The case concerns an alleged breach of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the domestic courts\u2019 disregard of the final judgment recognising the applicant\u2019s title to a flat and conferring the title to the same flat to a third person.<\/p>\n
FIFTH SECTION This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Grynenko v. Ukraine,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a\u00a0Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Lado Chanturia, President, Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a065890\/13) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Ukrainian national, Mr\u00a0Pavlo Yuriyovych Grynenko (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 4 October 2013;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (\u201cthe\u00a0Government\u201d) of the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 9 June 2022,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The case concerns an alleged breach of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the domestic courts\u2019 disregard of the final judgment recognising the applicant\u2019s title to a flat and conferring the title to the same flat to a third person.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Lviv. He was represented before the Court by Mr A. Kychenok, a lawyer practising in Kyiv.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n I. Background to the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. On 18 August 2003 the applicant signed an investment contract (\u201cthe\u00a02003 contract\u201d) with LDBK no. 2 (\u201c\u041b\u044c\u0432\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0431\u0443\u0434\u0456\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0431\u0456\u043d\u0430\u0442 \u21162\u201d), a private construction company. Under the terms of the\u00a0contract the applicant was to finance the construction of a flat (flat no. 8) in an apartment building; in exchange, LDBK no. 2 was to transfer the\u00a0ownership of that flat to the applicant once the construction work had been completed and the utilities had become operational. By the end of 2004 the\u00a0applicant had fulfilled his obligations under the contract.<\/p>\n 6. In August 2005 LDBK no. 2 lodged a claim against the applicant, seeking the termination of the 2003 contract and compensation for an alleged breach of contractual obligations. The applicant lodged a counterclaim in November 2005, arguing that he had fully complied with the terms of the contract and seeking confirmation that the legal title to the flat belonged to him (\u201cthe first set of proceedings\u201d). On 23 December 2005 the first-instance court allowed LDBK no. 2\u2019s claim and terminated the 2003 contract. The\u00a0applicant appealed against that decision.<\/p>\n 7. In the meantime, on 30 December 2005 LDBK no.\u00a02, without the applicant\u2019s knowledge and consent, entered into a contract (\u201cthe 2005 contract\u201d) with LDBK (\u201c\u041b\u044c\u0432\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0431\u0443\u0434\u0456\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0431\u0456\u043d\u0430\u0442\u201d), another private construction company, which in turn, on 4\u00a0January 2006 signed an\u00a0investment contract with K. (\u201cthe 2006 contract\u201d), under which the\u00a0ownership of the flat was to be transferred to K. after the completion of the construction work.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0Following sets of court proceedings, on 3 June 2010 the Higher Commercial Court (\u201cthe HCC\u201d) eventually dismissed LDBK no. 2\u2019s claim against the applicant (see paragraph 6 above) and allowed the applicant\u2019s counterclaim, finding that the applicant had duly complied with his obligations under the 2003 contract and had thus acquired title (\u043c\u0430\u0439\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0456 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430) to the flat. The HCC\u2019s judgment was not amenable to further appeal.<\/p>\n 9. On 3 August 2010 an application lodged by K. seeking to have the proceedings reopened on account of newly discovered circumstances was rejected by the Lviv Regional Commercial Court as K. had not been a party to the proceedings and thus had no right under the law to seek a review. Similar applications lodged by the prosecutor\u2019s office and LDBK were also rejected by the courts.<\/p>\n 10. In December 2010 the applicant instituted proceedings against LDBK no. 2. and LDBK, seeking to have the 2005 contract declared unlawful and to have it rescinded. By a final decision of 11 August 2011, the HCC allowed the applicant\u2019s claim and declared the 2005 contract null and void ab initio, as at the time of its signing, a valid investment contract had already been concluded in respect of the same flat between the applicant and LDBK no. 2, the terms of which the applicant had duly fulfilled.<\/p>\n 11. In June 2011 LDBK no. 2, in its turn, instituted proceedings against the applicant, seeking to have the 2003 contract rescinded, arguing that the\u00a0contract lacked important substantive elements. The claim was eventually rejected by the domestic courts.<\/p>\n II. Proceedings brought by K.