2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 guarantees to any person a right to liberty of movement within a given territory and the right to leave that territory, which implies the right to travel to a country of the person\u2019s choice to which he or she may be admitted (see Baumann v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a033592\/96, \u00a7 61, ECHR 2001-V; Khlyustov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a028975\/05, \u00a7 64, 11 July 2013; and Berkovich and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a078).<\/p>\n
30.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court observes, and this is undisputed by the Government, that on various dates the investigating authorities imposed travel bans on the applicants which prevented them from travelling abroad. The Court agrees with the applicants that those measures amounted to an interference with their right to leave their own country within the meaning of Article 2 \u00a7 2 of Protocol No. 4. It must therefore be examined whether the interference was \u201cin accordance with law\u201d, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in Article 2 \u00a7\u00a03 of Protocol No. 4 and whether it was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d to achieve such an aim (see Nalbantski v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a030943\/04, \u00a7 61, 10 February 2011; Stamose v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a029713\/05, \u00a7\u00a030, ECHR 2012; Kerimli v. Azerbaijan, no. 3967\/09, \u00a7 45, 16\u00a0July 2015; andDe Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395\/09, \u00a7 105, 23\u00a0February 2017).<\/p>\n
31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its settled case-law to the effect that the expression \u201cin accordance with law\u201d not only requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Dzhaksybergenov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 12343\/10, \u00a7 59, 10 February 2011, and De Tommaso, cited above, \u00a7 106).<\/p>\n
32.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the Government did not refer to any provision of domestic law as a legal basis for the imposition of travel bans on persons who were only witnesses in criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n
33.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, the Court observes that the relevant provisions of the Migration Code, which regulates the right of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan to leave the country, contains an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which this right may be temporarily restricted (see paragraph 17 above). However, as can be seen from the wording of the above-mentioned provisions of domestic law, none of the circumstances listed in the Migration Code correspond to the case of the applicants, who were only witnesses in criminal proceedings. Moreover, Article 1 of the Passports Act, as in force until 17 October 2014, also provided for a temporary restriction on the right of a person to leave the country within criminal proceedings only if he or she was a suspected or accused person, was convicted, or was subject to compulsory medical measures (see paragraph 16 above).<\/p>\n
34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the investigating authorities imposed the travel bans on the applicants in the absence of any judicial decision and that the domestic courts also failed to specify the legal basis for the imposition of travel bans on the applicants, contenting themselves with refusing to examine their actions on the merits (see paragraph 11 above). In the only case examined on the merits they found the restriction of the applicant\u2019s right to leave the country justified, without referring to any provisions of domestic law (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above).<\/p>\n
35.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that the interference with the applicants\u2019 right to leave their country was not \u201cin accordance with law\u201d. This finding makes it unnecessary to determine whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society (see Sissanis v. Romania, no. 23468\/02, \u00a7 78, 25 January 2007; Tatishvili v. Russia, no. 1509\/02, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2007\u2011I; and Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, no. 19356\/07, \u00a7 61, 20 December 2016).<\/p>\n
36.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of the applicants\u2019 right to leave their country, as guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.<\/p>\n
III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
37.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Articles 6 or 13 of the Convention, all the applicants, except the applicant in application no. 24749\/16, complained that they had not had an effective remedy in respect of the travel bans imposed on them as the domestic courts had failed to properly examine their complaints. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n
\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants, except the applicant in application no. 24749\/16, maintained that they had not had an effective domestic remedy in respect of the ban on leaving the country imposed on them by the investigation authorities. In particular, they pointed out that the domestic courts had constantly refused to examine their complaints lodged with the administrative courts or applications to the ordinary courts for a judicial review.<\/p>\n
40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not make any observations on the merits.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that, in view of its above finding of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (see paragraph 36 above), the above-mentioned applicants\u2019 complaint is arguable.It therefore remains to be ascertained whether they had an effective remedy under Azerbaijani law by which to complain of a breach of their Convention rights.<\/p>\n
