SECOND SECTION
\nCASE OF COTE\u021a v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
\n(Application no. 72238\/14)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n23 October 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Cote\u021b v. the Republic of Moldova,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Paul Lemmens, President, Having deliberated in private on 2 October 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 72238\/14) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Moldovan national, Mr Iurii Cote\u021b (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 29 October 2014.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr A. Bivol a lawyer practising in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. The Moldovan Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr O. Rotari.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 July 2017 the applicant\u2019scomplaintsunder Articles 3, 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not object to the examination of the application by a Committee.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s arrest and detention<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 June 2014 the applicant had an altercation with two persons, one of whom was in an advanced state of intoxication. During the altercation, the applicant pushed the intoxicated person and punched the other one.As a result,the intoxicated person fell to the ground and received a serious head trauma. The scene was witnessed by the wife of the intoxicated person and a neighbour.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0On the same day the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. On 18 June 2014 the Ialoveni District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody pending trial for a period of thirty days.\u00a0The court considered that the detention was necessary because the applicant was accused of a serious offence and there appeared to be a risk of his interfering with the investigation, absconding and re-offending.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed against the detention order and argued, inter alia, that he had a permanent abode, an employment and no history of violent behaviour. He also submitted that he could not influence any witnesses because they were in another village and that a restraining order to quit his town of residence would be sufficient to eliminate that risk. He also submitted that he had cooperated with the investigators from the beginning of the investigation and that he could not leave the country because his travel documents had been seized.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 July 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 July 2014 the Ialoveni District Court examined the Prosecutor\u2019s request for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention and a habeas corpus request lodged by the applicant. It found no reasons to detain the applicant in custody and ordered his immediate release under judicial control. The applicant had no right to leave the town without approval by the court and to communicate with the persons involved in the criminal investigation. The Prosecutor\u2019s Office appealed.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 July 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the Prosecutor\u2019s appeal, quashed the above decision and ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The reasons given by the Court of Appeal were that the applicant could abscond, interfere with the investigation and re-offend. The applicant was not arrested and, according to him, was told to go home.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 August 2014 the applicant was arrested at home and placed in detention.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 September 2014 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request with the Ialoveni District Court. He argued,inter alia, that the case was not complex and that all witnesses had been heard in the beginning of the investigation.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 September 2014 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged an application for the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention arguing,inter alia, that between 22 July 2014 and 25 August 2014 the applicant hadabsconded from the investigating authority.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 September 2014 the Ialoveni District Court upheld the Prosecutor\u2019s request and prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of thirty days. The reasons for detention were the same as before: risk of absconding, risk of interfering with the investigation and re-offending.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued,inter alia, that there was no risk of absconding or interfering with the investigation. He submitted that,on 22 July 2014, when the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal had quashed the Ialoveni District Court\u2019s decision of 11 July 2014 and had ordered the prolongation of his detention, he had not been arrested but advised to go home. He went home and nobody came after him until 25 August 2014. Between 11 July and 25 August 2014 he had not attempted to abscond or interfere with the investigation.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 October 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court found that the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding was real because he had absconded from investigating authorities between 22 July and 25 August 2014.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 October 2014 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office applied to the Ialoveni District Court for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention for another thirty days. One of the reasons relied upon by the Prosecutor was that the applicant had absconded from investigating authorities between 22\u00a0July and 25 August 2014.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0 On 22 October 2014 the applicant requested access to the casefile with a view to obtaining a copy of the materials filed by the public prosecutor together with his application of 7 October 2014. He argued that the public prosecutor\u2019s application was accompanied by a set of documents, while he had only received a copy of the application. The applicant lodged on the same date a habeas corpus request.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 October 2014 the Ialoveni District Court upheld the public prosecutor\u2019s application and ordered the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention for thirty days on the ground that there was a risk of absconding and interfering with the investigation. The applicant\u2019s habeas corpus request was rejected while his request for access to the materials of the file was not examined. The applicant appealed and complained about the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for detention. He did not complain in his appeal about the lack of access to the materials in the casefile.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 November 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 November 2014 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office applied again to the Ialoveni District Court for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 November 2014 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 November 2014 the Ialoveni District Court dismissed the public prosecutor\u2019s request and upheld the applicant\u2019s habeas corpus request. The applicant was released from detention and ordered not to leave his town and not to interfere with the investigation.