SECOND SECTION
\nCASE OF URAT v. TURKEY
\n(Applications nos. 53561\/09 and 13952\/11)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n27 November 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n06\/05\/2019<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Urat v. Turkey,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Robert Spano, President, Having deliberated in private on 23 October 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in two applications (nos.\u00a053561\/09 and 13952\/11) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by two Turkish nationals, Mr CemalUrat and Mr Ahmet Urat (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 4 September 2009 and 18 January 2011 respectively.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant, CemalUrat, was represented by Mr M. Sadak, a lawyer practising in Istanbul. The second applicant, Ahmet Urat, was represented by Mr E.\u00d6zkan, a lawyer practising in Diyarbak\u0131r. The Turkish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged, in particular, that their dismissal from the civil service despite the absence of a criminal conviction against them had violated their right to the presumption of innocence.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 August 2013 application no. 13952\/11 was communicated to the Government. On 12 December 2016 the complaints concerning the alleged violation of the applicant\u2019s right to the presumption of innocence and the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings in application no. 53561\/09were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the applicationwas declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants, who are brothers, were born in 1964 and 1962 respectively and live in Mardin.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against the applicants<\/em><\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicants held teaching posts with the Ministry of Education and were employed as primary school teachers.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 January 2000 the first applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, Hizbullah, following the discovery of his profile in the format of aCV (\u00f6zge\u00e7mi\u015f) amongst documents confiscated from the organisation\u2019s safe house in Beykoz, Istanbul. On 26 January 2000 he was questioned by the police. In his statement, which he refrained from signing, he denied the allegations that he was a member of Hizbullah but submitted that he had given some of the same personal information about himself reflected in the CV to an individual named F.\u015e. in 1983. He further submitted that he had adopted a religious lifestyle and had been in contact with religious communities since 1983; however, his activities had never gone beyond reading the Quran to children in mosques. In a statement given on 29 January 2000to the public prosecutor, the applicant stated that he had refrained from signing his statements before the police since they had contained expressions which had not been used by him. He further submitted that the fact that his profile had been discovered in thesafe house meant nothing, since anyone could have given that information to Hizbullah. He stated that, in any event, he had not given information about himself to the organisation.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 January 2000 the second applicant was taken into police custody in similar circumstances to the first applicant,that is,following the discovery of his profile in the format of a CV amongst documents confiscated from the organisation\u2019s safe house in Istanbul. On 28 and 29\u00a0January 2000 he was questioned by the police and the Mardin public prosecutor respectively, and denied all allegations against him on both occasions. Claiming that he had never been in contact with Hizbullah, he stressed that the CV shown to him as evidence by the police during questioning differed from the one he had seen at the time of his detention a week earlier, and that they both contained inaccurate information about his background.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 February 2000 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, accusing the applicants of membership of an illegal armed organisation. He further accused the second applicant of complicity in the murder of two individuals and the wounding of a third.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The cases against the applicants were therefore transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 September 2004 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held that the first applicant\u2019s involvement with the terrorist organisation had been limited to handing in his CV and attending its indoctrination sessions, which therefore fell within the scope of aiding and abetting rather than membership. Having regard to the fact that the alleged crime had been committed before 23 April 1999, the court held that Law no. 4616 \u2013 which provided for the suspension of criminal proceedings in respect of certain offences committed before that date(see paragraph 38 below)\u2013 was applicable. It thus suspended the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. On 28 September 2007 the proceedings against him were discontinued on account of the expiry of the five-year prosecution period. The decision became final on 31 October 2007.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 December 2007the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court reclassified the charge against the second applicant as aiding and abetting an illegal organisation and discontinued the proceedings in respect of that charge on account of the expiry of the five-year prosecution period. It further acquitted him of the remaining charges for lack of sufficient evidence.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Disciplinary proceedings against the applicants<\/em><\/p>\n a.