{"id":22219,"date":"2024-02-06T14:26:23","date_gmt":"2024-02-06T14:26:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=22219"},"modified":"2024-02-06T14:26:23","modified_gmt":"2024-02-06T14:26:23","slug":"case-of-t-a-v-armenia-the-case-concerns-the-applicants-placement-in-a-psychiatric-institution-for-compulsory-treatment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=22219","title":{"rendered":"CASE OF T.A. v. ARMENIA – The case concerns the applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric institution for compulsory treatment"},"content":{"rendered":"

European Court of Human Rights
\nFOURTH SECTION
\nCASE OF T.A. v. ARMENIA<\/strong>
\n(Application no. 2648\/22)
\nJUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n6 February 2024<\/p>\n

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n

In the case of T.A. v. Armenia,<\/strong><\/p>\n

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
\nFaris Vehabovi\u0107, President,
\nAnja Seibert-Fohr,
\nAnne Louise Bormann, judges,
\nand Valentin Nicolescu, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n

Having regard to:
\nthe application (no.\u00a02648\/22) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) on 23 December 2021 by an Armenian national, T.A., born in 1956 and living in Artik (\u201cthe applicant\u201d) who was represented by Mr H. Alumyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan;
\nthe decision to give notice of the complaints under Articles 5 \u00a7 1 and 8 of the Convention concerning the applicant\u2019s allegedly unjustified confinement in a psychiatric institution and the allegedly unjustified restrictions on her private and family life as well as her correspondence, to the Armenian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d), represented by their Agent, Mr\u00a0Y.\u00a0Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
\nthe decision not to have the applicant\u2019s name disclosed;
\nthe decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
\nthe parties\u2019 observations;<\/p>\n

Having deliberated in private on 16 January 2024,<\/p>\n

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE<\/strong><\/p>\n

1. The case concerns the applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric institution for compulsory treatment.<\/p>\n

2. On 24 December 2015 the applicant filed a crime report with the police alleging six different criminal offences, including a murder and a beating that had caused the death of a person, and pointing to the alleged perpetrators of those crimes.<\/p>\n

3. The investigation opened into the alleged crimes concluded that such crimes had never been committed. As a result, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant in connection with false crime reporting.<\/p>\n

4. On 27 September 2016 a joint forensic psychological and psychiatric examination, ordered within the scope of those criminal proceedings, concluded that the applicant suffered from \u201corganic delusional disorder\u201d, was mentally ill and needed compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution.<\/p>\n

5. On 26 December 2016 the investigator applied to the Shirak Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) seeking to have compulsory medical measures imposed on the applicant.<\/p>\n

6. On 9 February 2018, the Regional Court found that the applicant had filed a false crime report. It further found that the applicant lacked criminal liability on account of her mental illness and had to be subjected to compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution.<\/p>\n

7. Following the applicant\u2019s appeal, the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to quash the judgment of the Regional Court on procedural grounds and terminate the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n

8. On 25 June 2021, upon the prosecutor\u2019s appeal, the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Criminal Court of Appeal on procedural grounds and upheld that of the Regional Court. Consequently, the applicant was placed in a psychiatric institution on 14 July 2021.<\/p>\n

9. On 24 January 2022 the psychiatric institution lodged an application with the Regional Court seeking to have the applicant\u2019s compulsory treatment terminated and replaced with an outpatient treatment under the supervision of a local psychiatrist on the grounds that the applicant didn\u2019t pose any danger to society, her behaviour was adequate and the family insisted on the change of the compulsory confinement imposed. The application was supported by the opinion of the psychiatric panel of the psychiatric institution which also included the applicant\u2019s doctor. The latter acted as the representative of the psychiatric institution at the ensuing court hearing.<\/p>\n