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of detention<\/strong><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0Throughout his detention the applicant was held in Prison no. 13.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, he was detained in overcrowded cells which lacked ventilation. His co-detainees smoked in the cells. The cells were equipped with squat toilets which were not properly separated. There was a sink with a rusted tap and the quality of water was very bad. The food was insufficient.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0The termination of the criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 March 2017 the Supreme Court of Justice convicted the applicant for hooliganism and unintentional inflictionof severe bodily harm and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of two years\u2019 imprisonment.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law concerning detention on remand has been set out in the Court\u2019s judgment in Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC] (no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 42-43, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of Law No. 1545 \u201con Compensation for Damage Caused by the Illegal Acts of the Criminal Investigation Bodies, Prosecution and Courts\u201d, in force since 4 June 1998, read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cSection 1<\/p>\n (1)\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with the present law, individuals and legal entities are entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage caused as a result of:<\/p>\n a)\u00a0\u00a0illegal detention, illegal arrest, illegal indictment, illegal conviction;<\/p>\n b)\u00a0\u00a0illegal search carried out during the investigation phase or during the trial of the case, confiscation, levy of a distraint upon property, illegal dismissal from employment, as well as other procedural acts that limit the persons\u2019 rights;<\/p>\n c)\u00a0\u00a0illegal administrative arrest or order to work for the community, illegal confiscation of the property, illegal fine;<\/p>\n d)\u00a0\u00a0the carrying out of operative investigative measures in breach of lawful procedure;<\/p>\n e)\u00a0\u00a0illegal seizure of accounting documents, other documents, money, or stamps as well as the blocking of bank accounts.<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0The damage caused shall be fully compensated, irrespective of the degree of culpability of the agents of the criminal investigation organs, prosecution and courts.<\/p>\n […]<\/p>\n Section 6<\/p>\n A person shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the present law when one of the following conditions is met:<\/p>\n a)\u00a0\u00a0the pronouncement of an acquittal judgment;<\/p>\n b)\u00a0\u00a0the dropping of charges or discontinuation of an investigation on the ground of rehabilitation;<\/p>\n c)\u00a0\u00a0the adoption of a decision by which an administrative arrest is cancelled on the grounds of rehabilitation;<\/p>\n d)\u00a0\u00a0the adoption by an investigation judge, in accordance with Article 313 para. 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in respect of the acquitted person or of the person of a decision declaring null the acts and the actions of the investigation bodies.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention that the domestic courts had given insufficient reasons for their decisions to remand him in custody. Article\u00a05 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that there were no arguments in favour of his deprivation of liberty and that his remand in custody had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s detention had been necessary in order to exclude the risk of his absconding and influencing witnesses. The Government submitted that the applicant had absconded between 22 July and 25 August 2014, a fact which confirmed the necessity of his remand in custody.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. The requirement for the judicial officer to give relevant and sufficient reasons for the detention \u2013 in addition to the persistence of reasonable suspicion \u2013 applies already at the time of the first decision ordering detention on remand, that is to say \u201cpromptly\u201d after the arrest (see Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 87 and 102). Furthermore, when deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see, for example, Idalov v.\u00a0Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7 140, 22 May 2012).<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0Justifications which have been deemed \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d reasons in the Court\u2019s case-law have included such grounds as the danger of absconding, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, the risk of collusion, the risk of reoffending, the risk of causing public disorder and the need to protect the detainee (see, for instance, Wemhoff v. Germany, 27 June 1968, \u00a7 14, Series A no.\u00a07; St\u00f6gm\u00fcller v. Austria, 10 November 1969, \u00a7 15, Series A no. 9; Letellier v.\u00a0France, 26 June 1991, \u00a7 51, Series\u00a0A no. 207; Toth v.\u00a0Austria, 12\u00a0December 1991, \u00a7 70, Series A no. 224; Tomasi v. France, 27\u00a0August 1992, \u00a7 95, Series A no. 241\u2011A; and I.A. v. France, 23 September 1998, \u00a7\u00a0108, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VII).<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The presumption is always in favour of release. The national judicial authorities must, with respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts militating for or against the existence of the above-mentioned requirement of public interest or justifying a departure from the rule in Article 5, and must set them out in their decisions on applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the well-documented facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 89 and 91). Arguments for and against release must not be \u201cgeneral and abstract\u201d (see Smirnova v. Russia,nos.\u00a046133\/99 and 48183\/99, \u00a7\u00a063, ECHR 2003\u2011IX (extracts)).<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes in the first place that the criminal case against the applicant was not complex and that there were very few persons to be questioned. The Court also notes that the main accusation against the applicant was that he had involuntarilycausedbodily harm to a person. It also appears that the applicant cooperated with the investigating authorities during the proceedings against him. The applicant had a permanent abode and an employment and had no history of violent behaviour.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Between 11 July and 25 August 2014 the applicant was at large and it does not appear that he attempted to leave the country or to interfere with the investigation.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0It is the Government\u2019s case that he absconded from the investigating authorities between 22\u00a0July and 25\u00a0August 2014. In support of this contention the Government submitted a copy of a handwritten document, signed by a police officer, in which he reported to his superior about having arrested the wanted person (the applicant) on 25 August 2014. In the Court\u2019s view, this document does not prove that the applicant was absconding. The Government submitted no evidence to show that the applicant had been summoned to appear before the authorities between 22\u00a0July and 25 August 2014. The fact that the authorities only decided to place him in detention more than a month after the detention was ordered cannot be held against the applicant.