SECOND SECTION
\nCASE OF POLAT AND TAL\u0130 v. TURKEY
\n(Application no. 5782\/10)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n25 September 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Polat and Tali v. Turkey,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Paul Lemmens, President, Having deliberated in private on 4 September 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 5782\/10) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by two Turkish nationals, Ms EylemDilanPolat and Mr\u00a0Mehmet Tali (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 27 January 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by Mrs G. Altay and Mr H. Karaku\u015f, lawyers practising in Istanbul. The Turkish Government (\u201cthe\u00a0Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the criminal proceedings brought against them under section\u00a07(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) and their subsequent conviction had constituted a violation of their right to freedom of expression.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 August 2016 the complaints concerning the alleged breach of the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression was communicated to the Government, and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 March 2018 the Government were informed that the Court envisaged assigning the application to a Committee. By a letter dated 10\u00a0April 2018 the Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. Having considered the Government\u2019s objection, the Court rejects it.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were born in 1973 and 1976 respectively and live in Switzerland.At the relevant time, they were members of a research cooperative called the East Scientific Research Cooperative (Do\u011fu Bilimsel Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar Kooperatifi\u2013 \u201cthe Cooperative\u201d).<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Between 30 May and 1 June 2005 the Cooperative organised an exhibition in Diyarbak\u0131r as part of thefifth Diyarbak\u0131r Culture and Art Festival, entitled \u201cWitnesses of War Talk\u201d. Within the context of the exhibition, photographs of deceased members of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), deceased members of the security forces who had been killed in security operations, persons who had lost their lives in prison, victims of enforced disappearances and victims of assassinations by unknown assailants in south-east Turkey were publicly displayed. The exhibition also included statements from family members of deceased and disappeared individuals, presenting their relatives and containing their personal views on the disturbances going on in south-east Turkey, and their wish for an enduring peace.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date a criminal investigation was launched against the applicants and five other people in relation to a charge of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK. On 31 May 2005 the applicants gave a statement to the investigating judge. Both ofthe applicants maintained that the exhibition in question had been organised for purely sociological reasons, and that they had conducted interviews with the families of the deceased which had also been included in the exhibition. They asserted that there had been no intention to disseminate propaganda in favour of the PKK. The investigating judge dismissed an application by the public prosecutor to remand the accused in custody.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court, charging the applicants and five other suspects with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law\u00a0no.\u00a03713.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0Throughout the proceedings before the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court the applicants repeated their previous statements and contended that photographs of deceased members of the security forces had also been displayed in the exhibition alongside those of members of the PKK.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 May 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted both applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation under section\u00a07(2) of Law no. 3713. The applicants were sentenced to two\u00a0years and a year and eight months\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. In its judgment, the court observed that the invitations to the exhibition had referred to the armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK as a \u201cwar\u201d, and the PKK members as \u201cguerrillas\u201d, thus glorifying the deceased terrorists and inciting young people to become members of the PKK. The court also noted that a \u201cwar\u201d was an armed conflict between two States and a \u201cguerrilla\u201d was an armed person who fought against unjust occupation. The court further observed that a couple of photographs of deceased soldiers had also been displayed in order to conceal the accused\u2019s intention to incite young people to join the PKK.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 June 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of the second applicant, holding that the case should be reviewed in the light of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no.\u00a05271), which regulates the suspension of a judgment\u2019s pronouncement. However, the trial court\u2019s judgment of 18 May 2006 became final in respect of the first applicant. On 3 August 2009 the decision of the Court of Cassation was filed with the registry of the first-instance court.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 October 2009, in accordance with Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court decided to suspend the pronouncement of its judgment in respect of the second applicant on the condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant served the sentence arising from the judgment of 18\u00a0May 2006.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713)<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, section\u00a07(2) of Law no.\u00a03713 read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cAny person who assists members of the above-mentioned organisations [terrorist organisations] or who disseminates propaganda inciting others to violence or other methods of terrorism shall be liable to [serve] a term of imprisonment of one to five years and [receive] a judicial fine of five million liras to one billion liras …\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271)<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0Suspension of the pronouncement of a judgment is governed by Article\u00a0231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the relevant paragraphs of which read as follows at the material time:<\/p>\n \u201c…<\/p>\n (5)\u00a0\u00a0If the accused has been convicted of the charges against him and ordered to pay a fine or sentenced to imprisonment for a period of less than two years, the court may decide to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment … The suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment means that the judgment shall not bear any legal consequences for the offender.<\/p>\n (6)\u00a0\u00a0A decision to suspend the pronouncement of a judgment may be issued provided that:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the offender has never been found guilty of anintentional offence;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0the court is convinced, taking into account the offender\u2019s personal traits and his behaviour during the proceedings, that there is little risk of any further offence being committed; [and]<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0the damage caused to the victim or to society is redressed by way of restitution or compensation.