The application concerns a request to the Greek Court of Cassation to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which was made by the applicant in the context of criminal proceedings against him, and the alleged absence of any reasoning by the Court of Cassation in tacitly refusing this request.<\/p>\n
THIRD SECTION Art 6 \u00a7 1 (criminal) \u2022 Fair hearing \u2022 Court of Cassation\u2019s failure to examine, without giving reasons, applicant\u2019s request to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union STRASBOURG This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Georgiou v. Greece,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Having regard to:<\/p>\n the application (no.\u00a057378\/18) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Greek national, Mr Andreas Georgiou (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 3 December 2018;<\/p>\n the decision to give notice to the Greek Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) of the complaint concerning Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n the parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n the decision not to hold a hearing;<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 14 February 2023,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The application concerns a request to the Greek Court of Cassation to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which was made by the applicant in the context of criminal proceedings against him, and the alleged absence of any reasoning by the Court of Cassation in tacitly refusing this request.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Darnestown (Maryland, United States). The applicant was represented by Mr S. Potamitis, Mr\u00a0A.\u00a0Demetriades, Mr K. Papadiamantis and Ms V. Psaltis, lawyers practising in Athens.<\/p>\n 3. The Government were represented by their Agent\u2019s delegates, Ms\u00a0E.\u00a0Tsaousi, Legal Counsellor at the State Legal Council and Ms\u00a0A.\u00a0Dimitrakopoulou, Senior Adviser at the State Legal Council.<\/p>\n 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 5. The applicant was the president of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) from 2 August 2010 to 2 August 2015.<\/p>\n 6. On 10 November 2010, the applicant transmitted revised data concerning the Greek deficit for the year 2009 to Eurostat. The applicant had not presented the data for approval to the seven-member administrative board of ELSTAT in advance.<\/p>\n 7. The applicant claimed that his actions complied with the principle of professional independence in the European Statistics Code of Practice, Principle 1.4 of which explicitly gave him \u201csole responsibility\u201d as head of the statistical authority, for the decision to release statistics.<\/p>\n 8. On an unspecified date, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for breach of duty.<\/p>\n 9. On 6 December 2016 the applicant was acquitted at first instance of all three charges against him by the three-member Athens Criminal Court (judgment no. 40428 A\/2016). The charges were the following:<\/p>\n (i) breach of his official duty of full and exclusive employment with ELSTAT, because at the time of his appointment he had also continued to hold a position at the International Monetary Fund;<\/p>\n (ii) breach of his official duty to convene the board of ELSTAT from November 2010 to September 2011; and<\/p>\n (iii) breach of his official duty in that he had released the fiscal deficit information for 2009 without communicating it first to the administrative board of ELSTAT or asking for its consent to the release.<\/p>\n 10. The prosecutor of the Athens Criminal Court appealed.<\/p>\n 11. On 1 August 2017 the Athens Court of Appeal held that the applicant had committed the offence of breach of duty, and found him guilty of the third of the above charges and not guilty of the rest. The applicant was sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment, the sentence being suspended (judgment nos. 3103\/2017 and 4480\/2017). In particular, the appellate court found the applicant guilty because:<\/p>\n \u201cIn Athens, on 10 November 2010, he … transmitted to Eurostat a report on Greece\u2019s fiscal data, including the fiscal deficit data for 2009, without communicating them to ELSTAT as a body and without obtaining ELSTAT\u2019s consent, in breach of Article 10 \u00a7 2 A of Law no. 3832\/2010, as it read at the time, by which \u2018ELSTAT shall in particular (a) prepare and implement the national statistical plan and compile and publish, in its capacity as \u201cNational Statistical Service\u201d as defined in Article 5 \u00a7 1 of Regulation (EC) no. 223\/2009, the official, national and European statistics of Greece …\u2019 He committed this act intentionally with the purpose of gaining an illegal moral benefit, as specified in the description of the partial act referred to above at sub-paragraph (b), which consisted in the strengthening of his power as president of ELSTAT and his becoming a quasi-one-person executive organ by effectively abolishing the aforementioned body for practical purposes and usurping its powers. The above act was an objectively appropriate means of gaining the intended benefit.\u201d<\/p>\n 12. The applicant introduced an appeal on points of law.