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all of the above factors, the Court considers that there were no relevant and sufficient reasons to prolong the applicant\u2019s detention for almost four months. It follows that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the late examination of his habeas corpus request of 1 September 2014 and the courts\u2019 refusal to present him with materials from the criminal file following his request on 22 October 2014 amounted to a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4. Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 of the Convention reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the lack of access to the materials of the case-file is concerned, the Court notes that the applicant did not raise this issue in his appeal lodged against the decision of the Ialoveni Court of Appeal of 22\u00a0October 2014 (see paragraph 20 above). Thus, this part of the complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the remaining part of the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4of the Convention, namely the part concerning the late examination of the applicant\u2019s habeas corpus request of 1 September 2014, is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his habeas corpus request, lodged on 1\u00a0September 2014, was examined only on 23 September 2014. This, in his view, could not be considered prompt review under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Governemnt submitted that the delay in examinining the applicant\u2019shabeas corpus request was justified by the interests of justice. They considered that the delay was not excessive.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, in guaranteeing to detained persons a right to institute proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful (see Musia\u0142 v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 24557\/94, \u00a7\u00a043, ECHR\u00a01999-II). The question whether a person\u2019s right under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a04of the Convention has been respected has to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case (seeSarban v. Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7 118, 4\u00a0October 2005).<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it took the Ialoveni District Court twenty-two days to examine the applicant\u2019s habeas corpus request of 1 September 2014. Such a period of time cannot be considered to correspond to the requirement of a speedy judicial decision within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (Rehbock v. Slovenia, no.\u00a029462\/95, \u00a7\u00a082 et seq., ECHR 2000\u2011XII, and Kadem v.\u00a0Malta, no. 55263\/00, \u00a7 45, 9 January 2003). In this respect the Court recalls that in its judgment in the case ofSarban (cited above, \u00a7 120), it found a delay of twenty-one days to be excessively long.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in this respect too.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 5 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that he had been denied an enforceable right to compensation for his detention which had contravened Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.\u201d<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument and argued that there was a remedy under domestic law, namely that provided for by Law No. 1545. However, it admitted that since the applicant was not acquitted, that remedy was not open to him and Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Conventionwas not applicable.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the right to compensation set forth in Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention presupposes that a violation of one of the other paragraphs of that Article has been established, either by a domestic authority or by the Convention institutions (see N.C. v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a024952\/94, \u00a7 49, ECHR 2002\u2011X, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7 182, ECHR 2012).<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found above a breach of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention. It also notes the Government\u2019s submission to the effect that since the applicant was not acquitted, no right to compensation existed in domestic law within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 5. That submission is consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of Law No. 1545 (see paragraph 29 above) and with the Court\u2019s finding of a breach of Article\u00a013 of the Convention in Gu\u0163u v. Moldova(no. 20289\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 72-74, 7\u00a0June 2007) on account of lack of effective remedies under Moldovan law in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention on account of lack of an enforceable right to compensation under domestic law.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about the poor conditions of his detention. Article 3 reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained about poor conditions of detention in Prison no. 13 (see paragraph 26 above).<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed the applicant\u2019s allegations and argued that the conditions of detention did not amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the general principles concerning conditions of detention set out in its judgments in the cases ofOstrovar v. Moldova (no.\u00a035207\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 76-79, 13\u00a0September 2005); Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, (no.\u00a011353\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 83-85, 15 September 2015); Khlaifia and Others v. Italy ([GC], no.\u00a016483\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 163-67, ECHR 2016 (extracts)); and Mursi\u010d v. Croatia([GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7 104, ECHR 2016).<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that it has found the conditions of detention in Prison no. 13 to be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention in a number of cases examined by it (see, amongst many other authorities, Hadji v.\u00a0Moldova, nos.\u00a032844\/07 and 41378\/07, \u00a7 20, 14\u00a0February 2012; Silvestru v. the Republic of Moldova,no. 28173\/10, 13 January 2015; Pisaroglu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 21061\/11, 3 March 2015).Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaints. The Court thus considers that the hardship endured by the applicant during his detention in Prison no. 13 went beyond the unavoidable level of hardship inherent in detention and reached the threshold of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed with the amount of non-pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant.<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered stress and frustration as a result of the violations found. The particular amount claimed is, however, excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a04,000 for non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the amount claimed was excessive.<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the entire amount claimed for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention concerning lack of access to the documents of the case-file inadmissible and the remainder of the application admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months the following amounts,to be converted into the currency of the respondent Stateat the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 October 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Paul Lemmens
\nValeriu Gri\u0163co,
\nSt\u00e9phanie Mourou-Vikstr\u00f6m, judges,
\nand Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n