{"id":2412,"date":"2019-04-28T08:59:06","date_gmt":"2019-04-28T08:59:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2412"},"modified":"2026-08-25T16:43:23","modified_gmt":"2026-08-25T16:43:23","slug":"k-v-poland","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2412","title":{"rendered":"Conditions of detention and a prisoner\u2019s right to private life: the ECtHR decision on application no. 6068\/12 against Poland"},"content":{"rendered":"
Privacy notice.<\/strong> The applicant\u2019s personal data are not disclosed in this article. The applicant\u2019s name and initials, year and place of birth, nationality, place of residence, details of the applicant\u2019s representative, and other information not necessary for understanding the legal position of the European Court of Human Rights have been omitted. The person who lodged the application is referred to below as \u201cthe applicant\u201d.<\/div>\n

The decision of the European Court of Human Rights on application no. 6068\/12 concerns three important issues: detention in overcrowded cells, video surveillance in communal showers, and the confidentiality of medical examinations in a detention facility. The case is particularly useful for students and legal practitioners because it shows how the ECtHR distinguishes between Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention, assesses the proportionality of an interference with private life, and concludes the examination of part of an application on the basis of a unilateral declaration by the respondent State.<\/p>\n

The decision was adopted by a Committee of the First Section of the ECtHR on 26 March 2019 and notified in writing on 18 April 2019. It is not a judgment finding a violation of the Convention in respect of all the complaints raised: the Article 3 complaint was struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases, while the complaints under Article 8 were declared manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible.<\/p>\n

Facts of the case<\/h2>\n

The applicant was detained for more than two years in a remand centre in Gliwice. For approximately eight months and three weeks, he was held in overcrowded cells. The Polish courts established that the personal space available to each detainee ranged from 2.03 to 2.73 square metres, while domestic law prescribed a minimum of 3 square metres.<\/p>\n

According to the applicant, the inadequate conditions were not limited to a lack of space. He referred to dirt and mould, a lack of hot water, restricted lighting, only one hour of outdoor exercise per day, and the possibility of taking a shower just once a week for five minutes. He also complained of a lack of privacy in the communal shower, which had no cubicles or curtains and was subject to video surveillance.<\/p>\n

Later, while detained in another facility, the applicant also raised the issue of the confidentiality of medical examinations. He considered that supervision by a prison officer infringed his private life and the confidentiality of his medical information.<\/p>\n

Proceedings before the Polish courts<\/h2>\n

The applicant brought a civil claim for compensation against the State, relying on overcrowding, inadequate medical care, and video surveillance in the showers. The first-instance court confirmed that, for a substantial period, the personal space available to each prisoner had been below the prescribed minimum. It nevertheless considered that such accommodation had been permissible under the domestic law in force at the time.<\/p>\n

The domestic court stated that overcrowding did not in itself necessarily establish inhuman or degrading treatment. In its view, additional aggravating factors were required. It also found no infringement of the applicant\u2019s personal rights in connection with the video surveillance or the medical care provided. The appeal was dismissed, and the Supreme Court refused to entertain the cassation appeal.<\/p>\n

Convention provisions considered by the ECtHR<\/h2>\n

Article 3: prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment<\/h3>\n

Under Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained primarily about overcrowding and the general conditions of his detention. Article 3 lays down an absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.<\/p>\n

Article 8: right to respect for private life<\/h3>\n

The Court examined the issues of video surveillance in the shower and the confidentiality of medical examinations under Article 8 of the Convention. The ECtHR reiterated that deprivation of liberty does not deprive a person of all other Convention rights. Restrictions inherent in a prison regime or required for security may be permissible, but they must have a legal basis, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate.<\/p>\n

The State\u2019s unilateral declaration concerning the overcrowding complaint<\/h2>\n

During the proceedings, the Polish Government submitted a unilateral declaration. The State acknowledged a violation of Article 3 of the Convention arising from the applicant\u2019s detention in overcrowded cells and offered to pay 11,700 Polish zlotys. The amount covered pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, costs incurred before the domestic courts, and expenses.<\/p>\n

The ECtHR took account of the unequivocal acknowledgment of the violation, the nature of the complaint, the Court\u2019s established case-law on conditions of detention in Polish facilities, and the consistency of the proposed amount with awards in similar cases. It concluded that continued examination of this part of the application was no longer justified and struck it out of its list of cases under Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention.<\/p>\n

Important:<\/strong> The ECtHR did not deliver a judgment under Article 3 in which it itself found a violation after examining the merits of the case. The State acknowledged the violation in a unilateral declaration, after which the Court struck the relevant part of the application out of its list. It is therefore legally inaccurate to state simply that \u201cthe ECtHR found that Poland had violated Article 3\u201d without this explanation.<\/div>\n

The Court also considered whether respect for human rights required it to continue examining the complaint despite the State\u2019s declaration. As clear and extensive case-law on prison overcrowding already existed, it found no such requirement.<\/p>\n

Video surveillance in a communal shower<\/h2>\n

The ECtHR proceeded on the basis that the surveillance interfered with the prisoners\u2019 private life. In assessing whether the interference was justified, the Court examined three elements:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Lawfulness.<\/strong> The video surveillance was provided for by the Polish Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. Domestic law specified the places in which surveillance could be used, its purposes, the rules governing the handling of recordings, and the procedure for destroying them.<\/li>\n
  2. Legitimate aim.<\/strong> The surveillance was used to ensure the safety of prisoners and the institution, protect the rights of others, and prevent disorder and crime.<\/li>\n
  3. Necessity and proportionality.<\/strong> Access to the recordings was restricted to a limited group of officers; the material was reviewed daily and destroyed if it had no evidential or security value; and images of intimate parts of the body were automatically masked or distorted.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    In view of those safeguards, the Court considered the measure narrowly tailored and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The complaint was declared manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n

    The decision does not establish that video surveillance in showers is always permissible. The conclusion depended on the specific safeguards in place: a sufficiently detailed legal basis, restricted access, a minimal retention period, protection of images of intimate parts of the body, and a demonstrated security purpose. The absence of one or more of those safeguards could lead to a different assessment under Article 8.<\/p>\n

    Confidentiality of a prisoner\u2019s medical examination<\/h2>\n

    As regards the medical examinations, the Government explained that an officer escorted the applicant to the consulting room but remained during the examination in a separate vestibule behind a closed door. The officer could enter at the doctor\u2019s request if required for security reasons.<\/p>\n

    The ECtHR established that non-medical staff had not in fact been present during the examinations. The confidentiality of doctor-patient communications and the privacy of the medical procedures had therefore been respected. This part of the application was also declared manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n

    This conclusion should be distinguished from a situation in which a prison officer remains inside the consulting room, can hear the conversation with the doctor, or can observe medical procedures. The Court assessed the officer\u2019s actual position rather than merely the formal possibility of supervision under domestic law.<\/p>\n

    Outcome of the decision<\/h2>\n

    The ECtHR unanimously:<\/p>\n