FOURTH SECTION
\nCASE OF SOROKIN v. UKRAINE
\n(Application no. 3450\/09)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n18 December 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Sorokin v. Ukraine,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n FarisVehabovi\u0107, President, Having deliberated in private on 27 November 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 3450\/09) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Mikhail Yegorovich Sorokin (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 26 December 2008.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr I.Tokarev, a lawyer practising in Toretsk. The Ukrainian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 February 2018notice of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention concerning the alleged unfairness of the proceedings in his case was given to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Toretsk.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0In December 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Dzerzhynsk Court against the Social Insurance Fund (\u201cthe Fund\u201d), seeking damages for injuries caused by a work-related accident.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0By a judgment of 17 January 2008, the above court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant certain amounts in damages. The applicant and the Fund both sought to appeal against that judgment.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, on 25 January 2008 the applicant lodged through the Dzerzhynsk Court a statement of intent to lodge an appeal (\u201cthe statement of intent\u201d; \u0437\u0430\u044f\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e \u0430\u043f\u0435\u043b\u044f\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0440\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f). The copy of thestatement of intent submitted to the Court bears the Dzerzhynsk Court\u2019s stamp with reference number 1561 showing 25 January 2008 as the date of receipt. On 13\u00a0February 2008 the applicant lodged the appeal itself, in which he requested that the appellate court quash the judgment of 17\u00a0January 2008 and award him the claimed damages in full. A copy of the appeal bears the Dzerzhynsk Court\u2019s stamp, with 13 February 2008 showing as the date of receipt.The applicant statedthat no separate procedural decisions had been made about his appeal because ithad been mislaidby the court.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0In a ruling of 18 March 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, rejected it as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008. The ruling did not mention the applicant\u2019s appeal, and only stated that at the hearing, which was held on the same day, the applicant and his representative had contested the Fund\u2019s appeal and had asked the court to reject it.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0According to the transcript of the court hearing on 18 March 2008, the applicant\u2019s representative stated during the hearing that the applicant had lodged the statement of intent on 25\u00a0January 2008 and the appeal itself on 13 February 2008. She also stated that they were not challenging the judgment of 17\u00a0January 2008 as regards the application of the law but rather were merely seeking anaward ofthe full amount of damages claimed by the applicant. The applicant\u2019s representative also asked the Court of Appeal to reject the Fund\u2019s appeal. The applicant submitted that at the hearing his representative had also produced a copy of his appeal and had asked the Court of Appeal to join it to the case file; however, the latter refused to do so.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. A copy of the appeal in cassation submitted to the Court shows that the applicant had dated it 17 May 2008. In itthe applicant stated that he had lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17\u00a0January 2008 but that when he had arrived at the appellate hearing on 18\u00a0March 2008, it transpired that his appeal had been mislaid and his submissions had therefore not been examined by the Court of Appeal. He thus asked the Supreme Court to quash the ruling of 18 March 2008 and to remit the case for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave for the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation.It stated that the Court of Appeal had examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, but that the applicant had not personally appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2008 and for this reason the case could not be reviewed in cassation. It did not address the applicant\u2019s argument that he had indeed lodged an appeal, but that it had been mislaid. The decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation had been lodged in \u201cApril 2007\u201d.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Article 220 of the 2004 Code of Civil Procedure of Ukraine (\u201cthe Code\u201d)provided at the material time that upon the request of the parties or of its own motion a trial court could adopt an additional judgment if it had not previously ruledon a claim in respect of which a party had provided evidence and explanations.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0Article 296 provided that a statement of intent to lodge an appeal and an actual appeal against a trial court\u2019s judgment were to be lodged with the appellate court through the trial court which had adopted that judgment. The latter would then forward the appeal to the appellate court.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Conventionthat the proceedings in his case had been unfair, because the Supreme Court had refused to examine his appeal in cassation on the erroneous ground that he had not previously appealed against the Dzerzhynsk Court\u2019s judgment. The above provision reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the application had been lodged out of time, because the final decision in the applicant\u2019s case had been given on 27\u00a0June 2008, while the application had been lodged on 30 March 2009.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not provide any comments in reply.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant sent his first letter, in which he stated the relevant facts and complaints, on 26 December 2008. He was then asked to submitan application form by 19 March 2009,which he duly did on 12 March 2009 (with the Court marking it asreceived on 30\u00a0March 2009). Therefore,the applicant had complied with the six-month rule laid down in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and the Government\u2019sabove objection should be dismissed.