FIFTH SECTION
\nCASE OF GORKOVLYUK AND KAGANOVSKIY v. UKRAINE
\n(Application no. 49785\/06)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT STRASBOURG This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n In the case of Gorkovlyuk and Kaganovskiy v. Ukraine,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary, President, Having deliberated in private on 11 September 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 49785\/06) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by Ukrainian nationals, Ms Irina Valeryevna Gorkovlyuk (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) and Mr\u00a0Stanislav Yulyevich Kaganovskiy (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d), on 1\u00a0December 2006.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by Mr Iftikhar Ahmad Khattak, a\u00a0lawyer practising in Odessa. The UkrainianGovernment (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, most recently Mr\u00a0Ivan Lishchyna, of the Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained in particular under Article 3 of the Convention of the lack of an effective domestic investigation into her allegation of ill-treatment by the police. She next complained under Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 about the length of criminal and civil proceedings against her. Furthermore, the first applicant complained under Article 2 of Protocol No.\u00a04 about the length of an obligation not to leave her town of residence which had been imposed on her. Both applicants also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the police seizure of the second applicant\u2019s property and his unsuccessful attempts to get it back.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 September 2010 the first applicant\u2019s above complaints under Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 were communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 March 2017 the Vice-President of the Section decided, under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Rules of Court, that the parties should be invited to submit further written observations on the admissibility and merits of the first applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, as well as on the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were born in 1973 and 1970 respectively, and live in Odessa. They are a married couple.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0At the time of the events the first applicant was an accountant in a private food-processing company (\u201ccompany Y.\u201d). Her mother, N., was its director and owner. The second applicant was a private entrepreneur supplying company Y. with raw materials in exchange for processed foodstuffs.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Events of 24 July 2001 and related facts<\/strong><\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 July 2001 the Odessa Prymorskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Prymorskyy prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) opened a criminal case against the officials of company Y. on suspicion of forgery of quality certificates for the company\u2019s goods.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On the following day the police conducted a search on the company\u2019s premises, as a result of which they seized a considerable volume of foodstuffs belonging to the second applicant.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0There was an altercation between the first applicant and the police: she attempted to leave, but several officers stopped her when she was already in her car, dragged her out and handcuffed her (see paragraphs\u00a016, 31, 35 and 38 below for additional factual details). As the first applicant lost control of her vehicle, it collided with a car parked nearby, which belonged to a private person, G.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 May 2002 the Odessa Prymorskyy District Court (\u201cthe\u00a0Prymorskyy Court\u201d) quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 23\u00a0July 2001 (see paragraph 8above) as unlawful.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints raised at domestic level regarding the alleged ill\u2011treatment of the first applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 July 2001 N. (the first applicant\u2019s mother and the director of company Y. \u2013 see paragraph 7 above) complained to the Prymorskyy prosecutor\u2019s office about the events of 24 July 2001. She submitted in particular that the first applicant had been beaten by the police.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On the following day N. sent a similar complaint to the city and regional prosecuting authorities, as well as the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 July 2001 the first applicant complained to the Prymorskyy Court about her alleged ill-treatment on 24 July 2001 at the time of her arrest. She asked the court to declare the officers\u2019 actions unlawful and to oblige them to make a public apology to her.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 December 2001 the Prymorskyy Court forwarded the above complaint to the Odessa Suvorivskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Suvorivskyy prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) for investigation.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 December 2001 the Suvorivskyy prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of the constituent elements of a criminal offence in their actions. The prosecutor gave the following reasonsfor that decision. The first applicant had arrived at company Y. during the police search and had tried to leave the premises before the search had been completed. She had \u201cdeliberately inflicted minor bodily injuries on [two police officers] who had tried to stop her illegal actions\u201d. Furthermore,a medical examination of the first applicant of 25\u00a0July 2001 had documented in particular an abrasion below her right eye, a bruise on her chest and a bruise on her left thigh. However, \u201cshe had sustained those injuries in circumstances which [she was] concealing\u201d. The first applicant had also had bruises on her wrists and arms. Those had resulted from her forceful removal from the car and her subsequent handcuffing, both of which were deemed to be legitimate restraint measures. The prosecutor observed that the first applicant\u2019s arrest by the police and the events thereafter had been videorecorded, and that the videotape confirmed the police officers\u2019 account.