<\/strong><\/p>\n 12. On 9 April 2009 K. instituted proceedings (\u201cthe second set of proceedings\u201d) in the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Lviv (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) against LDBK, seeking to have her ownership of the flat recognised by virtue of the 2006 contract, as LDBK had failed to transfer ownership of the flat to her, in breach of that contract. LDBK acknowledged the claim as well-founded, and on 21 April 2009 the District Court allowed the claim. The\u00a0applicant appealed, arguing that he had not been notified that the\u00a0proceedings would take place, even though they had concerned his rights and obligations, given that he had title to the flat.<\/p>\n 13. On 10 December 2009 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal allowed an\u00a0appeal lodged by the applicant, quashed the judgment of 9 April 2009 and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. During the new first-instance hearing, the applicant, who had been admitted to the\u00a0proceedings as a third party, sought to have the 2006 contract declared null and void and to have K. evicted from the flat. He argued, inter alia, that by virtue of the 2003 contract \u2013 which had been declared valid and fulfilled and which he had signed three years earlier than K. had signed the 2006 contract \u2013 he had title to the flat, although he had never been granted access to it.<\/p>\n 14. On 31 March 2011 the District Court suspended the proceedings until another set of proceedings instituted by the applicant concerning the validity of the investment contract of 30 December 2005 between LDBK no. 2. and LDBK could be resolved (see paragraph 10 above). The District Court noted that the outcome of those proceedings would be decisive for the case that it was hearing.<\/p>\n 15. On 20 June 2011 LDBK no. 2 offered the applicant the opportunity to invest in another flat and stated that it would apply the contribution he had made under the 2003 contract to the new flat. The applicant rejected the offer, stating, inter alia, that it was insufficiently detailed. He insisted that LDBK no. 2 comply with the 2003 contract.<\/p>\n 16. On 12 March 2012 the District Court confirmed K.\u2019s title to the flat in issue and rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found, inter alia, that K. had acquired the flat in good faith, had fully complied with her investment contract, had moved into the flat and performed renovation work and that her eviction would constitute a breach of her rights. The court noted that by virtue of Article 620 of the Civil Code, the disputed flat could not be taken from K., as it was already being used by her. While conceding that final decisions delivered by the HCC had confirmed the applicant\u2019s title to the flat, the court noted that those decisions had only been delivered in 2010, whereas K. had concluded her investment contract in 2006, when the applicant had not had any property title to the flat.<\/p>\n 17. The applicant lodged an appeal, relying on, inter alia, the final and binding judgment given by the HCC on 3 June 2010, which had established the relevant facts and confirmed his title to the disputed flat. He furthermore submitted that the 2005 contract between LDBK no. 2. and LDBK had been declared invalid ab initio by the courts and had therefore not entailed any legal consequences.<\/p>\n 18. On 19 November 2012 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, referring to the same grounds as had the District Court. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, inter alia, that the\u00a0lower courts had not respected the principle of res judicata and had acted in breach of Article 6 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 19. On 30 January 2013 K. registered her property rights to the flat with the relevant State authority and obtained a title deed.<\/p>\n 20. By a final decision of 9 April 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, stating in a\u00a0general way that there had been no evidence of a breach of material law or procedural law by the lower courts.<\/p>\n 21. On 14 November 2013 LDBK no.\u00a02 was liquidated following bankruptcy proceedings.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/p>\n 22.\u00a0Article 620 of the Civil Code, as in force at the relevant time, provided, inter alia, that a creditor was to be considered to have lost his or her right to lodge a vindicatory claim in respect of an identifiable item if the item had already been transferred to another person\u2019s possession or use. If the item in question had not yet been transferred, the title to it was to be given to creditor in respect of whom the obligation had arisen; if it was not possible to identify that creditor, it was to be given to the creditor who had first lodged the claim.<\/p>\n 23. Article 61 of the Code of\u00a0Civil Procedure, as in force at the relevant time, provided that once a judgment became effective, the circumstances established therein should not have to be proved again in another case to which the person in respect of whom the circumstances had been established was a party.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6\u00a0OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 24. The applicant complained that the domestic courts had acted in breach of the principle of legal certainty. He relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the\u00a0Convention. