FIFTH SECTION
\nCASE OF ROSTOMASHVILI v. GEORGIA
\n(Application no. 13185\/07)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n8 November 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n08\/02\/2019<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Rostomashvili v. Georgia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Angelika Nu\u00dfberger, President, Having deliberated in private on 9 October 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 13185\/07) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Georgian national, Mr Paata Rostomashvili (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 2 March 2007.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Ms S. Abuladze, a lawyer practising in Tbilisi. The Georgian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, most recently Mr L. Meskhoradze, of the Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular, that the domestic courts had failed to give reasons for their decision to convict him of a criminal offence, compromising the fairness of the criminal trial, contrary to Article\u00a06 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 April 2009 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in the village of Akhaldaba.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 August 2004 the applicant and two other men (\u201cthe brothers\u201d) were arrested on identical charges of aggravated murder and illegal manufacturing, possession, and carrying of firearms.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0The charges against the applicant and the brothers were based on a statement given by the victim\u2019s father, Mr V.N., who claimed to have witnessed the crime, and on other evidence, namely a hand grenade seized from the brothers\u2019 home, as well as several forensic reports.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0According to Mr V.N., there was a long-running dispute between his family and the respective families of the applicant and the brothers. On two occasions, one two years earlier and the second earlier that year, the three accused attempted to rob and threaten his family, but he chose not to notify the police. Early in the morning on 14\u00a0August 2004, Mr V.N. went to work on a farm near the village and was later joined by his son. At the time of the murder, at about 10 a.m., he was working in the farmhouse while his son was outside. As he heard a gunshot, he rushed to the window and saw his son lying on the ground, about forty to forty-five metres from the building. One of the accused was holding a gun, while his brother and the applicant were shouting at him to fire another shot, which he did. The three men then ran off. Mr V.N. first ran up to his son, whose body was shaking, and then ran home to bring his car back to help him. Once he got home, he took out a gun. At that moment he was visited by his neighbours, who told him the news about his son\u2019s death. Mr\u00a0V.N. did not tell the visitors that he had been at the crime scene and witnessed his son\u2019s murder, or that he knew anything about the shooting. He drove them to the farmhouse to see his son\u2019s body and once there started claiming that the brothers and the applicant had killed him, without mentioning that he had witnessed the crime. It appears that he later told the police that he had witnessed the crime.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0Three witnesses, a father and son \u2013 Mr M.M. senior and Mr M.M. junior, and Mr S.P., testified that they lived in the same village, knew the victim\u2019s family, and on the morning of 14 August 2004 had also been working on the farm, around two hundred metres from the crime scene. None of them had seen the victim\u2019s father at the farm either before the murder or immediately after. According to them, however, the victim passed by their plot at around 9\u00a0a.m. and they heard shots after about fifteen to twenty minutes. They rushed to the crime scene and found the victim dead. Mr M.M. senior sent his son to notify Mr V.N. of the murder. Mr\u00a0M.M. junior was joined by Mr\u00a0D.M., Mr V.N.\u2019s neighbour, along the way. They found Mr V.N. at home. On hearing the news, Mr V.N. took his car and drove Mr M.M. junior and Mr D.M. to the crime scene, without mentioning that he had witnessed the murder, or that he knew anything about it. Once Mr V.N. arrived at the crime scene, he started blaming the brothers and the applicant, without mentioning that he had personally witnessed the crime.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0According to several witness statements, the applicant was seen in the village sometime between 9 and 10 a.m. Ms T.M. said that she had seen him in her yard at 9.10 a.m. Mr D.K. stated that he had seen him in Ms\u00a0T.M.\u2019s yard on the morning of 14 August 2004, without specifying the exact time. Mr G.G. could recall seeing him in the village shop sometime between 10 and 11 a.m. He stated that the shop was located approximately two kilometres from the crime scene. The shopkeeper stated that the applicant had spent about two to three hours in the shop, without specifying the exact time. The applicant had allegedly heard the news about the murder while there. He was not with the brothers at the time.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0A forensic biological examination report (no. 140\/162) ordered by a prosecutor and implemented by the Forensic Centre of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs between 2 September and 22 October 2004 provided an analysis of bloodstains found on the trousers of one of the brothers. The blood was of type AB (II), the same as that of the victim, while the owner of the trousers had blood type AB (IV).<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0A forensic soil examination report (no. 1700\/10) ordered by a prosecutor and implemented by the Forensic and Special Research Centre of the Ministry of Justice between 7 September and 6 October 2004 provided an analysis of soil found on the brothers\u2019 shoes in relation to soil at and around the crime scene. It found that the traces of soil on the brothers\u2019 shoes seized from their home had the same characteristics as the soil at the crime scene.