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 December 2001 the first applicant received a copy of the above ruling.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0She challenged the ruling before the Odessa Suvorivskyy District Court (\u201cthe Suvorivskyy Court\u201d). As confirmed by a postal receipt, the first applicant sent the above complaint on 3 January 2002 and the court received it on 4\u00a0January 2002.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 January 2002 the Suvorivskyy Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint without examining it on the grounds that it had been introduced out of time. According to the court\u2019s ruling, she had lodged it on 9 January 2002[1], whereas she had had to do so within seven days of 26\u00a0December 2001.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 January 2002 the first applicant appealed against the above ruling to the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal. She submitted that the correct date on which she had lodged her complaint was 3 January 2002[2] and she had not missed the seven-day time-limit, given that there had been official holidays during which neither the post office nor the court had been open.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 February 2004 the first applicant enquired with the Suvorivskyy Court about the progress of her appeal. In accordance with the relevant procedure, she had submitted the appealvia the court\u2019s registry and the registry had been responsible forforwarding it to the appellate court.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 April 2004 the President of the Suvorivskyy Court replied to the first applicant that her appeal had indeed been received on 21\u00a0January 2002. However, the clerk who had registered it had been dismissed in February 2003. Atthe time of writing, there were no records of the first applicant\u2019s appeal in the court\u2019s information system.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 July 2004 the first applicant asked the Suvorivskyy Court to restore the proceedings concerning her appeal of 21 January 2002 which had apparently been mislaid. She received the reply that such an action was impossible, given that there was no appeal before the court.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 April 2005 the first applicant again challenged the prosecutor\u2019s ruling of 20 December 2001 before the Suvorivskyy Court.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The case file does not contain any further information in that regard.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against the first applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 September 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted against the first applicant on suspicion of having inflicted minor bodily injuries on the police officers.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 December 2001 an obligation not to leave her town of residence was imposed on the first applicant as a preventive measure pending her trial.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 March 2002 the investigator rejected a request by the first applicant for a forensic medical examination to establish the seriousness of her injuries sustained on 24 July 2001. The reason for the rejection was that on 20 December 2001 the prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings regarding the matter (see paragraph\u00a016above).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case was referred to court for trial.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Suvorivskyy Court adjourned hearings on several occasions owing to the absence of the first applicant and the absence of the victims and witnesses. One of the adjournments, which lasted almost eight months, was at the first applicant\u2019s request,because she was pregnant.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 September 2004 the Suvorivskyy Court found the first applicant guilty of deliberately inflicting minor bodily injuries on law\u2011enforcement officials and sentenced her to one year\u2019s imprisonment, suspended for one year. The court relied in particular on the videotape of the events of 24 July 2001, as well as reports on the officers\u2019medical examination of 25 July 2001 which documented the injuries which they had possibly sustained a day earlier. One of them had a bite wound on his right wrist possibly originating from a human bite, and an abrasion on his right hand that might have resulted from scratching by handcuffs. Another officer had abrasions on his face and right arm possibly resulting from being scratched with fingernails. The preventive measure in respect of the first applicant \u2013 the obligation not to leave town \u2013 remained the same.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant appealed. She submitted in particular that the trial court had failed to examine her own allegation of ill-treatment by the police. She noted in that regard that, as shown on the videotape, at 2.30\u00a0p.m. she had had no visible injuries, whereas at 4.10\u00a0p.m. on that day there had been a bruise below her eye.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 September 2004 the President of the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal acknowledged the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant in a letter sent to her following her complaints in that regard. The letter stated that the judge of the first-instance court who was dealing with her case had been disciplined in that regard.