{"id":2894,"date":"2019-05-02T16:48:58","date_gmt":"2019-05-02T16:48:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2894"},"modified":"2019-11-04T09:49:53","modified_gmt":"2019-11-04T09:49:53","slug":"case-of-ursu-v-romania-european-court-of-human-rights","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2894","title":{"rendered":"CASE OF URSU v. ROMANIA (European Court of Human Rights)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: center;\">FOURTH SECTION<br \/>\nCASE OF URSU v. ROMANIA<br \/>\n(Application no. 44497\/09)<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">JUDGMENT<br \/>\nSTRASBOURG<br \/>\n18 December 2018<\/p>\n<p>This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n<p><strong>In the case of Ursu v. Romania,<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n<p>Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, President,<br \/>\nEgidijus K\u016bris,<br \/>\nIulia Antoanella Motoc, judges,<br \/>\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n<p>Having deliberated in private on 27 November 2018,<\/p>\n<p>Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n<p><strong>PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 44497\/09) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by aRomanian national, Mr R\u0103zvanBogdan Ursu (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 10\u00a0August 2009.<\/p>\n<p>2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr A.Hahui, a lawyer practising in Constan\u0163a. The Romanian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, MsC. Brumarfrom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n<p>3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular, that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair because he had been convicted of an offence committed under police incitement. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3\u00a0(d) of the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>4.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 November 2013 the complaints underArticle 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3\u00a0(d) of the Convention were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule\u00a054 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n<p>5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Bucharest.<\/p>\n<p>6.\u00a0\u00a0According to a police report drawn up on 21 June 2005, the police division responsible for fighting organised crime and drug trafficking (\u201cthe police\u201d) received information from an undisclosed source that an individual called \u201cUrsu-Degweed\u201dwasa member of a network of dealers that was trafficking drugs in Constan\u0163a.<\/p>\n<p>7.\u00a0\u00a0The police initiated an investigation of their own motion. On 21\u00a0June\u00a02005 the prosecutor authorised the use of an undercover police agent, who was to be helped by a police informer, D., to follow a lead regarding the applicant\u2019s alleged criminal activities. At the time of the events, the applicant was a student;D. was an acquaintance of the applicant, studyingat the same university.<\/p>\n<p>8.\u00a0\u00a0D. called the applicant and asked him to provide her with some drugs. She informed him that a common friend, L., could help him to find a dealer, set the price for the drugs and sent the money by mail (postal order) on 23\u00a0June 2005.<\/p>\n<p>9.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 June 2005 the applicant called D. and set up a meeting at the Constan\u0163a railway station for the same day. The applicant was accompanied by three friends. At about 11.45 p.m., while he was waiting for D.at the railway station, police officers from Constan\u0163a Police, acting in league with the undercover agent and D.,approached him. They searchedthe applicant and found eighteenecstasy tablets and 0.46 grams of cannabis resin in his possession.<\/p>\n<p>10.\u00a0\u00a0In his first statement to the police, given on 26 June 2005, the applicant disclosed that the dealer who had sold him the drugswas called B. and helped the police to set up an operation to catch him in the act of committing a crime.<\/p>\n<p>11.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantalso stated that D. had called and had askedhim to buy twentyecstasy tablets for her. She had sent the money for the drugs by post and had informed him that a common friend, L., could help him to find a dealer. L. had given him the number of a dealer, B., who had sold himseventeentablets. He had received two tablets as a gift; he had kept one for himself and had given the other one in exchangefor the cannabis resin, found in his possession at the search. He intended to spend his holidays in Constan\u0163a with his friends at D.\u2019s invitation. D.had also promised to offer him accommodation.<\/p>\n<p>12.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his allegations in a statement given in the presence of two lawyers of his choice on 19 July 2005. He added that he had accepted to provide D. with the ecstasy tablets in the hope of having an intimate relationship with her during his stay in Constan\u0163a.<\/p>\n<p>13.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 July 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office committed the applicant for trial on charges of drugtrafficking, in violation of Law no. 143\/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (hereinafter \u201cLaw\u00a0no.\u00a0143\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 22 below).<\/p>\n<p>14.\u00a0\u00a0Several hearings were held before the Constan\u0163a County Court. The applicant denied his involvement in drug trafficking and claimed that he had been entrapped by the police. His lawyers insisted on the importance of hearing evidence from D.<\/p>\n<p>15.