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 alone, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 25. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article\u00a035 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 26. The applicant argued that the domestic courts had breached the\u00a0principle of legal certainty when they had allowed K.\u2019s claim and disregarded the binding court decisions delivered earlier in his favour and the\u00a0facts established thereby.<\/p>\n 27. The Government submitted that the domestic courts\u2019 findings in respect of K.\u2019s title to the flat at issue had been based on careful examination of the relevant factual and legal circumstances. There had been nothing arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable in the courts\u2019 decisions.<\/p>\n 28. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty, encompasses the requirement that, where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Brum\u0103rescu v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a028342\/95, \u00a7\u00a061, ECHR 1999\u2011VII; Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova, no. 14385\/04, \u00a7 97, 19 December 2006; and Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 47797\/99 and 68698\/01, \u00a7 61, 12\u00a0January 2006).<\/p>\n 29. The Court also reiterates that it should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 the judgment of the national courts unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Bochan v.\u00a0Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no.\u00a022251\/08, \u00a7\u00a061, ECHR 2015, with further references). In particular, a judgment is manifestly unreasonable if it does not contain any connection between the established facts, the applicable law and the outcome of the proceedings (see An\u0111elkovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 1401\/08, \u00a7\u00a027, 9\u00a0April 2013).<\/p>\n 30. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that by a final judgment of 3 June 2010, the HCC confirmed that the applicant had title to the disputed flat by virtue of the 2003 contract, the obligations stipulated by which he had duly fulfilled. K., the prosecutor\u2019s office and LDBK were unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain a review of the final judgment in the light of newly discovered circumstances (see paragraph 9 above). Furthermore, by another final judgment given on 11 August 2011 the HCC declared the contract between LDBK no. 2 and LDBK in respect of the flat invalid ab initio, as it was signed in breach of the law and the applicant\u2019s rights (see paragraph 10 above). LDBK no. 2\u2019s further attempt to have the 2003 contract declared null and void was unsuccessful (see paragraph 11 above). Therefore, the applicant could legitimately expect that, given that the relevant circumstances had been established in the first set of proceedings, his title to the flat would not be questioned and subject to re-examination.<\/p>\n 31. However, two years later, in the proceedings brought by K. concerning the same issue (title to the disputed flat), the District Court \u2013 having reassessed the applicant\u2019s contractual obligations and ownership rights \u2013 ruled that K. had title to the flat. This judgment was upheld by the\u00a0higher courts.<\/p>\n 32. It remains unclear why the courts, having been aware of the findings reached in the first set of proceedings, disregarded them and decided, contrary to those findings, that until 2010 the applicant had not had any rights in respect of the flat. This conclusion appeared to be a decisive one for the\u00a0outcome of the proceedings. No explanation as to the legal grounds for such a finding can be found in the decisions of the District Court or the higher courts.<\/p>\n 33. The Court notes that in his appeals against the District Court\u2019s judgment of 5 September 2011, the applicant specifically raised the\u00a0above\u2011noted issue, complaining of a breach of the principle of legal certainty. However, his arguments were left unanswered.<\/p>\n 34. The Court furthermore observes that, unlike in the case of Brum\u0103rescu (cited above), in the present case the 2010 final judgment was not formally quashed in the second set of proceedings. It was rendered devoid of any legal effect, however, as the decisive circumstances established therein were reassessed and decided differently by the courts in the second set of proceedings. The Court has already found that such a situation may also amount to a breach of the principle of legal certainty, in violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Esertas v. Lithuania, no. 50208\/06, \u00a7 25, 31 May 2012).<\/p>\n 35. The Court notes that such a situation would also appear to be in breach of the domestic law \u2013 namely Article 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that circumstances that had been established by a court in one case could not be contested in another case (see paragraph 23 above).<\/p>\n 36. The Government have not referred to any circumstance of a\u00a0sufficiently substantial and compelling character to justify a departure from the principle of legal certainty in the present case. The Court does not find that the first set of proceedings was tarnished by a fundamental defect, such as, in particular, a jurisdictional error, or serious breaches of court procedure or abuses of power. Therefore, no pressing social need was shown to justify the courts\u2019 disregard of the judgment in question.