<\/p>\n 13. By a memorandum of additional grounds dated 21 March 2018, the applicant requested that a preliminary ruling be sought from the CJEU. In particular, he argued:<\/p>\n \u201c… If, nevertheless, there is any doubt as to the correct interpretation of the crucial provision, your Court ought to, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, request the Court of Justice of the European Union to issue a preliminary ruling on the true intent of Principle 1.4 of the European Statistics Code of Practice. If such preliminary reference is not made, this will constitute a violation of my right to a fair hearing, as defined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights …\u201d<\/p>\n 14. On 7 June 2018 the Court of Cassation rejected his appeal on points of law (judgment no. 977\/2018). In that judgment, there is no reference to the applicant\u2019s request for a preliminary ruling to be sought from the CJEU.<\/p>\n RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/p>\n 15. The relevant domestic and European Union law and practice is described in the Court\u2019s judgments in Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) ([GC], no.\u00a012686\/03, \u00a7 15, 20\u00a0March 2009), Baydar v. the Netherlands (no.\u00a055385\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 21-29, 24\u00a0April 2018) and Ilias Papageorgiou v. Greece (no.\u00a044101\/13, \u00a7 14, 10\u00a0December 2020).<\/p>\n 16. Principle 1.4 of the European Statistics Code of Practice reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe heads of the National Statistical Institutes and of Eurostat and, where appropriate, the heads of other statistical authorities have the sole responsibility for deciding on statistical methods, standards and procedures, and on the content and timing of statistical releases.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 17. The applicant complained that the Court of Cassation had rejected the request for a preliminary reference without any justification. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 18. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article\u00a035 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 19. The applicant argued that, despite the Court\u2019s case-law, the Court of Cassation had failed to address his request for a preliminary reference to the CJEU. Not only had the Court of Cassation not examined the relevant criteria or provided any reasons for its refusal to seek a preliminary ruling but it had not even mentioned the applicant\u2019s request. In addition, it had not even mentioned the applicant\u2019s memorandum in which that request had been made. In the memorandum, the applicant had explained what the correct interpretation of Principle 1.4 was, provided evidence as to the meaning of that principle in support of his interpretation and asked the Court of Cassation, if it still had doubts as to the correct interpretation, to seek a preliminary ruling. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the request in the memorandum was clear and it was not conditional on whether the Court of Cassation had any doubt as to the meaning of the relevant provision. The applicant added that the principle of independence of the president of ELSTAT was of fundamental importance for the reliability of national statistics within the European Union (EU). The failure of the Court of Cassation to address this critical issue meant that the applicant\u2019s fundamental professional duty as president had not been given due and proper consideration.<\/p>\n 20. The Government submitted that it was evident from the wording of the request for a preliminary reference that the applicant had raised an issue to be dealt with only if the Court of Cassation had any doubt as to the interpretation of Principle 1.4 of the European Statistics Code of Practice. In the Government\u2019s submission, the contents of the judgment of the Court of Cassation showed that the ruling of the domestic courts could not be considered arbitrary, totally unreasoned, contradictory or incoherent, and so no issue arose under Article 6 \u00a7 1. It had not been necessary for the Court of Cassation to give a detailed answer. In addition, it had included in its judgment the crucial detailed considerations of the court dealing with the merits of the case. There was therefore no doubt that the domestic courts had paid due attention, taken all the applicant\u2019s allegations into account and assessed them, and provided adequate reasoning, in line with the requirements of the Convention.<\/p>\n 21. Regarding in particular the rejection of the request for a preliminary reference to the CJEU, the Government argued that it was clear that the Court of Cassation had been in no doubt as to the interpretation and meaning of the provisions applied, \u201cwhich is not negated by a possibly different interpretation proposed by the applicant\u201d. The provisions, including Principle\u00a01.4 of the European Statistics Code of Practice, were, according to the assessments of both the Court of Cassation and the Court of Appeal, sufficiently clear, and therefore no preliminary reference to the CJEU was necessary for the domestic courts to reach their final judgment. An interpretation by the CJEU of the words \u201cthe sole responsibility\u201d in Principle\u00a01.4 of the European Statistics Code of Practice, regardless of the formal force of the Code, would not contribute materially to the assessment of the grounds of appeal by the Court of Cassation. Therefore, a request for a preliminary ruling, even if considered admissible by the CJEU, would have had no decisive influence on the outcome of the case. The Government further argued that it would in any event be for the national court to apply EU law after the issuance of the preliminary ruling, which would not have any decisive influence on the outcome of the case. In any event, in the present case a preliminary ruling had not been considered necessary by the domestic courts.