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 June 2007 the Constan\u0163aCounty Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to one and a half years\u2019imprisonment suspended on probation. The court dismissed his allegations that he had been entrapped. It confined itself in noting that the activity of the informer, D.,had been lawful,without referring to the question whether she had been authorisedto act as an undercover agent. The relevant part of its reasoning read as follows:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe applicant\u2019s argument that the informer, D.,had incited him to commit the offence could not be retained. The court notes the applicant\u2019s recruitment activity in bars in Constan\u0163a, the undercover informerbeing a simple client among other clients. The activity performed by the undercover informerwas in line with Law\u00a0no.\u00a0143\/2000.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>16.\u00a0\u00a0The Constan\u0163a County Courtdid not provide any reasons justifying the fact that, in spite of the applicant\u2019s insistence, D. had not been heard. In convicting the applicant,it relied on his own statements, corroborated by the statements made by the friends who had accompanied him on his trip to Constan\u0163a on 25 June 2005, as well as on reports produced by the undercover agent and the police following the police operation organised on 25\u00a0June 2005 when the applicant had been caught in the act of committing a crime.<\/p>\n<p>17.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed against the judgment of 5 June 2007. His lawyers reiterated that he had been entrapped by the police and that D. should be heard by the court. They also claimed that D. had not been authorised to be part of the undercover operation.<\/p>\n<p>18.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 October 2008 the Constan\u0163a Court of Appeal noted that D. had never given evidence as a witness before the investigating authorities and that her name had only been mentioned in the reports drafted by them. Accordingly,her previous statements could not be read in open court pursuant to Article 327 \u00a7 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 23 below).<\/p>\n<p>19.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 October 2008 the court dismissedthe applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the County Court\u2019s findings. Without providing any additional reasons,the courtsimply reiterated that the evidence obtained by using an undercover agent was in accordance with Law no. 143. It did not refer at all to the applicant\u2019s argument that D. had not been heard.<\/p>\n<p>20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his complaints. He claimed that he had been unduly incited by D. to commit the offence of which he had been found guilty and that throughout the proceedings he had not had an opportunity to have her questioned.<\/p>\n<p>21.\u00a0\u00a0In a final decision of 4 March 2009 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded. It upheld the reasoning of the two lower courts.<\/p>\n<p>II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW<\/p>\n<p>22.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the former Criminal Procedure Code (\u201cCCP\u201d) and the relevant provisions of Law no. 143\/2000 on combating drug trafficking are described in Constantin and Stoian v.\u00a0Romania (nos.\u00a023782\/06 and 46629\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 33 and 34, 29 September 2009).<\/p>\n<p>23.\u00a0\u00a0Article 327 \u00a7 3 of the CCP provided that when it was impossible for a court to hear a witness it should read out his or her testimony given at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings and take it into consideration when examining the case.<\/p>\n<p>24.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant Council of Europe and other international conventions concerning special investigation techniques are described in Ramanauskas v.\u00a0Lithuania ([GC], no. 74420\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 35-37, ECHR 2008).<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n<p>25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had not received a fair trial in the criminal proceedings against him, in particular as he had been convicted of drug offences which he had been incited to commit, and essentially on the basis of evidence obtained by that entrapment operation. He relied on Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n<p>\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of &#8230; any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair &#8230; hearing &#8230; by [a] &#8230; tribunal&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights &#8230;<\/p>\n<p>(d)\u00a0\u00a0to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him &#8230;\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that thesecomplaintsare not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><em>1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n<p>(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n<p>27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had not been involved in drug trafficking and that the only reason for buying the eighteenecstasy tablets was the insistence of the police informer, D., who had not only sent the money to buy them but had also indicated the person from whom he might buy them.<\/p>\n<p>28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that D. had never been heard by any of the domestic authorities, despite the specific requests of his lawyers.<\/p>\n<p>(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n<p>29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied that there had been police entrapment in the case. They explained that the police had identified an organised crime group, and that the role of the undercover agent and the police informer, D., was to confirm those findings. D. had remained passive and had not exerted any pressure on the applicant.