10. On 22 February 2022, relying on statements by the applicant and her daughter denying the diagnosis as well as their unwillingness to continue the applicant\u2019s taking medication, which was considered necessary by the applicant\u2019s doctor, the Regional Court dismissed the application finding that the compulsory medical measure imposed on the applicant should be maintained. It also found that a statement made by the applicant\u2019s doctor that the applicant\u2019s relatives had made periodical requests to change the type of the compulsory medical measure left an impression that the application lodged by the psychiatric institution had been preconditioned by the persistent pressure of the applicant\u2019s relatives, rather than by the positive changes in the applicant\u2019s state of health.<\/p>\n

11. On 5 May 2022, the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal upholding the reasoning of the Regional Court. It further concluded that the assurances given by the applicant\u2019s daughter that the applicant would take the prescribed medicine in case of changing the imposed compulsory medical measure were misleading and aimed at creating the mere impression that the applicant\u2019s treatment would have an ongoing nature and would not be terminated.<\/p>\n

12. On 23 December 2022 the psychiatric institution lodged another application with the Regional Court asking to terminate the applicant\u2019s compulsory treatment and replace it with outpatient treatment under the supervision of a local psychiatrist.<\/p>\n

13. On 9 January 2023 the Regional Court granted the application and terminated the applicant\u2019s compulsory treatment in the psychiatric institution, resulting in the applicant\u2019s release on the same date. The applicant alleged that the court had agreed to grant this measure only after she agreed to admit that she had falsely reported crimes.<\/p>\n

THE COURT\u2019S ASSESSMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n

14. The applicant complains that her compulsory confinement in a psychiatric institution did not comply with the requirements of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(e) of the Convention.<\/p>\n

15. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant is no longer a victim since her compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution has been terminated. A decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive her of her status as a \u201cvictim\u201d for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see\u00a0Selahattin Demirta\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305\/17, \u00a7 218, 22 December 2020). There was no acknowledgement of a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to liberty or any redress provided in that respect and she was simply released from the psychiatric institution after almost eighteen months since her confinement and inpatient treatment were no longer considered to be justified (see paragraph 13 above).<\/p>\n

16. The general principles concerning the grounds for deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound mind have been summarised in Ilnseher v.\u00a0Germany ([GC], nos. 10211\/12 and 27505\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 126-41, 4\u00a0December 2018).<\/p>\n

17. The Court reiterates that an individual cannot be deprived of his liberty as being of \u201cunsound mind\u201d unless the following three minimum conditions are satisfied: firstly, he must reliably be shown to be of unsound mind, that is, a true mental disorder must be established before a competent authority on the basis of objective medical expertise; secondly, the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; thirdly, the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder (see Ilnseher, cited above, \u00a7 127).<\/p>\n

18. The Regional Court\u2019s finding that the applicant lacked criminal liability on account of her mental illness was based on the report of the joint forensic psychological and psychiatric examination. The report explained at length the reasons why the applicant was considered to be suffering from \u201corganic delusional disorder\u201d. The Court has no reason to criticise these conclusions. No issue, therefore, arises in connection with the first condition.<\/p>\n

19. Moving on to the second condition, however, the Court notes that neither the report of the joint forensic psychological and psychiatric examination nor the decision of the Regional Court provided reasons as to why the applicant\u2019s condition was considered of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement (see paragraphs 4 and 6 above). While the report of the joint forensic psychological and psychiatric examination stated that the applicant needed compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution, no justification was provided for such a need of compulsory confinement. It appears that the fact that the applicant was mentally ill was considered in itself sufficient to justify her compulsory placement and treatment in a psychiatric institution.<\/p>\n

20. Furthermore, the Court has previously noted in the context of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention that the detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest (see Ilnseher, cited above, \u00a7 137; D.R. v. Lithuania, no.\u00a0691\/15, \u00a7 94, 26 June 2018). In the present case, however, the Regional Court, when imposing on the applicant compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution, did not consider a less severe measure in the form of outpatient supervision and compulsory treatment by a physiatrist which was one of the types of compulsory medical measures available under domestic law. It cannot therefore be said that the decision to deprive the applicant of his liberty was based on an assessment of all the relevant factors including the therapeutic prospects or the viability of less invasive alternatives, as required also by the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (see Ples\u00f3 v.\u00a0Hungary, no.\u00a041242\/08, \u00a7 68, and the international text referred therein).<\/p>\n