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 May 2006 the Tbilisi Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The brothers were convicted of aggravated murder and illegal possession of firearms, and were sentenced to seventeen and sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The first-instance court fully relied on Mr V.N.\u2019s statement (see paragraph 8 above). It accordingly found that the ongoing dispute between the three men and the victim and his family had been the underlying cause of the crime. It continued to note that at around 10 a.m., the applicant and the brothers had gone to the victim\u2019s farm and killed him with a gun. After one of the accused fired the first shot, his brother and the applicant shouted at him to shoot again, which he did. The gun was never recovered. In addition, the court relied on the forensic biological examination\u00a0(see paragraph\u00a011 above) and forensic soil examination (see paragraph\u00a012 above), and other forensic evidence such as a forensic examination of the victim\u2019s body and of the hand grenade, without elaborating on their relevance to the applicant\u2019s conviction.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s argument that he had an alibi for the presumed time of the crime in the light of the statements given by some of the defence witnesses (see paragraph 10 above) was dismissed by the court. It noted that the statements in question were inconsistent, contradictory and aimed at shielding the accused from criminal responsibility.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 June 2006 only the applicant appealed against the judgment of 8 May 2006. He emphasised that unlike his co-accused, no piece of forensic evidence available in the criminal case file implicated him personally in the crime. He argued that the only piece of evidence connecting him to the murder was the eyewitness statement given by the victim\u2019s father. However, it was doubtful whether the latter had even been at the crime scene, given the evident contradictions between his account and the statements given by witnesses M.M. junior and D.M., that they had found him at home shortly after the murder, and that he had not mentioned having witnessed the crime, despite having gone with them to the crime scene to verify the tragic news (see paragraph 9 above). He argued that Mr V.N.\u2019s version that he had gone home after having witnessed his son\u2019s murder without notifying anyone and without telling Mr M.M. junior and Mr D.M. that he had been at the crime scene, without any other evidence corroborating his account, created serious doubts as to the veracity of his claim to have witnessed the event. The applicant further claimed to have an alibi to the effect that he had been seen alone in the centre of the village around the time of the murder, and noted that Mr V.N. might have been implicating him out of revenge. He argued that given the lack of any response to his main arguments, the conviction rendered by the first-instance court had relied on a mere doubt devoid of any evidence, in violation of Article\u00a0503 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below).<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 21\u00a0September 2006 the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of second and final instance, held a hearing and upheld the lower court\u2019s verdict. It reasoned that the lower court had acted in full compliance with Article\u00a018 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below) and had assessed the factual circumstances of the case fully and objectively. In upholding the lower court\u2019s verdict, the Supreme Court fully relied on the statement of the victim\u2019s father, the statements of the other witnesses who were told by him that the applicant had killed his son, and the forensic evidence, without addressing any of the applicant\u2019s arguments, including that none of the cited evidence had implicated him, and that the lower court had failed to address his arguments in that regard.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date in May 2016 the applicant was released from prison.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Detention conditions and medical care in prison<\/strong><\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 September 2004 the applicant was remanded in custody and placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 5. He was allegedly held in an overcrowded cell, had to take turns with other prisoners to sleep, and was unable to shower for months. The toilet in the cell was not separated from the living area. He also alleged that there were rodents in his cell.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant was transferred to Tbilisi Prison no. 1. According to him, the conditions there were identical.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 31 March 2006 he was transferred from Tbilisi Prison no.\u00a01 to the newly built Rustavi Prison no. 6.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 December 2006 the applicant was transferred to Rustavi Prison no.\u00a02. During his time there, he was allegedly exposed to harmful emissions from a nearby concrete factory. It does not appear that he complained to the prison authorities about any aspect of his detention conditions.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 April 2007 the applicant was returned to Rustavi Prison no.\u00a06. He stayed at that prison until his transfer to the prison hospital on 11\u00a0January 2009 (see paragraph 27 below).<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0It does not transpire from the case file that the applicant raised any concerns before the prison administration or any domestic authority about the conditions of his detention in any of the penal institutions referred to above.