FOURTH SECTION
\nCASE OF KRIVOLAPOV v. UKRAINE
\n(Application no. 5406\/07)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n2 October 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n02\/01\/2019<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Krivolapov v. Ukraine,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, President, Having deliberated in private on 4 September 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 5406\/07) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Igor AleksandrovichKrivolapov (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 25\u00a0April 2007.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr T.O. Kalmykov, a lawyer practising in Kharkiv. The Ukrainian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, most recently Mr\u00a0I.\u00a0Lishchyna, from the Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been detained in poor conditions, that his detention had been unlawful and lengthy and that he had had no enforceable right to compensation in that regard. He furthermore complained that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been unreasonable and that his right to the presumption of innocence had not been respected.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 February 2017 the above complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible,pursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Kramatorsk.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Background facts<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0In July 2001 a journalist, Mr Igor Aleksandrov, was beaten to death by unknown persons in the premises of the local television companyin Slovyansk, which he headed. He was the author of a number of television programmes on corruption and organised crime in the region.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0The above tragic event sparked a broad public outcry.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0In August 2001 the police arrested a certain V. on suspicion of Mr\u00a0Aleksandrov\u2019s murder. V. was homeless and had no means of subsistence, being newly released from prison, where he had served a sentence for theft. Although he confessed to the crime in question many times, his statements lacked coherence. Eventually, he mentioned that he had entered into an agreement with a certain B., also a former convict, who had promised him a car and an apartment in exchange for his confessing to the journalist\u2019s murder. B.\u00a0himself had been acting upon the instructions of certain law\u2011enforcement officials. He had assured V. that the latter would be taken care of in prison and that his term of imprisonment would be minimal.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that B. went missing in October 2001.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0In May 2002 the first-instance court acquitted and released V. In July 2002 he died, supposedly of heart failure. Subsequently, a criminal investigation was launched into V.\u2019s suspected poisoning. Its outcome is not clear from the case-file materials.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were initiated in respect of the assumed murder of B., even though his body had not been found.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0At the time of the events the applicant held the post of deputy head of the Kramatorsk City Police Department.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 January 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant in respect of a suspected abuse of office having led to grave consequences. Namely, he was suspected of having falsified the criminal case against V. According to the prosecution, the applicant, aiming to avoid responsibility for the failure to uncover the journalist\u2019s murder, had instructed B. to find a vulnerable person who would agree to confess to the crime in question in exchange for remuneration. Accordingly, B. had convinced V. to play that role. The applicant was also suspected of having instructed his subordinates to either bribe or coerce a taxi driver into committing perjury with a view to his acting as a witness against V.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 February 2004 the applicant was arrested as a suspect.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 February 2004 the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (\u201cthe Pecherskyy Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody pending trial. His pre-trial detention was subsequently extended on many occasions.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On various dates in 2004 further criminal cases were opened against the applicant and other persons in respect of: several counts of suspected kidnapping and aggravated murder and a further episode of abuse of office (selling a car which had been impounded as material evidence). Furthermore, a criminal case was opened against the applicant in respect of B.\u2019s murder. All the cases in question were joined to the one initiated earlier.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0During his questioning on 8 November 2004 the applicant confessed to having falsified, together with another police officer, the criminal case against V., as well as to having been involved in V.\u2019s poisoning and to having murdered B.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 November 2004 the applicant retracted his statements of 8\u00a0November 2004 and lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, submitting that he had been coerced into self-incrimination under psychological pressure.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 April 2005 the Supreme Court extended the term of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to eighteen months (until 10 August 2005) in the light of the particular complexity of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 July 2005 the pre-trial investigation was declared completed. The investigator also made a formal declaration that the case file was available for inspection by the accused and their lawyers.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 July 2005 the applicant was given access to the case file.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 August 2005 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Kyiv Court\u201d) extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to twenty months (until 10\u00a0October 2005) on the grounds that the applicant and his lawyers had not finished studying the case file, which consisted of over a hundred volumes. The applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted that the extension was not justified as, in any event, they had not received access to all the case-file materials. His argument was dismissed. The court based its ruling on Articles 156 and 165\u20113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph61below).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 October and 8 December 2005, and on 6 March and 7\u00a0April 2006, the Kyiv Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, respectively, to twenty-two, twenty-five, twenty-six and twenty-seven months (until 10 May 2006) on the same grounds as before.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 April 2006 the case file was sent to the Supreme Court for it to determine the court which would conduct the trial.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 May 2006 the Supreme Court referred the case to the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Zaporizhzhya Court\u201d).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 September 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Court held a preparatory hearing. It decided to keep the earlier chosen preventive measure in respect of the applicant.