FIRST SECTION
\nDECISION<\/p>\n
Application no. 37309\/10
\nPawe\u0142 WASIK
\nagainst Poland<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 18\u00a0December 2018as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Ksenija Turkovi\u0107, President,
\nKrzysztof Wojtyczek,
\nArmen Harutyunyan, judges,
\nand Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 15 June 2010,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Mr Pawe\u0142 Wasik, is a Polish national, who was born in 1982 and is currently detained in Wo\u0142\u00f3w Prison.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mrs J.\u00a0Chrzanowska, who was later replaced by\u00a0Mr\u00a0 J. Sobczak of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Background to the case<\/em><\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On an unknown date the applicant was convicted of murder and uttering threats. At the time of the events in the present case he was serving a long-term sentence of imprisonment.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Application for compassionate leave<\/em><\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 February 2010 the applicant asked the penitentiary judge of the Wroc\u0142aw Regional Court to grant him compassionate leave from prison in order to conclude a civil marriage with his partner, M.M. The applicant attached a letter from the Wroc\u0142aw Public Registry Office showing that the ceremony had been scheduled to take place on 3 March 2010.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 February 2010 a hearing was held before the penitentiary judge of Wroc\u0142aw Regional Court. The judge read out the applicant\u2019s request, an opinion provided about the applicant and relevant passages from the applicant\u2019s personal files.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On the same day the judge refused the request. The decision was announced orally; the written reasoning of the ruling reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNone of the grounds specified by Article 141a \u00a7 2 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences are present.\u201d<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 March 2010 the applicant submitted an appeal against that decision to the prison administration.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 March 2010 the applicant married M.M. in a ceremony held in prison. The applicant was not allowed to take photographs of the ceremony owing to internal security rules.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0Following the ceremony, he was allowed to spend three hours and thirty minutes with his wife. This included two visits without supervision and one unsupervised visit which lasted ninety minutes. Subsequently, he was granted three unsupervised visits with his wife on 6, 19 and 26 March 2010.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 May 2010 the Wroc\u0142aw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 25 February 2010. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cUnder Article 7 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences [\u2018the Code\u2019] a convicted person may challenge only the lawfulness of a decision given by an authority specified in Article 2 section 3-6 of the Code [a judge, a penitentiary judge, a director of a prison or detention centre, a regional director or the Director General of the Prison Service or a court probation officer].<\/p>\n Because the applicant in his complaint does not contest the lawfulness of the prison judge\u2019s decision – and no unlawfulness has been observed by the [Regional] Court of its own motion \u2013 but only discusses the assessment of facts made by the prison judge, the requirements specified in Article 7 have not been met.\u201d<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Further developments<\/em><\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 November 2010 the applicant was granted one year\u2019s leave from serving his sentence. During that leave, on 1 December 2010, the applicant\u2019s son K.W. was born. Subsequently, the applicant and his wife separated and on a later unknown date their marriage was dissolved.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant domestic law and practice<\/strong><\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law concerning compassionate leave from prison, as applicable at the relevant time, is set out in the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Giszczak v. Poland (no. 40195\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a019\u201121, 29\u00a0November\u00a02011).<\/p>\n COMPLAINT<\/strong><\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0Without invoking any provisions of the Convention, the applicant complained about the refusal to grant him leave from prison in order to conclude a civil marriage.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s complaint relates to the refusal to grant him compassionate leave from prison in order to conclude a marriage. However, the Court observes that the applicant was not prevented from contracting marriage (see, by contrast, Frasik v. Poland, no. 22933\/02, ECHR\u00a02010 (extracts), and Jaremowicz v. Poland, no. 24023\/03, 5 January 2010). It thus finds that this complaint should be examined under Article\u00a08 of the Convention alone, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life …<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society … for the prevention of disorder or crime … or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations<\/em><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted at the outset that the applicant could not claim to be the victim of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention since he had been allowed to contract the marriage with the person of his choice on a chosen date. In any event, even assuming that there had been an interference with his right to family life, the Government submitted that it had been in accordance with the law and had pursued a legitimate aim for the prevention of disorder or crime. They stressed that at the material time the applicant had been serving a prison sentence and had still had eight years of his sentence to serve. Consequently, in their view, the interference had been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested those submissions. He argued that as a consequence of the refusal of compassionate leave the marriage ceremony had had to take place in prison with all the accompanying security restrictions.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that Article 8 of the Convention does not guarantee a detained person an unconditional right to be granted leave to attend any event of importance to him or her. It is up to the domestic authorities to assess each request on its merits. The Court\u2019s scrutiny is limited to considering the impugned measures in the context of the applicant\u2019s Convention rights, taking into account the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States (see P\u0142oski v. Poland, no. 26761\/95, \u00a7 38, 12\u00a0November 2002).<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the gist of the applicant\u2019s complaint is that owing to the refusal of compassionate leave his marriage had to take place in prison and involved the necessary security restrictions associated with such an event.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0However, as the Court has already held: \u201cdetention facilities are neither designed, nor freely and normally chosen for [the purpose of marriage]. What needs to be solved in a situation where a detained person wishes to get married [are] … the practical aspects of timing and making the necessary arrangements, which … might, and usually will, be subject to certain conditions set by the authorities\u201d (see Frasik, cited above, \u00a7\u00a095).<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that even though the events in the present case could have constituted an interference with the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his private and family life, this interference was \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d and in the interests of \u201cpublic safety\u201d or \u201cfor the prevention of disorder or crime\u201d. It thus remains to be decided whether it was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court notes that the applicant had been convicted of murder and uttering threats and that at the relevant time he was serving a long\u2011term prison sentence (see paragraph 4 above). Consequently, the Court accepts that in the circumstances of the present case it was reasonable to consider the risks associated with his release from prison to be high.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the applicant was allowed to contract his marriage on a chosen date, and the only inconveniences suffered by him were security measures inextricably linked to the fact that the marriage took place behind the prison gates, the Court concludes that the authorities\u2019 decision not to grant him compassionate leave did not exceed the margin of appreciation left to the respondent State and was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0For the above reasons, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Other alleged violations<\/strong><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0In a letter of 28 August 2017 the applicant submitted that the prison authorities had put pressure on him in connection with his complaint to the Court.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will consider whether these alleged actions by the Polish authorities amounted to a hindrance of the applicant\u2019s right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted in that respect that the applicant had failed to give any details as regards the alleged actions of the prison authorities. Therefore, it had been impossible to verify whether any such situation had indeed occurred.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by Article\u00a034 that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see, among other authorities, Fedotova v. Russia, no. 73225\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049\u201152, 13\u00a0April 2006).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court observes that the applicant limited his submissions to vague and general statements. He failed to provide any details of his allegations. In particular he did not refer to any dates or names of persons who had allegedly approached him.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court is unable to establish the existence of any unacceptable practices amounting to a form of pressure on the applicant by the prison authorities concerning his application before the Court.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant\u2019s complaint is manifestly ill\u2011founded. It must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 24 January 2019.<\/p>\n Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ksenija Turkovi\u0107
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n