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 November 2004 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 17 September 2004(see paragraph 31 above) and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 July 2005 the Suvorivskyy Court acquitted the first applicant. It held that, as indicated by the case-file material, the search conducted oncompany Y.\u2019s premises on 24 July 2001 had been unlawful (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a011 above). Furthermore, the police officers involved had been wearing plain clothes. Accordingly, the first applicant\u2019s actions had been legitimate and had aimed to protect her property and reputation. The court also lifted the preventive measure in respect of the first applicant.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 December 2005 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor and quashed the judgment of 28 July 2005,remitting the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 January 2006 the Suvorivskyy Court started a retrial.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 October 2008 the Suvorivskyy Court acquitted the first applicant once again and lifted her obligation not to leave town. The Suvorivskyy Court\u2019s reasoning was similar to that in its decision of 28 July 2005. It further stated that the police officers had had no order to prevent anybody from leaving the company\u2019s premises and that their violence towards the first applicant had been unlawful and arbitrary.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On the same day the Suvorivskyy Court also delivered a separate ruling stating that there had been a number of violations of the domestic legislation and the Convention in the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of that ruling.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 February 2009 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 10 October 2008 and the separate ruling.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 January 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions in the retrial proceedings.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Civil proceedings against the first applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 September 2001 G., with whose car the first applicant\u2019s car had collided on 24 July 2001 (see paragraph 10above), lodged a civil claim for damages against the first applicant.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0On three occasions the appellate court remitted the case to the first\u2011instance court for fresh examination. In the fourth round of the proceedings, on 2\u00a0December 2008, the Suvorivskyy Court allowed G.\u2019s claim in part,awarding her an amount corresponding to 420 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and about EUR 50 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by the first applicant.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 February and 7\u00a0May 2009 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively upheld that judgment.<\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0Commercial proceedings brought by the second applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0After the seizure of the foodstuffs on 24 July 2001, the prosecuting authorities transferred them to a private company, D. (\u201ccompany\u00a0D.\u201d), for storage purposes.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0Following several unsuccessful complaints to the prosecuting authorities in respect of the search and seizure, on an unspecified date the second applicant brought a commercial claim against company D.,seeking the return of his property, as well as compensation for lost profit.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 January 2002 the Odessa Regional Commercial Court allowed his claim in part and ordered company D., which did not dispute having received the foodstuffs, to return the second applicant\u2019s property to him. However, as the bailiff was unable to find any such property at the premises of company D., on 14 February 2002 the same court changed the mode of enforcement in respect of its judgment and ordered the company to pay the second applicant 102,535Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH \u2013about EUR 22,000 at the time).<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 April 2002 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the defendant in part and deleted certain foodstuffs from a list referred to in the judgment of 18 January 2002. Apparently, the appellate court was not aware of the ruling of 14\u00a0February 2002.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0On 29\u00a0May 2002 the Higher Commercial Court quashed the lower courts\u2019 decisions and rejected the second applicant\u2019s claim.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 June 2002 the second applicant applied to the Higher Commercial Court for a review of its ruling of 29 May 2002 on the basis of newly discovered circumstances, namely the Prymorskyy Court\u2019s decision of 24 May 2002 recognising that the criminal investigation against the company Y. officials had been unlawful (see paragraph\u00a011 above). The Higher Commercial Court referred that application to the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal for examination.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0On 25\u00a0November 2002 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal quashed the Higher Commercial Court\u2019s ruling of 29\u00a0May 2002. It held that the impugned seizure had taken place within the criminal proceedings, whose institution had been recognised as unlawful. Furthermore, the police had had no procedural documents authorising them to seize the goods in question. It had also been established that the withheld property had never been used as material evidence in criminal proceedings;nor had the assetsbeen frozen or transferred to company D. to secure a civil claim. Lastly, the court stated that company D. had had no legal basis to sell those goods.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 April 2003 the bailiff\u2019s service transferred to the second applicant UAH 4,404 which it had recovered from company D. in relation to the enforcement of the ruling of 14 February 2002.