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 22. Concerning the general principles governing the application of Article\u00a06 of the Convention in cases raising similar issues to those which fall to be addressed in the present case, the Court refers to its relevant case-law on the subject (see, in particular, Dhahbi v. Italy, no. 17120\/09, \u00a7 31, 8 April 2014, Baydar, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 41-44, and Bio Farmland Betriebs S.R.L. v.\u00a0Romania, no. 43639\/17, \u00a7\u00a7 48-51, 13 July 2021).<\/p>\n 23. In the case of Vergauwen and Others v. Belgium ((dec.), no. 4832\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, 10 April 2012), the Court established the following principles:<\/p>\n – Article 6 \u00a7 1 imposes on the domestic courts an obligation to give reasons, in the light of the applicable law, for decisions by which they refuse to refer a question for a preliminary ruling;<\/p>\n – when an allegation of a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 is brought before the Court in that context, its task consists in ensuring that the contested decision refusing the reference was duly accompanied by such reasons;<\/p>\n – although it is for the Court to carry out this check rigorously, it is not for it to examine any errors that the domestic courts may have made in the interpretation or the application of the relevant law;<\/p>\n – in the specific context of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), this means that domestic courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under domestic law are required to justify a refusal to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of EU law in the light of the exceptions provided for by the case-law of the CJEU. They must therefore state the reasons why they consider that the question is not relevant, or that the provision of EU law in question has already been interpreted by the CJEU, or even that the correct application of EU law is so obvious that it leaves no room for reasonable doubt.<\/p>\n 24. In the present case, the applicant requested the Court of Cassation in his memorandum of 21\u00a0March 2018 to ask the CJEU to issue a preliminary ruling on the true intent of Principle 1.4 of the European Statistics Code of Practice. The decision of the Court of Cassation was not subject to any appeal under domestic law. The Court of Cassation was therefore under an obligation to give reasons for its refusal to ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.<\/p>\n 25. The Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment of 7 June 2018 contains neither a reference to the request made by the applicant nor any reasons why it was considered that the question raised by him did not merit reference to the CJEU. That being so, it cannot be established from the content and reasoning of judgment no. 977\/2018 of the Court of Cassation whether the question was considered irrelevant, whether it was viewed as relating to a provision that was clear or had already been interpreted by the CJEU, or whether it was simply ignored (see Dhahbi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a033, and contrast Vergauwen and\u00a0Others, cited above, \u00a7 91). As regards the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant had requested a preliminary reference only in case the Court of Cassation had doubts as to the interpretation of the applicable principles (see paragraph 20 above), the Court notes that it cannot impact its conclusion since, as established above, the Court of Cassation did not give any reasons in refusing that request.<\/p>\n 26. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLES\u00a041 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 27. Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 28. The relevant parts of Article\u00a046 of the Convention provide:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.<\/p>\n 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.\u201d<\/p>\n (…)\u201d<\/p>\n A. Article 41 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 29. The applicant did not make any claim in respect of pecuniary or non\u2011pecuniary damage or in respect of costs and expenses. He argued that what was important to him was that the domestic proceedings should be reopened.<\/p>\n 30. In these circumstances, the Court is not called to make any award under Article 41 of the Convention.<\/p>\n B. Article 46 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 31. The Court reiterates its case-law to the effect that a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Kuri\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no.\u00a026828\/06, \u00a7\u00a079, ECHR\u00a02014). Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. This discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attaching to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed by it (Article 1). If the nature of the breach allows of restitutio in integrum, it is for the respondent State to effect it, the Court having neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself.<\/p>\n 32. The Court notes that it has found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on the ground that the Court of Cassation did not examine the applicant\u2019s request for a preliminary ruling to be sought from the CJEU.