THIRD SECTION
\nDECISION<\/p>\n
Application no. 64232\/16
\nGordana NI\u0160EVI\u0106 TADI\u0106
\nagainst Serbia<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 25\u00a0September 2018 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Pere Pastor Vilanova, President,
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides, judges,
\nand Fato\u015f Arac\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 October 2016,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n The applicant, Ms Gordana Ni\u0161evi\u0107 Tadi\u0107, is a Serbian national, who was born in 1966 and lives in Novi Sad. The applicant is an attorney.<\/p>\n The Serbian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms N. Plav\u0161i\u0107.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The facts as submitted by the Applicant<\/em><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 October 2016 the applicant lodged an application invoking the fairness and length issues in the context of the civil proceedings concerning ownership rights over certain property.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, the civil proceedings in question were brought in April 2002, and she was one of three initial plaintiffs. The first instance decision was rendered in June 2013, and the second instance decision in October 2013. In December 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court, which court rendered its decision in April 2016. Before the Court the applicant complained under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the fairness and the length of the civil proceedings, and sought compensation in the amount of 20,000\u00a0EUR.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The facts as submitted by the Government<\/em><\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On basis of the facts and documents in the case file, the applicant\u2019s length complaint was communicated to the Government on 5 October 2017, while the fairness complaint was declared inadmissible upon communication. A friendly settlement in the amount of 3,000 euros was also proposed. The applicant accepted the friendly settlement, whereas the Government sent their observations.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0In their submissions, however, the Government submitted that the impugned civil proceedings had indeed been initiated in 2002, but only by two plaintiffs, A.H. and M.H.V., excluding the applicant. It was only in November 2011 that the applicant informed the first instance court that she would join the proceedings as the third plaintiff, which was acknowledged and accepted at the hearing held in March 2013. In support of these claims, the Government submitted copies of the applicant\u2019s submission of November 2011 and of the minutes of the hearing held in March 2013. Additionally, the Government submitted that the decision of the Constitutional Court of April 2016 did not concern the applicant. The Constitutional Court instead decided upon the applicant\u2019s complaints later, in October 2017. In support of this claim the Government submitted a copy of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 31 October 2017.<\/p>\n COMPLAINT<\/strong><\/p>\n The applicant complained that the length of civil proceedings had been incompatible with the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, nevertheless, did not raise the question of the applicant\u2019s abuse of her right to lodge an application. In their observations the Government submitted that the applicant had failed to raise her length complaint and a request for non-pecuniary damage properly in her constitutional appeal, and that the impugned civil proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case lasted only two years, and that, therefore, the length complaint was unfounded.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0In her reply to the Government\u2019s observations the applicant submitted that they were without significance (\u201cbez zna\u010daja\u201d) and that she properly exhausted all available remedies at the domestic level. She also submitted a request for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 3,000 euros.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention allows it to declare inadmissible any application that it considers to be \u201can abuse of the right of individual application\u201d.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0In the S.A.S. judgment (S.A.S.v. France [GC], no.\u00a043835\/11, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts)) the Grand Chamber held as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates in this connection that the implementation of … [Article\u00a035 \u00a7 3 (a)] … is an \u201cexceptional procedural measure\u201d and that the concept of \u201cabuse\u201d refers to its ordinary meaning, namely, the harmful exercise of a right by its holder in a manner that is inconsistent with the purpose for which such right is granted (see Miro\u013cubovs and Others v.\u00a0Latvia, no.\u00a0798\/05, \u00a7 62, 15 September 2009). In that connection, the Court has noted that for such \u201cabuse\u201d to be established on the part of the applicant it requires not only manifest inconsistency with the purpose of the right of application but also some hindrance to the proper functioning of the Court or to the smooth conduct of the proceedings before it (ibid., \u00a7 65).<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has applied that provision in four types of situation (see Miro\u013cubovs and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 62-66). First, in the case of applications which were knowingly based on untrue facts (see Varbanov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 31365\/96, \u00a7 36, ECHR 2000\u2011X), whether there had been falsification of documents in the file (see, for example, Jian v. Romania (dec.), no.\u00a046640\/99, 30 March 2004) or failure to inform the Court of an essential item of evidence for its examination of the case (see, for example, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963\/99, \u00a7 89, 20 June 2002, and Kerechashvili v.\u00a0Georgia (dec.), no. 5667\/02, 2 May 2006) or of new major developments in the course of the proceedings (see, for example, [Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a067810\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 35 and 36, ECHR 2014, and] Predescu v. Romania, no.\u00a021447\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a025-27, 2 December 2008). Secondly, in cases where an applicant had used particularly vexatious, contemptuous, threatening or provocative expressions in his correspondence with the Court (see, for example, \u0158eh\u00e1k v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 67208\/01, 18 May 2004). Thirdly, in cases where an applicant had deliberately breached the confidentiality of negotiations for a friendly settlement (see, for example, Hadrabov\u00e1 and Others v. the Czech Republic (dec.), nos. 42165\/02 and 466\/03, 25 September 2007, and Deceuninck v. France (dec.), no.\u00a047447\/08, 13\u00a0December 2011). Fourthly, in cases where applicants had repeatedly sent quibbling and manifestly ill-founded applications resembling an application they had previously lodged that had been declared inadmissible (see Anibal Vieira & Filhos LDA and Maria Rosa Ferreira da Costa LDA v. Portugal (dec.), nos. 980\/12 and 18385\/12, 13\u00a0November 2012; see also the Commission decisions M. v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a013284\/87, 15 October 1987, and Philis v. Greece, no. 28970\/95, 17\u00a0October 1996).\u201d<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the absence of the Government\u2019s initial objection as regards the abuse of the right of petition does not preclude it from examining the matter proprio motu. It is, indeed, for the Court itself and not the respondent Government to monitor compliance with the procedural obligations imposed by the Convention and its Rules on the applicant party (see Miro\u013cubovs and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070). The Court, therefore, has both a right and an obligation to monitor such compliance taking into account all relevant information, whether it happens to be provided by the parties themselves or is otherwise publicly available (see Zarubica v. Serbia (dec.), no. 35044\/07and 2 others, \u00a730, 18\u00a0June 2015).<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, particularly because the applicant had knowingly based her application on untrue facts and failed to provide the Court with complete and valid documentation, and because she herself is an attorney, which is why she should clearly have known better the Court\u2019s Rules of the Procedure and the jurisprudence, the Court is of the opinion that the applicant\u2019s conduct constitutes an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 18 October 2018.<\/p>\n Fato\u015f Arac\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Pere Pastor Vilanova
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n