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0Upon the applicant\u2019s readmission to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 6\u00a0April 2007 (see paragraph 23 above), he underwent a standard medical examination upon entry and was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia but was not prescribed any treatment. It does not appear that the applicant lodged any complaints in that respect.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0June 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Department of Prisons, apparently for the first time, about headaches, and requested to have a medical examination administered in that regard. On 17\u00a0December 2008, in view of the applicant\u2019s complaint that the Government had allegedly left his medical complaints \u2013 including those concerning headaches \u2013 unaddressed, the President of the Section decided to indicate to the Government, under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court, to implement all necessary measures to assess his state of health. It transpires from the information submitted by the Government that on 28\u00a0July 2008 the applicant was consulted by a neurologist concerning the headaches. He was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia, hypertensive hydrocephaly syndrome, and post-traumatic brain condition, and the relevant treatment was prescribed. The applicant complained again about headaches on 18\u00a0September and 11\u00a0November 2008. The applicant\u2019s submissions dated 29\u00a0January 2009 revealed that he had been seen by a neurologist on an unspecified date in\u00a0October 2008. As regards the complaint of 11\u00a0November 2008, no immediate reaction followed from the authorities. On 14\u00a0January 2009, the applicant was consulted by a neurologist and a skull X-ray was carried out. The neurologist concluded that no pathological signs could be observed and prescribed treatment for the applicant\u2019s headache. No complaints regarding headaches appear to have been raised following that date. As regards the other health-related complaints, on 28 October 2008 the applicant was examined and diagnosed with a chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. On 19\u00a0November 2008 an ultrasound exam was performed which confirmed the diagnosis of the chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. The relevant treatment was prescribed. The interim measure was lifted on 8 February 2012.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 January 2009 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital, where he underwent a series of examinations and tests. On 16\u00a0January 2009, he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. On the same day, he was put on a DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short course) programme, the strategy for the detection and treatment of tuberculosis recommended by the World Health Organisation.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 12\u00a0February 2009 the applicant was placed in a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 July 2009 he was placed in Tbilisi Prison no.\u00a01 and on 21\u00a0September 2009 successfully finished his treatment in the framework of the DOTS programme.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND OTHER NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitution of Georgia (1995), as it stood at the material time, provided as follows:<\/p>\n Article 40 \u00a7 3<\/p>\n \u201cThe charges, bill of indictment and conviction shall be based only on incontrovertible evidence. Any kind of doubt which cannot be proven in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law shall be resolved in favour of the accused.\u201d<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Code of Criminal Procedure (1998), in force at the material time, provided as follows:<\/p>\n Article 10: Presumption of innocence<\/p>\n \u201c…3.\u00a0\u00a0The charges, indictment, conviction and all other procedural decisions shall be based only on incontrovertible evidence.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Any kind of doubt which cannot be proven in accordance with the law shall be resolved in favour of the suspect and the accused.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 18: Comprehensive, objective, and full examination of the circumstances of a\u00a0case<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Investigators, prosecutors, judges and courts shall establish, incontrovertibly, whether a crime was committed, who committed it, and all other circumstances of the criminal case.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of a case shall be examined comprehensively, objectively and fully. Incriminating and exonerating [circumstances], as well as aggravating and extenuating circumstances with respect to a suspect or an accused individual shall be determined with the same diligence.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0All statements and complaints of a suspect, accused and a defence lawyer concerning innocence or a lesser degree of guilt, the participation of other individuals in the crime, or violations of law at the investigation or trial stage or during trial shall be given careful consideration.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 503 \u00a7 2<\/p>\n \u201cA conviction may not be based on a supposition. [Such a decision] shall be reached only if the commission of a crime by an accused is proven during court proceedings, on the basis of incontrovertible evidence…\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention had been inadequate and that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in prison. