The cases concern the applicants\u2019 sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they have served a minimum term of between 30 and 40 years (see the appended table). The applicants complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n
FIRST SECTION This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Blonski and Others v. Hungary,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: the decision not to disclose the identity of certain applicants as specified in the appended table;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 3 of the Convention to the Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, Ministry of Justice, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of applications nos. 16796\/16, 59530\/18 and 59440\/19;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019observations;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 20 September 2022,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The cases concern the applicants\u2019 sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they have served a minimum term of between 30 and 40 years (see the appended table). The applicants complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 2. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.<\/p>\n 3. The relevant domestic law is set out in Bancs\u00f3k and L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Magyar (no. 2) v. Hungary (nos. 52374\/15 and 53364\/15, \u00a7\u00a7 15-17, 28 October 2021).<\/p>\n THE COURT\u2019S ASSESSMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n 4. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 6. The automatic review of a sentence after a specified minimum term represents an important safeguard for the prisoner against the risk of detention in violation of Article 3. The relevant principles have been summarised in Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 57592\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a066-68, 17\u00a0January2017), and Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos.\u00a066069\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). In Bodein v.\u00a0France (no.\u00a040014\/10, 13November 2014) the Court examined whether the possibility of a review of life sentences after thirty years of imprisonment remained compatible with the criteria established in Vinter and Others. In finding that it did, the Court gave particular weight to the fact that the starting\u2011point for the calculation of the whole-life term included any deprivation of liberty, that is to say, even the period spent in pre\u2011trial detention. Since the applicant was able to apply for parole twenty-six years after the imposition of his life sentence, the Court concluded that the punishment in his case was to be considered reducible for the purposes of Article\u00a03(seeBodein, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061).<\/p>\n 7. Under the Hungarian Criminal Code, the minimum term to be served before an offender sentenced to life imprisonment can be released on parole must be set in the judgment convicting the offender and must range between the statutory minimum of twenty-five years and the maximum of forty years. Furthermore, the requirements which a person sentenced to a prison term must fulfil in order to be conditionally released are set out in section\u00a0188 of Act no. CCXL of 2013; satisfactory compliance with those requirements is subject to assessment by a court. National law and practice therefore afford the possibility of a dedicated judicial review of the life sentences imposed on the applicants.<\/p>\n 8. However, in the present case, the applicants could be eligible for release only after having served thirty to forty years of their terms. It remains to be determined whether in their case the review mechanism satisfies the criteria set out in the Court\u2019s case-law.<\/p>\n 9. In that connection, the Court notes that the thirty to forty years the applicants must wait before they can first expect to be considered for release on parole is a significantly longer period than the maximum recommended time-frame for review of a life sentence, namely twenty-five years, as established on the basis of a clear support in comparative and international law (seeVinter and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0120).<\/p>\n 10. The Court further notes the Government\u2019s position that the applicants Mr A.A. and Mr T\u00f3th would in practice have to serve less than thirty years after the imposition of their life sentences in order to be considered for conditional release, since the period spent in pre-trial detention was included in the calculation. Indeed, Mr A.A. is eligible for release on parole twenty\u2011six years, and Mr T\u00f3th twenty-nine years after the imposition oftheir life sentences.<\/p>\n 11. However, the Court notes that this is so only because they have been kept in pre-trial detention before their conviction and sentencing and this pre\u2011trial detention period has been deducted from the thirty-year period. It does not change the fact that the term to be served before they are eligible to be considered for parole was set at thirty years, like it was for the applicant Mr Benjamin (see the appended table), and that this review would take place more than twenty-five years after the imposition of their life sentences. Thus, even having regard to the State\u2019s margin of appreciated, in the instant case the Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s position on this point.