<\/p>\n 37. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention were violated, since the courts in the second set of proceedings disregarded the previous judicial process. By reassessing and overruling the decisive circumstances established by the final judgment of 3 June 2010, the national courts acted in breach of the principle of legal certainty inherent in Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and did not give the applicant\u2019s case a fair hearing (see Esertas, cited above, \u00a7 31).<\/p>\n 38. It follows that there has been a violation of that provision.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 of Protocol No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 39. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complained that, as a result of the breach of the principle of legal certainty by the courts in the above-mentioned proceedings, he had been deprived of his possession \u2013 namely the title to the flat, confirmed previously by a final judicial decision in his favour.<\/p>\n Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. …\u201d<\/p>\n A. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/strong><\/p>\n 40. The Government argued that the applicant did not have a \u201cpossession\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since after his title to the\u00a0flat at issue had been confirmed by the courts, he had failed to formally register his ownership rights, in accordance with the procedure provided by domestic law. They furthermore submitted that the present case concerned a\u00a0dispute among private parties: the applicant, the two construction companies and K. This being the case, the State\u2019s positive obligation was to provide an appropriate legal mechanism allowing the aggrieved party to protect his or her rights effectively. The applicant had been afforded such a\u00a0mechanism: he had participated in court proceedings, during which he had been able to present his arguments; moreover, the courts that had heard the\u00a0case had delivered fair and well-founded decisions. The Government furthermore submitted that the above-noted complaint was inadmissible for non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies, given that the applicant had not lodged a claim against LDBK no. 2 (with which he had signed the investment contract) seeking to have the contract terminated and seeking compensation for the company\u2019s failure to fulfil its obligations, as stated in the contract.<\/p>\n 41. The applicant submitted that his property rights in respect of the flat had arisen from the investment contract and had been confirmed by the final decision given by the domestic court. He had therefore done everything that he could have done to protect his title to the property. However, in the\u00a0subsequent proceedings initiated by K., the domestic courts had disregarded the final decision in his favour (without citing any reasons or legal grounds) and had confirmed K.\u2019s title to the same flat.<\/p>\n B. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Admissibility<\/em><\/p>\n 42. The Court reiterates that the concept of \u201cpossessions\u201d in the first part of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning that is not limited to the ownership of material goods and is independent of any formal classification in domestic law. In the same way as material goods, certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as \u201cproperty rights\u201d and thus as \u201cpossessions\u201d for the purposes of this provision (see\u00a0B\u00e9l\u00e1n\u00e9 Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080\/13, \u00a7 73, 13 December 2016). The concept of \u201cpossessions\u201d is not limited to \u201cexisting possessions\u201d but may also cover assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a reasonable and \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. An \u201cexpectation\u201d is \u201clegitimate\u201d if it is based on either a legislative provision or a legal act bearing on the property interest in question. In each case the issue that needs to be examined is whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1 (see Saghinadze and Others v. Georgia, no.\u00a018768\/05, \u00a7\u00a0103, 27 May 2010, and Maharramov v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a05046\/07, \u00a7 47, 30\u00a0March 2017).<\/p>\n 43. In the present case, the applicant\u2019s title to the flat was confirmed in 2010 by the final judgment delivered by the HCC on 3 June 2010 (see\u00a0paragraph 8 above) .<\/p>\n 44. Accordingly, the Court considers that in the present case the applicant had a sufficient proprietary interest in the flat in issue for it to qualify as a\u00a0\u201cpossession\u201d protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (compare Akhverdiyev v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a076254\/11, \u00a7 77, 29 January 2015, and Maharramov, cited above, \u00a7 54), which is therefore applicable. The fact that the applicant failed to register his ownership rights with the relevant State authority, relied on by the Government (see paragraph 40 above), is not decisive from the standpoint of determining whether, at the time when the\u00a0applicant signed the contract and fulfilled it, he could have entertained a\u00a0legitimate expectation that his title to the flat would not be capable of being called into question (see,\u00a0mutatis mutandis, \u010cakarevi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a048921\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 54-65, 26\u00a0April 2018, with further references).