\u00a0\u00a0Preliminary disciplinary investigation<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0Owing to the fact that they were being prosecuted on charges of membership of an illegal organisation, the applicants were suspended from their positions. Furthermore, on 27 January 2000, following the initiation of the criminal investigation against the applicants,the Mardin Directorate of Education (\u201cthe Directorate\u201d) initiated a disciplinary investigation against the applicants and a number of other civil servants into their political and ideological activities. Among those questioned within the context of that investigation were the applicants, about six to nine of their colleagues, as well as the principal and vice-principal of the primary school. In respect of the first applicant, three teachers briefly stated that they had been aware that the applicant was a Hizbullah supporter or had heard such rumours. One teacher colleague stated that he believed the applicant was a Hizbullah supporter as he had seen his wife wearing a \u00e7ar\u015faf (chador). In respect of the second applicant, the teachers said that they knew him to be religious but that they had not witnessed him engaging in any ideological propaganda at school. One teacher submitted that the second applicant was rumoured to be a Hizbullah supporter. In respect of both applicants, most of the teachers submitted that their suspension from the school had disrupted the working order of the institutionin so far asthe applicants\u2019 students had had to be transferred to therest of the teachers, resulting in mergedclasses of sixty to seventy pupils. The principal and vice-principal stated that they had not witnessed or been made aware of anything to suggest that the applicants had connections with the illegal organisation. The applicants denied the allegations and stated that they wanted to return to their duties as soon as possible.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0In an investigation report dated 30 June 2000, investigators took into account the evidence in the criminal proceedings, in particular the fact that the applicants\u2019CVs had been discovered on a computer confiscated from the organisation\u2019s safe house, and concluded that the applicants were members of Hizbullah. They also went on to add that this conclusion was corroborated by the statements of the applicants\u2019 teacher colleagues. They then decided that the nature of the criminal proceedings against the applicants on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation fell within the ambit of section 125(E)(a) of the Law on Civil Servants(Law no. 657), which provides for the dismissal of a civil servant for disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of an institution for ideological and political purposes. The investigators therefore recommended the applicants\u2019 dismissal on those grounds.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 October 2000 the applicants were invited by the Supreme Disciplinary Council of the Ministry of Education (\u201cthe Supreme Disciplinary Council\u201d) to submit defence statements in response to the allegations concerning their active membership of the illegal terrorist organisation Hizbullah and their alleged disruption of the peace, tranquillity and order at the workplace for ideological and political purposes.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0In separate submissions the applicants denied all the allegations against them. They denied having given Hizbullah their CVs and highlighted obvious spelling mistakes, discrepancies and inaccurate information in the copies contained in the case file to demonstrate that they had been prepared by someone else without their knowledge. The first applicant further argued that the disciplinary investigation file contained no objective assessment of whether he had engaged in ideologically or politically motivated behaviour at the workplace so as to disrupt the peace, tranquillity and the working order of the school. In that respect he submitted that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authorities was not grounded on facts but solely on accusations and rumours.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0By a decision of the Supreme Disciplinary Council dated 18 April 2001, the applicants were dismissed from the civil service pursuant to section 125(E)(a) of Law no. 657. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c…The acts attributed to the applicant[s]: Membership of the illegal terrorist organisation Hizbullah and carrying out activities for the organisation, disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working orderof the institution for ideological and political purposes.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Based on the examination of the information and documents in the case file, the veracity of the acts attributed to the applicant[s] and their continuous nature has been established. Having regard to the importance of the teaching post and the characteristics and seriousness of the offence, it has not been deemed appropriate to impose a lighter penalty. Based on the following considerations, the recommendation for the applicant[s]\u2019 dismissal was accepted unanimously…\u201d<\/p>\n b.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings before the Administrative Courts against the dismissal of the first applicant<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 August 2001 the first applicant brought a claim against the Ministry of Education in the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court, challenging his dismissal. He requested a stay of execution of the dismissal order because criminal proceedings were still pending against him.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 January 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court rejected his request for a stay of the dismissal order.