37685\/10 and 22768\/12<\/a>, \u00a7\u00a0126, ECHR 2018). Articles 8 and 14 provide as follows:<\/p>\nArticle 8<\/p>\n
\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n
Article 14<\/p>\n
\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n23.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that neither Article 8 nor Article 14 was applicable in the instant case as it concerned a right which was not secured by the Convention, namely the right to access to a particular profession.<\/p>\n
24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested that claim.<\/p>\n
25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already examined and rejected the Government\u2019s preliminary objection in the case of EmelBoyraz(cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 38-46). The Court finds no particular circumstances in the present case which would require it to depart from that conclusion. The Court considers that Article 14 of the Convention is applicable in the circumstances of this case, taken in conjunction with Article 8, and rejects the Government\u2019s objection.<\/p>\n
26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that there had been an objective and reasonable justification for the refusal of the domestic authorities to appoint the applicant to the post of security officer. They noted that the post in question had been reserved for male candidates in view of the nature of the service, which involved bearing and using firearms. They submitted that male candidates had already received training in use of firearms and were able to work in rural areas and at night time, where necessary.<\/p>\n
28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that being a woman was not an obstacle to use firearms and working in rural areas and at night time. She noted that women were employed as police and prison officers.<\/p>\n
29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the case of EmelBoyraz(cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a048\u201156), which raised the same issues as those in the present case, it held that this difference in treatment between women and men, of which the applicant had been a victim, was not objectively and reasonably justified under Article 14.<\/p>\n
30.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. In particular, in the Court\u2019s view, the mere fact that security officers had to work on night shifts and in rural areas and might be required to use firearms and physical force under certain conditions could not in itself justify the difference in treatment between men and women. Besides, Ms Can worked as a security officer between 1 April 2003 and 19 March 2004 and that there was nothing in that case file to indicate that the applicant had failed to fulfil her duties as a security officer in TEDA\u015e because of her sex.<\/p>\n
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8.<\/p>\n
III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
31.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n
\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 55,962.45 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage in her submissions dated 14 September 2014. She contended that she had been deprived of a salary and her pension rights between 2000 and 2014. In that connection, she noted that when she had been employed at the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015ebetween 1 April 2003 and 19\u00a0March 2004, her salary had been EUR 139. In support of her claim for pecuniary damage, the applicant submitted a table indicating the minimum wage scales between 1996 and 2014 and a document prepared by the Social Security Institution of Turkey indicating calculation of amounts concerning minimum wages. The applicant also claimed EUR 25,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n
33.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those claims.<\/p>\n
34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the applicant was dismissed from her post on account of her sex, which the Court has found to be discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. The loss of her employment undoubtedly deprived the applicant of her main source of income. Hence, there is a direct causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage claimed, which has to be reimbursed in such a way as to restore, as far as possible, the situation existing before the breach (see, inter alia, Rainys and Gasparavi\u010dius v.\u00a0Lithuania, nos. 70665\/01 and 74345\/01, \u00a7 45, 7 April 2005). However, the Court notes that a precise calculation of the sums necessary to make complete reparation (restitutio in integrum) in respect of the pecuniary loss suffered by the applicant is prevented by the inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the violations. This is particularly so in relation to the question of how long the applicant would have remained in TEDA\u015e had it not been for her dismissal. Nevertheless, an award may still be made notwithstanding the large number of imponderables involved in the assessment of future losses, though the greater the lapse of time involved the more uncertain the link becomes between the breach and the damage. The question to be decided in such cases is the level of just satisfaction, in respect of both past and future pecuniary loss, which it is necessary to award to each applicant, the matter to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable (see Lustig-Prean and Beckett v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 31417\/96 and 32377\/96, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a022-23, 25\u00a0July 2000, and Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 33985\/96 and 33986\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 18-19, ECHR 2000\u2011IX).<\/p>\n
35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant did not provide information to the Court as to how long she had remained unemployed after she had been dismissed from her position in TEDA\u015e or whether she had taken any steps to mitigate her loss of earnings. The Court therefore finds it difficult to ascertain the precise amount of pecuniary damage which ensued. At the same time, it considers that the applicant would have been able to work as a security officer at least between 27 June 2000 (the date on which she was notified that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e) and 1 April 2003 (the date on which she started working subsequent to the first-instance court\u2019s judgment in her favour). Moreover, had the administrative courts prevented the violation found under Article\u00a014 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant would have been able to obtain redress for her loss of income concerning the period starting from her dismissal until the date of the final judgment in the domestic proceedings. The Court also considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage which the finding of a violation of the Convention in this judgment does not suffice to remedy. Therefore, taking into account the number of imponderables involved in the assessment of the applicant\u2019s loss of earnings and in the light of all the information in its possession, the Court decides on an equitable basis to award the applicant an aggregate sum of EUR\u00a011,000 under all heads of damage combined, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 6769,11 for his lawyer\u2019s fee incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court. In support of his claim the applicant submitted the Turkish Bar Association\u2019s scale of fees.<\/p>\n
37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.<\/p>\n
38.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant merely referred to the Istanbul Bar Association\u2019s scale of fees and failed to submit any supporting documents. In those circumstances, and bearing in mind the terms of Rule 60 \u00a7 2 and 3 of its Rules, the Court makes no award in respect of the costs and expenses claimed by the applicant (see, inter alia, Hasan D\u00f6nerv. Turkey, no. 53546\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a059\u201161, 20\u00a0November 2007, and Y\u0131lmaz Y\u0131ld\u0131zand Others v. Turkey, no.\u00a04524\/06, \u00a7 57, 14 October 2014).<\/p>\n
C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe application admissible;<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention;<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant within three months, EUR 11,000 (eleven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 September 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n
Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 LediBianku
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n