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 June 2008 the trial court allowed a request by the prosecutor for the charge regardingB.\u2019s murder to be severed into a separate set of proceedings. That part of the case was sent to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for additional investigation. There is no information on any further developments in those proceedings or their outcome.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 December 2008 the trial court severed into a separate set of proceedings another charge against the applicant \u2013concerning suspected abuse of office leading to grave consequences (the falsification of the criminal case against V.) \u2013 and remitted it to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The remaining charges against the applicant, in respect of which the Zaporizhzhya Court continued his trial, concerned several counts of kidnapping and murder, as well as abuse of office on account of his having sold the evidence.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 February 2009 the Zaporizhzhya Court delivered a judgment by which it acquitted the applicant of kidnapping and murder for lack of evidence of his guilt. The applicant was, however, found guilty of abuse of office in respect of his having sold evidence. He was sentenced to five years and nine days\u2019imprisonment. Given that the applicant had already served that term, he was released in the court room. As a preventive measure until the verdict became final, he was placed under an undertaking not to leave the town.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On the same date the trial court issued a separate ruling (see paragraph 59 below) with a view to bringing to the attention of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office certain shortcomings in the pre-trial investigation, which it considered to have been superficial and inadequate. The court also noted that throughout 2005-2008 the investigator in charge had given numerous interviews to various television and print media depicting the applicant and the other co\u2011accused as guilty, without changing their names (see paragraphs\u00a041-43below). The Zaporizhzhya Court held that such behaviour had been in breach of the accused\u2019s right to presumption of innocence and had amounted to exerting pressure on the court.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 October 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the lower court\u2019s decision of 17 December 2008 (see paragraph 28 above), as well as both the judgment and the separate ruling of 19 February 2009 (see paragraphs\u00a030 and 31above). It criticised the Zaporizhzhya Court, in particular for not having made any specific recommendations as to howthe investigation could be improved. As regards the separate ruling, the Supreme Court noted that it had wrongly been issued in respect of the part of the proceedings remitted for additional investigation. The criminal case was remitted for fresh examination by a first-instance court. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the part of the trial court\u2019s decision placing the applicant under an undertaking not to leave town as a preventive measure.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Pursuant to a decision of the President of the Supreme Court, the case was referred to the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Lugansk Court\u201d) as a first-instance court, which started the trial on 22 February 2010.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 January 2012 the Lugansk Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention following a request made by the prosecutor. The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of that order.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 February 2012 the trial court severed the charge of abuse of office (concerning the illegal sale of evidence) into a separate set of proceedings and remitted it to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 March 2012 the Lugansk Court found the applicant guilty of abuse of office leading to grave consequences (concerning the falsification of the case file in respect of V.) and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, with no right to hold public posts for three years. It also found the applicant guilty of perjury and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment on that count. As regards the last-mentioned charge, the court held that the prosecution had become time-barred and that the applicant was not therefore to serve that part of the sentence. By the same judgment, the trial court acquitted the applicant of the other charges (creating a criminal gang, as well as several counts of kidnapping and aggravated murder) for want of evidence. It decided to keep the applicant in detention as a preventive measure until the verdict became final.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 August 2012 the RubizhneTown Court (\u201cthe Rubizhne Court\u201d) held a preparatory hearing for the applicant\u2019s trial in respect of the abuse-of-office charge regarding the illegal sale of evidence, which had been remitted for additional investigation on 6 February 2012 (see paragraph\u00a035 above). It observed that, while the issue of a preventive measure had not been dealt with within that set of proceedings, the applicant was already detained in a different context under the judgment of 20 March 2012. Accordingly, the Rubizhne Court ordered his pre-trial detention as the most appropriate preventive measure pending trial in respect of the severed charge also.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 December 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (\u201cthe Higher Specialised Court\u201d) modified the Lugansk Court\u2019s judgment of 20 March 2012. It held that the applicant was to be absolved from serving the sentence altogether, given that the only charge which had entailed the imposition of that sentence (abuse of office on account of the falsification of the case file in respect of V. \u2013 see paragraph\u00a036above)had become time-barred as well. The Higher Specialised Court therefore ordered that the applicant be released.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, however, continued to be detained as a preventive measure in the context of his trial on the charge of abuse of office concerning the illegal sale of material evidence, which remained pending(see paragraph 37 above).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 January 2013 the Rubizhne Court allowed a request lodged by the applicant for the criminal proceedings to be discontinued because theonly remaining charge against him (abuse of office on account of the illegal sale of evidence) had become time-barred. The applicant was released in the court room.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Media coverage of the criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0In 2005 a thirty-minute documentary \u201cThe Deadly Agreement\u201d (\u0421\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430) was broadcast on one of the national television channels, STB. As indicated during the programme, it was created with the support of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Interior (specifically, its Main Department for the Organised Crime Combatting). The documentary was about the agreement between V. and the law-enforcement officials, and the subsequent murder of V. and B. The applicant was named as the person who had proposed the agreement and as B.