THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF K\u013dA\u010cANOV\u00c1 v. SLOVAKIA
\n(Application no. 8394\/13)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n27 November 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of K\u013ea\u010danov\u00e1 v. Slovakia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a\u00a0Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Dmitry Dedov, President, Having deliberated in private on 6 November 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 8394\/13) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Slovak national, Ms Anna K\u013ea\u010danov\u00e1 (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 26\u00a0January\u00a02013. The applicant subsequently died and her heirs, Mr\u00a0Jaroslav Junas and Ms Gabriela K\u013ea\u010danov\u00e1, expressed the wish to continue the application in her stead. The proceedings are continued with them although, for practical reasons, unless specifically indicated otherwise, they will also be referred to as the \u201capplicant\u201d in the text of this judgment.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Ms M. Chorv\u00e1thov\u00e1 a lawyer practising in Martin. The Government of the Slovak Republic (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Piro\u0161\u00edkov\u00e1.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 March 2017 the application was communicated to the Government. They had no objection to the examination of the application by a Committee.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Martin. In 2006 she was recognised as \u201cseverely disabled\u201d with 60% \u201cfunctional impairment\u201d pursuant to the relevant national laws. Her monthly disabled person\u2019s allowance payments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were 325.40 euros (EUR), EUR 336.20 and EUR 346.30, respectively.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Prior to the above, in 2004, the applicant had lodged a claim with the Martin District Land Office (Obvodn\u00fd pozemkov\u00fd \u00farad) for restitution of a\u00a0suite of real property consisting of several plots which came under special legislation provisions on restitution.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 December 2011 she lodged an action against the Land Office with the \u017dilina Regional Court, sitting as an administrative tribunal, seeking an order for acceleration of the restitution proceedings.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0This type of action required mandatory legal representation. Accordingly, the action was submitted through a lawyer.The applicant also sought an order for costs. The latter claim was calculated under the applicable national rules as pertaining to two \u201cacts of legal assistance\u201d (\u00fakon pr\u00e1vnej slu\u017eby), in particular a first consultation with a lawyer, and the formulation of the action. EUR 130 was claimed in respect of one such act along with an associated lump sum for overheads; the whole claim came to some EUR 260.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 January, 29 February and 23 March 2012 the applicant made further submissions. In the former two, she proactively informed the court that the Land Office had taken decisions in respect of her restitution claim on 23 December 2011 and 12 January 2012 and contended that these decisions did not determine her claim in relation to all the plots concerned and that they had been taken with the aim of creating a false impression that there had been no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The latter submission was made in response to a request by the court to specify the plots in respect of which the applicant\u2019s restitution claim was still outstanding.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0In the submission of 23 March 2012 the applicant reiterated her claim in respect of legal costs, amending its scope as pertaining to five acts of legal assistance, including the three submissions mentioned in the preceding paragraph.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 April 2012 the Regional Court granted the action and made an\u00a0order for costs. As to the latter ruling, it summarised the applicant\u2019s claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance (the first consultation with a lawyer, the formulation of the action, and the formulation of the submission of 2 January 2012). It found that the applicant had correctly calculated the value of the act of legal assistance and that the undertaking by her lawyer of those acts had been justified. Accordingly, it allowed the claim in respect of those three acts of legal assistance.<\/p>\n There is no reference in the Regional Court\u2019s decision to the remaining two acts of legal assistance in the summary of the applicant\u2019s claim, in the courts\u2019 reasoning, or in the operative part of its decision.<\/p>\n The Regional Court\u2019s decision was not amenable to appeal.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 May 2012 the applicant challenged the ruling on costs before the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, she complained that the Regional Court had failed to provide any reasons for not allowing her claim for costs with respect to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. As she had been fully successful in the case, she normally should have been compensated in respect of the costs of all justified acts of legal assistance received. A reduction of the award could only have been based on exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in determining the issue of legal costs, the Regional Court had made no use of that provision and, in any event, no such circumstances pertained, in particular because the case concerned unjustified delays in proceedings before a public authority lasting more than seven years; her efforts to ensure an out-of-court solution had been futile and had left her with no alternative to asserting her rights in the Regional Court; legal representation before that court was mandatory, the applicant was disabled, and she was living on the allowance specified above.