231\/15<\/a><\/p>\nJudgment 2.10.2018 [Section IV]<\/p>\n
Article 6<\/strong>
\nCivil proceedings<\/strong>
\nArticle 6-1<\/strong>
\nFair hearing<\/strong><\/p>\nCivil liability for acts of a minor established on the basis of findings in criminal proceedings in which he had been a witness: violation<\/p>\n
Facts \u2013 The applicant complained that her civil liability for the acts of her minor son had been established on the basis of the findings of courts in criminal proceedings in which her son had only been a witness and she had not had any procedural status.<\/p>\n
Law \u2013 Article 6 \u00a7 1: In cases concerning civil proceedings for compensation following an acquittal or the discontinuation of criminal proceedings, the Court usually examined an applicant\u2019s complaint from the perspective of Article 6 \u00a7 2. One of the key questions in such cases was whether the courts in the civil proceedings had made any statements imputing criminal liability to an individual who had not been held liable in criminal proceedings. It had not been alleged, either in the criminal or in the civil proceedings, that the applicant herself had committed any unlawful acts. The applicant\u2019s case therefore did not concern her right to the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 2. Nonetheless, the Court considered that the principles developed in its case-law under that provision were relevant.<\/p>\n
In cases involving civil compensation claims lodged by victims, regardless of whether the criminal proceedings had ended in discontinuation or acquittal, the Court had emphasised that while exoneration from criminal liability ought to be respected in civil compensation proceedings, it should not preclude the establishment of civil liability to pay compensation arising out of the same facts on the basis of a less strict burden of proof. The same principle was applicable in situations such as the applicant\u2019s, in which her minor son could not be held criminally liable because of his age. Consequently, establishing the applicant\u2019s and her son\u2019s joint civil liability arising out of the assault in respect of which her son had not been held criminally liable was not in itself incompatible with Article 6. The question was whether the civil proceedings had been conducted in line with the requirements of a fair hearing.<\/p>\n
The domestic courts which had examined the civil claim had relied on the case-file material of the criminal proceedings. In those proceedings the applicant\u2019s son had admitted to having hit the victim but had claimed to have done so in self-defence. Since he had not been the accused, the courts in the criminal proceedings had not been allowed by law to establish his guilt in respect of any criminal acts. Nonetheless, the first-instance court had stated that the applicant\u2019s son had \u201cconfessed\u201d and that his \u201cguilt\u201d had been proved. The regional court which had examined the appeals held that it was not necessary to carry out a fresh assessment of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s role in the assault because it had already been established. In particular, while the applicant had explicitly argued that the judgments given in the criminal proceedings should not have had a res judicata effect in the civil proceedings because they had not concerned her son\u2019s criminal liability, the regional Court rejected that argument and held that the courts in the criminal proceedings had established that unlawful actions had been committed by the applicant\u2019s son and that thus, in line with Article 182 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, those actions did not need to be proved.<\/p>\n
The Supreme Court of Lithuania had held in its case-law that not all facts established in final judgments in criminal proceedings had a res judicata effect in subsequent civil cases. A court examining a civil case did not need to establish afresh the criminal acts, their consequences and whether they were committed by the individual with respect to whom the judgment had been given; by contrast, any other facts established in criminal proceedings had been found not to have a res judicata effect in a subsequent civil case.<\/p>\n
The domestic courts had considered the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s actions to have been definitively established in the criminal proceedings in which he had been a witness, and had therefore made it impossible for the applicant to question the facts on which her civil liability was based \u2013 an opportunity which she had not had in the criminal proceedings either, since those proceedings had not concerned the actions of her son. In such circumstances, the Court could not accept that the civil proceedings against the applicant had been \u201cfair\u201d within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).<\/p>\n
Article 41: EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; claim in respect of pecuniary damage dismissed.<\/p>\n