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the abovecomplaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that since the applicant had not provided any court decision regarding the acceptance of his appeal against the judgment of 17\u00a0January 2008, it was not known whether he had indeedlodged it.Even if he had, it had \u201cobviously\u201d been returned unexamined, because the statement of intenthad not complied with the proceduralrules. In another part of their submissions the Government stated, however, that the court had \u201capparently accepted the appeal for consideration\u201d. Then they contendedthat if the Court of Appeal had not examined all of the applicant\u2019s arguments, he could have asked it to adopt an additional judgment under Article 220\u00a71 of the Code (see paragraph 12 above). Next, they argued that the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation was dated 17 May 2008 (see paragraph 10 above) and bore no stamp ofthe Supreme Court, while the latter\u2019s decisionreferred to an appeal in cassation lodged in April 2007 (see paragraph 11 above). Therefore, it was not clear whether the applicant had provided the Court with the same appeal in cassation documentas the one mentioned in the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 27 June 2008. If the Supreme Court\u2019s reference to April 2007had been a clerical error, the applicant could have requested that it be rectified.In any event, the Supreme Court\u2019s decision had not been manifestly unreasonable andthe applicant had received a fair trial.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantreiterated that he had lodged the statement of intent, the appeal and the appeal in cassation on 25 January, [13] February and 17\u00a0May 2008 respectively.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that although Article 6 of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or cassation, where such courts do exist, the proceedings before them must comply with the guarantees of Article 6, for instance in that it guarantees to litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination of their civil rights and obligations (see, for instance, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no.\u00a055707\/00, \u00a7\u00a097, ECHR 2009). It further reiterates that it is not for this Court to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. The Court should not act as a fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 \u00a7 1 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see, for instance, Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251\/08, \u00a7 61, ECHR 2015). The Court has for instancefound a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Conventionin circumstances in which the court of last-instance\u2019s decision toreject an applicant\u2019s appeal in cassationas inadmissible was the result of a manifest error of assessment on the part of that court (see Dulaurans v. France, no. 34553\/97, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034-39, 21\u00a0March 2000).<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court has no reason to doubt that the applicant lodged his appeal against the judgment of 17\u00a0January 2008, the applicant having produced a copy of the appeal withthe DzerzhynskCourt\u2019s stamp showing the date ofreceipt (see paragraph 7 above). As to the Government\u2019s submission that even had it beenlodged, the appeal had been returned to the applicant unexamined because the statement of intent had not complied with the procedural rules, the Court considersthat this is merely speculation unsupported by any evidence. Moreover, that submissioncontradicts the Government\u2019s other submission that the applicant\u2019s appeal had \u201capparently [been] accepted for consideration\u201d (see paragraph 19 above).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s submission that, even if the applicant had indeed lodged the appeal, he could have requested that theCourt of Appealadopt an additional decision under Article 220 \u00a7 1 of the Code (see paragraph 19 above), the Court notes that thatprovision only concernsthe judgments of trial courts (see paragraph 12 above). The Government neither argued that the provision was likewise applicable to appellate court decisions nor cited any other provision which would give recourse to the same option in appellate proceedings. Even on the assumption that the above provision is also applicable to appellate court decisions, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaintwas that no decision had been taken on his appeal because ithad been mislaid, and the Government did not explain how he could have raisedthis particular point in the framework of the provision in question.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation, the Court considers that there was clearly a clerical error in the Supreme Court\u2019s reference to \u201cApril 2007\u201das the date of the appeal (see paragraph 11in fine above),because the decisions challenged by the applicant were adoptedin 2008 (see paragraphs\u00a06 and 8 above). In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court has no reason to doubt that the copy of theapplicant\u2019s appeal in cassation in the case file anddated 17 May 2008 is indeed the same as the one he lodged with the Supreme Court. In any case, the Government did not explain how a request that the Supreme Court rectify its mistake as to the date would have led to an examination of the merits of the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court next observes that in his appeal in cassation the applicant argued that he had lodged hisappealagainst the judgment of 17\u00a0January 2008, but that it had been mislaid and therefore hadnot beenexamined (see paragraph 10 above). However, the Supreme Court did not address thatargument at all, having held instead that the applicant had not first appealed against the above judgmentand therefore that it could not review the appeal in cassation (see paragraph 11 above).In the absence of any further explanation by the Supreme Court about how it reached thisconclusion, despite the arguments to the contrary raised by the applicant in his appeal in cassation, and also taking into account the findings made in paragraph\u00a022 above, the Court considers that the above conclusion was the result of a manifest error on the part of the Supreme Court. The Government did not present any argument that would convince the Court to reach any other conclusion.The Court thus findsthat the Supreme Court did not ensure that the applicant had a fair trial asguaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see,mutatis mutandis,Dulaurans, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034-39).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a breach of the above provision.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed an award in respect of pecuniary damage caused to him due to the work-related accident.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there was no causal link between the violationfound and the damage claimed.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant has not shown the existence of a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. The Court also notes that the applicant is entitled under Ukrainian law to request a rehearing of his case in the light of the Court\u2019s finding that the domestic courts did not comply with Article 6 in his case (see Bochan (no. 2), cited above, \u00a7 18).<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make anyclaim in this respect.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there is no call for an award under this head.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe application admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Andrea Tamietti\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 FarisVehabovi\u0107
\nCarlo Ranzoni,
\nP\u00e9terPaczolay, judges,
\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputyRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n