<\/p>\n 45. With respect to the remainder of the Government\u2019s objections as to admissibility, the Court observes that, given the subject of the applicant\u2019s complaint, the issue in the present case is not, in and of itself, a dispute between private parties. In particular, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is, in essence, directed against the domestic courts, for whose actions the State may be held responsible. Notably, it was the courts\u2019 decisions in the proceedings initiated by K. (to which the applicant was as a\u00a0third party) which led to the loss of the applicant\u2019s title to the flat. The\u00a0Government\u2019s argument that the applicant had not exhausted the\u00a0available domestic remedies (since he had not sought the termination of the investment contract and compensation from LDBK no. 2) should therefore, given the particular circumstances of this case, be dismissed (see,\u00a0mutatis mutandis, Altima Limited v. Ukraine, no.\u00a056714\/11, \u00a7 32, 20\u00a0May 2021). The Court notes, however, as far as such a claim is concerned, that any damages an applicant may recover may be taken into account for the\u00a0purposes of the calculation of compensation to be awarded for pecuniary damage under Article 41 (see, for instance, Gladysheva v. Russia, no.\u00a07097\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60-62, 6\u00a0December 2011, and Batkivska Turbota Foundation v. Ukraine, no.\u00a05876\/15, \u00a7 47, 9\u00a0October 2018).<\/p>\n 46. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 2. Merits<\/em><\/p>\n 47. The Court notes at the outset that the national courts\u2019 judgments in the\u00a0proceedings initiated by K. constituted an interference with the\u00a0applicant\u2019s \u201cpossessions\u201d, in that the courts ignoring the applicant\u2019s title to the flat (which by that time had been confirmed by a final court decision) awarded title to the same flat to K.<\/p>\n 48. The Court finds that it is not necessary to decide whether that interference amounted to a deprivation of property within the meaning of the\u00a0second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It\u00a0observes that this rule is only concerned with a particular instance of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and must be construed in the light of the principle enunciated in the first sentence of the\u00a0first paragraph. The Court will therefore examine the interference in the\u00a0light of the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Decheva and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 43071\/06, \u00a7 56, 26 June).<\/p>\n 49. The Court has already found that the authorities in the case acted in breach of the principle of legal certainty inherent in Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the\u00a0Convention (see paragraph 37 above). In a number of judgments raising similar issues the Court concluded that such an interference could consequently not be considered lawful under the Convention, not least because of the fundamental nature of the principle of rule of law in a\u00a0democratic society, of which the legal certainty principle forms part and which is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see, for instance, Kehaya and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a075-76; Decheva and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a057; and Chengelyan and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 47405\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 49 and 50, 21 April 2016). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the instant case.<\/p>\n 50. Accordingly, it finds that the failure to recognise the res judicata effect of a final judgment delivered in contentious proceedings and the\u00a0acknowledgement of K.\u2019s title over the flat amounted to an unlawful interference with the applicant\u2019s \u201cpossession\u201d. There has therefore been a\u00a0violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.<\/p>\n III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 51. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 52. In respect of pecuniary damage, the applicant submitted that he should be awarded an amount equal to the current market value of the flat. He\u00a0claimed 1,484,600 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in that connection. He\u00a0submitted a valuation report prepared by an expert in March 2021 indicating that amount as the flat\u2019s market value. He also sought compensation for the\u00a0loss of rental income from the flat for the period from 2011 (when the\u00a0building was operational) until the date of the submission of his claim for just satisfaction (March 2021). He claimed 8,977 euros (EUR) in that regard.<\/p>\n 53. The Government contested that claim.