{"id":2862,"date":"2019-05-02T14:01:14","date_gmt":"2019-05-02T14:01:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2862"},"modified":"2019-11-05T10:59:59","modified_gmt":"2019-11-05T10:59:59","slug":"case-of-cernea-v-romania","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2862","title":{"rendered":"CASE OF CERNEA v. ROMANIA (European Court of Human Rights)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: center;\">FOURTH SECTION<br \/>\nCASE OF CERNEA v. ROMANIA<br \/>\n(Application no. 7486\/12)<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">JUDGMENT<br \/>\nSTRASBOURG<br \/>\n18 December 2018<\/p>\n<p>This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n<p><strong>In the case of Cernea v. Romania,<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n<p>Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, President,<br \/>\nEgidijus K\u016bris,<br \/>\nIulia Antoanella Motoc, judges,<br \/>\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n<p>Having deliberated in private on 27 November 2018,<\/p>\n<p>Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n<p><strong>PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 7486\/12) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Romanian national, Mr Vasile Gavril Cernea (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 3\u00a0November 2011.<\/p>\n<p>2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr M.C. Jida, a lawyer practising in Oradea. The Romanian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n<p>3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant allegedunder Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention thatthe criminal proceedings opened against him had been unreasonably lengthy. Relying, in substance, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant alleged that he had incurred substantial losses because he had been unable to dispose freely of his property following the seizure of his assets.<\/p>\n<p>4.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 February 2016notice of theabove-mentioned complaintswasgiven to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n<p>5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Oradea.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>6.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 November 2000 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bihor County Court (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d)discontinued thecriminal proceedings which it had opened against the applicant on 24 November 2000 for bribe taking.<\/p>\n<p>7.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bihor Court of Appealquashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motionand ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened.<\/p>\n<p>8.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 February and 11 June 2001, respectively, the prosecutor\u2019s office reopened the criminal proceedings against the applicant for bribe taking andopened criminal proceedings against him for abuse of office.<\/p>\n<p>9.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 July 2002 the State Agency for Capitalisation of Banking Assets (Autoritate Pentru Valorificarea Activelor Bancare \u2013 \u201cAVAB\u201d) joined the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a civil party. It sought the recovery of 27,863,805,105 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 1,758,753 US dollars (USD)),the damage that it had allegedlyincurred as a result of the applicant\u2019s abuse of office.<\/p>\n<p>10. On 16 August 2002 theprosecutor\u2019s office ordered the seizureofthe applicant\u2019s movable and immovable assets up to the value of the damage allegedly incurred by AVAB. The order was enforced by the Bihor Police Department on 19 December 2002 by seizing part of the immovable properties owned jointly by the applicant and his wife, in particular four plots of intra muros agricultural land, a home and annexes.<\/p>\n<p>11.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 August 2002 the prosecutor\u2019s office indicted the applicant for bribe taking and for abuse of office and sent his case for trial.<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0First round of court proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>12.\u00a0\u00a0Between 7 October 2002 and6 February 2006the Bihor County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d)adjourned the proceedings twenty-four times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence,and for deliberations. Also, at a hearing on 10 February 2003, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge against the order of 16 August 2002 on the grounds that the measure was temporary and had been enforced correctly. This decision was upheld by the Oradea Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) on 11 March 2003 following an appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n<p>13.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 February 2006 theCounty Court examined the applicant\u2019s case on the merits and acquitted him of abuse of office. However, it held that the applicant had to pay AVAB the damages it claimed because AVAB had suffered damageas a result of his actions. Consequently,the court maintained the measure imposed on the applicant\u2019s assets. It also convicted the applicantof bribe taking and sentenced him tothree years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended.<\/p>\n<p>14.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n<p>15.\u00a0\u00a0Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 theCourt of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases.On 19\u00a0September 2006 the courtquashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examinationon procedural grounds.<\/p>\n<p><strong>C.\u00a0\u00a0Second round of court proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>16.\u00a0\u00a0Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedingsthirty-twotimes to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence,for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 thecourt adjourned the examination of the applicant\u2019s request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court\u2019s determinationof the case.<\/p>\n<p>17.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 April 2010 theCounty Court examined the applicant\u2019s case on the merits, acquitted him of abuse of office and dismissed AVAB\u2019s civil claim. Consequently, it lifted the seizure measure from his assets. The court convicted the applicant, however,of receiving bribes and gave him a suspended sentence of three years\u2019 imprisonment.<\/p>\n<p>18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantand AVAB appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n<p>19.\u00a0\u00a0Between 21 September and 16 November 2010 theCourt of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases, to summon them, and for the court to deliberate.On 23 November 2010 the court dismissed the appeals of the parties and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.