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 March 2004 the bailiff\u2019s service returned the writ of enforcement to the court, as it was impossible to implement it, owing to the absence of any funds or property at company D.<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 April 2002 the second applicant complained to the Odessa Regional Commercial Court of the bailiff\u2019s inactivity as regards enforcing the ruling of 14 February 2002 (see paragraph 47above).<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 June 2003 the Odessa Regional Commercial Court found that there had indeed been an unlawful omission on the part of the bailiff\u2019s service:the service had not taken any steps to ensure the enforcement.<\/p>\n F.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings against the bailiff brought by the applicants<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 December 2004 the applicants brought a claim against the bailiff\u2019s service, seeking compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 December 2005 the Odessa Kyivskyy District Court ordered the bailiff\u2019s service to pay the second applicant UAH\u00a098,131in respect of pecuniary damage (the unenforced part of the ruling of 14\u00a0February 2002 \u2013 see paragraphs47 and 52 above). The court also ordered the defendant to pay both applicants UAH\u00a030,000 (about EUR\u00a05,000) jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and rejected the first applicant\u2019s claim for pecuniary damages.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0On\u00a021\u00a0June 2006 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the Odessa Kyivskyy District Court\u2019s decision of 26 December 2005. It rejected the first applicant\u2019s claim and discontinued the proceedings brought by the second applicant, holding that his claim fell to be examined by commercial courts.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants appealed on points of law to the Higher Administrative Court, which started the proceedings on 24\u00a0March 2008.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants\u2019 submissions of 7 September 2017, they did not receive any information from the Higher Administrative Court about further developments in those proceedings.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Applicable legislation<\/strong><\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1960), as in force at the material time, can be found in the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893\/03, \u00a7 45, 15 May 2012).<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the Law on the procedure for compensation for damage caused to citizens by the unlawful acts of bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigation authorities, prosecutor\u2019s offices and courts of 1 December 1994 (\u201cthe Compensation Act\u201d), as worded at the material time,read as follows:<\/p>\n Section 1<\/p>\n \u201cUnder the provisions of this Law, a person is entitled to compensation for damage caused by:<\/p>\n 1)\u00a0\u00a0unlawful conviction, [the] unlawful bringing of criminal charges …<\/p>\n In the cases referred to in subsection 1 of this section, the damage caused shall be compensated for fully regardless of the guilt of officials of the bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigation authorities, prosecutor\u2019s offices and courts.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 2<\/p>\n \u201cThe right to compensation for damage in the amount and in the manner established by this Law shall arise in cases of:<\/p>\n acquittal by a court; …\u201d<\/p>\n Section 3<\/p>\n \u201cIn the cases referred to in section 1 of this Act, the applicant shall be compensated for:<\/p>\n 1)\u00a0\u00a0earnings and other income lost as a result of the unlawful actions; … and<\/p>\n 5)\u00a0\u00a0non-pecuniary damage.\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Domestic case-law cited by the Government<\/strong><\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted to the Court the following domestic judicial decisions which they considered to be of relevance.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 July 2006 the Krasnyy Lyman Town Court allowed a civil claim brought by an individual against the State Treasury and the local police department on account of his unlawful criminal prosecution. The court noted that during the criminal proceedings against the claimant, which had lasted almost four years and six months and had been dropped for want of evidence of his guilt, he had been under an obligation not to leave town. The court awarded him UAH 20,062, which was equivalent to about EUR\u00a03,000, in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On\u00a016\u00a0October 2006 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld that judgment.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 November 2007 the Telmanove Town Court allowed a similar claim for damages from an individual on account of criminal proceedings against him and an obligation not to leave town imposed on him in the context of those proceedings which had lasted a year and two months. Like in the case cited above, the criminal proceedings had been dropped at the pre-trial investigation stage for lack of evidence of the person\u2019s guilt. The court\u2019s award in respect of non-pecuniary damage was UAH 14,000 (about EUR 1,900 at the time).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE FIRST APPLICANT<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that there had been no effective domestic investigation into her allegation of ill-treatment by police officers on 24\u00a0July 2001. Although she relied on Article 13, the Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, according to the information provided by the Suvorivskyy prosecutor\u2019s office, it had not registered any complaints from the first applicant in 2001 as regards her alleged ill\u2011treatment on 24 July 2001.The Government therefore asserted that the first applicant had not exhausted available domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained that she had complained to various authorities on many occasions.