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on his right to be presumed innocent, on 18 February 2002 the first applicant challenged that decision before the Regional Administrative Court.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 March 2002, having regard to the fact that the first applicant had been dismissed on account of his alleged membership of a terrorist organisation, the Regional Administrative Court granted his request for a stay of the dismissal decision and held that he had been charged with a criminal,not a disciplinary, offence, the determination of which could only be made by a competent criminal court. It therefore held that he could not be dismissed from public service for membership of a terrorist organisation without a final conviction. If he were to be convicted, however, he could be dismissed on the grounds that he no longer qualified for civil service. The case was remitted to the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 December 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court adjourned its examination of the merits of the case pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 April 2005, shortly after the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court\u2019s decision to suspend the criminal proceedings, the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s request for the dismissal decision to be quashed. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe applicant and other civil servants holding various posts in the district have been the subject of a disciplinary investigation in connection with their alleged acts of \u2018disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of the institution for ideological and political purposes; participating, provoking, encouraging or otherwise assistingin acts such as boycotts, occupations, obstructions, slowdowns and strikes or being collectively absent from work.\u2019 The Ministry of Education\u2019s investigation report dated 30 June 2000 recommended the applicant\u2019s dismissal from public service because [he] was a member of the Hizbullah terrorist organisation.<\/p>\n Despite the fact that the criminal proceedings against the applicant [on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation] have been suspended, it is an established principle of case-law that exoneration from criminal liability does not preclude the finding of a disciplinary offence. Hence, following an examination of the case file and investigation report, the court finds it established that the applicant committed the disciplinary offence in so far as he gave the organisation his profile and attended its lessons and meetings.\u201d<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 June 2005 the first applicant appealed against the judgment of the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court to the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting a stay of the decision ordering for his dismissal from service. He challenged the grounds on which he had been dismissed, arguing that membership of a terrorist organisation was not one of the disciplinary offences listed in the Law on Civil Servants which warranted dismissal from public service. Moreover, he relied on his right to be presumed innocent since the criminal proceedings against him had been suspended and there had been no definitive finding of guilt. He also argued that the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court\u2019s failure to give reasons in its decision implied that it had not established the facts giving rise to the disciplinary action independently.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0In a decision dated 27 September 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed thefirst applicant\u2019s request for a stay of the dismissal order without providing any further reasons. On 6 June 2006 it also dismissed his appeal.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date the first applicant requested a stay of his dismissal order and rectification of the decision in the Supreme Administrative Court, maintaining the same grounds of appeal as in his previous appeal (see paragraph 25 above).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s requests on 13 February 2008 and 14 April 2009 respectively, without responding to his arguments.<\/p>\n c.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings before the Administrative Courts against the dismissal of the second applicant<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date the second applicant brought a case before the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court, challenging his dismissal and requestinga stay of execution of the dismissal order. On 10 January 2002 the Administrative Court dismissed the requestfor a stay of execution.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0Thesecond applicant appealed against that decision to the Diyarbak\u0131r Regional Administrative Court. He complained, inter alia, that the criminal proceedings on charges of membership of an illegal organisation were still pending before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court and that, therefore, his dismissal without a conviction on the basis of abstract accusations infringed the presumption of innocence; that the allegations that he had disturbed the peace and order at the workplace remained completely unproven and unsubstantiated; and that in delivering its decision, the Supreme Disciplinary Council had failed to comply with the six-month time\u2011limit set out in Law no. 657.