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (8)\u00a0\u00a0If the pronouncement of the judgment is suspended, the offender will be kept under supervision for the next five years.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (10)\u00a0\u00a0If the offender does not commit another intentional offence and abides by the obligations of the supervision order, the judgment [whose] pronouncement had been suspended will be cancelled and the case discontinued.<\/p>\n (11)\u00a0\u00a0If the offender commits another intentional offence or acts in violation of the obligations of the supervision order, the court shall impose the sentence. Nevertheless, the court may evaluate the offender\u2019s situation and may decide that … up to half of the total sentence will not be executed. If the conditions so permit, the court may also suspend the execution of [any] sentence of imprisonment or commute it to other optional measures.<\/p>\n (12)\u00a0\u00a0An objection to the decision to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment may be filed.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the criminal proceedings brought against them under section\u00a07(2) of Law no. 3713 and their subsequent conviction had constituted a violation of their right to freedom of expression. They relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\u201d<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant<\/em><\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the second applicant did not have victim status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, as he had not been convicted at the end of the proceedings. They also claimed that the second applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, because he had not objected to the decision of 22 October 2009 suspending the pronouncement of the judgment against him. They submitted that the second applicant could have raised his Convention grievances by using the remedy in question. In support of their submissions, the Government provided a copy of the Plenary Court of Cassation\u2019s decision dated 22\u00a0January 2013 (decision no. 2013\/15). In that decision, the Court of Cassation had held that in a case where the accused had been convicted of illicit substance use and where the first-instance court had ordered the accused\u2019s treatment and the application of judicial control measures after his treatment, an objection by the public prosecutor regarding the qualification of the accused\u2019s acts and challenging the court\u2019s above-mentioned orders had to be examined on its merits and in adversarial proceedings.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant did not respond to the Government\u2019s above\u2011mentioned objections.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find it necessary to examine the first limb of the Government\u2019s objections, as it considers that the application lodged by the second applicant is inadmissible on the following grounds.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy in question was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. Once this burden has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 225, ECHR 2014 (extracts) and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Courtobserves that the Government submitted that the second applicant had failed to use the remedy provided for in Article\u00a0231 \u00a7 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and provided a copy of the decision dated 22 January 2013 rendered by the Plenary Court of Cassation in support of their submissions. The Court notes that the decision in question concerns the Court of Cassation\u2019s considerations in a case involving the general objection procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and not specifically the procedure concerning objections to decisions suspending the pronouncement of judgments. However, the Court also observes that the second applicant did not submit any arguments in response to the Government\u2019s objection. He neither attempted to argue before the Court that he had actually exhausted the domestic remedies, nor claimed that the remedy referred to by the Government had been inadequate or ineffective. In these circumstances, the Court is led to conclude that the second applicant failed to exhaust the domestic remedies (see, mutatis mutandis, Czernuszewicz v. Poland (dec.) [Committee], no.\u00a02891\/12, 19\u00a0January 2016).<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the application as regards the second applicant must be rejected under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant<\/em><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application as regards the first applicant is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant submitted that she had not had any intention to disseminate propaganda in favour of the PKK. The exhibition had aimed to portray the suffering caused by the Kurdish problem in Turkey and create a platform to discuss that problem. According to the first applicant, the content of the exhibition had not incited violence. Nor had it constituted glorification of violence or a risk to public order. The first applicant considered that the armed conflict in Turkey could be described as a \u201clow-intensity war\u201d, and that in any event she was not bound by the official definitions of the State. Besides, freedom of expression allowed her to use strong language when criticising official military policies.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the first applicant had been prosecuted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus any interference had been prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security and public order as well as preventing crime. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that by referring to the security forces\u2019 struggle against terrorism as a \u201cwar\u201d in the title of the exhibition, the first applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of the PKK. The Government further noted that members of the PKK were defined as \u201cguerrillas\u201d by persons who had connections with or supported the PKK, and that by referring to the deceased members of the PKK as guerrillas the first applicant had considered them heroes. The Government submitted that the first applicant had not defined the persons whose photographs had been displayed as members of a terrorist organisation. The Government also argued that the exhibition had not reflected any sociological work, and that the content of the visitors\u2019 book showed that the first applicant had encouraged the public to participate in the terrorist organisation. The Government lastly noted that the exhibition had been held in Diyarbak\u0131r, where the authorities had to be alert to acts capable of fuelling violence.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the interference with the first applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression was based on section 7(2) of Law\u00a0no.\u00a03713. In the light of its conclusion below (see paragraph 35), the Court considers that it is not required to conduct an examination of the \u201clawfulness\u201d of the interference. Moreover, the Court is prepared to accept that, in the present case, the national authorities may be considered to have pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security and preventing disorder and crime (see Faruk Temel v. Turkey, no. 16853\/05, \u00a7 52, 1\u00a0February 2011).