<\/p>\n<p>20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant and AVAB appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (\u201cthe Court of Cassation\u201d).<\/p>\n<p>21.\u00a0\u00a0Between 23 February and 20 April 2011 theCourt of Cassation adjourned the proceedings once to allow the applicant to prepare hiscase.<\/p>\n<p>22.\u00a0\u00a0By a final judgment of 4 May 2011 theCourt of Cassationallowed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of fact andlaw in part. It held that he was guilty of bribe taking, buthis criminal liability for that offence had become time-barred. The court upheld the remaining parts of the judgments delivered by the lower courts.<\/p>\n<p>23.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 March 2012, once the applicant had submitted certified copies of all the courts\u2019 judgments, the Bihor Land and Immovable Property Register removed the annotation concerning the seizure measure imposed on his immovable property from the above-mentioned register, which had prevented him from freely disposing of it.<\/p>\n<p>II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0Former Code of Criminal Procedure<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>24.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the former Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the seizure of assets during a criminal investigation and the available challenges, in particular Articles 163, 168 and 169, are described in Nedescu v. Romania (no. <a href=\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=9423\">70035\/10<\/a>, \u00a7 40, 16 January 2018).<\/p>\n<p>25.\u00a0\u00a0Articles 370 and 3855 provided that an ordinary appeal and an appeal on points of fact and of law had suspensive effect on the proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>B.\u00a0\u00a0Law no. 7\/1996 in respect of the land and immovable property register, in force at the relevant time<\/p>\n<p>26.\u00a0\u00a0Articles 28 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 and 47 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 provided that the land register could be updated only if anotarised copy was provided of the final judgment which attested the legal fact beingsubmitted for registration.<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6\u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n<p>27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complainedof the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIn the determination of &#8230; any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a &#8230; hearing within a reasonable time by [a] &#8230; tribunal &#8230;\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the case had not been complex and thatthe authorities had been responsible for the delays in the proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government challenged the applicant\u2019s arguments, noting thatthe applicanthad asked for repeated adjournments of the proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the principles set out in its case-law concerning the assessment of the reasonableness of the length of proceedings(see, among many other authorities, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 76943\/11, \u00a7 143, 29 November 2016).<\/p>\n<p>32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in the current case, the criminal proceedings against the applicant had begun on 24 November 2000and had ended with the final judgment of the Court of Cassation on 4 May 2011. Hence, they had lasted ten years, five months and ten days over three levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<p>33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that neither the complexity of the case, nor\u00a0the applicant\u2019s conduct could explain the overall length of the proceedings. In so far as the conduct of the relevant domestic authorities was concerned, the Court notes that the proceedings regarding the applicant were reopened repeatedly (see paragraphs 7 and 15 above) or were delayed (see paragraph16above) for reasons which could not be imputed to the applicant.<\/p>\n<p>34.\u00a0Having regard to the available evidence, the parties\u2019 submissions, and to the relevant case-law on the matter (seeLupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others, \u00a7 147, cited above), the Court takes the view that the length of the proceedings in the present case does not satisfy the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement.<\/p>\n<p>There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOCL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n<p>35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had incurred substantial losses because he had been unable to freely dispose of his property for almost nine years following the seizure of his assets. He relied in substance on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n<p>The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that theinterference with his rightof property had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it had lasted for an unreasonably long time, had concerned all the immovable assets owned by him and his wife and had prevented him from disposing of them or from mortgaging them. These restrictions,together with the fact that once the criminal proceedings had been opened against him he had remained unemployed, made the burden that had been imposed on him excessive.<\/p>\n<p>38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that thecontrol of theuse of the applicant\u2019s property was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim.<\/p>\n<p>39.\u00a0\u00a0While an indefinite interference with the applicant\u2019s rights could not be justified by a mere reasonable suspicion, objective elements, such as the complexity of the case and his conduct,had to be considered when examining the proceedings. In addition, the applicant had failed to explain in what way the measurehad affected him. Only part of his immovable property had been seized and the measure had not concerned any movable property which would have been necessary for the development of a professional activity. Also, he had been free either to farm the seized land or to build on it and had never claimed that he had intended to sell his properties or to carry out an activity that had been affected by the seizure.<\/p>\n<p>40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant hadused the effective remedy available to him to challenge the measureand the courts had dismissed his challenge by providing reasonable grounds.<\/p>\n<p>41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the principles set out in its case-law in circumstances relating to instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property (see, amongst other authorities, B.K.M. Lojistik Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Slovenia, no. 42079\/12, \u00a7 39, 17\u00a0January 2017).<\/p>\n<p>42.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, the Court has no reason to doubt that the interference complained of \u2013 which constituted a control of the use of property \u2013 was in accordance with Romanian law since it had a clear basis in the former Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular Article 163thereof, and that it pursued the legitimate aims of fighting crime and of securing the coverage of debt caused as a result of unlawful acts.