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/strong><\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s health condition had been duly monitored, and that during his imprisonment all adequate treatment had been administered to him by the relevant specialist doctors. As regards the complaints concerning inadequate prison conditions, they were wholly unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that there had been a lack of medical supervision and treatment of his health concerns in prison, including tuberculosis, and that the prison conditions in all of the institutions where he had been held had been unsatisfactory.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention concern the conditions of his detention and the adequacy of medical care in prison. These complaints will be addressed in turn.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of detention<\/em><\/p>\n (a) Detention prior to 31 March 2006<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its relevant case-law, according to which it will not consider detention conditions as a continuous situation in circumstances where the complaint concerns an episode, treatment or particular detention regime attached to an established period of detention (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 76-78, 10 January 2012).<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Tbilisi Prison no. 5 and Tbilisi Prison no. 1 had been wholly unsatisfactory owing to overcrowding and substandard sanitary conditions, among other things (see paragraphs 19-20 above). The Court notes the generally favourable assessment of prison conditions in the then newly built Rustavi Prison no. 6 made by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) (see Mirzashvili v. Georgia, no.\u00a026657\/07, \u00a7\u00a045, 7 September 2017).<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s detention in the two prisons concerned ended with his transfer to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 31 March 2006. The present application was submitted to the Court on 2 March 2007.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that there was a continuous situation. It therefore considers that this part of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention was lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 4 of the Convention (see Mirzashvili, cited above, \u00a7 51; Gorguiladze v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 4313\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 23-24, 20 October 2009; and Mazanashvili v.\u00a0 Georgia, no. 19882\/07, \u00a7 40, 28 January 2014).<\/p>\n (b) Rustavi Prison no. 6 and subsequent penal institutions<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to its relevant case-law in respect of conditions of detention in Georgian custodial institutions at the material time, the Court reiterates the rule that whenever an applicant wished to challenge allegedly poor material conditions of detention in a Georgian prison, even if such complaints did not call for the full and meticulous exhaustion of any specific criminal or civil remedies (see, for comparison, Aliev v. Georgia, no. 522\/04, \u00a7 62 and 63, 13 January 2009, and Goginashvili v. Georgia, no.\u00a047729\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 54 and 57, 4 October 2011), it was still required, at the very minimum, that at least one of the responsible State agencies must have been informed of the applicant\u2019s subjective assessment that the conditions of the detention in question constituted a lack of respect for, or diminished, his or her human dignity. Without such basic conduct at the domestic level by a person who wished to challenge the conditions of his or her detention under the Convention, the Court would necessarily have difficulty in evaluating the credibility of an applicant\u2019s allegations of fact in that connection (see Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), no.\u00a01704\/06, 26\u00a0June 2007, and Janiashvili v. Georgia, no. 35887\/05, \u00a7 70, 27\u00a0November 2012).<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the material available in the case file, the Court notes that the applicant never informed any of the relevant authorities of his dissatisfaction with any particular aspect of the material conditions of his detention in any of the relevant prisons. However, it observes that, even supposing that, at the relevant time, the applicant had had an effective domestic remedy at his disposal which he could have exhausted (see paragraph 41 above), in the proceedings before the Court, he limited his submissions to vague and general statements only. Consequently, the Court finds that the applicant has failed to discharge his burden of proof and substantiate his complaint properly (compare, amongst many other similar authorities, Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7 127, ECHR\u00a02016; Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 122, 10\u00a0January 2012; and Ildani v.\u00a0 Georgia, no. 65391\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 26 and 27, 23 April 2013).<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the material conditions of his detention in Prison no.\u00a06 and subsequent penal institutions is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Medical care in prison<\/em><\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the adequacy of medical treatment in prisons were summarised by the Court in the cases of Blokhin v. Russia ([GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 135-140, ECHR 2016, with further references therein); Goginashvili (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-70); Irakli Mindadze v.\u00a0Georgia (no. 17012\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 11 December 2012); and Jeladze v.\u00a0Georgia (no. 1871\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 41-42, 18 December 2012).