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued, in their additional observations, that the first applicant had failed to comply with the six-month rule laid down in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. According to them, had the first applicant considered that she had no effective domestic remedies to exhaust, she should have lodged the complaint with the Court within six months of the date of the incident, 24 July 2001.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant did not comment on that issue.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0Having regardto the case-file material (see, in particular, paragraphs\u00a012-14 above), the Court accepts the first applicant\u2019s argument that she complained about the incident to various authorities and can be said to have taken sufficient steps at domestic level prior to raising her complaint before this Court.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection based on the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s objection based on the first applicant\u2019s failure to respect the six-month time-limit, the Court observes that it held in the case of Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no.\u00a023893\/03, \u00a7 97, 15 May 2012) that the procedures of appeal to hierarchically superior prosecutors and to the courts were not capable of providing adequate redress in respect of complaints of both ill-treatment by the police and ineffective investigation. At the same time, the Court considered it reasonable for the applicant in that case to have waited for the completion of his trial prior to raising an ill-treatment complaint before the Court, where the domestic courts had examined that complaint on the merits in the course of his trial (ibid., \u00a7\u00a099).<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the first applicant raised the allegation of her ill\u2011treatment during her trial. Even though that complaint was eventually not examined on merits, it was so closely linked to the charges against her that she can hardly be reproached for having tried that remedy before complaining to the Court. In any event, the first applicant did not wait for her trial to be completed (which was on 19\u00a0January 2010), and lodged her application on 1\u00a0December 2006, once it must have become clear to her that no effective domestic investigation into her ill-treatment allegation could be ensured within those proceedings. Accordingly, the Court does not see any valid reasons for considering this complaint belated, and also dismisses the Government\u2019s objection based on those grounds.<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicantmaintained that there had been no assessment of the police officers\u2019 violence against her, and that they had never been punished. She found it particularly unjust that, instead of ensuring an effective investigation into her arguable complaint of ill-treatment, the authorities had focused their efforts on her own criminal prosecution in respect of the same factual events.<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit any observations on the merits of this complaint.<\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he or she has been seriously ill-treated by police in breach of Article 3, that provision requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, 28\u00a0October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 31, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). The minimum standards of effectiveness defined by the Court\u2019s case-law include the requirements that the investigation must be independent, impartial and subject to public scrutiny, and that the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness (see, for example, Menesheva v.\u00a0Russia, no. 59261\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2006\u2011III).<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that on the day after the incident the first applicant underwent a medical examination which documented numerous bruises on her face and body. Shortly thereafter she complained of her ill-treatment by the police to various authorities. Furthermore, the authorities had at their disposal a video recording of the events of 24 July 2001, from which it was clear that prior to the incident the first applicant had had no injuries, and that thereafter she had had a bruise on her face (see paragraphs 16 and 32 above).<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations provided a sufficient basis for the authorities to consider the first applicant\u2019s complaint \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 3, thus requiring them to carry out an effective investigation.<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0It was not disputed that there had been an altercation between the first applicant and the police, and that both she and two officers had sustained some bodily injuries in the course of that altercation. However, it appears that only the officers were treated as victims of that incident, not the first applicant. Thus, the Court observes that on 20 December 2001 the Suvorivskyy prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police following the first applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment,on the grounds that the application of restraint measures in respect of the first applicant had been justified by her own illegal and aggressive behaviour (see paragraph\u00a016 above). As regards the first applicant\u2019s injuries which could not be explained by her forceful removal from the car and handcuffing, the prosecutor merely stated that she had concealed the circumstances in which she had sustained them.<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0There appears to be no indication in the above-mentioned prosecutor\u2019s ruling that any investigative measures wereundertaken to establish the truth and bring those responsible to account. Although the police officers had been in plain clothes at the time of the incident and had had no arrest warrant for the first applicant,the legitimacy of their using force towards her was never questioned.