<\/p>\n<p>30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that the domestic courts had thoroughly examined the applicant\u2019s allegation of entrapment and that his conviction had not been based to a decisive extent on evidence given by D. The courts had relied primarily on the admissions of the applicant himself, as well as on the reports drafted by the police. Moreover, the applicant had failed to indicate to the courts which aspects he had considered required elucidation by hearing D.<\/p>\n<p><em>2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n<p>(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/p>\n<p>31.\u00a0\u00a0In the specific context of investigative techniques used to combat drug trafficking and corruption, the Court\u2019s long-standing view has been that, while the use of undercover agents may be tolerated provided that it is subject to clear restrictions and safeguards, the public interest cannot justify the use of evidence obtained as a result of police incitement, as to do so would expose the accused to the risk of being definitively deprived of a fair trial from the outset (see, among other authorities, Teixeira de Castro v.\u00a0Portugal, 9 June 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 35-36 and 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions1998-IV, and Ramanauskasv. Lithuania[GC], no.\u00a074420\/01, \u00a7\u00a054, ECHR 2008).<\/p>\n<p>32.\u00a0\u00a0In its extensive case-law on the subject, the Court has developed the concept of entrapment in breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, as distinguished from the use of legitimate undercover techniques in criminal investigations. It has held that while the use of special investigative methods \u2013 in particular, undercover techniques \u2013 cannot in itself infringe the right to a fair trial, the risk of police incitement entailed by such techniques means that their use must be kept within clear limits (see Ramanauskas, cited above, \u00a7\u00a051).<\/p>\n<p>33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s examination of complaints of entrapment has developed on the basis of two tests: the substantive and the procedural test of incitement. The relevant criteria determining the Court\u2019s examination in this context are set out in the cases of Bannikova v. Russia (no.\u00a018757\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a037\u201165, 4\u00a0November 2010) andMatanovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia (no.\u00a02742\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0123-135, 4 April 2017).They were recently summarised in the cases of Ramanauskas v. Lithuania (No. 2) (no. <a href=\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=9031\">55146\/14<\/a>, \u00a7\u00a7 56-62, 20\u00a0February 2018) and Virgil Dan Vasile v. Romania (no. 35517\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 40-50, 15\u00a0May 2018).<\/p>\n<p>34.\u00a0\u00a0The methodology of the Court\u2019s assessment is as follows (see, inter\u00a0alia, Ramanauskas (No. 2), cited above, \u00a7 62):<\/p>\n<p>(a)\u00a0\u00a0A preliminary consideration in its assessment of a complaint of incitement relates to the existence of an arguable complaint that an applicant was subjected to incitement by the State authorities. In this connection, in order to proceed with further assessment, the Court must satisfy itself that the situation under examination falls prima facie within the category of \u201centrapment cases\u201d. If the Court is satisfied that the applicant\u2019s complaint falls to be examined within the category of \u201centrapment cases\u201d, it will proceed, as a first step, with the assessment under the substantive test of incitement.<\/p>\n<p>(b)\u00a0\u00a0Where, under the substantive test of incitement, on the basis of the available information the Court could find with a sufficient degree of certainty that the domestic authorities investigated the applicant\u2019s activities in an essentially passive manner and did not incite him or her to commit an offence, that will normally be sufficient for the Court to conclude that the subsequent use in the criminal proceedings against the applicant of the evidence obtained by the undercover measure does not raise an issue under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>(c)\u00a0\u00a0However, if the Court\u2019s findings under the substantive test are inconclusive owing to a lack of information in the file, the lack of disclosure or contradictions in the parties\u2019 interpretations of events or if the Court finds, on the basis of the substantive test, that an applicant was subjected to incitement, contrary to Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, it will be necessary for the Court to proceed, as a second step, with the procedural test of incitement (see, in this respect, P\u0103tra\u015fcuv.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a07600\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a036\u201141, 14\u00a0February 2017).<\/p>\n<p>(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the case<\/p>\n<p>i.\u00a0\u00a0Substantive test of incitement<\/p>\n<p>35.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the arguments adduced in the present case as regards the substantive test, the Court observes that the parties disagreed as to whether the authorities had carried out the investigation in the applicant\u2019s case in an essentially passive manner. In particular, they differed as to D\u2019s role in the applicant\u2019s acting as an intermediary for the drug sale and the existence of objective suspicions that the applicant had been regularly trafficking drugs prior to the setting up of the undercover operation (see paragraphs27 and\u00a029 above).