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Court notes that it has already examined similar grievances in a number of cases and found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention (see, for example,Erdo\u011fdu and \u0130nce v. Turkey [GC], nos. 25067\/94 and\u00a025068\/94, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a032-55, ECHR 1999\u2011IV; Gerger v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a024919\/94, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034-52, 8\u00a0July 1999;Ko\u00e7 and Tamba\u015f v. Turkey, no. 50934\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 25-40, 21\u00a0March 2006; Ulusoy v. Turkey, no. 52709\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 31-49, 31 July 2007; Savg\u0131n v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 13304\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 39-48, 2 February 2010; G\u00fcl and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 4870\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 32-45, 8 June 2010; Mente\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey (no.\u00a02), no.\u00a033347\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 39-54, 25 January 2011; K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 and Eren v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a043807\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 20-31, 29 November 2011; FarukTemel,cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a058-64; Yavuz and Yaylal\u0131v. Turkey, no. 12606\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a042-55, 17\u00a0December 2013; \u00d6ner and T\u00fcrk, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 19-27, 31\u00a0March 2015; and Belge v. Turkey, no. 50171\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a024-38, 6 December 2016).The Court has examined the present case and considers that the Government have not put forward any argument which would require it to reach a different conclusion in this case.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that within the context of the exhibition held by the Cooperative on 30 May and 1 June 2005, photographs of deceased members of the PKK, deceased members of the security forces who had been killed during security operations, persons who had lost their lives in prison, victims of enforced disappearances and victims of assassinations by unknown assailants in south-east Turkey were publicly displayed. The exhibition also included statements from family members of deceased and disappeared individuals presenting their relatives. Most of those family members also affirmed their wish for peace in their statements. The Court further observes that,when convicting the first applicant, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court noted that the invitations to the exhibition had referred to the armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK as a \u201cwar\u201d, and the PKK members as \u201cguerrillas\u201d. In that court\u2019s view, the first applicant had thus glorified the deceased terrorists and incited young people to become members of the PKK. The court further noted that a \u201cwar\u201d was an armed conflict between two states and a \u201cguerrilla\u201d was an armed person who fought against unjust occupation. The court also observed that a couple of photographs of deceased soldiers had also been displayed in order to conceal the accused\u2019s intention to incite young people to join the PKK.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the expressions \u201cwar\u201d and \u201cguerrilla\u201d by themselves do not incite to violence (see, in particular,Erdo\u011fdu and \u0130nce,cited above, \u00a7 52, in which the Court considered that an interview published in a monthly review in which members of the PKK had been referred to as \u201cguerrillas\u201d had not constituted an incitement to violence and could not be construed as liable to incite to violence; Gerger,cited above, \u00a7 50, andBelge cited above, \u00a7 34, in which the Court held that the applicants\u2019 speeches, which had referred to members of the PKK as \u201cguerrillas\u201d, had constituted political criticism of the Turkish authorities and not an incitement to violence, armed resistance or an uprising; and Ko\u00e7 and Tamba\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 38, and Ulusoy, cited above, \u00a7 48, in which the Court considered that articles published and written by the applicants, in which the authors had described the State security forces\u2019 actions against the PKK as a \u201cdirty war\u201d, had constituted a critical assessment of Turkey\u2019s policies concerning the Kurdish problem, and had not encouraged violence, armed resistance or insurrection,or amounted to hate speech). Besides, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court did not conduct an assessment of the content of the exhibition as a whole. It focused on the use of those two expressions and found that their use had constituted the dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined the content of the exhibition in its entirety and considers that, as a whole, it cannot be construed as encouraging violence, armed resistance or an uprising (see Belge, cited above, \u00a7 34). On the contrary, most of the relatives of the deceased and disappeared persons made statements which were in favour of peace in Turkey and finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. The Court further observes that the first\u2011instance court failed to examine whether the content of the exhibition had had any adverse impact on public order. In this connection, the Court notes that there is no indication in the case file that the people who had visited the exhibition engaged in acts of violence after visiting it (see K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 and Eren v. Turkey, no.\u00a043807\/07, \u00a7 27, 29 November 2011).<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the reasons given by the national courts to justify the first applicant\u2019s criminal conviction pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 were not \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d for the purposes of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court reiterates that the nature and severity of the penalty imposed are also factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference. In that regard, the Court notes the severity of the penalty imposed on the first applicant, that is to say two\u00a0years\u2019 imprisonment which she served(see Karata\u015f v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a023168\/94, \u00a7 53, ECHR 1999\u2011IV).<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, and having regard to the interpretation of section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 by the national courts, the Court concludes that the interference in question was not \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d (see Faruk Temel,cited above, \u00a7 64).<\/p>\n There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. She also claimed EUR 2,200 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the first applicant\u2019s claims as excessive and undocumented.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the first applicant EUR\u00a05,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On the other hand, in the absence of any document in support of her claim for costs and expenses, the Court rejects the claim under this head.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaint brought by the first applicant under Article 10 of the Convention admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three months,EUR\u00a05,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the first applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 September 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Paul Lemmens
\nValeriu Gri\u0163co,
\nSt\u00e9phanie Mourou-Vikstr\u00f6m, judges,
\nand Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n