21. The Court considers that the authorities should have taken a more cautious approach, given that any encroachment on the Convention rights of those belonging to particularly vulnerable groups such as psychiatric patients can be justified only by \u201cvery weighty reasons\u201d and taking into account the fact that compulsory psychiatric hospitalisation often entails measures interfering with a person\u2019s private life and physical integrity, including medical interventions in defiance of the subject\u2019s will, such as forced administration of medication (ibid., \u00a7 65).<\/p>\n

22. The Court observes that in its decision of 22 February 2022 the Regional Court provided some reasons when it decided to dismiss the first application lodged by the psychiatric institution in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 10 above). It finds however worthy to underline that the application had been submitted with a view to the applicant\u2019s release and was based on the opinion of an expert panel supporting it. Under domestic law (Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) an opinion of an expert panel was the necessary basis for reviewing the compulsory measure. While the Regional Court apparently found that the statements made at the hearing before it by the applicant, her daughter as well as her doctor raised questions about the well-foundedness of the application and of the expert panel\u2019s opinion supporting it, it made no serious effort to clarify these issues by, for example, seeking a new expert opinion that could have also taken into account those statements. The Court is of the view that a case, such as this one, where there had been no allegation about the applicant\u2019s imminent dangerousness to herself or others, should have incited the domestic authorities to give a more in-depth consideration of the measure by analysing the true health benefits of the applicant\u2019s treatment or the risks in the case of the absence of such treatment without imposing a disproportionate burden on the person concerned (see Ples\u00f3, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a066-68).<\/p>\n

23. The above reasons are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the domestic authorities failed to convincingly demonstrate that the applicant\u2019s mental disorder was of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement (see Ples\u00f3, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 60-62 and 69, and to illustrate application of the same principles in specific cases, Y.S. v. Russia [Committee], no.\u00a028131\/19, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a023-26, 30 March 2021 and Vershinin v. Russia [Committee], no.\u00a042858\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a024-26, 20 September 2016). It follows that the applicant\u2019s confinement in the psychiatric institution did not meet the requirements of 5\u00a0\u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention.<\/p>\n

24. There has accordingly been a violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention.<\/p>\n

II. OTHER COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n

25. The applicant also complained under Article 8 of the Convention that her treatment at the psychiatric institution had involved forced administration of medication, that her contacts with relatives had been restricted and her mobile phone had been taken from her on several occasions. In her observations, the applicant also alleged that she had been coerced to admit false crime reporting in order to be released (see paragraph 13 above), alleging that this had violated her rights guaranteed under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal question raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7\u00a0156, ECHR 2014).<\/p>\n

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/strong><\/p>\n

26. The applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage and 4,174 euros (EUR) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court.<\/p>\n

27. The Government contested those claims.<\/p>\n

28. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a07,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.<\/p>\n

29. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,534 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.<\/p>\n

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n

1. Declares the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention concerning the applicant\u2019s unlawful confinement in a psychiatric institution admissible;<\/p>\n

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention;<\/p>\n

3. Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints;<\/p>\n

4. Holds<\/p>\n

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n

(i) EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n

(ii) EUR 1,534 (one thousand five hundred and thirty-four euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n

Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 February 2024, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n

Valentin Nicolescu \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Faris Vehabovi\u0107
\nActing Deputy Registrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 President<\/p>\n

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European Court of Human Rights FOURTH SECTION CASE OF T.A. v. ARMENIA (Application no. 2648\/22) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 6 February 2024 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of T.A. v. Armenia, The…<\/p>\n

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