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it was essentially aimed at the fact that the Regional Court had provided no explanation for deciding on and granting compensation in respect of three acts of legal assistance only. It observed that, as such, the complaint concerned a decision on costs rather than on the merits of the applicant\u2019s action. It referred to its established case-law to the effect that decisions on costs could violate fundamental rights and freedoms only exceptionally, in particular if there were an extremely serious interference with such rights and freedoms. It was true that the decision contested in the applicants\u2019 case was \u201cchallengeable under the criteria of lawfulness\u201d. However, it was necessary to take into account that the value of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was only some EUR 270. This was less than three times the statutory minimum wage, the limit that was otherwise applicable to admissibility of appeals on points of law. If the amount at stake was this negligible, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been established in the applicant\u2019s case. Accordingly, her complaint was rejected as manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n The decision was served on 3 August 2012 and no appeal lay against it.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the Regional Court had failed to\u00a0provide any reasons at all for not allowing her claim for costs in respect of the remaining two acts of legal assistancecontrary to the requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a\u00a0fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The Government first of all pointed out that the value of the applicant\u2019s claim in issue was as little as EUR 270. They considered that this amount was not indicative of any significant disadvantage in terms of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention to have been potentially suffered by the applicant. Moreover, they were of the view that the remaining conditions for the application of the admissibility requirement under that provision had also been met. Therefore, in their assessment, the application was inadmissible under Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Government submitted that under the applicable statute legal costs could have been compensated only in so far as they originated from legal assistance that was necessary for the defence or promotion of the rights and interests of the party concerned in the proceedings in question. In the applicant\u2019s case, the Regional Court had accepted that such legal assistance had been necessary and was accordingly to be compensated in so far as it concerned three acts of legal assistance. In their view, it was not necessary to provide any specific reasons for not allowing the applicant\u2019s claim in relation to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. Therefore, in their view, the applicant\u2019s complaint was in any event manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant responded by advancing similar arguments as before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 11 above). In addition, in so far as the Government might have been understood as wishing to suggest that her claim in respect of the remaining two acts of legal assistance had not been granted because the legal assistance in question had not been found as having been necessary, the applicant contended that there was no basis for any such conclusion since the Regional Court had strictly made no observations or conclusions at all as regards her claim in relation to those two acts of legal assistance. At any rate, she argued that those two acts of legal assistance had been necessary, the need for them having been prompted by the actions of the Land Office and the Regional Court itself.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the Government\u2019s objection under Article\u00a035 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. It therefore should be joined to the merits of that complaint.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0For the rest, noting that no objections has been raised in respect of the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court is of the view that the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a73 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Other than what has been mentioned above, the parties have not made separate observations on the merits.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicability of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention to the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation of her legal costs has not been disputed and neither has it been disputed that the applicant had in fact incurred the legal costs she then sought to have compensated. Her compensation claim accordingly fell to be determined by a tribunal under the requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard, the Court reiterates that Article 6 \u00a7 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. This \u201cright to a court\u201d, of which the right of access is an aspect, may be relied on by anyone who considers on arguable grounds that an interference with the exercise of his or her civil rights is unlawful and complains that no possibility was afforded to submit that claim to a court meeting the requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 1 (see, for example, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 229, ECHR\u00a02012, with further references).<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to the case at hand, the applicant lodged a claim for compensation in respect of five acts of legal assistance. The Regional Court for its part dealt with the claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance only, acknowledging its legal basis as well as its scope (see paragraph 10 above). However, in its decision, it took no note at all of the claim in relation to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. Accordingly, the decision contains no analysis and no conclusion in relation to that part of the applicant\u2019s claim. In that regard, the Court notes the Constitutional Court\u2019s finding that the contested part of the Regional Court\u2019s decision was \u201cchallengeable under the criteria of lawfulness\u201d (see paragraph 12 above). In these circumstances, the Court considers that rather than having been decided upon summarily or by implication, as the Government may have wished to suggest, the claim in respect of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was simply overlooked by the Regional Court and has thus remained undetermined. In that regard, the Court reiterates that the right of access to court must be \u201cpractical and effective\u201d, not theoretical or illusory, and that it includes not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court (see, for example, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943\/11, \u00a7 86, 29 November 2016, with further references).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that the right of access to court is not absolute but may be subject to limitations which must not, however, restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 \u00a7 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a\u00a0reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see, for example, Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 230, with further references).