\u2019s murderer. The programme comprised, in particular, short films, in which the roles of the applicant and the other persons concerned were played by professional actors. One of those short films depicted the applicant murdering B. Furthermore, there were numerous interviews given by the investigator in charge, as well as by several officials of the Security Service. They shared their version of the events of the case in the form of what appeared to be factual statements, without specifying at what stage the proceedings had reached at thetimes of the various interviews. The fate of V. was described with a lot of emotion. The programme also contained extracts from the applicant\u2019s questioning of 8 November 2004, during which he confessed to having falsified the criminal case against V. and to having murdered B. (see paragraph 17above).<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The above-mentioned programme was transmitted on STB at least twelve times between 2005 and 2008, and possibly later.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case gave numerous interviews (making the same assertions as those made in the aforementioned programme) to various printed media.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the Lugansk SIZO<\/strong><\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0In 2012 the applicant was detained, with brief interruptions, in theLugansk SIZO. According to the applicant, he was detained there from 20\u00a0March until 28\u00a0December 2012; however, according to the Government\u2019s submissions and thedocuments in the case file, the period of his detention in that facility was from 25 January until 20 December 2012.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Material conditions of detention<\/em><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, the cells were extremely small and lacked proper ventilation; the sanitary conditions were very poor; the toilet was not separated from the living area and the applicant was obliged to take meals in its close vicinity;and the bed was infested with bedbugs. Furthermore, the applicant was allegedly often deprived of the daily hour\u2011long outdoor walk provided for by law.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they were not in a position to provide a description of the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the Lugansk SIZO given that, following the outbreak of the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Lugansk was on non-Government controlled territory.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Medical care<\/em><\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0On 25\u00a0January 2012, upon the applicant\u2019s arrival at the Lugansk SIZO, he underwent a medical examination, chest X-ray and blood analysis, with no particular health concerns being reported. At\u00a0the same time, the doctors documented his medical history \u2013 namely, that he had suffered from hepatitis and had had surgery on account, in particular, of an inguinal hernia and an umbilical hernia. According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, he did not raise any health-related complaints at that stage.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0On 30\u00a0January 2012 a dermatologist and a psychiatrist examined the applicant in the Lugansk SIZO and reported the absence of any acute health concerns. At the same time, he was registered for medical monitoring on account of hypertension, chronic pancreatitis and chronic cholecystitis.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0Following complaints made by the applicant of headaches, dizziness and numbness of the tongue, on 28 November 2012 he was examined by a doctor of the Lugansk SIZO, who diagnosed a hypertensive crisis and administered him some medications. It was recommended that the applicant be examined by a general doctor of the inter-regional hospital attached to the Lugansk SIZO and that he undergo an electrocardiogram.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 November 2012 the applicant underwent an electrocardiogram, which showed that he had a rotated heart and indications of left ventricular hypertrophy.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 December 2012 a general doctor of the inter-regional hospital attached to the Lugansk SIZO examined the applicant and diagnosed him with: ischemic heart disease, stable effort angina, diffuse cardiosclerosis, cardiac insufficiency and high-risk hypertensive heart disease. Certain medications were prescribed to the applicant and it was recommended that he undergo inpatient medical treatment in the SIZO\u2019s medical unit and that his blood pressure be monitored.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government were not able to provide further factual details as to whether the applicant had undergone the recommended medical treatment because they did not have access to the Lugansk SIZO\u2019s documentation (see\u00a0also paragraph 46 above).<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, he was not hospitalised.<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 January 2013 the applicant was released (see paragraph\u00a040 above).<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The case file contains an extract from the applicant\u2019s clinical record from the cardiological department of the town hospital, in which he underwent inpatient medical treatment from 10 until 22 April 2013 on account of headaches and chest pain, accompanied by shortness of breath. According to the applicant\u2019s explanation summarised in that record, he had been suffering from headaches and hypertension since 2000 and his health had been deteriorating because of stressful circumstances in his life since September 2004. A limited improvement in the applicant\u2019s health condition was reported at the time of his discharge.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The case file also contains a report of the ultrasound scan of the knee joints that the applicant underwent on 5 July 2013. He was diagnosed with a \u201cBaker\u2019s cyst\u201d(a\u00a0pocket of fluid forming a lump behind the knee) in respect of both knees.<\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings brought by the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged a civil claim against the State Treasury seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of his unlawful criminal prosecution and detention under the Compensation Act (see paragraph\u00a062below).<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0Courts at three levels of jurisdiction (the Kramatorsk City Court on 10\u00a0December 2013, the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal on 17 January 2014 and the Higher Specialised Court on 17\u00a0February 2014) rejected his claim as being without basis. They held that the Compensation Act did not provide for compensation in the applicant\u2019s situation because he had been acquitted only in part.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0Article 23-2 of the 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), which was repealed with effect from 19 November 2012,provided that if a court discovered that there had been a violation of law and\/or of citizens\u2019 rights in the course of a pre-trial inquiry or investigation, or during the examination of a case by a lower-level court, it had to issue a separate ruling by which it drew the attention of the respective authorities to the established facts and directed them to take certain measures to remedy the situation. Failure to take the requisite measures was considered to constitute an administrative offence.