<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a lack of medical supervision and care. It appears from the information submitted by the Government in response to the indication of interim measures under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court that the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding his headaches had been addressed on 28\u00a0July 2008 (see paragraph\u00a026 above). The applicant subsequently admitted having been seen by a neurologist on an unspecified date in\u00a0October 2008 (see ibid.). While the complaint regarding headaches dated 11\u00a0November 2008 was not followed by an immediate response, the applicant was consulted by a neurologist on 14\u00a0January 2009, and relevant treatment was prescribed. No complaints regarding headaches appear to have been raised following that date (see ibid.). As regards the symptoms of an inflamed gallbladder were addressed on 28 October and 19\u00a0November 2008. He was accordingly diagnosed with a chronic inflammation of the gallbladder and prescribed the relevant treatment (see ibid.).<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0As concerns the treatment in relation to his tuberculosis, the seriousness of the problem of tuberculosis in Georgian prisons, as well as the role of screening for tuberculosis in minimising the spread of the disease, has already been acknowledged by the Court in its case\u2011law on the matter (see Poghosov v. Georgia [Committee], no. 33323\/08, \u00a7 29, 26\u00a0June 2017, with further references). The Court notes that while the applicant did not have a screening test for tuberculosis during the initial period of his detention, it does not appear that he voiced any related ailments in the period concerned (contrast Ildani, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 37-38, where despite a diagnosis of chronic bronchitis and repeated requests for a proper medical check-up, the applicant was not given a tuberculosis test for fifteen months). Nor did the applicant complain of being held in a cell with an inmate with tuberculosis (compare Vasyukov v. Russia, no. 2974\/05, \u00a7 68, 5 April 2011).<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background, the Court notes that immediately following the applicant\u2019s diagnosis of tuberculosis on 16\u00a0January 2009, the Government involved the applicant in the DOTS programme, and the treatment was successfully completed on 21\u00a0September 2009 (see paragraphs 27-29 above).<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint should be rejected as manifestly ill\u2011founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the domestic courts had failed to give sufficient reasons for their decision to convict him of a criminal offence in view of their silence concerning his principal arguments, compromising the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention which, in its relevant part, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that there had been a manifest lack of duly reasoned domestic decisions confirming his guilt. He maintained that the statement given by the victim\u2019s father \u2013 the sole piece of evidence allegedly implicating him in the murder \u2013 contained such manifest contradictions and ambiguities that his presence at the crime scene was called into question and needed to be addressed explicitly. Therefore, the domestic courts\u2019 undisputed reliance on it, in the absence of any other evidence, as well as their total silence concerning his objections in that regard, had compromised the fairness of the criminal proceedings against him. He also argued that his arguments concerning an alibi had not been properly addressed.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the domestic courts had duly considered all the evidence available in the case file and reached their verdict accordingly.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention obliges the domestic courts to indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they base their decisions (see, among other authorities, Taxquet v.\u00a0Belgium\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a0926\/05, \u00a7\u00a091, ECHR 2010, and Nikolay Genov v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a07202\/09, \u00a7\u00a027, 13\u00a0July 2017). The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9\u00a0December 1994, \u00a7\u00a029, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0303\u2011A; Garc\u00eda Ruiz v. Spain\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a030544\/96, \u00a7\u00a026, ECHR 1999\u2011I; and Moreira Ferreira v.\u00a0Portugal\u00a0(no.\u00a02)\u00a0[GC] (no. 19867\/12, \u00a7\u00a084, 11 July 2017).<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0Without requiring a detailed answer to every argument advanced by the complainant (see Fomin v. Moldova, no.\u00a036755\/06, \u00a7 31, 11\u00a0October 2011), this obligation presupposes that parties to judicial proceedings can expect to receive a specific and explicit reply to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of those proceedings (see, among other authorities, Moreira Ferreira, cited above, \u00a7\u00a084; Tchankotadze v.\u00a0Georgia, no.\u00a015256\/05, \u00a7\u00a0103, 21 June 2016; and Deryan v. Turkey, no.\u00a041721\/04, \u00a7\u00a033, 21 July 2015). It must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed (see Boldea v. Romania, no.\u00a019997\/02, \u00a7\u00a030, 15\u00a0February 2007, and Uche v. Switzerland, no.\u00a012211\/09, \u00a7\u00a037, 17\u00a0April 2018).<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the applicant\u2019s argument concerning his alibi was addressed, even if briefly, by the court of first instance. It reasoned that the statements given by the defence witnesses were contradictory and considered the account untrustworthy (see paragraph 15 above).<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0By contrast, the applicant\u2019s two principal arguments before the domestic courts were not given an explicit reply. Firstly, he had argued that unlike his co-accused, no piece of forensic evidence concerned him or his alleged actions and therefore did not implicate him, in any manner whatsoever, in the crimes he had been charged with. Secondly, the applicant had underlined that immediately following the murder the victim\u2019s father was found at home, apparently unaware of his son\u2019s death (see paragraph\u00a09 above), and that it was unclear why he had allegedly pretended being unaware of his son\u2019s murder. This, the applicant had argued, made it open to doubt whether the eyewitness had been at the crime scene at all.