THIRD SECTION<\/p>\n
CASE OF M\u00d3RY AND BENC v. SLOVAKIA
\n(Applications nos. 3912\/15 and 7675\/15)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n22 January 2019<\/p>\n
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article\u00a044 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of M\u00f3ry and Benc v. Slovakia,<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a\u00a0Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n
Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,
\nHelen Keller,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides,
\nJolien Schukking,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated in private on 18 December 2018,<\/p>\n
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n
PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in two applications (nos.\u00a03912\/15 and 7675\/15) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by two Slovak nationals, Mr Marek M\u00f3ry (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) and Mr Mat\u00fa\u0161 Benc (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d), on 14 January and 3 February 2015 respectively.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by Ms I. Len\u010d\u00e9\u0161ov\u00e1, a lawyer practising in Nitra. The Government of the Slovak Republic (\u201cthe\u00a0Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Piro\u0161\u00edkov\u00e1.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 January 2017 the applicants complaints\u2019 raised under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule\u00a054 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Horn\u00e1 Kr\u00e1\u013eov\u00e1. The\u00a0second applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Nitra.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 March 2014 a judge of the Nitra District Court remanded the applicants in detention pending trial on the charge of continuous criminal offence of insurance fraud. This followed their arrest on 11\u00a0March 2014.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to the first applicant, the District Court decided that there were reasons to suspect that he would influence witnesses, reoffend and continue to make illegal financial gains. With respect to the second applicant, the District Court concluded that there was a reason to suspect that he would interfere with witnesses and his co-accused to influence the evidence they would give.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 March 2014 both applicants lodged an interlocutory appeal, arguing that no specific factual elements had been relied on in the District Court\u2019s decision to justify their pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 April 2014 the Nitra Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 interlocutory appeals, referring to the findings of the District Court.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 April 2014 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint alleging that the decisions on their detention lacked specific reasons justifying their pre-trial detention. They each requested just satisfaction of 5,000 euros (EUR).<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court joined their complaints and on\u00a024\u00a0September 2014 found a violation of their rights under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 4 of the Convention. It quashed the relevant part of the decision of the Regional Court and awarded each of the applicants EUR\u00a01,000 as just satisfaction in addition to their legal costs and expenses in the amount of EUR 284.<\/p>\n The Constitutional Court noted that where the ordinary courts used only formal and standard phrases in their decisions on detention (as was the case with the applicants), suspicion arose as to whether they had looked properly at the specific circumstances at hand. It concluded that even though the ordinary courts had referred to some specific facts, which allegedly justified the applicants\u2019 detention, they had failed to explain them in their decisions. Furthermore, the Regional Court had not dealt with some of the applicants\u2019 core arguments and thus had not remedied the shortcomings of the District Court\u2019s decision.<\/p>\n In view of the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention had been based on an arbitrary decision lacking proper and sufficient reasoning.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, on 30 May 2014 the applicants had been released and placed under supervised probation.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law and practice is summarised in the Court\u2019s judgment in the cases of Kuc v. Slovakia (no. 37498\/14, \u00a7 33, 25 July 2017) and Horv\u00e1th v. Slovakia (no. 5515\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 35-54, 27\u00a0November 2012).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that given their common factual and legal background the two applications should be joined, in accordance with Rule\u00a042 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the Constitutional Court\u2019s findings and arguing that no sufficient redress has been granted to them in that respect, the applicants complain that their pre-trial detention was arbitrary. The Court considers that in so far as this complaint has been substantiated, it most naturally falls to be examined under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c), which in its relevant part reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The Government relied on the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of\u00a024\u00a0September 2014, and considered that by virtue of that judgment the\u00a0applicants had lost their \u201cvictim\u201d status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. In so far as the applicants claimed to have been awarded insufficient compensation by the Constitutional Court, the Government further submitted that they had failed to\u00a0comply with the requirement of\u00a0Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention to exhaust domestic remedies, since they had failed to claim damages under the State Liability for Damage Act (Law\u00a0no.\u00a0514\/2003 Coll., as amended – \u201cthe SLD Act\u201d).<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained that they were still victims of the violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Referring to the case-law of the Court, they argued that the compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court was insufficient. According to their opinion, the claim for damages under the SLD Act would be ineffective in their case.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will first deal with the Government\u2019s non-exhaustion objection. It observes that, after having examined it in extenso, it rejected substantially the same objection as to the requirement to exhaust the remedy under the SLD Act in the Horv\u00e1th case (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 67-82) and confirmed this approach more recently in \u0160ablij v. Slovakia (no. 78129\/11, \u00a7\u00a026, 28 April 2015). It further notes that the Government provided no evidence that the national law or jurisprudence has changed from those considered in these cases. In these circumstances, the Court finds no reasons to depart from the jurisprudence cited above in the present case. The\u00a0Government\u2019s non\u2011exhaustion objection must therefore be dismissed.