR 2007-I).<\/p>\n 38. Thus, where a proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim, the person in whom it is vested may be regarded as having a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d if there is a sufficient basis for the interest in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming its existence (see Kopeck\u00fd v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912\/98, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2004\u2011IX). However, no legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant\u2019s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (ibid., \u00a7 50). Furthermore, the belief that the law then in force would be changed to the applicant\u2019s advantage cannot be regarded as a form of legitimate expectation for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. There is a difference between a mere hope, however understandable that hope may be, and a legitimate expectation, which must be of a nature more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial decision (see Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794\/98, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2002\u2011VII).<\/p>\n 39. The Court also reiterates that Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 does not guarantee, as such, any right to a pension of a particular amount (see B\u00e9l\u00e1n\u00e9 Nagy, cited above, \u00a7 84, and Yava\u015f and Others v. Turkey, no. 36366\/06, \u00a7 40, 5 March 2019). Furthermore, where the amount of a benefit is reduced or discontinued, this may constitute an interference with possessions which requires to be justified (see Rasmussen v. Poland, no. 38886\/05, \u00a7 71, 28\u00a0April 2009). Where, however, the person concerned does not satisfy, or ceases to satisfy, the legal conditions laid down in domestic law for the grant of such benefits, there is no interference with the rights under Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 (see Bellet, Huertas and Vialatte v.\u00a0France (dec.), no.\u00a040832\/98 27 April 1999; Richardson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a026252\/08, \u00a7 17, 10 April 2012; and Damjanac v. Croatia, no. 52943\/10, \u00a7 86, 24 October 2013).<\/p>\n 40. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the principal issue for it is to determine whether there was a sufficient basis in the relevant domestic law, as interpreted by the domestic courts, for the applicant to claim the special pension in question (compare Kopeck\u00fd, \u00a7 54, and Damjanac, \u00a7 87, both cited above).<\/p>\n 41. In that connection, the Court observes that the domestic courts at all levels, including the Constitutional Court, were called upon to interpret the relevant domestic law and concluded, albeit after initially taking divergent positions, that the relevant legal provisions at the material time did not confer a right on the applicant to claim the special pension in question on the grounds that he had not completed the statutory minimum period of service with the prosecution authorities to be granted such a pension.<\/p>\n 42. In these circumstances, having regard to the fact that it is in the first place for the domestic authorities, namely the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, the Court finds that neither domestic law nor the domestic courts\u2019 case-law can be considered to have given rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the applicant that he would be entitled to the special pension claimed.<\/p>\n 43. Moreover, the Court does not consider that the Constitutional Court\u2019s recommendation to improve the relevant legislation can be considered to be a legal ground for establishing the applicant\u2019s legitimate expectation. The Court notes that the Constitutional Court did not declare the relevant provisions of domestic law unconstitutional, even though it could have done so, and instead confined itself to recommending to Parliament that it amend the relevant legislation. However, this mere recommendation does not prevent the Parliament from freely exercising its legislative function in compliance with the Constitution (see paragraph 26 above and compare Sukhanov and Ilchenko v. Ukraine, nos. 68385\/10 and 71378\/10, \u00a7 37, 26\u00a0June 2014). It then clearly appears to the Court that there was no legal basis on which the applicant could rely to justify his claim of a special pension.<\/p>\n 44. Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot but conclude that the applicant did not have a \u201cpossession\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. His complaint under this provision is therefore incompatible\u00a0ratione materiae\u00a0with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04.<\/p>\n 45. As regards the applicant\u2019s reliance on Article 14, the Court reiterates that that provision has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. Its application presupposes that the facts of the case fall \u201cwithin the ambit\u201d of one or more of the provisions in question (see, among many other authorities, Andrejeva v.\u00a0Latvia [GC], no.\u00a055707\/00, \u00a7\u00a074, ECHR 2009).<\/p>\n 46. The Court concludes that the facts of the case do not fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It follows that Article 14 is likewise not applicable and that this part of the application should also be rejected as being incompatible\u00a0ratione materiae\u00a0with the provisions of the Convention in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 (see Gratzinger and Gratzingerova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 76-77, and Persjanow v.\u00a0Poland (dec.), no. 39247\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a055\u201156, 11 December 2018).<\/p>\n III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 47. The applicant complained that the domestic proceedings had been excessively lengthy. The relevant part of Article 6 of the Convention reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 48. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies because he had not lodged a complaint regarding a breach of the reasonable time requirement and claiming compensation for the alleged violation.