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 March 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r Regional Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of the dismissal decision. It reiterated at the outset the three principal conditions for an act to be considered a disciplinary offence: (i) that it be carried out by the employees of an institution within that institution; (ii) that it disrupt the established order of the institution; and (iii) that the act constituting the disciplinary offence, as well as the related penalty, be set out in the relevant laws and regulations. The Regional Administrative Court then went on to examine the different types of offences that may be committed by civil servants, differentiating between acts amounting to disciplinary offences exclusively, acts considered to be offences under both disciplinary and criminal laws and, lastly, acts defined as offences only under the Criminal Code. In the light of this classification, the Diyarbak\u0131r Regional Administrative Court decided that the act attributed to the second applicant, that is, membership of a terrorist organisation, fell under the third category of acts punishable only under the Criminal Code, the determination of which could only be made by a competent criminal court. Bearing in mind that the relevant criminal proceedings were still pending before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, the Regional Administrative Court concluded that the second applicant could not, for the time being, be lawfully dismissed from the civil service on account of membership of a terrorist organisation. The case was remitted to the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 September 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court annulled the Supreme Disciplinary Council\u2019s dismissal decision as unlawful. Noting the discrepancy in the latter\u2019s decision, the court stated that while the second applicant was being accused by the administration of membership of a terrorist organisation, the legal basis put forward for his dismissal was the disruption of peace and order at the workplace through ideological and political propaganda under section 125(E)(a) of Law no. 657. Considering that none of the peoplequestioned at the school had witnessed such propaganda by the second applicant there, and bearing further in mind that \u201cmembership of a terrorist organisation\u201d was not one of the exhaustive grounds for dismissal from the civil service listed in the relevant section, the second applicant\u2019s dismissal had had no legal basis.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The Ministry of Education appealed against the decision. On 20\u00a0June 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the decision of the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court and amended the legal grounds for the second applicant\u2019s dismissal. The Supreme Administrative Court firstly acknowledged that the charges against the second applicant of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation had been discontinued on account of the expiry of the five-year prescription period laid down for that offence, and that he had been acquitted of the remaining charges. Referring to the second applicant\u2019s statements givento the police, his CV obtained from the Hizbullahsafe house in Istanbul and the bill of indictment filed against him by the Mardinpublic prosecutor, the Supreme Administrative Court then found it established that the second applicant was a member of a terrorist organisation who in additionhad recruited members to the organisation and pursued the ideology of the terrorist organisation in the classroom. It continued that even if his colleagues had not witnessed such action on the part of the second applicant at the school, his dismissal had still been justified under a different subsection of section 125(E), namely subsection (g), which authorised the dismissal of civil servants who were found to engage in \u201cdisgraceful and shameful conduct incompatible with the position of a civil servant\u201d.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 May 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court transferred the case to the Mardin Administrative Court, which was deemed to be the court with jurisdiction in the instant case.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 November 2009, complying with the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Mardin Administrative Court upheld the disciplinary decision ordering the second applicant\u2019s dismissal from the civil service under section 125(E)(g) of Law no. 657. The relevant parts of the judgment read:<\/p>\n \u201cNotwithstanding the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of membership of an armed organisation and his acquittal oncharges of murder and battery, the investigation and [criminal] case file reveal that the applicant\u2019s profile was discovered in the organisation\u2019s [safe] house in Istanbul and that his statements to the police and the bill of indictment demonstrate the fact that he was a member of the organisation, recruiting new members and lecturing on its ideologies, facts which were corroborated by his statements and [CV]. These acts fall within the scope of disgraceful and shameful conduct incompatible with the position of a civil servant…which therefore justify his dismissal from public service.\u201d<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 September 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a request for leave to appeal lodged by the second applicant.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0Section 125(E) of the Law on Civil Servants (Law no. 657), in so far as relevant, provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c…The following acts and conduct shall result in dismissal from the civil service:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Disrupting the peace, tranquility and working order of the institution for ideological and political purposes; participating in such acts as boycotts, occupations, obstructions, slowdowns and strikes or being collectively absent from work for these purposes; provoking, encouraging or assisting in such acts;<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (g)\u00a0\u00a0Engaging in disgraceful and shameful conduct incompatible with the position of a civil servant;<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Law no. 4616, in so far as relevant, provides:<\/p>\n \u201c4. In respect of offences committed before 23 April 1999 which carry a maximum prison sentence of ten years:<\/p>\n – where no criminal investigation has been commenced or no indictment has been filed, the institution of criminal proceedings shall be suspended;<\/p>\n – where the criminal proceedings have reached the final stages but no definitive finding on the merits has been adopted or where a definitive finding on the merits has not yet become final, the adoption of a definitive finding on the merits shall be suspended.