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that the Government\u2019s objection concerning the applicants\u2019 status as \u201cvictims\u201d is closely linked to and should be joined to the merits of the complaint (see Kormo\u0161 v. Slovakia, no.\u00a046092\/06, \u00a7 50, 8 November 2011).<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court considers that this part of the applications raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination on the merits. It\u00a0cannot therefore be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it\u00a0inadmissible has been established. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments<\/em><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the decisions of the domestic courts by which they had been deprived of liberty were arbitrary. They maintained that the just satisfaction awarded to them by the Constitutional Court was insufficient considering the harm suffered by detention.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the findings of the Constitutional Court, the\u00a0Government conceded that the applicants\u2019 complaints were not manifestly ill-founded but stated that in view of the amounts of just satisfaction awarded to the applicants at the domestic level, they were no longer victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. In that respect, they pointed to the Court\u2019s own approach in cases where it had found that the finding of a violation of applicants\u2019 rights constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage they had sustained.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is in issue, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. The compliance with national law is, however, not sufficient: Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping withthe purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. In the context of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c), the reasoning of the decision ordering detention is a\u00a0relevant factor in determining whether a\u00a0person\u2019s detention must be considered as arbitrary (for recapitulation of the applicable principles see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a072-81, 9 July 2009).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In its decision of 24 September 2014 the Constitutional Court established that the applicants\u2019 detention had been based on arbitrary decisions lacking proper and sufficient reasoning. The Court finds no reasons to reach a different conclusion and considers that the applicants\u2019 detention was not in conformity with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above conclusion, it remains to be examined whether the applicants can still claim to be victims in that respect.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an applicant is deprived of his or her victim status if the national authorities have acknowledged the violation of the applicant\u2019s rights either expressly or in substance and then afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for it (see, for example, Scordino v. Italy(no. 1) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7 193, ECHR 2006-V).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Since in its judgment of 24 September 2014 the Constitutional Court acknowledged a breach of the applicants\u2019 right under Article 5 \u00a7 1, the only issue which arises in that respect in the present case is whether the redress afforded to them can be considered as appropriate and sufficient.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0When determining such issue the Court will have regard to its own practice in similar cases. This does not imply that in situation where domestic authorities awarded a sum to the applicant with a view to redressing the breach found, such sum must correspond to the Court\u2019s award. The issue must be determined in light of all relevant circumstances including the nature of the breach and the way and speediness in which it was established by domestic authorities for which it is in the first place to ensure respect for rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. The level of just satisfaction granted at national level must nevertheless not be manifestly inadequate in the particular circumstances of the case (see\u00a0Kormo\u0161, cited above, \u00a7 73).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court\u00a0awarded each applicant EUR\u00a01,000 as just satisfaction and reimbursement of their legal costs and expenses. At the time of the Constitutional Court judgment the applicants had been released.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The first question is whether, in the circumstances, such redress was \u201cappropriate\u201d. The Court has previously found that monetary compensation for damage resulting from unlawful detention may constitute \u201cappropriate\u201d redress for an applicant who, by the time he was awarded it, was no longer in detention (see Trepashkin v. Russia, no. 36898\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 71-72, 19\u00a0July\u00a02007). The Court sees no reason to depart from such conclusion in the case under consideration. It accepts, accordingly, that the redress afforded to the applicants was appropriate.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0As to the \u201csufficiency\u201d of the redress, the Court considers that the sum awarded as just satisfaction, albeit not negligible as such, was not sufficient to provide the applicants with appropriate redress in the circumstances. When reaching this conclusion the Court had regard, in particular, to the importance of the right to liberty and security as enshrined in Article 5 \u00a7 1 and other criteria which it has applied for the determination of just-satisfaction awards under Article\u00a041 of the Convention (see Kormo\u0161, cited above, \u00a7\u00a075, with further references).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants can thus still claim to be \u201cvictims\u201d within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention in respect of the breach of their rights under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and the Government\u2019s objection in this respect must be dismissed.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed EUR\u00a03,000 each in respect of pecuniary damage for legal services connected with their representation in the pre-trial proceedings.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these claims.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that this claim concerns the costs of legal representation and as such falls to be considered under the \u201ccost and expenses\u201d head. It further observes that no further claim in respect of pecuniary damage has been raised. The Court therefore finds no call for making any award under this head.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0In their application form before the Court the applicants claimed EUR\u00a04,000 each in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage suffered as a\u00a0consequence of arbitrary detention. In their observations they referred to their previous submissions and requested the Court to award compensation for non-pecuniary damage to the amount awarded in similar cases.