\u00a0Based on those submissions, the applicant maintained that the prosecution\u2019s case against him was devoid of any factual and evidentiary grounds and was based on a mere suspicion, in violation of the pertinent legislation (see paragraphs\u00a016 and 30-31 above).<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is not its task to review the manner in which forensic and witness evidence is assessed by the domestic courts. Nor is the Court called upon to rule on the guilt or innocence of a person convicted by the domestic courts, that matter being within the competence of the domestic courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 59552\/08, \u00a7 55, ECHR 2015, and Popov v. Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7 188, 13 July 2006). In addition, the Court recognizes that, in a case such as this, a trial court, which relies on witness statement for the accused\u2019s conviction, is able to base itself on direct contact with the witness, the reliability of whose statement it must nevertheless properly assess. However, it is within the Court\u2019s jurisdiction to assess whether the proceedings as a whole, including the obligation of the domestic courts to give reasons for their judgments, were in compliance with the Convention. It is against this background that the Court will proceed with its assessment of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is of the opinion that the two arguments raised by the applicant before the domestic courts (see paragraph 57 above) related to the core of the criminal case against him and called for a specific and explicit reply. However, none of the domestic judicial authorities addressed them. The generic response given by the domestic courts that \u201call the evidence available in the case file\u201d was sufficient to convict the applicant cannot be regarded as an explicit and specific reply to the latter\u2019s principal arguments before them. Such an answer, on the facts of the present case, amounts to a manifest lack of reasoning on the part of the domestic courts as in fact, no piece of forensic evidence had implicated the applicant, and the sole eyewitness statement was subjected to repeated reasoned yet unanswered challenges questioning its veracity and probative value.\u00a0Accordingly, the domestic courts failed to address, in any manner, the applicant\u2019s reasoned arguments (see Fomin, cited above, \u00a7 30, and contrast Kuparadze v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 30743\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a072-73, 21\u00a0September 2017).<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the domestic courts adjudicating the applicant\u2019s criminal case failed to fulfil one of the requirements of a fair hearing, namely to provide adequate reasons for their decisions. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained under Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (c), 2 and 3 of the Convention concerning the lawfulness and reasonableness of his pre\u2011trial detention. However, the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention ended upon his conviction at first instance on 8\u00a0May 2006 (see, inter alia, Labita v.\u00a0Italy\u00a0[GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0147, ECHR 2000\u2011IV; Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a047095\/99, \u00a7\u00a0110, ECHR 2002\u2011VI; and Jeladze, cited above, \u00a7\u00a052). As the application was lodged with the Court on 2 March 2007, this complaint is inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month rule, and must be rejected under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3\u00a0(b) of the Convention concerning the alleged failure of the domestic courts to ensure the attendance of a party at a reconstruction of events, the applicant admitted before the Court that his lawyer had been notified. The complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the Government had not complied with its obligations under Article\u00a034 of the Convention in the context of the interim measures indicated to it under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court to provide the applicant with adequate medical care. However, in the light of the Court\u2019s findings concerning the adequacy of the medical care administered to the applicant (see paragraphs 44-48 above), the respondent State cannot be considered to have failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.<\/p>\n V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 7,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim as excessive and unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that his claim in the sum of EUR 7,000,000 included the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim as excessive and unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the absence of relevant documents and the above criteria, the Court decides that no award shall be made in this respect.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention concerning the inadequate reasoning of the domestic judgments admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; and<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 8\u00a0November 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Claudia Westerdiek\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Angelika Nu\u00dfberger
\nYonko Grozev,
\nS\u00edofra O\u2019Leary,
\nM\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits,
\nGabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
\nL\u04d9tif H\u00fcseynov,
\nLado Chanturia, judges,
\nand Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n