Communicated on 15 March 2019<\/p>\n
THIRD SECTION<\/p>\n
Application no. 28435\/18
\nLeonid Sergeyevich YARYGIN
\nagainst Russia
\nlodged on 6 June 2018<\/p>\n
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE<\/p>\n
Tambov town administration opposed a group picket that the applicant wanted to hold on 7 October 2017 to support Mr Navalnyy\u2019s candidacy for President of Russia. On 6 October 2017 the applicant reposted on his VKontakte page the following message from the Navalnyy Team VKontakte group: \u201cThe town administration opposed all our notifications about the group picket for 7 October. Thus we are going to stage solo demonstrations. Drop us a message to this group if you want to participate\u201d. It appears that on 7 October 2017 several people staged demonstrations in a peaceful manner. On 13 October 2017 the applicant was arrested. On 14 October 2017 he was sentenced to eight days\u2019 detention. The court considered that the demonstrations had in fact been one group event in disguise, having the same organisation and goals, and that the applicant was the organiser of that group event. Thus, he should have obtained the local authority\u2019s approval for that event, and had violated the provision allowing pre-event campaigning only after the authority\u2019s approval of the event.<\/p>\n
QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES<\/p>\n
1.1. Has the applicant complied with the six-month rule under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention for his complaints under Article 5 \u00a7 1 about the administrative escorting and arrest (\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435), in so far as the courts in his CAO case assessed the escort and arrest reports as admissible evidence and relied on them as adverse evidence confirming his guilt?<\/p>\n
1.2. Was there a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the administrative escorting and arrest?<\/p>\n
2. Were there violations of Articles 10 or 11 of the Convention on account of the applicant\u2019s administrative escorting, administrative arrest and the sentence of detention? In particular, did the courts convincingly establish (as required by the Plenary Supreme Court\u2019s Ruling No. 28 of 26 June 2018, paragraph 31 in fine) that the solo demonstrations had been one group event in disguise; that when disseminating information prior to 7 October 2017, the applicant had had the intent to organise a group event and had incited others to take part in this type of event (see section 2.2 of Ruling No. 4-P of 14 February 2013 by the Constitutional Court)? Was it established that he had \u201cundertake[n] the obligation to organise and\/or run\u201d this specific assembly (see, as regards the definition of \u201corganiser\u201d and \u201corganisation\u201d, sections 21 and 28 in fine of ruling no. 28 of 26 June 2018 by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia)?<\/p>\n
3. Was there a violation of the objective impartiality requirement under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention because of the lack of a prosecuting party at the court hearings and the use of the offence record (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) as adverse evidence (\u0434\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e) (compare with Karelin v. Russia, no. 926\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 66 and 68, 20 September 2016; and the Plenary Supreme Court\u2019s Ruling No. 28 of 26 June 2018, paragraph 31 in fine)?<\/p>\n