<\/p>\n 12. In sum, the fact that the applicants in the present case can hope to have their progress towards release reviewed only after they have served thirty to forty years of their life sentences is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicants\u2019 life sentences cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. Such a long waiting period unduly delays the domestic authorities\u2019 review of \u201cwhether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds\u201d (Vinter and Others, cited above,\u00a7\u00a0119).<\/p>\n 13. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III. OTHER COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 14. In application no. 12152\/16, the applicant also complained under Articles 4, 6, 13 and 17 of the Convention of the unfairness of the criminal proceedings, essentially challenging their outcome. Assessing the circumstances of the case as a whole, there is no indication that the proceedings were conducted unfairly. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 15. The applicants in applications nos. 12152\/16, 59530\/18, 56162\/19, 58544\/19 and 13524\/20 claimed various amounts in damages and for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n 16. The Government found these claims excessive.<\/p>\n 17. The Court considers that its finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly makes no award under this head.<\/p>\n 18. As to costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that an applicant is entitled to their reimbursement only in so far as it has been shown that they have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. That being so, the Court awards the sums indicated in the appended table for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.<\/p>\n 19. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decidesto join the applications;<\/p>\n 2. Declares the complaints concerning Article 3 admissible and the remainder of application no. 12152\/16 inadmissible;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants;<\/p>\n 5. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 October 2022, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Liv Tigerstedt\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Raffaele Sabato ____________<\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/strong><\/p>\n Date of introduction<\/strong><\/td>\n (in euros)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n 29\/02\/2016<\/td>\n 35 years<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 11\/03\/2016<\/td>\n 35 years<\/td>\n 29\/06\/2017<\/td>\n 30 years<\/td>\n 07\/12\/2018<\/td>\n v. Hungary<\/td>\n 30 years<\/td>\n 17\/10\/2019<\/td>\n 35 years<\/td>\n 04\/11\/2019<\/td>\n 30 years<\/td>\n 03\/03\/2020<\/td>\n 40 years<\/td>\n The cases concern the applicants\u2019 sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they have served a minimum term of between 30 and 40 years (see the appended table). The applicants complained that their sentences constituted…<\/p>\n
\nCASE OF BLONSKI AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY<\/strong>
\n(Applications nos. 12152\/16 and 6 others \u2013 see appended list)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n13 October 2022<\/p>\n
\nRaffaele Sabato, President,
\nP\u00e9ter Paczolay,
\nDavor Deren\u010dinovi\u0107, judges,
\nand Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
\nHaving regard to:
\nthe applications against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by the applicants listed in the appended table (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on the various dates indicated therein;<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Application no.<\/strong><\/p>\n Case name<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant
\nYear of birth
\nPlace of residence
\n<\/strong><\/td>\nRepresented by<\/strong><\/td>\n Date of final judgment and minimum term to be served before eligibility for release<\/strong><\/td>\n Amount awarded for costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n 12152\/16<\/p>\n Blonski v. Hungary<\/td>\n Imre BLONSKI
\n1970
\nTiszal\u00f6k<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>\nArthur KOV\u00c1CS<\/td>\n 07\/04\/2011<\/p>\n 1,292<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n 16796\/16<\/p>\n R.H. v. Hungary<\/td>\n R.H.
\n1981
\nS\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>\n\u00c9va G\u00d6CS<\/td>\n 16\/09\/2010<\/p>\n –<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n 47754\/17<\/p>\n A.A. v. Hungary<\/td>\n A.A.
\n1980
\nS\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>\nEdina Eszter J\u00d3ZSA<\/td>\n 27\/10\/2009<\/p>\n –<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n 59530\/18<\/p>\n Benjamin<\/p>\n Simon BENJAMIN
\n1972
\nSzeged<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>\nIstv\u00e1n SZIKINGER<\/td>\n 15\/01\/2001<\/p>\n 2,000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n 56162\/19<\/p>\n Rendek v. Hungary<\/td>\n Imre L\u00e1szl\u00f3 RENDEK
\n1976
\nSzeged<\/strong><\/td>\nD\u00e1nielAndr\u00e1s KARSAI<\/td>\n 05\/06\/2006<\/p>\n 1,800<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n 58544\/19<\/p>\n T\u00f3th v. Hungary<\/td>\n Attila T\u00d3TH
\n1980
\nSzeged<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>\nD\u00e1nielAndr\u00e1s KARSAI<\/td>\n 20\/04\/2004<\/p>\n 1,800<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n 13524\/20<\/p>\n P\u00e1va v. Hungary<\/td>\n S\u00e1ndor P\u00c1VA
\n1972
\nSzeged<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>\nD\u00e1nielAndr\u00e1s KARSAI<\/td>\n 15\/06\/2003<\/p>\n 1,800<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"