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0Article 253 of the CCP provided that if a judge decided to commit an accused for trial, hehad todecide, among other things,whether to change, discontinue or apply a preventive measure.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0Other relevant provisions of the CCP read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 156. Duration of pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n \u201cDetention during a pre-trial investigation shall not last more than two months.<\/p>\n When it is impossible to complete the investigation within the period provided in Part 1 of this Article and there are no grounds for discontinuing the preventive measure or replacing it with a less restrictive measure, the term of pre-trial detention may be extended:<\/p>\n (1) for up to four months \u2013 upon a request approved by the prosecutor supervising the compliance of the bodies conducting the relevant inquiry or investigation with the laws, or at the same prosecutor\u2019s request, by a judge of the court which ordered the application of the preventive measure;<\/p>\n (2) for up to nine months \u2013 upon a request approved by the Deputy Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Prosecutor of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional prosecutors, Kyiv and Sevastopol prosecutors [or] prosecutors of equal rank, or upon the same prosecutor\u2019s request in cases concerning serious and particularly serious crimes, by a judge of the court of appeal;<\/p>\n (3) for up to eighteen months \u2013 upon a request approved by the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and his Deputy, or at the same prosecutor\u2019s request in particularly complex cases concerning particularly serious crimes, by a judge of the Supreme Court of Ukraine.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n After the completion of the investigation the case file shall be presented to the detained accused and his defence not later than a month before the expiry of the pre-trial detention time-limit set under paragraph 2 of this Article.<\/p>\n If the time-limit for providing the accused and his defence with the case file is not complied with … the accused shall be released immediately after the expiry of the maximum term of detention set by Part 2 of this Article. In such a case, the accused and his defence shall continue to be entitled to familiarise themselves with the case file.<\/p>\n … If the accused and his defence received access to the case file [in due time, as noted above], but that time appeared insufficient, the respective term may be extended by a judge of an appellate court at the request of an investigator approved by the Prosecutor General of Ukraine or his deputy, or upon a request coming directly from the [aforementioned prosecutorial officials]. Where there are several co-accused held in pre-trial detention and if at least one of them finds [the term for allotted for the study of the case-file] insufficient, a request [for its extension] may also be applicable to those other co\u2011accused who has\/have completed his\/their study of the case file, if his\/their pre\u2011trial detention remains necessary and there are no grounds for changing that preventive measure. …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 165-3: Procedure for extending the term of pre-trial detention<\/p>\n \u201cWhen there are no grounds for changing the preventive measure or if it is impossible to complete the investigation of the case in respect of the part relating to proven charges, an investigator, upon the approval of the relevant prosecutor, or of the same prosecutor, shall apply to the court with a request for an extension of the term of pre-trial detention. The request shall contain reasons for it being necessary to extend the term, circumstances which must be examined, evidence that the detainee committed the crime [of which he or she is accused], and grounds [indicating] the necessity to maintain the preventive measure. …<\/p>\n Having received the request, the judge shall examine the criminal case material; if necessary, the judge shall question the accused [and] the investigator, [and] hear the prosecutor [and the defence counsel (if the latter has appeared before the judge), following which the judge shall adopt a resolution extending the term of pre-trial detention, if there are grounds for this, save in a case provided in paragraph 7 of Article 156 of the Code, or shall refuse to extend it.<\/p>\n The prosecutor, suspect, accused or his defence or legal representative may lodge an appeal against the resolution of the judge within three days of its delivery. Such an appeal shall not suspend the execution of the judge\u2019s resolution. The resolutions issued by judges of a court of appeal and of the Supreme Court shall not be subject to an appeal.\u201d<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the Compensation Act (1994, with further amendments) are quoted in the Court\u2019s judgment on the case of Yaroshovetsand Others v. Ukraine, nos. 74820\/10 et seq., \u00a7\u00a7 62-63, 3 December 2015).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations regarding the conditions of detention in the Lugansk SIZO, the applicant additionally complained of the conditions of his transportation for court hearings throughout the entire period of his detention, as well as the allegedly unjustified application of disciplinary measures to him in detention.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these new, belated complaints do not constitute an elaboration of the applicant\u2019s original complaint, on which the parties have commented. The Court considers, therefore, that it is not appropriate now to take up these matters in the context of the present case (see, for example, Kapustyak v. Ukraine, no. 26230\/11, \u00a7 52, 3 March 2016).<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complainedof the material conditions of his detention and the lack of proper medical care in the Lugansk SIZO. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of this complaint because he had not raised it before the prosecutors or other domestic authorities.<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0In substantiation of that submission, the Government referred to the case of Sadkov v. Ukraine(no.\u00a021987\/05, 6\u00a0July\u00a02017, \u00a7 85), in which the Court acknowledged that the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding specific health problems had been duly dealt with by the authorities. In the Government\u2019s opinion, there was no indication that the applicant\u2019s complaints of inadequate medical care in the present case, had he raised any at the domestic level, would have been treated in a deficient manner.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that they did not have access to the relevant documents from the Lugansk SIZO in order to formulate a position on the substance of the applicant\u2019s grievances. At the same time, they argued that the applicant had failed to show that the conditions of his detention in that facility had been in breach of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the Government\u2019s arguments. He noted that he had complained on many occasions about the conditions of his detention to the trial court and that the judge had sent letters in that regard to the administration of the Lugansk SIZO, albeit to no avail. As regards the possibility of complaining to the prosecution authorities, the applicant considered it pointless, given their alleged lack of independence and their partiality.