<\/p>\n If the person concerned is remanded in custody, he or she shall be released. Documents and evidence concerning the offences shall be kept until the statute of limitations has been reached.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the similarity between the applications in terms of the facts and the substantive issues they raise, the Court decides to join them and to examine them together in accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 2 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their dismissal from the civil service despite the absence of a criminal conviction against them had violated their right to the presumption of innocenceas provided in Article 6 \u00a72 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.\u201d<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 \u00a7 2 safeguards the right to be \u201cpresumed innocent until proved guilty according to law\u201d. The Court has acknowledged in its case\u2011law the existence of two aspects to the protection afforded by the presumption of innocence: a procedural aspect relating to the conduct of the criminal trial, and a second aspect, which aims to ensure respect for a finding of innocence in the context of subsequent proceedings, where there is a link with criminal proceedings which have ended with a result other than a conviction (see, generally, Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a025424\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 93-94, ECHR 2013). Under the first aspect, the principle of the presumption of innocence prohibits public officials from making premature statements about the defendant\u2019s guilt and acts as a procedural guarantee to ensure the fairness of the criminal trial itself. However, it is not limited to a procedural safeguard in criminal matters: its scope is broader and requires that no representative of the State should say that a person is guilty of an offence before his or her guilt has been established by a court (see Konstas v. Greece, no. 53466\/07, \u00a7 32, 24 May 2011). In that connection the presumption of innocence may be infringed not only in the context of a criminal trial, but also in separate civil, disciplinary or other proceedings that are conducted simultaneously with the criminal proceedings (see Kemal Co\u015fkun v. Turkey,no. 45028\/07, \u00a7 41, 28\u00a0March 2017). While the scope of the first aspect under Article 6 \u00a72 of the Convention covers the period in which a person has been charged with a criminal offence until the criminal proceedings are finalised, the second aspect of the protection of the presumption of innocence comes into play when the criminal proceedings end with a result other thanconviction, and requires that the person\u2019s innocence vis-\u00e0-vis the criminal offence is not called into doubt in subsequent proceedings (see Allen, cited above, \u00a794).<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The second aspect of the protection afforded by Article 6 \u00a72 requires that a person must be treated in a manner that is consistent with his or her innocence after the conclusion of criminal proceedings which have terminated in an acquittal or discontinuation (ibid., \u00a7 103). The extension of the protection of Article 6 \u00a7 2 to subsequent non-criminal proceedings constitutes an important safeguard for the person\u2019s established innocence in relation to any charge not proven.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0In order for the second aspect of Article 6 \u00a72 to be applicable to subsequent proceedings, the Court requires an applicant to demonstrate the existence of a link between concluded proceedings and subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings and, in particular, where they oblige the court to analyse the criminal judgment, to engage in a review or evaluation of the evidence in the criminal file, to assess the applicant\u2019s participation in some or all of the events leading to the criminal charge, or to comment on the subsisting indications of the applicant\u2019s possible guilt (see Allen, cited above, \u00a7 104).<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0In Allen (ibid., \u00a7 125), the Grand Chamber noted that there was no single approach to ascertaining the circumstances in which the second aspect of Article 6 \u00a7 2 would be violated in the context of proceedings following the conclusion of criminal proceedings. As illustrated by the Court\u2019s existing case-law, much will depend on the nature and context of the proceedings in which the impugned decision was adopted. However, in all cases and regardless of which approach applied, the language used by a decision maker would be of critical importance in assessing the compatibility of the decision and its reasoning with Article 6 \u00a7 2 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0125 and 126).