42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy by which to complain of a breach of the Convention rights and freedoms.Therefore, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision, there must be a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief.The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint under the Convention, but the remedy must in any event be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the State (see Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593\/08, \u00a7 207, ECHR 2012, and De Tommaso, cited above, \u00a7 179).<\/p>\n
43.\u00a0\u00a0Where there is an arguable claim that a measure taken by the authorities might infringe an applicant\u2019s freedom of movement, Article 13 of the Convention requires the national legal system to afford the individual concerned the opportunity to challenge the measure in adversarial proceedings before the courts. However, a domestic appeal procedure cannot be considered effective within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention unless it affords the possibility of dealing with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d for Convention purposes and granting appropriate relief. In this way, by giving direct expression to the States\u2019 obligation to protect human rights first and foremost within their own legal system, Article 13 establishes an additional guarantee for individuals in order to ensure that they effectively enjoy those rights (see Riener v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a046343\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 138 and 142, 23 May 2006; Stamose, cited above, \u00a7 49; andDe Tommaso, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 182-83).<\/p>\n
44.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that while the above-mentioned applicants argued before the Court that they had not had an effective domestic remedy in respect of the prohibition on leaving the country, the Government failed to make any submissions whether under Azerbaijani law a ban on leaving the country could be challenged before the courts.<\/p>\n
45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the applicants in question, either by lodging a complaint with the administrative courts or applying to the ordinary courts for a judicial review, challenged the travel bans imposed on them by the investigating authorities before the domestic courts. However, the administrative and ordinary courts each time, except in application no.\u00a066650\/13, refused to examine their complaints on the merits, declaring that they did not have competence to examine the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities (see paragraph 11 above).<\/p>\n
46.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the examination of the complaint by the domestic courts in application no. 66650\/13, the Court observes that the courts held that the restriction of the applicant\u2019s right to leave the country had been lawful, without giving any further explanation (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above). In that connection, the Court considers it necessary to reiterate that such a limited scope of review by the domestic courts, failing to establish the legal basis of the restriction in question and to address the proportionality of the measure taking into account its duration and other particular circumstances of each case, cannot satisfy the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (see Riener, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0141-143; Stamose, \u00a7 51 and, a contrario, De Tommaso, \u00a7 184, all cited above).<\/p>\n
47.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicants, except the applicant in application no. 24749\/16 who did not raise any complaint in this regard, did not therefore have an effective remedy under Azerbaijani law affording them the opportunity to raise their complaints of Convention violations. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention in respect of the above-mentioned applicants.<\/p>\n
IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
48.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant in application no. 76071\/16 complained that the travel ban imposed on him had prevented him from travelling abroad for the purpose of an eye operation which had to be carried out abroad, in the absence of any document indicating the impossibility to have such an operation in Azerbaijan. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention (see Nada, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0149-54), which provides, in so far as relevant:<\/p>\n
\u201c1.\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private life …<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n
49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one under Article\u00a02 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention and must therefore likewise be declared admissible. However, having regard to its finding in respect of the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol\u00a0No. 4, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the same facts again by reference to Article\u00a08 (see Riener, cited above, \u00a7 134; A. E.v. Poland, no. 14480\/04, \u00a7 54, 31 March 2009; Prescher v. Bulgaria, no. 6767\/04, \u00a7 56, 7 June 2011; and Battista v.\u00a0Italy, no. 43978\/09, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2014).<\/p>\n
V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
50.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations lodged in reply to those of the Government, the applicants in applications nos. 43327\/16, 62775\/16, 8051\/17, 8702\/17 and\u00a012870\/17 lodged a further complaint, arguing that there had been a hindrance to the exercise of their right of individual application under Article\u00a034 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n