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention, he observed, referring to his initial account (see paragraph 45 above), that he had not considered it necessary to provide a detailed description of them, as, in his opinion, the Court was aware of the existing realities in all Ukrainian detention facilities. The applicant provided some general information as to the allegedly poor toilet and laundry arrangements in Ukrainian detention facilities, without specifying to which detention facility he was referring, if any, from his own experience. He furthermore went on to elaborate on his complaints regarding the conditions of his detention in the Kyiv and ZaporizhzhyaPre-Trial Detention Centres (SIZOs), which had already been declared inadmissible by the Court (see paragraph 4 above).<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the issue of medical care in detention, the applicant argued that the state of his health had been incompatible with the conditions of his detention and that, as a result, his health had seriously deteriorated.The applicant furthermore observed that in November and December 2012 his scheduled transfer to other facilities in order to allow him to participate in investigative measures had been cancelled twice owing to his high blood pressure. Furthermore, according to the applicant, the medical conclusion that his state of health called for immediate hospitalisation (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a051 above) had been disregarded and, instead of being placed in a hospital for medical treatment, he had been transferred to another detention facility for investigative activities.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant furthermore submitted, in his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, that as a result of his detention in inadequate conditions he had been diagnosed with two Baker\u2019s cysts; he did not submit further details or explanations.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government\u2019s objection based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies given that the applicant\u2019s complaints under this head are in any event manifestly ill\u2011founded for the following reasons.<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, under Article 3 of the Convention, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, and that the manner and method of execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a094, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XI).<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that information about the material conditions of detention falls within the knowledge of the domestic authorities. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Even so, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide \u2013 to the greatest possible extent \u2013 some evidence in support of their complaints. The Court has considered as evidence in such situations, for example, written statements by fellow inmates or photographs provided by applicants in support of their allegations (see, for example, Golubenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 36327\/06, \u00a7\u00a052, 5\u00a0November 2013, with further references).<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore reiterates that an unsubstantiated allegation that medical care has been non-existent, delayed or otherwise unsatisfactory is normally insufficient to disclose an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. A credible complaint should normally include, among other things, sufficient reference to the medical condition in question; medical treatment that was sought, provided, or refused; and some evidence \u2013 such as expert reports \u2013 which is capable of disclosing serious failings in the applicant\u2019s medical care (see, for example,ValeriySamoylov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a057541\/09, \u00a7 80, 24 January 2012, and YevgeniyBogdanov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a022405\/04, \u00a7 93, 26 February 2015).<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicantfailed to specify in which cells he had been detained in the Lugansk SIZO, let alone give a detailed description of them or support his account with any evidence. The remainder of his complaint about the material conditions of detention there \u2013 in particular, as regards the nutrition and sanitary conditions \u2013 was likewise couched in broad terms and not supported by any evidence (see and compare Moroz v. Ukraine, no. 5187\/07, \u00a7 47, 2\u00a0March 2017).<\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant alleged that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention, the Court observes that this complaint is vague too. The only specific allegation made by the applicant in that context was that he had not been hospitalised, contrary to the doctor\u2019s recommendation of 6\u00a0December 2012 (see paragraphs 51 and 71above). In the absence of access to the applicant\u2019s medical file, the Government were not in a position to comment on that allegation. Even assuming that, as alleged by the applicant, he had not been hospitalised, the Court notes that there was no indication of any particular urgency in respect of the recommended hospitalisation of the applicant. Nor was it disputed by the applicant that he had been receiving medications following his medical examination of 6 December 2012, and he did not argue that that medicinal treatment had been deficient. Nor did the applicant allege that the state of his blood pressure had not been monitored. Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant was released on 24 January 2013. He could have undergone a complete medical check-up upon his release and could have obtained a medical opinion as to the deterioration of his health in detention, if any, as well as the quality of medical care provided for him. However, as can be seen from the case-file material (see paragraph 55 above), the applicant applied for medical treatment only two and a half months after his release in respect of long-standing health concerns. It appears that he did not complain to doctors of any deficiencies in the medical care he had received while in detention. Lastly, the applicant failed to show how his diagnosis of Baker\u2019s cysts(which was established about half a year after his release) could have been caused by the treatment he had received from the authorities (see\u00a0paragraph 56 above).<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that neither of the two complaintsunder this head(regarding the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention and the medical care provided for him in the Lugansk SIZO) have been properly substantiated by the applicant and must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded,pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1, 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complainedof a violation of his rights under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3 and 5 of the Convention, whichprovide as follows in the relevant part:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints arenot manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his detention from 10 August 2005 until 19 February 2009 had been unlawful and arbitrary.He observed, in particular, that the maximum term of pre-trial detention set by the national legislation at eighteen months had expired in his case on 10 August 2005 and that he should have been released on that day.