<\/p>\n 49. The applicant maintained his complaint.<\/p>\n 50. A similar objection was already raised by the Government in a previous case against Azerbaijan and was dismissed by the Court, which found that they had not shown that such a separate claim was capable of providing the applicant with direct and speedy redress, by expediting the proceedings at issue. The Court also held that the Government have not shown that such a claim offered any reasonable prospects of obtaining adequate compensation for the delay that had already occurred and the proceedings for obtaining the compensation for the length of the proceedings operated without excessive delays (see Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a016528\/05, \u00a7 44, 10 July 2008). The Court sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case and considers that the Government\u2019s objection should be dismissed.<\/p>\n 51. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 52. The applicant maintained his complaint.<\/p>\n 53. The Government pointed to the absence of substantial periods of inactivity on the part of the domestic courts and the complexity of the domestic proceedings.<\/p>\n 54. The Court notes that in the present case the period to be taken into consideration began on 20 November 2007, the date on which the civil proceedings were instituted, and ended on 6 March 2017, the date on which the Supreme Court delivered its final decision. Thus, in total, the proceedings lasted more than nine years, three months and fourteen days.<\/p>\n 55. The Court reiterates that it is for the Contracting States to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts are able to guarantee the right of everyone to obtain a final decision on disputes concerning civil rights and obligations within a reasonable time (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943\/11, \u00a7 142, 29 November 2016). The reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed, in accordance with well-established case-law, in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no.\u00a030979\/96, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2000\u2011VII, and Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931\/13, \u00a7 209, 27 June 2017).<\/p>\n 56. The Court observes that the domestic proceedings were not characterised by particularly long periods of inactivity on the part of the domestic courts, except for the period between the delivery of the Constitution Court\u2019s decision on 18 May 2012 and the Plenum of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 30 October 2015, which lasted around three years, five months and twelve days. In any event, the total length of the proceedings was excessive, which seems to have been caused by the fact that the case was examined on numerous occasions at various levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 57. The Court is of the view that the case was not particularly legally complex, but involved a different interpretation of the relevant domestic law by various domestic courts and examination by the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n 58. Moreover, as regards what was at stake for the applicant, special diligence was required in the present case, which concerned a pension dispute (see Pej\u010di\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 34799\/07, \u00a7 70, 8 October 2013, and Somorjai v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 60934\/13, \u00a7 71, 28 August 2018).<\/p>\n 59. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings as a whole was excessive and failed to meet the reasonable time requirement. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1.<\/p>\n IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 60. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 61. The applicant claimed 177,783 Azerbaijani manats in respect of pecuniary damage for his inability to obtain the special pension claimed. He also claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 62. The Government submitted that the amounts claimed by the applicant were unsubstantiated and excessive.<\/p>\n 63. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant. However, the Court considers that he has suffered non-pecuniary damage on account of the excessive length of the proceedings which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of violation, and that compensation should thus be awarded. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 2,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.<\/p>\n B. Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 64. The applicant claimed EUR 2,000 for legal services incurred before the Court. He submitted a contract concluded with his representative in support of his claim and asked that the compensation in that connection be paid directly into his representative\u2019s bank account.<\/p>\n 65. The Government considered that the amount claimed by the applicant was unsubstantiated and excessive.<\/p>\n 66. According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the amount of work carried out by the applicant\u2019s representative, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a01,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. The amount awarded in that respect is to be paid directly into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative.<\/p>\n C. Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 67. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention concerning the length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State, at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 June 2022, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Victor Soloveytchik \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary
\nCASE OF RAMIZ JAFAROV v. AZERBAIJAN<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 40424\/12)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT<\/p>\n
\n16 June 2022<\/p>\n
\nM\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits,
\nSt\u00e9phanie Mourou-Vikstr\u00f6m,
\nLado Chanturia,
\nIvana Jeli\u0107,
\nArnfinn B\u00e5rdsen,
\nKate\u0159ina \u0160im\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1, judges,
\nand Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 President<\/p>\n