<\/p>\n<p>36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the domestic authorities have produced no evidence to substantiate their claim that before the intervention by D., the police had reason to suspect that the applicant was a drug dealer. The police report of 21 June 2005 did not offer any more details in respect of the information the authorities had about the applicant\u2019s alleged involvement in drug trafficking and how that information had been acquired by the police (see paragraph 6 above). Therefore, a mere claim by the police to the effect that they possessed information concerning the applicant\u2019s involvement in drugdealing \u2013 a statement which does not seem to have been scrutinised by the courts \u2013does not provide a sufficiently solid basis for the Court to conclude that the applicant\u2019s criminal activities were already ongoing prior to him being contacted by D. (see paragraph 8 above).<\/p>\n<p>37.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicant\u2019s behaviour was not indicative of any pre-existing criminal activity. In convicting him of drug trafficking, the domestic courts did not rely on either his demonstrable familiarity with the current prices of drugs or his ability to obtain drugs at short notice (contrast with Shannon v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 67537\/01, ECHR\u00a02004-IV).D. sent the money for the drugs and gave him the name of a common acquaintance, L.,to help him find a drug dealer (see paragraph 8 above). The Court cannot but note the significant role played by D. in arranging the deal, which runs counter to the requirement of passivity on the State agent\u2019s part. D. initiated the whole criminal activity under the direct supervision of the investigation bodies. Her friendship with the applicant seemed to have played a significant role in the events leading to the apprehension of the applicant with drugs in his possession. Although she was not a State agent and it appears that she had not been authorised to act as an undercover agent, the incriminating evidence obtained because of her intervention led to the prosecution and conviction of the applicant (see paragraph 15 above).<\/p>\n<p>38.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court considers that the police did not confine themselves to investigating the applicant\u2019s criminal activity in an essentially passive manner. There is nothing to suggest that the offence would have been committed had it not been for the above-mentioned intervention by D. The applicant\u2019s conviction for drug trafficking, in so far as his procuring the ecstasy tablets for D. is concerned, was based mainly on evidence obtained as a result of the police operation.<\/p>\n<p>ii.\u00a0\u00a0Procedural test of incitement<\/p>\n<p>39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will further proceed to the second step of its assessment and examine whether the applicant was able to raise the issue of incitement effectively in the domestic proceedings, and assess the manner in which the domestic courts dealt with his plea (see paragraph 34in fine above).<\/p>\n<p>40.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that the applicant raised a plea of incitement with the trial courts (see paragraphs 14, 17 and 20 above). The domestic courts were therefore under an obligation to take the necessary steps to uncover the truth, while bearing in mind that the burden of proof fell on the prosecution to prove that there had been no incitement. They should accordingly have verified, by assessing the information in the case file and, if necessary, reviewing the relevant material concerning the undercover operation and examining the officials and other individuals involved, on what basis the authorities suspected the applicant of involvement in drug dealing.<\/p>\n<p>41.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court notes the summary manner in which the domestic courts rejected the allegations of police entrapment (see paragraph\u00a015 above).<\/p>\n<p>42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the applicant did not, at any stage of the proceedings, have an opportunity to have D. questioned. By failing to hear her as a witness, the domestic courts deprived the applicant of the possibility of clarifying to what extent D.\u2019s actions had influenced and determined his behaviour. That essential question was nevertheless in dispute. The failure to hear D. also prevented the courts from forming their own opinion on the latter\u2019s credibility.<\/p>\n<p>43.\u00a0\u00a0The courts did not give any reasons for denying the applicant the right to have D. questioned (see paragraphs 16 and 19 above). The Court notes in this regard that unlike in similar drug-trafficking cases, the courts did not hold that the police authorities had a legitimate interest in preserving the anonymity of their agent, so that they could protect him and also make use of him again in the future (contrast withScholer v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a014212\/10, \u00a7 52, 18 December 2014). In any event, the applicant knew D. well.<\/p>\n<p>44.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that D. was asked, and refused, to make depositions within the framework of the applicant\u2019s trial for any reason. The national courts did not assess the impact of D.\u2019s absence.<\/p>\n<p>45.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court considers that the applicant was convicted on the basis of evidence obtained by way of police incitement and that the courts which examined the case did not carry out a careful examination of his assertion that he had been incited to commit the offence imputed to him.