<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s detention had been in compliance with both the domestic legislation and the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.They noted that the file in the applicant\u2019s criminal case had been particularly voluminous, which had necessitated extending the time-limits for its study by the accused (including the applicant) and that this had resulted, in turn, in further extensions of his pre\u2011trial detention.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0It is well established in the Court\u2019s case-law on Article 5 \u00a7 1 that all deprivation of liberty must not only be based on one of the exceptions listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) but must also be \u201clawful\u201d. Where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is in issue, including the question of whether \u201ca\u00a0procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see Del R\u00edo Pradav.\u00a0Spain [GC], no. 42750\/09, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2013).<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s detention from 10\u00a0August 2005 until 10\u00a0May 2006<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s detention during this period \u2013 that is to say for nine months \u2013 was based on five judicial decisions extending its term for periods varying from one to three months, on the grounds that he and the other co-accused needed time to study the voluminous case file, which comprised over a hundred volumes (see\u00a0paragraph23 above).<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure, as worded at the material time, provided for a maximum of eighteen months\u2019 pre\u2011trial detention. At least a month before the expiry of that period the accused and his defence were to be provided with access to the case file. If that was done any later, the accused was to be released immediately upon the expiry of the eighteen-month time-limit. However, if the accused started studying the case file within the established one-month time-limit, but that time appeared insufficient, the term of his\/her detention could be extended by a judge of an appellate court at the investigator\u2019s request, and in agreement with the Prosecutor General (see paragraph 61above).<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant was de facto provided with access to the case file on 14 July 2005 (see paragraph 21 above) \u2013 that is to say in breach of the one-month time-limit, which expired on 10 July 2005.<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s detention during the period in question raises serious issues as regards its compliance with the domestic law and, furthermore, as regards the existence of sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness.<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s detention from 10\u00a0May 2006 until 12\u00a0September 2006<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the period in question was the one between the expiry of the pre-trial detention ordered by judicial decisions and the preparatory hearing held by the Zaporizhzhya Court, during which time the applicant\u2019s detention was not covered by any judicial decision. This issue has often been criticised by the Court as stemming from legislative lacunae in Ukraine (see Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a071 and 98, 10\u00a0February 2011, with further references) and it has manifested itself in the circumstances of the present case too.<\/p>\n (iii)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s detention from 12\u00a0September 2006 until 19\u00a0February 2009<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that during this period the applicant was detained on the basis of the ruling of the Zaporizhzhya Court of 12 September 2006, following his committal for trial. Under the legislation in force at the material time, the judge was required neither to give reasons for maintaining the applicant\u2019s detention nor to set any time-limits (see paragraph\u00a060 above).<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held that at the time in question it was a recurrent practice in Ukraine for court orders issued during the trial stage to set no time\u2011limits for the further detention of a defendant, and to uphold rather than extend his or her previous detention, and that that practice was not compatible with the requirements of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7 1 of the Convention (see\u00a0Kharchenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 75 and 98).<\/p>\n 92.\u00a0\u00a0That conclusion remains relevant in the circumstances of the present case. Thus, the Court considers that the Zaporizhzhya Court\u2019s decision of 12\u00a0September 2006(see paragraph 26 above) left the applicant in a state of uncertainty as to the grounds of his detention after that date and its possible duration.<\/p>\n (iv)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/p>\n 93.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s detention from 10 August 2005 until 19 February 2009 was not in accordance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 94.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of that provision.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s detention from 25 January 2012 until 24\u00a0January 2013<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments<\/p>\n 95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his detention from 25 January 2012 until 24 January 2013 had been excessively long and that it had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons.<\/p>\n 96.\u00a0\u00a0He submitted, in particular, that he had never breached the obligation imposed on him not to leave the town (which had been applicable to him from 19\u00a0February 2009 until 25\u00a0January 2012) and that there had therefore been no grounds for placing him in pre-trial detention once again at that stage.<\/p>\n 97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that they had no access to the archives of the Lugansk Court (see also paragraph 46 above). As a result, they did not have a copy of the impugned order of 25\u00a0January 2012 and were not able to comment on its contents. Nor did the Government consider it possible, in the light of that circumstance, to comment on the applicant\u2019s continued detention in the context of that set of proceedings until the order for his release of 12 December 2012 (it had remained unimplemented given the fact that a separate set of proceedings was ongoing \u2013 see paragraphs 36-39 above).<\/p>\n 98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the applicant\u2019s detention after 12 December 2012 until his de facto release on 24\u00a0January 2013 had been based on the ruling of the Rubizhne Court of 17 August 2012 (see\u00a0paragraph 37 above), which they considered had complied with the Article 5 requirements.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/p>\n 99.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the close affinity between the relevant principles developed under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 (c) and 3 of the Convention, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the present complaint under both provisions simultaneously (see, for example, Korneykova v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a039884\/05, \u00a7 38, 19 January 2012, and Sizarev v. Ukraine, no. 17116\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0161-164, 17 January 2013).<\/p>\n 100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that on 25 January 2012 \u2013 that is to say almost three years after the applicant\u2019s release subject to an obligation not to abscond, which had been applicable starting from 19\u00a0February 2009 \u2013 he was detained again as a preventive measure.