<\/p>\n 33. In principle, it is not the Court\u2019s task to prescribe exactly how a State should put an end to a breach of the Convention and make reparation for its consequences. Nevertheless, it is clear that restoration of \u201cthe closest possible situation to that which would have existed if the breach in question had not occurred\u201d (see Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31\u00a0October 1995, \u00a7 38, Series A no. 330-B; Visti\u0146\u0161 and Perepjolkins v. Latvia (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 71243\/01, \u00a7 33, ECHR 2014; and Chiragov and\u00a0Others v.\u00a0Armenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no.\u00a013216\/05, \u00a7 59, 12\u00a0December 2017) would consist, in the present case, in taking measures to ensure that the domestic proceedings are reopened, if requested, so that the request for a preliminary reference is examined by the Court of Cassation.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Declares the application admissible;<\/p>\n 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3. Holds that the taking of measures by the respondent State to ensure that the proceedings before the Court of Cassation are reopened, if requested, would constitute appropriate redress for the violation of the applicant\u2019s rights.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 March 2023, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Milan Bla\u0161ko \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Pere Pastor Vilanova ___________<\/p>\n In accordance with Article\u00a045 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention and Rule\u00a074 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Serghides is annexed to this judgment.<\/p>\n P.P.V. CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The present judgment concerns the applicant\u2019s complaint that the Court of Cassation in Greece had rejected his request for a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) without giving any justification and, thus, by its omission it had breached Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 2. I entirely agree with the judgment and, consequently, with all the points of its operative provisions. The only reason I have decided to write this concurring opinion is in order to explain what I consider are the legal bases for the Court\u2019s power to indicate individual measures, by way of contributing to the implementation of its own judgments and, in particular, in the present case, in holding \u201cthat the taking of measures by the respondent State to ensure that the proceedings before the Court of Cassation are reopened, if requested, would constitute appropriate redress for the violation of the applicant\u2019s rights\u201d (see paragraph 33 of the judgment and point 3 of its operative provisions).<\/p>\n 3. The need to elaborate on this issue arises because, though the Court very often indicates general and individual measures in its judgments, it, however, omits to refer to or least to elaborate on the legal basis or bases for doing so, apart from dealing with these issues under the heading \u201cArticle 46 of the Convention\u201d, as the Court did in the present judgment, thus implying that its legal basis is Article 46. The aim of this opinion is not only to strengthen the present judgment but also to show that there can be no doubt that the Court has the power to contribute to the implementation of its own judgments.<\/p>\n 4. Before delving into the legal basis for the Court\u2019s power to contribute to the implementation of its own judgments, the difference between implementation and execution should first be explained, because it is in the context of the implementation rather than the execution of the Court\u2019s judgments that the indication of individual (as well as, of course, general measures) is made.<\/p>\n II. Difference between implementation and execution <\/strong>of the Court\u2019s judgments<\/strong><\/p>\n 5. It is my submission that any possible negative criticism of the Court\u2019s contribution to or participation in the implementation of its own judgments could rightly be answered by explaining the difference between the implementation and the execution of judgments.<\/p>\n 6. In my humble view \u201cimplementation\u201d is a broader term than \u201cexecution\u201d, because the former is the process of putting a judgment or decision into effect, starting from the time when the case is decided and its wording is formulated by the judges, while execution takes place after the judgment has been delivered. Looking at implementation from this starting point and angle, Article 46 \u00a7 2 of the Convention cannot, therefore, be an obstacle preventing the Court from contributing to the implementation of its judgments, since the execution of its judgments by the national authorities as supervised by the Committee of Ministers (CoM) is only part of the implementation process as a whole and starts after delivery of the judgment. In other words, by considering that the implementation starts before delivery and includes the formulation of the judgment, there will be no clash between the role of Court and that of the High Contracting Parties or the CoM, since the latter can claim no role in supervising a judgment before its delivery.<\/p>\n 7. It is to be emphasised that, save for the procedure under Article 46 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u20115 of the Convention, all of the Court\u2019s contribution towards the implementation of its own judgments is made within or as part of the judgment itself, which needs to be implemented, and not outside of that framework. This is a proactive contribution on the part of the Court. The effective implementation of a judgment, which is a requirement of the principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law, should always be in the Court\u2019s mind when drafting its judgment and providing for general or individual measures to be taken by the relevant respondent State which is found to have violated a Convention provision.