<\/p>\n<p>46.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>47.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the remaining argument raised by the applicant under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention (seeCiprianVl\u0103du\u021b and Ioan Florin Popv.\u00a0Romania, nos.\u00a043490\/07 and 44304\/07, \u00a7 94, 16 July 2015).<\/p>\n<p>II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n<p>48.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n<p>50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that no non-pecuniary damage should be awarded to the applicant as no right under the Convention had been violated by the Romanian authorities. Moreover, they considered the amount requested by the applicant as excessive and speculative. They also submitted that in similar cases (such as Bulfinsky v. Romania, no.\u00a028823\/04, \u00a7\u00a061, 1 June 2010andConstantin and Stoian v. Romania, nos.\u00a023782\/06 and\u00a046629\/06, \u00a7 71, 29 September 2009) in which the Court had found a violation of Article 6 on account of police incitement and failure of the domestic authorities to investigate such a claim, the amount awarded to the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage had been EUR 10,000.<\/p>\n<p>51.\u00a0\u00a0Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a02,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n<p>52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also considers that, where, as in the instant case, an individual has been the victim of proceedings that have entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, a retrial or the reopening of the case, if he or she so requests, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see Gen\u00e7el v. Turkey, no. 53431\/99, \u00a7\u00a027, 23\u00a0October 2003). In this respect it notes that the applicant may apply to have the proceedings reopened under Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should he choose to do so (see Mischie v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a050224\/07, \u00a7 50, 16 September 2014, and CiprianVl\u0103du\u021b and Ioan Florin Pop, cited above, \u00a7 99).<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 8,500for lawyers\u2019 fees.He claimed that he could not produce evidence to support the whole amount, and adduced bills attesting to the payment of 12,500 Romanian lei (approximately EUR 3,500) to his lawyer in the domestic proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the fact that the applicant had submitted two invoices dated 22 June and 9 February 2006 respectively could not be considered as sufficient to justify the reimbursement of the amount requested.<\/p>\n<p>55.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,500for the proceedings before the domestic courts<\/p>\n<p><strong>C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n<p><strong>FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the application admissible;<\/p>\n<p>2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n<p>3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there is no need to examine the complaint under Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(d) of the Convention;<\/p>\n<p>4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n<p>(a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts,to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n<p>(i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n<p>(b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n<p>5.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n<p>Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n<p>Andrea Tamietti \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque<br \/>\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n<div class=\"social-share-buttons\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer\/sharer.php?u=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2894\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Facebook<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/intent\/tweet?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2894&text=CASE+OF+URSU+v.+ROMANIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Twitter<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/shareArticle?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2894&title=CASE+OF+URSU+v.+ROMANIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">LinkedIn<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/pinterest.com\/pin\/create\/button\/?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2894&description=CASE+OF+URSU+v.+ROMANIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Pinterest<\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>FOURTH SECTION CASE OF URSU v. ROMANIA (Application no. 44497\/09) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 18 December 2018 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ursu v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights&hellip;<\/p>\n<p class=\"more-link-p\"><a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=2894\">Read more &rarr;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2894","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-available-in-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2894","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2894"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2894\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9036,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2894\/revisions\/9036"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2894"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2894"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2894"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}