<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the applicants\u2019 complaint essentially concerns their dismissal from the civil service and the way in which their objections concerning the alleged violation of their right to the presumption of innocence were treated by the administrative courts reviewing their dismissal. The Court observes in that connection that disciplinary and criminal proceedings were initiated simultaneously against the applicants following the allegations that they were members of an illegal organisation. The disciplinary decisions to dismiss them were taken while the criminal proceedingswere still pending. In the case of the first applicant, the reasoning of the disciplinary decision was endorsed by the administrative court in its judgment of 14April 2005 and by the Supreme Administrative Court on 6 June 2006, that is, after the decision had been taken on 13 September\u00a02004 to suspend the criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of membership of an illegal organisation.Moreover, those judgments were upheld during the subsequent rectification proceedings, even though by that time the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been formally discontinued. In the case of the second applicant, the Supreme Administrative Court in its decision of 20 June 2008 endorsed the findings of the disciplinary authorities and held that the legal classification of the applicant\u2019s conduct corresponded to the disciplinary offence of disgraceful and shameful conduct that was incompatible with the position of a civil servant. The reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court was followed by the Mardin Administrative Court in its judgment of 24\u00a0November 2009. The Court notes that those decisions also post-dated the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against that applicant on charges of membership of an illegal organisation andto acquit him of the murder of two individuals and the wounding of a third.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0As to which aspect of Article 6 \u00a7 2 should apply to the applicants\u2019 complaints, while the Court notes that both aspects of Article6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 remained relevant for the timeperiod in which the disciplinary and criminal proceedings wereconductedin parallel to each other, having regard to the fact that both administrative court judgments post-dated the decisions in the criminal proceedings against the applicants, the Court takes the view that the features of the second aspect of Article 6 \u00a7 2, which requires that a person\u2019s innocence is not called into doubt in subsequent proceedings,are predominant in the present cases. However, this overlap in time between the proceedings does not lead to an automatic application of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a02 to the subsequent proceedings; there must also be a link between two such sets of proceedings to justify extending the principle of the presumption of innocence to subsequent proceedings. The Court notes in that connection that the parties do not dispute the fact that the dismissal of the applicants from the civil service was directly related to the events leading to the criminal proceedings. The fact that the disciplinary authorities and administrative courts examined the criminal file and based their reasoning to a great extent on its contents is sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that a strong link existed between the criminal and disciplinary proceedings (seeAlka\u015f\u0131 v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 21107\/07, \u00a7 28, 18 October 2016). As a result, Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 is applicable in the context of the disciplinary and judicial proceedings at issue. The application is therefore not incompatible rationemateriae with the provisions of the Convention.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments<\/em><\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantsmaintained their arguments.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not dispute the fact that the disciplinary investigation against the applicants had been conducted on the basis of the criminal investigation file. However, they submitted that other evidence, such as witness statements, had been collected during the disciplinary investigation. They argued that the disciplinary authorities, on the basis of a less strict burden of proof, had reached the conclusion that the applicants should be held liable in terms of disciplinary law for their conduct which had given rise to a criminal investigation. In the case of the first applicant, they argued that the grounds for his dismissal had been disturbing the peace and order of the work environment and not membership of an illegal organisation and, therefore, the decision could not be considered to be contrary to the applicant\u2019s right to the presumption of innocence. They argued in that connection that the findings of the disciplinary and judicial authorities had only concluded that the applicant had a link with the illegal organisation without suggesting that he had been aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation from a criminal law perspective. In the case of the second applicant, they contended that since the Mardin Administrative Court in its judgment of 24 November 2009 had limited its reasoning to the disciplinary sphere by expressly indicating that the criminal charges against the applicant had been discontinued, it could not be said that that court\u2019s reasoning ran contrary to the presumption of innocence. Lastly, they argued that where there were serious suspicions against civil servants, the disciplinary bodies should nothave to await the outcome of criminal proceedings, which could take years to finalise.In the face of serious allegations such as those in the present cases, it would be contrary to the public interest if the disciplinary authorities were required to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n
\nJulia Laffranque,
\nI\u015f\u0131lKaraka\u015f,
\nPaul Lemmens,
\nJon FridrikKj\u00f8lbro,
\nSt\u00e9phanie Mourou-Vikstr\u00f6m,
\nIvana Jeli\u0107, judges,
\nand Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n