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0The legal bases for the Court\u2019s power to indicate individual measures<\/strong><\/p>\n 8. In my view, the legal bases for the Court to indicate individual measures, including the measure provided for in point 3 of the operative provisions of the present judgment, are multifaceted and can be summarised as follows:<\/p>\n (a) Article 46 of the Convention, under which the individual measure in paragraph 33 is examined in the present judgment. Article 46 \u00a7 1 makes provision for the binding force of the Court\u2019s judgments on the High Contracting Parties, and it is obvious that the Court in delivering them must make them clear and helpful to the States to ensure that they are complied with under the supervision of the CoM. Effectiveness is a requirement of the binding force of judgments. If the Court\u2019s judgments were not to have binding force, there would neither be a need for them to be effective nor would there be any need for them to be executed. Apart from paragraph 1, paragraphs 3\u20115 of Article 46 can also show that the Court has the power to be involved in the implementation of its own judgments, but since these provisions are not relevant to the facts of the present case, I will not deal with them further.<\/p>\n (b) Article 45 of the Convention, which provides that the Court should give reasons for its judgments. This, in my view, may also include reasons as to how the Court considers that its judgments can better be implemented especially when the proposed individual measures are inextricably connected with the issue or issues before the Court, as in the present case. In my opinion, the principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law is nested in the Court\u2019s judgment until its effective execution.<\/p>\n (c) Article 32 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which provides that \u201cthe jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47\u201d. The express reference to Article\u00a046 in Article 32 \u00a7 1 leaves no doubt that the Court can derive from these two provisions its power to contribute to the implementation of its own judgments by indicating individual measures. At the same time, paragraph 2 of Article\u00a032 strengthens this finding even more by providing that \u201cin the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide\u201d.<\/p>\n (d) Article 19 of the Convention, which provides that the Court ensures the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. This can better be ensured, in my view, if the Court is involved in the implementation of its judgments by indicating therein general and individual measures which can assist the High Contracting Parties and the CoM in their respective tasks, namely, the execution and the supervising of the execution of the judgments, respectively.<\/p>\n (e) Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The prompt implementation of the Court\u2019s judgment is regarded as an integral part of the \u201ctrial\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 (see Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, \u00a7 181, 18 April 2004, and Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), no. 33509\/04, \u00a7 65, 15 January 2009). Article 6 \u00a7 1 applies not only to the domestic courts but also to the Court itself (see Jean-Paul Costa, La Cour europ\u00e9enne des droits de l\u2019homme \u2013 Des Juges pour la Libert\u00e9, 2nd edition, Dalloz, 2017, at p. 179). This provision allows the Court to contribute to the implementation of its own judgments by ensuring that its judgments are clear and that as far as possible they help the relevant Contracting Parties, under the supervision of the CoM, to execute them more effectively and more quickly. The non-implementation or delayed implementation of judgments disrupts legal certainty and, consequently, the rule of law, given that legal certainty is an aspect of the rule of law, in the light of which the right to a fair hearing must be interpreted. Thus it has rightly been argued that \u201c[f]rom the perspective of the ECHR, a failure to implement a decision of the ECtHR is a breach of the Convention and flouts the rule of law\u201d (see Andrew Le Sueur, Maurice Sunkin, Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, Public Law \u2013 Text, Cases, and Materials, 4th edition, Oxford, 2019, at p. 219).<\/p>\n (f) The relevant substantive Convention provisions, in other words, the allegedly impugned provisions in a given case (in the present case Article 8) and the norm of effectiveness therein. As I have previously said in several other separate opinions and in academic works, the principle of effectiveness is not only a method or tool or means of interpretation but also a norm of international law enshrined in every Convention provision safeguarding human rights, in the present case Article 8. It is also enshrined in the other Convention Articles mentioned above, namely, Articles 19, 32, 45 and 46. The principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law should also be inherent in every judgment of the Court. As to the \u201cjourney\u201d of the principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law in a particular case, I will elaborate thereon under the next heading.