<\/p>\n 101.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of a copy of the impugned court order or the respective prosecutor\u2019s application of 25 January 2012, the Court is unable to reach any conclusion as regards the relevance and sufficiency of reasons advanced by the domestic authorities in justification of that measure.This does not, however, prevent the Court from adjudicating on the applicant\u2019s complaint as a whole.<\/p>\n 102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that on 20 March 2012 the trial court delivered a verdict in one set of the criminal proceedings against the applicant and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. On\u00a012\u00a0December 2012 that verdict was quashed and the proceedings were discontinued in that part. There were, however, concurrent criminal proceedings against the applicant remaining at the pre-trial investigation stage during the entire period in question (see, in particular, paragraphs 35-40 above).<\/p>\n 103.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant\u2019s detention between 20 March 2012 and 12\u00a0December 2012 was based both on sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 within those proceedings and on its sub-paragraph (c) within the proceedings severed on 6 February 2012 (see paragraph 35 above; compare Kushnir v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042184\/09, \u00a7 156, 11 December 2014). As the applicant was detained following conviction by a competent court, it is clear that his detention was lawful in terms of domestic law. The Court further observes that its actual length did not exceed his sentence. There is no other indication that his detention under the judgment of 20 March 2012 was not in conformity with the purposes of the deprivation of liberty permitted by Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention.<\/p>\n 104.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has held in the cases of Borisenko v.\u00a0Ukraine (no.\u00a025725\/02, \u00a7 44, 12 January 2012) and Ustyantsev v.\u00a0Ukraine (no.\u00a03299\/05, \u00a7 82, 12 January 2012), Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention does not apply to situations amounting to \u201clawful detention after conviction by a competent court\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention. The Court has found it difficult to see any practical purpose in requiring the State authorities to justify the detention of an applicant under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) and 3 of the Convention when such detention was justified under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a). The Court has further held that any request for release in such cases would thus be limited to the purely hypothetical question of whether the person in question could be released if he was not already serving a prison sentence. Therefore, even if the applicant\u2019s continuing detention within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) ceased to be reasonable, it would not automatically cease to be lawful and justified under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(a).<\/p>\n 105.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration in the present case under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (c) and 3 (in\u00a0respect of which there are documents in the case file \u2013 see paragraph 101 above) is from 12 December 2012 (when the applicant, albeit released by a verdict delivered within one set of proceedings, continued to be detained as a preventive measure within another set of proceedings \u2013 see paragraphs 38-39 above) until 24\u00a0January 2013 (the date of the applicant\u2019s actual release \u2013 see paragraph 40 above) \u2013 that is to say forty-three days.<\/p>\n 106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held that justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. Justifications which have been deemed to constitute \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d reasons (in addition to the existence of reasonable suspicion) in the Court\u2019s case-law have included such grounds as the danger of absconding, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, the risk of collusion, the risk of reoffending, the risk of causing public disorder and the need to protect the detainee (see\u00a0Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 87-88, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 107.\u00a0\u00a0No such reasons were advanced by the authorities in the present case in justification of the applicant\u2019s detention during the period in question. Moreover, that issue was not even examined, and the only basis for the applicant\u2019s detention was the Rubizhne Court\u2019s ruling of 17 August 2012 \u2013 which had, in turn, merely referred to the concurrent proceedings against the applicant and his detention in that context (see paragraph\u00a037 above).<\/p>\n 108.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s detention from 12\u00a0December 2012 until 24 January 2013.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 109.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that he had no enforceable right to compensation in respect of the violations of his rights under the other paragraphs of Article 5.<\/p>\n 110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Ukrainian legislation provided for the possibility to claim compensation for unlawful detention, subject to a judicial decision acknowledging such unlawfulness. It was not, however, applicable to the circumstances of the present case because the applicant\u2019s detention had been lawful.<\/p>\n 111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 5 is complied with where it is possible to apply for compensation in respect of a deprivation of liberty effected in conditions contrary to paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4. The right to compensation set forth in paragraph 5 therefore presupposes that a violation of one of the other paragraphs has been established, either by a domestic authority or by the Convention institutions. In this connection, the effective enjoyment of the right to compensation guaranteed by Article 5 \u00a7 5 must be ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty (see Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7 182, ECHR 2012, with further references).<\/p>\n 112.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the domestic courts rejected the applicant\u2019s compensation claim in respect of his allegedly unlawful detention (see paragraph 58 above). At the same time, regard being had to the Court\u2019s findings of a violation of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article\u00a05 (see paragraphs 94 and 108 above), paragraph 5 is applicable to the applicant\u2019s situation. The Court must therefore ascertain whether the applicant will have an enforceable right at the domestic level to compensation for damage following the adoption of this judgment.<\/p>\n 113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in similar previous cases that the right to compensation under Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention was not ensured in the Ukrainian legal system, should the Court find a violation of any preceding paragraphs of that Article (see, for example, Taran v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a031898\/06, \u00a7\u00a089, 17 October 2013, and Kushch v. Ukraine,no. 53865\/11, \u00a7\u00a0136, 3\u00a0December 2015, with further references). It finds no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.<\/p>\n 114.