<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further takes note of various procedural obstacles and omissions on the part of the authorities which prevented the first applicant from challenging the prosecutor\u2019s refusal to initiate criminal proceedings before the courts (see paragraphs 17-24 above).<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0It is noteworthy that the authorities did eventually conclude that the first applicant had simply been protecting her property and reputation from unlawful actions of the police (see paragraphs35and 38above). However, notwithstanding that conclusion, the first applicant was an accused person in those proceedings. Moreover, it took the authorities nine and a half years to reach that conclusion, and it had no bearing as regards the liability of the police in respect of the first applicant\u2019s arguable claim of ill-treatment.<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there was no effective domestic investigation into the first applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment by the police.<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb in respect of the first applicant.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE FIRST APPLICANT<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings against her had been incompatible with the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement enshrined in Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the first applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to her, as she had not claimed damages under the Compensation Act (see paragraph 62 above). They argued that such an action was effective both in theory and practice, and submitted copies of several decisions by which the domestic courts had awarded private persons compensation for the unlawful institution of criminal proceedings and imposition of obligations not to abscond (see\u00a0paragraphs\u00a063-65above).<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicantmaintained that she had not had any effective domestic remedy to exhaust.<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the decisive question in assessing the effectiveness of a remedy concerning a complaint about the length of proceedings is whether an applicant can raise this complaint before domestic courts by claiming specific redress; in other words, whether a remedy exists that could answer his or her complaints by providing direct and speedy redress (see Loshenko v. Ukraine, no. 11447\/04, \u00a7\u00a028, 11\u00a0December 2008). The Court has also held that a remedy is \u201ceffective\u201d if it can be used either to expedite a decision by the courts dealing with the case, or to provide the litigant with adequate redress for delays that have already occurred (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 157-59, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XI).<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0Applying the above principles to the instant case, the Court observes that the domestic compensation procedure referred to by the Government could not provide for the acceleration of the pending judicial proceedings. Nor did it specifically provide for compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage caused by the unreasonable length of proceedings. Lastly, the domestic decisions submitted by the Government did not concern explicit complaints about the length of proceedings (see and compare with Nakonechnyy v.\u00a0Ukraine [Committee], no.17262\/07, \u00a7\u00a018, 26\u00a0January 2012).<\/p>\n 92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further refers to its earlier findings in other Ukrainian cases about the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for complaints in respect of the length of criminal proceedings (seeMerit v. Ukraine, no. 66561\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 78-79, 30 March 2004).<\/p>\n 93.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers that it has not been sufficientlyestablished that recourse to the remedy suggested by the Government would have been capable of affording redress to the first applicant in relation to her complaint concerning the length of the proceedings in her case. The Court therefore rejects the Government\u2019s objection.<\/p>\n 94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 95.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant argued that the length of the proceedings, which had been marked by two remittals for retrial, had been unreasonable. She further observed that, although she had eventually been acquitted, the authorities had kept her in a state of uncertainty as to her fate for over eight years, and for almost that entire period she had been under an obligation not to leave town.<\/p>\n 96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the length of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant had been reasonable. They observed that several adjournments in those proceedings had been attributable to the first applicant\u2019s pregnancy.<\/p>\n 97.\u00a0\u00a0According to the well-established principles of the Court\u2019s case-law, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities,P\u00e9lissier and Sassi v.\u00a0France [GC], no. 25444\/94, \u00a7 67, ECHR 1999\u2011II).<\/p>\n 98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the leading case of Merit, (cited above, \u00a7\u00a076), it found a violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the unreasonable length of criminal proceedings. There seem to be no reasons for the Court to reach a different conclusion in the circumstances of the present case. Thus, the major delay in the proceedings \u2013 of over seven years \u2013 was caused by the remittal of the case for retrial on two occasions (see, in particular, paragraphs 31 and 34-38 above).<\/p>\n 99.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant, on account of the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against her.