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that the applicants had failed to specify the exact amount of their claims and had claimed just satisfaction corresponding to the awards in similar cases. They invited the Court to award the applicants compensation in an adequate way, left to the discretion of the Court.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes the view that the applicants must have sustained non\u2011pecuniary damage as a result of the violation found which cannot be made good by the Court\u2019s finding of a violation alone. Ruling on an equitable basis and having regard to the applicant\u2019s submissions and particular circumstances of the case, it awards each applicant EUR\u00a04,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed EUR 3,000 each for legal representation in the pre-trial proceedings, including representation during their detention. They submitted receipts of 14 March 2014 issued and signed by the applicants\u2019 legal representative, addressed to Ms A. M\u00f3riov\u00e1 and Ms\u00a0M.\u00a0Bencov\u00e1, and specifying that they concerned \u201cten acts of legal defence\u201d.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these claims. They submitted that there was no indication that any of the domestic costs and expenses claimed by the applicants had been incurred for the purpose of preventing or obtaining redress for the alleged violation.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0By Rule 60 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court, itemised particulars of any claim made under Article 41 of the Convention must be submitted, together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, failing which the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part. Furthermore, costs and expenses are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see, among many other authorities, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no.\u00a055707\/00, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2009).<\/p>\n In the present case, apart from specifying that the legal costs in question concerned \u201cten acts of legal defence\u201d, the applicants\u2019 claim provides no further details, in particular none showing that the legal service in question was provided with a view to prevent or redress the violation found. Accordingly, the claim has to be dismissed.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Decides, unanimously, to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Joins, unanimously, the Government\u2019s objection under Article 34 of the Convention to the merits of the applications and rejects it;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Declares, unanimously, the applications admissible;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, unanimously,<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, EUR\u00a04,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a\u00a0rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses, by six votes to one,the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2019, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Vincent A. De Gaetano ________________<\/p>\n In accordance with Article\u00a045 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention and Rule\u00a074 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Serghides is annexed to this judgment.<\/p>\n V.D.G. PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0My only disagreement with the judgment is that I am unable to reject the applicants\u2019 claim for costs in whole, as the majority did.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, Rule 60 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court provides that \u201c[t]he applicant must submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents\u201d.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0However, in the event of non-compliance with the above requirement, paragraph 3 of the same Rule provides that \u201cthe Chamber may reject the claims in whole or in part\u201d. The use of the word \u201cmay\u201d in the above sentence is not of a mandatory nature as the word \u201cshall\u201d would have been, had it been used instead. So, in my humble view, in a case where the applicant fails to submit itemised particulars, the Court\u2019s discretion is not confined only to rejecting a claim in whole or in part but also extends to not rejecting it at all. It all depends on the particular circumstances of a case how the Court can exercise its discretion and deal with the issue of legal costs.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0In their written observations of 27 July 2017 (p. 3), the applicants argue the following in relation to their claims for legal costs:<\/p>\n \u201cIn relation to satisfaction for pecuniary damage for legal services connected with representation of both claimants in pre-trial proceeding (police investigation) including representation during the stay in custody, we paid EUR 3,000 each, what is supported by attached copies of relevant documents.\u201d<\/p>\n The relevant receipts of payment indicate that they concern \u201cten acts of legal defence\u201d. It is clear from these documents and the statement in the applicants\u2019 observation that each of the applicants actually paid his lawyer the amount of EUR 3,000. The respondent Government, in the last paragraph of their observations to the Court dated 8 September 2017, admit that the applicants \u201csubstantiated\u201d the claim for the reimbursement of their legal costs and expenses \u201cby the annexed voucher\u201d.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0To my mind, it is clear from the applicants\u2019 above statement in their observations, and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that the amount of EUR 3,000 paid by each applicant for legal costs related to legal services which were provided with the view to prevent or redress the violation found.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The said statement of the applicants in their written observations, together with the attachment of copies of the relevant receipts and the content of these receipts, cannot be said to be in full but only in partial compliance with the provisions of Rule 60 \u00a7 2. Though there is no itemisation of particulars of costs as required by Rule 60 \u00a7 2, the two receipts do contain some description, both numerical and substantial, of the legal services rendered, i.e. \u201cten\u201d \u201cacts of legal defence\u201d. In addition, in the statement in the applicants\u2019 observations there is a further description of the legal services rendered, that is to say the \u201crepresentation of both claimants in pre-trial proceedings (police investigation) including representation during the stay in custody\u201d.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Hence, I would not exercise my discretion so strictly, as the majority did by rejecting the whole of the applicants\u2019 claim in respect of costs, also having regard to the fact that this amount of EUR 3,000 was actually paid by each applicant to his lawyer. I would exercise my discretion more leniently, and on a reasonable and equitable basis I would award EUR 2,000 to each applicant plus tax.<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
\nJ.S.P.<\/p>\n