<\/p>\n<p>43.\u00a0\u00a0In remains to be determined whether the measure complained of was proportionate to the aim pursued.<\/p>\n<p>44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the seizure of the applicant\u2019s movable and immovable assets on 16 August 2002 and that the order was enforcedonly on 19 December 2002 and only with regard to the applicant\u2019s immovable assets. In addition, in spite of the applicant\u2019s arguments to the contrary, it seems that theenforcement concerned only part of his immovable assets. None of his movable property wasseized.<\/p>\n<p>45.\u00a0\u00a0The Courtnotes that there is no evidence in the file that the applicant was prevented from living on or renting out his property or from farming the land. Also, there is no indication that he was unable to make full use of his movable property. Moreover, the interference with his property stemmed from a criminal investigation opened against him on suspicion of an offence which had allegedly caused damage to others.<\/p>\n<p>46.\u00a0\u00a0However, a reasonable suspicion at the beginning of the investigation cannot justify an indefinite interference with the applicant\u2019s rights. The ensuing investigation must be sufficiently diligent and speedy to ensure that the interference lasts only a limited time (seeBenet Czech, spol. s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic, no. 31555\/05, \u00a7 42, 21 October 2010).<\/p>\n<p>47.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that it has already established that the criminal investigation opened against the applicant was not very complex and was excessively lengthy (seeparagraphs33-34above).<\/p>\n<p>48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the procedure enabling the applicant to complain before the courts against the measure taken against him was eventually successful and that the measure was formally lifted by the first\u2011instance court on 8 April 2010. However, in practice, given the suspensive effect of the ordinary appeals lodged by the parties against the above-mentioned judgment and the condition set out by Law no. 7\/1996 for the land register to be updated, the applicant remained unable to freely dispose of his property pending a final judgment by the criminal court. He was therefore unable to freely use part of his immovable property, in particular to sell it or use it as collateral for loans, from 19 December 2002 to at least 4 May 2011, that is eight years, four months and fifteen days.<\/p>\n<p>49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court acknowledges the importance of conducting investigations of suspected serious offences, as in the instant case, with due diligence in order to ensure that these offences are properly assessed and the proceedings duly terminated. Nevertheless, given the length of the proceedings and the apparent significant value of the applicant\u2019s seized immovable property, the Court finds that a fair balance was not struck in the instant case between the general interests of society and the interests of the applicant, as the latter was obliged to bear an excessive burden as a result of the continuing seizure.<\/p>\n<p>50.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n<p>51.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage as a result of the distress and mental suffering caused by the length of the proceedings against him and the seizure of his property.<\/p>\n<p>53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s claim was excessive and he had failed to substantiate it. Moreover, there was no causal link between the alleged violation of his property rights and the damage claimed.<\/p>\n<p>54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the applicant suffered some non\u2011pecuniary damage as a result of the infringement of his rights under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which cannot be made good by the mere finding of a violation. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 3,900 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant has not submitted any claim for costs and expenses. The Court is therefore not called upon to make any award in this respect.<\/p>\n<p><strong>C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n<p><strong>FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe application admissible;<\/p>\n<p>2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n<p>3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;<\/p>\n<p>4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n<p>(a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 3,900 (three thousand nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage,to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n<p>(b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n<p>5.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n<p>Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n<p>Andrea Tamietti\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque<br \/>\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n<div class=\"social-share-buttons\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer\/sharer.php?u=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2862\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Facebook<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/intent\/tweet?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2862&text=CASE+OF+CERNEA+v.+ROMANIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Twitter<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/shareArticle?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2862&title=CASE+OF+CERNEA+v.+ROMANIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">LinkedIn<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/pinterest.com\/pin\/create\/button\/?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2862&description=CASE+OF+CERNEA+v.+ROMANIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Pinterest<\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>FOURTH SECTION CASE OF CERNEA v. ROMANIA (Application no. 7486\/12) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 18 December 2018 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Cernea v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights&hellip;<\/p>\n<p class=\"more-link-p\"><a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2862\">Read more &rarr;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2862","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-available-in-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2862","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2862"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2862\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9425,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2862\/revisions\/9425"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2862"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2862"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2862"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}