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No.\u00a01 TO THE CONVENTIONIN RESPECT OF THE SECOND APPLICANT<\/p>\n 100.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant complainedof a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they were not able to formulate their position on the admissibility of this part of the application, given that all the official records of relevance had been destroyed after the expiry of the statutory period for their storage.<\/p>\n 102.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant maintained that the interference with his property rights was sufficiently established by the documents already available in the case file.<\/p>\n 103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the second applicant\u2019s complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits.<\/p>\n 104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this part of the application is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 105.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant alleged that the State was responsible for a series of unlawful acts and omissions violating his property rights. In that connection, he referred to the seizure of the foodstuffs belonging to him on 24\u00a0July 2001, their transfer to a private company, the non-enforcement of the judgment in his favour against that company, owing to unlawful omissions on the part of the bailiff\u2019s service, and the failure of the domestic courts to adjudicate on his claim for damages against the bailiff\u2019s service.<\/p>\n 106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit any observations on the merits of this complaint, relying on the fact that they had no documents of relevance in their possession (see also paragraph 101 above).<\/p>\n 107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No. 1 is that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful: the second sentence of the first paragraph authorises a deprivation of possessions only \u201csubject to the conditions provided for by law\u201d, and the second paragraph recognises that States have the right to control the use of property by enforcing \u201claws\u201d (see Broniowski v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 31443\/96, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2004\u2011V).<\/p>\n 108.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that it was sufficiently established by the domestic courts that the seizure of the second applicant\u2019s property by the police and its transfer to a private company had been unlawful (see paragraph 51 above). Likewise, it was acknowledged by the domestic courts that the second applicant\u2019s inability to retrieve his goods or recover their monetary value was attributable to the State authorities, namely the bailiff\u2019s service (see, in particular, paragraph 55 above).<\/p>\n 109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is mindful of the absence of any documents in the case file as regards the outcome of the proceedings for damages brought by the second applicant against the bailiff\u2019s service. According to the second applicant, on 7 September 2017 \u2013 the date of his submissions to the Court \u2013 he had not heard from the Higher Administrative Court since 24\u00a0March 2008 (see paragraph 60 above). The Court also finds it regrettable that the Government did not succeed in establishing whether there had been any further developments in those proceedings.<\/p>\n 110.\u00a0\u00a0However, regardless of the eventual outcome of the proceedings in question, the Court takes note of the strenuous efforts made by the second applicant before various authorities for about six and a half years (calculated with reference to the last known event, namely the opening of the proceedings before the Higher Administrative Court on 24 March 2008) and possibly longer. Moreover, as rightly pointed out by the second applicant, the State\u2019s interference with his property rights was not confined to the unlawful seizure of his goods, but also the arbitrary transfer of the goods to a private company, as well as the failure of the bailiff\u2019s service to take any measures to recover the value of his property from that company.<\/p>\n 111.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to find a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the second applicant.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION AND ITS PROTOCOLS<\/p>\n 112.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant also complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 thatthe length of the civil proceedings against her had been unreasonable. Furthermore, she complained under Article 2 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a04 about the length of the obligation not to leave town which had been imposed on her as a preventive measure in the criminal proceedings against her. Lastly, she complained that the alleged interference with her husband\u2019s property rights had breached her own rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, given that they were a married couple. The Court communicated those complaints to the respondent Government.<\/p>\n 113.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings under Article 3 and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in relation to the first applicant, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to the second applicant (see\u00a0paragraphs 86, 99 and 111 above), the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raisedin the present application, and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the above-mentioned complaints (see, for example, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014).<\/p>\n 114.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant additionally complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention of the unfairness of the criminal and civil proceedings against her. Furthermore, she complained under Article 5 of Protocol No.