<\/p>\n (g) The inherent power of the Court based on its role and mission, which is the effective protection of human rights. The principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law is embedded in the jurisdiction and Rules of the Court as an international human rights court.<\/p>\n (h) Together with the above, the general and customary rule of international law by which an international human rights court can contribute to the implementation of its own judgments.<\/p>\n (i) The abundant and constant case-law in which the Court has made provision for general and individual measures, and through which it has acknowledged and developed its jurisdiction in that respect.<\/p>\n 9. The CoM has not only acknowledged the power of the Court to contribute to the implementation of its own judgments but has also urged it to take a more active role in certain cases (see, for instance, CM\/Res(2004)3 on \u201cjudgments revealing an underlying systemic problem\u201d).<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0Further reflection on the Court\u2019s contribution to the implementation of its judgments on the basis of the principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law<\/strong><\/p>\n 10. The principle of effectiveness in its capacity as a norm of international law holds that the Convention provisions, which are rules of international law, must be effective and be treated as such. The same principle holds, with regard to the implementation of the Court\u2019s judgments, that they must be executed effectively, thus putting the applicant as far as possible in the position he or she would have been in had the Convention provisions not been violated.<\/p>\n 11. The principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law has a remarkable \u201cjourney\u201d \u03b9n a particular case which can be compared to a relay race: the principle of effectiveness as a norm is inherent in the relevant Convention provision, in the present case Article 8; then the provision, through its interpretation and application by the Court, passes the norm of effectiveness to the judgment as a baton, which can also contribute to its effective implementation; and finally the judgment conveys the norm of effectiveness to the mechanism for the execution of judgments under Article 46 of the Convention. The speedier and the more efficient this relay race, the better the principle of effectiveness is upheld as a norm. Only through the effective implementation of the judgment can the principle\u2019s function as a norm be fulfilled.<\/p>\n 12. The principle of effectiveness, as a norm of international law embedded in a Court judgment and requiring its effective implementation, concerns and pervades the whole of the judgment, not only the finding of a violation of a Convention provision, but also any provision or indication in the judgment calling for general or individual measures regarding the implementation of the judgment. The individual measures provided for in point 3 of the operative provisions of the present judgment should in my humble view be considered in that sense, namely, as being a part or an element of the norm of effectiveness of the judgment.<\/p>\n 13. The relationship between the principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law and the effective implementation of the Court\u2019s judgments is twofold: on the one hand, the principle of effectiveness in its capacity as a norm of international law is the main source of, and the basis or foundation for, the effective implementation of the Court\u2019s judgments and therefore the latter is a corollary of the former; and, on the other hand, the effective implementation of the Court\u2019s judgments is a requirement of the principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law, which is embraced not only in the Convention provision at issue, in the present case in Article 8, but also in the Court\u2019s judgment and in the provisions of Article 46 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 14. The principle of effectiveness as a norm of international law is also an impetus to the evolutive involvement of the Court in the implementation of its own judgments. This is a consequence of the capacity of the principle of effectiveness as a norm, which is flexible, tending always to be progressive in the effective protection of human rights.<\/p>\n 15. Consequently, the Court contributes through its judgment to the formulation of the norm of effectiveness and at the same time contributes to the implementation of that judgment.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n 16. I have decided to follow the present judgment as to paragraph 33 and point 3 of its operative provisions, having in mind the above legal analysis. This concurring opinion humbly seeks to take a step further as to the legal bases which enable the Court to contribute to the implementation of its judgments, this being a step of the utmost importance for the effective protection of human rights.<\/p>\n
\nCASE OF GEORGIOU v. GREECE<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 57378\/18)<\/em>
\nJUDGMENT<\/p>\n
\nArt 46 \u2022 Execution of judgment \u2022 Reopening of domestic proceedings, if requested, to allow examination of preliminary reference request<\/p>\n
\n14 March 2023<\/p>\n
\nPere Pastor Vilanova, President,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides,
\nYonko Grozev,
\nDarian Pavli,
\nPeeter Roosma,
\nIoannis Ktistakis,
\nAndreas Z\u00fcnd, judges,
\nand Milan Bla\u0161ko, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0President<\/p>\n
\nM.B.<\/p>\n