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT<\/p>\n 115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been unreasonable. Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, as far as relevant, provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the overall duration of the proceedings in his case had not been justified and that the authorities had been responsible for it.<\/p>\n 118.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s claim, stating that his case had been complex from both a legal and factual point of view. In particular, he had been charged with a number of serious crimes and the proceedings in question had involved many co-defendants, victims and witnesses.<\/p>\n 119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case in question and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see,\u00a0among many other authorities, P\u00e9lissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no.\u00a025444\/94, \u00a7 67, ECHR 1999-II).<\/p>\n 120.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the criminal proceedings against the applicant consisted of several interrelated episodes and lasted for a total of nine years. While admitting the complexity of the case, the Court has doubts as to whether the length of the proceedings was reasonable.<\/p>\n 121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the case was remitted for additional pre-trial investigation and for retrial because of procedural violations attributable to the authorities (see, in particular, paragraphs 28, 32 and 36 above). The Court further observes that the Government did not show that the applicant, from his side, had been responsible for any delays in the proceedings.<\/p>\n 122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to those in the present case (see\u00a0P\u00e9lissier and Sassi, cited above, and Yaroshovets and Others v.\u00a0Ukraine, nos. 74820\/10 and 4 others, \u00a7\u00a7 166-172, 3 December 2015).<\/p>\n 123.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. On the whole, having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement.<\/p>\n 124.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 2 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 125.\u00a0\u00a0Theapplicant next complainedof a violation of his right to the presumption of innocence under Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c2.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court declares this complaint admissible given that it is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 127.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that public officials had been involved in the media campaign surrounding his case; they had asserted his guilt prior to his conviction by a court, thus influencing public opinion and prejudging the case against him.<\/p>\n 128.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the authorities had been merely informing society of progress in a high-profile criminal case.<\/p>\n 129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the well-established principle of its case-law that Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention bars officials from declaring a person guilty before that person\u2019s conviction by a court. The officials may tell the public about criminal investigations by, for example, reporting suspicions, arrests, and confessions, if they do it discreetly and circumspectly. Choice of words matters (see\u00a0Turyev v. Russia, no. 20758\/04, \u00a7 19, 11\u00a0October 2016, with further references).<\/p>\n 130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that in the present case the statements made by the investigator and Security Service officials to the mass media in respect of the criminal proceedings against the applicant were far from discreet or circumspect. They amounted to an unqualified declaration of his guilt without even specifying what stage the proceedings were then at: the applicant\u2019s full identity was disclosed to the public and he was labelled as a murderer and a falsifier of a highly sensitive criminal case (see paragraphs\u00a041and\u00a043above).Moreover, the Court observes that those statements were disseminated on many occasions in a documentary, which had been created with the direct support of the high-level State authorities and which contained extracts from the video of the applicant\u2019s confession to the police (see paragraphs17 and41 above).<\/p>\n 131.\u00a0\u00a0TheCourt considers that such statements of the State officials encouraged the public to believe the applicant to be guilty and prejudged the assessment of the facts by the relevant judicial authority.<\/p>\n 132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention.<\/p>\n VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 133.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 134.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 194,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 135.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that that claim was exorbitant and without basis.<\/p>\n 136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress and anxiety on account of the violations found. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, it awards the applicant EUR\u00a020,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 137.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR\u00a02,800 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be transferred to the account of Mr\u00a0T.\u00a0Kalmykov, his legal representative. He noted that this amount corresponded to legal fees of EUR\u00a02,775 (thirty-seven\u00a0hours at EUR\u00a075 per hour) for the preparation of observations in response to those of the Government, and EUR\u00a025 for administrative expenses (telephone calls, postal expenses, photocopying and other costs). To substantiate that claim, he submitted a contract for legal assistance dated 18 September 2017.<\/p>\n 138.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the above claim as unfounded and excessive.<\/p>\n 139.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above-mentioned criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to grant the applicant\u2019s claim in part and to award him EUR\u00a0300 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. The award is to be paid into Mr Kalmykov\u2019s bank account, as indicated by the applicant (see,\u00a0for\u00a0example, Belousov v. Ukraine, no. 4494\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 116-17, 7\u00a0November 2013).<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/p>\n 140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresinadmissible the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Declares admissible the remainder of the application;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s detention from 10 August 2005 until 19\u00a0February 2009;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s detention from 12\u00a0December 2012 until 24 January 2013;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant;<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 300 (three hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of legal costs before the Court (the net award to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, Mr\u00a0Kalmykov); and<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 October 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Andrea Tamietti\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque
\nGanna Yudkivska,
\nFaris Vehabovi\u0107,
\nIulia Antoanella Motoc,
\nGeorges Ravarani,
\nMarko Bo\u0161njak,
\nP\u00e9ter Paczolay, judges,
\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputyRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n