<\/p>\n 54. The Court notes that in similar cases where it has found a violation of Article 6 and\/or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a result of a disregarding or quashing of a final judgment recognising an applicant\u2019s title to a property, it has held that the return of the property in question would put the applicant as far as possible in the situation equivalent to the one in which he would have been if there had not been a breach of the Convention (see, among others, Brleti\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 42009\/10, \u00a7 55, 16 January 2014, and Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria (just satisfaction), nos.\u00a047797\/99 and 68698\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a021-23, 14\u00a0June 2007). However, as an alternative, an award in the amount of the\u00a0current value of the property as compensation for pecuniary damage is also possible (see Brum\u0103rescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no.\u00a028342\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 22-23, ECHR 2001-I).<\/p>\n 55. Given the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that it is doubtful that the flat in issue can be reinstated to the applicant. It therefore finds that the award, in respect of pecuniary damage, of a sum reasonably related to the value of the flat, corresponding to the applicant\u2019s claim under Article 41, constitutes the most appropriate form of redress.<\/p>\n 56. As to the determination of the exact amount of the award, the Court notes that the expert commissioned by the applicant included in his report all relevant data showing how he arrived at his estimates. That being so, and regard being had to the fact that the Government did not provide any alternative to or comments on the report, the Court considers that the report can be accepted as fully reliable and awards the applicant the approximate equivalent of UAH 1,484,600, that is to say EUR\u00a046,000, in respect of compensation for the value of the property.<\/p>\n 57. Concerning the damage sustained by the applicant on account of the\u00a0loss of rent, even assuming that the argument is reasonable, the Court notes that the applicant has failed to provide any evidence in support of his estimate, including information on the level of rents in the relevant district of Lviv during the period referred to by the applicant. Accordingly, the Court cannot but reject the claim in respect of this damage as unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 2. Non-pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 58. The applicant claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the stress, anxiety and uncertainty suffered by him.<\/p>\n 59. The Government contested that claim.<\/p>\n 60. The Court considers that the applicant has suffered distress and frustration on account of the breach of his right, which cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a02,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.<\/p>\n B. Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 61. The applicant also claimed EUR\u00a0705 for the costs and expenses\u00a0incurred before the domestic courts and EUR\u00a01,000 for those incurred before the Court. In support of his claims, he presented a contract for legal representation at an hourly rate of EUR\u00a050 and a timesheet recording twenty hours of legal work. According to the contract, the applicant is obliged to pay for the work done when and if the Court makes a relevant award. The\u00a0applicant requested that the amount awarded by the Court in respect of the expenses incurred before it be paid directly into the bank account of his legal representative.<\/p>\n 62. The Government\u00a0contested those claims.<\/p>\n 63. According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the\u00a0reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Having regard to the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his claims, and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a01,000 for costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court and dismisses the reminder of the claim. The awarded sum is to be paid directly into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s legal representative.<\/p>\n C. Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 64. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the application admissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the\u00a0Convention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the\u00a0respondent State\u00a0at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) EUR 46,000 (forty-six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (iii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;\u00a0this amount is to be paid into the bank account of Mr A. Kychenok.<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a\u00a0rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 September 2022, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Martina Keller\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Lado Chanturia
\nCASE OF GRYNENKO v. UKRAINE<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 65890\/13)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n20 September 2022<\/p>\n
\nGanna Yudkivska,
\nMattias Guyomar, judges,
\nand Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n