\u00a07 that the courts\u2019 rejection of her claims in the proceedings initiated by her husband had been in breach of the principle of equality of spouses. The second applicant additionally complained that the obligation not to leave town which had been imposed on his wife had negatively affected his freedom of movement, and had thus breached his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No.\u00a04.<\/p>\n 115.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that the above issues do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 116.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 117.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed 101,105 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.The second applicant claimed EUR 80,284 in respect of pecuniary damage. This amount comprised: EUR 20,923 (equivalent to 98,131 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in 2002 \u2013 see paragraph 57 above), and EUR\u00a059,361 (estimated lost profit). The second applicant also claimed EUR\u00a060,658 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 118.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the above claims as exorbitant and unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 119.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any documents regarding the outcome of the proceedings for damages brought by the second applicant against the bailiff\u2019s service (see paragraphs 59-60 above), the Court cannot discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged.<\/p>\n 120.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court considers that the applicants must have suffered distress and anxiety on account of the violations found. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, it awardsthe first applicant EUR 10,000 and the second applicant EUR\u00a05,000.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 121.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantsalso claimed costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts, without specifying theamount claimed. Furthermore, they claimed an award equal to 3% of the above just satisfaction claims in respect of their legal representation in the proceedings before the Court. In support of this claim, they submitted a copy of a legal services agreement concluded with Mr Khattak on 5 October 2010, in accordance with which theyhad undertaken to pay him3% of the just satisfaction awarded to them by the Court in this case.<\/p>\n 122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those claims as unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 123.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Bottazzi v. Italy [GC], no. 34884\/97, \u00a7\u00a030, ECHR 1999\u2011V).<\/p>\n 124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants concluded an agreement with their lawyer concerning his fees which is comparable to a contingency fee agreement. Such an agreement, whereby a lawyer\u2019s client agrees to pay the lawyer, in fees, a certain percentage of the sum, if any, awarded to the litigant by the court \u2013 an agreement giving rise to obligations solely between lawyer and client \u2013 cannot bind the Court, which must assess the level of costs and expenses to be awarded with reference not only to whether the costs have actually been incurred, but also to whether they have been reasonably incurred (seeIatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no.\u00a031107\/96, \u00a7 55, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XI).<\/p>\n 125.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing principles, and having regard to the case-file material, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 300 to the applicants jointly in respect of their legal representation before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them on that amount.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the first applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention of the lack of an effective domestic investigation into her allegation of ill-treatment by the police, her complaint under Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention about the length of the criminal proceedings against her, and the second applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the violation of his property rights admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that it is not necessary to examine the admissibility and merits of the first applicant\u2019s complaints under: Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 about the length of the civil proceedings against her; Article 2 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a04 about the length of the obligation not to leave town; and Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 in respect of the police seizure of her husband\u2019s property;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb in respect of the first applicant;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant, on account of the lengthy criminal proceedings against her;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the second applicant;<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the first applicant, Ms\u00a0Irina Valeryevna Gorkovlyuk, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the second applicant, Mr\u00a0Stanislav Yulyevich Kaganovskiy, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (iii) EUR 300 (three hundred euros) jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of legal costs before the Court;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses the remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 October 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Milan Bla\u0161ko\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary ______________<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0Rectified on 19 November 2018: the date was \u201c9 January 2001\u201d.
\nThis version was rectified on 19 November 2018<\/em>
\nunder Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.<\/em><\/p>\n
\n4 October 2018<\/p>\n
\nL\u04d9tif H\u00fcseynov,
\nLado Chanturia, judges,
\nand Milan Bla\u0161ko, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
\n2.\u00a0Rectified on 19 November 2018: the date was \u201c3 January 2001\u201d.<\/p>\n