\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d<\/p>\n
51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that they had not received the Court\u2019s letter dated 21 February 2017 containing the Government\u2019s observations in a timely manner. In particular, they pointed out that they had only received it together with the relevant documents after they had sent a letter to the Court enquiring about it. They also argued that the delay in the delivery of the letter had not been a coincidence and had been the result of interference by the Government, which controlled the postal service in the country.<\/p>\n
52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not make any observations in this regard.<\/p>\n
53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is of utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual application guaranteed by Article 34 of the Convention that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 105, Reports 1996\u2011IV, and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7 159, Reports 1998\u2011III). In this context, \u201cany form of pressure\u201d includes not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation, but also other improper indirect acts or communication designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention complaint or having a \u201cchilling effect\u201d on the exercise of the right of individual application by applicants and their representatives (see Annagi\u00a0Hajibeyliv. Azerbaijan, no. 2204\/11, \u00a7 66, 22 October 2015, andHilal Mammadovv. Azerbaijan, no. 81553\/12, \u00a7 116, 4 February 2016).<\/p>\n
54.\u00a0\u00a0However, having examined the submissions made by the applicants in applications nos. 43327\/16, 62775\/16, 8051\/17, 8702\/17 and 12870\/17, and the material available to it, the Court finds that there is no sufficient factual basis for it to conclude that the authorities of the respondent State have interfered in any way with the applicants\u2019 exercise of their right of individual application in the proceedings before the Court in relation to the above-mentioned applications (compare Juhas \u0110uri\u0107 v. Serbia, no.\u00a048155\/06, \u00a7 75, 7 June 2011, and Vasiliy Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a0760\/03, \u00a7 115, 26 July 2012).<\/p>\n
55.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article\u00a034 of the Convention.<\/p>\n
VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
56.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n
\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants each claimed the following amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage: 20,000 euros (EUR) in applications nos. 76071\/16, 8051\/17, 8702\/17, 12870\/17 and 21246\/17; EUR 30,000 in applications nos.\u00a066650\/13 and 37696\/17; EUR 10,000 in applications nos. 62775\/16 and\u00a068722\/16; EUR 450,000 in application no. 24749\/16. Moreover, the applicant in application no. 43327\/16 claimed EUR 10,300 in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. In addition to their above-mentioned claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicants in applications nos. 66650\/13 and 76071\/16 claimed EUR\u00a017,527 and\u00a0EUR\u00a0195 respectively in respect of pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n
58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government asked the Court to reject the applicants\u2019 claims, considering them excessive and unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n
59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants have suffered non\u2011pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation, and that compensation should thus be awarded. Therefore, having examined the applicants\u2019 claims as a whole and making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards each applicant the sum of EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount (see Kerimli, \u00a7\u00a063, and Berkovich and Others, \u00a7 106, both cited above) and rejects the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims in respect of damage.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants, except the applicant in application no. 62775\/16, each claimed the following amounts for legal services incurred in the proceedings before the domestic courts and the Court: EUR 1,006 in application no. 66650\/13; EUR 3,200 in application no. 24749\/16; EUR\u00a01,600 in application no. 43327\/16; EUR 500 in application no.\u00a068722\/16; EUR 3,180 in application no. 76071\/16; EUR 2,442 in application no.\u00a08051\/17; EUR 2,038 in application no. 8702\/17; EUR 2,023 in application no. 12870\/17; EUR 2,980 in application no. 21246\/17; and EUR\u00a02,209 in application no. 37696\/17. All the above-mentioned applicants, except the applicant in application no. 68722\/16, submitted the relevant contracts concluded with their representatives or invoices in support of their claims. The applicants in applications nos. 76071\/16 and\u00a021246\/17 further claimed EUR 370 and 295 respectively for translation costs.<\/p>\n
61.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the amounts claimed by the applicants were unsubstantiated and excessive, asking the Court to apply a strict approach in respect of the applicants\u2019 claims. They also submitted that the request for translation expenses was not justified because the applicants\u2019 representative had a good command of English.<\/p>\n
62.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The Court notes that in the present case some of the applicants were represented by the same lawyers and that substantial parts of their submissions in relation to their applications were similar. Moreover, the amount of work done by the applicants\u2019 representatives in the domestic proceedings was limited, as the domestic courts refused to examine their complaints on the merits. Therefore, having regard to these facts, as well as to the documents in its possession and to the amount of work done by the applicants\u2019 representatives before it, the Court considers it reasonable to award to each applicant, except the applicants in applications nos. 62775\/16 and 68722\/16, the sum of EUR 1,000 to cover costs under all heads.<\/p>\n