<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Government do not cite any legitimate aim and do not advance any arguments in relation to the proportionality of the Regional Court\u2019s apparent failure to determine the applicant\u2019s claim. And neither has the Constitutional Court made any pronouncements in that respect.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court of its part reiterates that the risk of any mistake made by a\u00a0State authority must be borne by the State, and errors must not be remedied at the expense of the individual concerned (see \u0160imecki v. Croatia, no. 15253\/10, \u00a7 46, 30 April 2014, with further references).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The Regional Court\u2019s omission to determine the applicant\u2019s claim accordingly cannot be seen other than as impairing the very essence of her right of access to court in relation to that claim.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to examine the application under the criteria established by Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as de-fined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.\u201d<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in that connection, there has been disagreement between the parties as regards the question of whether the applicant suffered any significant disadvantage. It notes that under the provision in question, even assuming that the applicant has not suffered any such disadvantage, her complaint still could not be rejectedif it has not been duly considered by a\u00a0domestic tribunal. On the facts of this case the Court finds it appropriate first to examine the latter issue.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0It notes that the applicant challenged the Regional Court\u2019s failure to\u00a0determine the relevant part of her claim by way of a complaint to the Constitutional Court, in support of which she advanced a complex set of arguments, including in relation to the lawfulness of the Regional Court\u2019s decision and its compatibility with her rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 11 above).<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court rejected the complaint in its decision of 14\u00a0June 2012, essentially because it found the amount at stake to be negligible, held that in such a case its jurisdiction could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances, and found that in the applicant\u2019s case there were no such circumstances. In the absence of any specific statutory rules providing for such a construct, the Constitutional Curt relied on analogy with a ratione valoris applicable to appeals on points of law before the ordinary courts (see paragraph 11 above).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that, other than the above abstract elements, the Constitutional Court gave no consideration at all to the applicant\u2019s arguments, including those made specifically in reliance on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court finds that the requirements for the \u201ccase\u201d to have been duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) have not been met. It is accordingly not necessary to examine it under the other criteria of that provision and the Government\u2019s inadmissibility objection must be dismissed.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that she had not had an effective remedy in relation to her complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, in particular because no appeal had been available against the Regional Court\u2019s decision and the Constitutional Court had arbitrarily rejected her complaint. Article 13 provides that:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to their position as regards the complaint under Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, the Government contended that that complaint was not \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention, in view of which the complaint under the latter provision was in their view manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint but made no specific observations in reply.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0In view of its findings in relation to the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that the Government\u2019s objection cannot be sustained, that the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention is admissible, and that there is no need to examine it separately on the merits.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 1,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the claim overstated.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the claim should be allowed in full. It therefore awards EUR 1,000, payable jointly to Mr Junas and Ms\u00a0K\u013ea\u010danov\u00e1,plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 269.58 for the costs of her legal representation before the Constitutional Court and EUR 33.90 for postal expenses in the proceedings before the Court.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they had no objection to the claim.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law, the Court considers that the claim should be allowed in full. It therefore awards the sum of EUR 303.48, payable jointly to Mr Junas and Ms K\u013ea\u010danov\u00e1,plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, covering costs under all heads.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Joins the Government\u2019s objection under Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention to the merits of the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 and rejects it;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresapplication admissible;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there is no need to examine separately the merits of the complaint under Article 13, in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay Mr Junas and Ms K\u013ea\u010danov\u00e1 jointly, within three monthsthe following amounts:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 303.48 (three hundred and three euros and forty-eight cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a\u00a0rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 November 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Fato\u015f Arac\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Dmitry Dedov
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nJolien Schukking, judges,
\nand Fato\u015f Arac\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n