C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the applications admissible;<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention in respect of all the applicants;<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of all the applicants, except the applicant in application no.\u00a024749\/16;<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the applicant in application no. 76071\/16;<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention in respect of the applicants in applications nos. 43327\/16, 62775\/16, 8051\/17, 8702\/17 and 12870\/17;<\/p>\n
7.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted intoAzerbaijani manats at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n
(i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to each applicant, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n
(ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), to each applicant, except the applicants in applications nos. 62775\/16 and 68722\/16, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n
8.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 December 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n
Milan Bla\u0161ko\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Angelika Nu\u00dfberger
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
APPENDIX<\/p>\n
\n\n\n
\n<\/strong>No.<\/strong><\/td>\nApplication<\/strong><\/p>\n no.<\/strong><\/td>\nLodged on<\/strong><\/td>\n| Applicant name<\/strong><\/p>\n date of birth<\/strong><\/p>\nplace of residence<\/strong><\/td>\nRepresented by<\/strong><\/td>\nDate on which the applicant learned about the restriction<\/strong><\/td>\nRelevant final court decisions in the domestic proceedings<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n\n1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 66650\/13<\/td>\n | 07\/10\/2013<\/td>\n | Azad Ogtay oglu MURSALIYEV<\/strong><\/p>\n 25\/10\/1970<\/p>\n Baku<\/td>\n Sadig AFANDIYEV<\/td>\n | 2 November 2012<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 12 April 2013<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 24749\/16<\/td>\n | 22\/04\/2016<\/td>\n | Aynura Imran gizi IMRANOVA<\/strong><\/p>\n 11\/11\/1976<\/p>\n Zardab<\/td>\n Samira AGAYEVA<\/td>\n | 21 November 2014<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 22\u00a0January 2015 and the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 23\u00a0February 2016<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 43327\/16<\/td>\n | 04\/07\/2016<\/td>\n | Gular Shahin gizi MEHDIZADE<\/strong><\/p>\n 13\/04\/1988<\/p>\n Absheron<\/td>\n Yalchin IMANOV<\/td>\n | 12 February 2016<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 31 May 2016<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 62775\/16<\/td>\n | 20\/10\/2016<\/td>\n | Rovshana Vagif gizi RAHIMOVA<\/strong><\/p>\n 08\/07\/1984<\/p>\n Baku<\/td>\n Rovshana RAHIMOVA<\/td>\n | 25 February 2015<\/td>\n | The Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 7 April 2016 (the applicant was provided with a copy of the decision on 18 May 2016)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 68722\/16<\/td>\n | 19\/11\/2016<\/td>\n | Amina Fevzi gizi HAJIYEVA<\/strong><\/p>\n 16\/04\/1955<\/p>\n Baku<\/td>\n Agil<\/p>\n LAYIJOV<\/td>\n | On an unspecified date in April 2016<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 4\u00a0November 2016<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n6.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 76071\/16<\/td>\n | 29\/11\/2016<\/td>\n | Annagi Bahadur oglu HAJIBEYLI<\/strong><\/p>\n 03\/09\/1955<\/p>\n Baku<\/td>\n Khalid BAGIROV<\/td>\n | On an unspecified date in Autumn 2014<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 11 July 2016<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n7.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 8051\/17<\/td>\n | 29\/12\/2016<\/td>\n | Izolda Heydar gizi AGAYEVA<\/strong><\/p>\n 04\/09\/1988<\/p>\n Baku<\/td>\n Yalchin IMANOV<\/td>\n | 21 March 2016<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decisions of 1 July 2016 and 17 November 2017<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n8.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 8702\/17<\/td>\n | 19\/01\/2017<\/td>\n | Aynura Tavakkul gizi HEYDAROVA<\/strong><\/p>\n 23\/01\/1981<\/p>\n Ganja<\/td>\n Fariz NAMAZLI<\/td>\n | 28 June 2016<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 20 July 2016<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n9.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 12870\/17<\/td>\n | 06\/02\/2017<\/td>\n | Aytan Intigam gizi ALAKBAROVA<\/strong><\/p>\n 26\/04\/1980<\/p>\n Sumgayit<\/td>\n Fariz NAMAZLI<\/td>\n | 20 September 2015<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 4 August 2016 and the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 28\u00a0December 2016<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n10.\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 21246\/17<\/td>\n | 07\/03\/2017<\/td>\n | Azer Agagasim oglu GASIMLI<\/strong><\/p>\n 31\/03\/1975<\/p>\n Baku<\/td>\n Khalid BAGIROV<\/td>\n | 28 September 2016<\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 18 January 2017<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n11.\u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n| 37696\/17<\/td>\n | 10\/05\/2017<\/td>\n | Dilara Valeh gizi VALIYEVA<\/strong><\/p>\n 12\/08\/1958<\/p>\n Baku<\/td>\n Javad JAVADOV<\/td>\n | On an unspecified date in 2013<\/p>\n <\/td>\n | The Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 15 March 2017 and the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 22\u00a0November 2017<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |