FIFTH SECTION
\nCASE OF ANNEN v. GERMANY (No. 3)
\n(Application no. 3687\/10)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n20 September 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n20\/12\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Annen v. Germany (no. 3),<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Yonko Grozev, President, Having deliberated in private on 28 August 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 3687\/10) against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a German national, Mr Klaus G\u00fcnter Annen (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 15 January 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr L. Eck, a lawyer practising in Passau. The German Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agents, Mr H.\u2011J. Behrens and Ms K. Behr, of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that a civil injunction, ordering him to desist from asserting that a doctor performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice, had violated his freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 January 2017 the complaint concerning Article 10 of the Convention was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 November 2004 and 7 December 2004 the applicant distributed leaflets in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice of Dr S. The leaflets contained, inter alia, the following text on the front page:<\/p>\n \u201cDid you know that Dr S. [full name and address] performs abortions that are unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court?\u201d (Wussten Sie schon, dass Dr S. … Abtreibungen durchf\u00fchrt, die nach der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts rechtswidrig sind?)<\/p>\n Underneath, the following was in smaller type:<\/p>\n \u201cAccording to international criminal law: aggravated murder is the intentional \u2018bringing-to-death\u2019 of an innocent human being.\u201d(Sinngem\u04d3\u03b2 aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vors\u04d3tzliche \u201cZu-Tode-Bringen\u201d eines unschuldigen Menschen!)<\/p>\n The back side of the folded leaflet contained the following text:<\/p>\n \u201cThe aggravated murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NSState allowed the aggravated murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability.\u201d (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.)<\/p>\n The applicant further quoted parts of the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s leading judgmentof 28\u00a0May 1993 (BVerfGE 88, 203)(see paragraph 17 below) with regard to abortion and a statement by Christoph-Wilhelm Hufeland, the personal physician of Goethe and Schiller. He also cited section 12(1) of the Conflicts in Pregnancy Act(see paragraph 17 below) and asked readers to make use of their influence on those performing and assisting in abortions.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter of 23 December 2004 Dr S.requested that the applicant sign a declaration to cease and desist. The applicant refused and published the following statement on his website:<\/p>\n \u201cIf Dr S.[full name], by carrying out abortions, publicly shows that he agrees with abortions, then he should stand by his opinion. Instead Dr S.considers the leaflet campaign to be slander, threatens an interim injunction and has already given his lawyer a mandate to lodge a criminal complaint for defamation\/slander. Weaskourselves: Is Dr S.unprincipledandcharacterless?\u201d(Wenn Dr S.mit der Durchf\u00fchrung von Abtreibungen \u00f6ffentlich bekundet, dass er f\u00fcr Abtreibungen ist, dann sollte er auch dazu stehen. Stattdessen sieht Dr S.in der Flugblatt-Verteilaktion eine Rufmordkampagne, droht mit einer einstweiligen Verf\u00fcgung und hat bereits seinem Rechtsanwalt die Vollmacht gegeben, eine Strafanzeige wegen Beleidigung\/Verleumdung zu erwirken. Wirfragenuns: Ist Dr S.stand- und charakterlos?)<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently Dr S. applied to the Karlsruhe Regional Court for a civil injunction ordering the applicant not to claim on the Internet that the plaintiff performed unlawful abortions and not to disseminate leaflets containing his name and the assertion that unlawful abortions were performed in his medical practice. He also lodged a claim for non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 20,000 euros (EUR) and for pre-trial legal fees.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 September 2005, the date of the oral hearing before the Karlsruhe Regional Court, the applicant distributed a second leaflet directly in front of Dr S.\u2019s practice. Among other places, the applicant deposited this second leaflet, in which Dr S. was not mentioned by name, into letterboxes in the immediate vicinity of the latter\u2019s practice.The following sentence was on the front side of the leaflet:<\/p>\n \u201cNear you: unlawful ABORTIONS…and YOU are silent about the AGGRAVATED MURDER of our CHILDREN?\u201d (In Ihrer N\u00e4he: rechtswidrige ABTREIBUNGEN … und SIE schweigen zum MORD an unseren KINDERN?)[Emphases in original]<\/p>\n The back of the folded leaflet contained the following text:<\/p>\n \u201cThese pre-natal infanticides have meanwhile taken on proportions that bring tomind a new HOLOCAUST!\u201d(Diese vorgeburtlichen Kindst\u00f6tungen haben mittlerweile Ausma\u00dfe angenommen, welche an einen \u201eneuen HOLOCAUST\u201c erinnern!)[Emphases in original]<\/p>\n Farther down the leaflet read:<\/p>\n \u201cI\u2019m simply unable to understand that medical personnel and doctors, who are supposed to help and save lives, stoop to take part in aggravated murder.\u201d(Noch weniger kann ich verstehen, dass Mediziner und \u00c4rzte, welche helfen und Leben retten sollen, sich f\u00fcr\u2019s Morden hergeben)<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 November 2005 the Karlsruhe Regional Court granted the requested injunction and ordered the applicant to desist from asserting publicly, both in writing and orally, on the Internet as well as on leaflets, that the plaintiff performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice. In addition, the Regional Court awarded compensation for the pecuniary damage requested by the plaintiff (EUR 811.88) and dismissed the claim in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0The court held that the applicant\u2019s statements were protected by freedom of expression and contributed to a public debate. Moreover, they had to be classified as statements of fact and, as such, the information that abortions were unlawful was in line with the judgment of the Constitutional Court and not incorrect. However, when read in conjunction with the whole leaflet, the statements had a \u201cpillory effect\u201d and amounted to a serious interference with Dr S.\u2019s personality rights, which was not justified by the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. The court came to this conclusion based on the facts that the applicant had singled out Dr S. by mentioning him by name and distributing the leaflets in the vicinity of his practice, that he had quoted the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment only in parts and had omitted the parts that stated that doctors had not been subject to criminal liability, that he had implied by defining aggravated murder that Dr S. had committed this criminal offence and that he had associated Dr S. with the Holocaust. Nonetheless, in regard to non-pecuniary damage the court concluded that even though the attacks on Dr S.\u2019s reputation hadbeen grave enough to justify the injunction, they had not been sufficiently serious to justify non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant and Dr S. appealed against the Regional Court\u2019s decision. Additionally Dr S.expanded his action to include the second leaflet (see paragraph 9 above), which subsequently became the subject matter of the judgment of the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal confirmed the reasoning of the Regional Court andin essence dismissed both appeals. However, itpartly modified the Regional Court\u2019s judgment concerning the precise wording of the requested injunction. It ordered the applicant to desist from asserting in public that Dr S. performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice and asserting in direct connection to this that \u201caggravated murder is the intentional \u2018bringing-to-death\u2019 of an innocent human being\u201d. The Court of Appeal further ordered the applicant to desist from asserting that Dr S. performed unlawful abortions causing \u201cinfanticide\u201d. At the outset, it emphasised that the applicant\u2019s view that abortions should be subject to criminal liability and were not compatible with higher-ranking law fell within the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. However, the court also noted that the very wording of the applicant\u2019s statements showed that he labelled abortions, as performed by the plaintiff,aggravated murder, which could not be tolerated, neither if the statements were considered statements of fact nor if considered value judgments. In the court\u2019s view the applicant had created an unacceptable \u201cpillory effect\u201d by singling out the plaintiff, who had not given the applicant any reason to do so. In that regard the court noted that Dr S. had not been involved in the public debate about abortions in any way.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0In regard to the second leaflet the Court of Appeal held that even though Dr S. had not been mentioned by name, it had referred to him as it had been distributed in front of his medical practice and deposited in letterboxes in the vicinity. Similarly to the first leaflet, a not negligible part of the readers would have understood from the leaflet that Dr S.\u2019s professional activities had constituted aggravated murder. However, even if understood in a non-legal sense, the leaflet had madeit understood that the applicant had conducted illegal and punishable abortions. Since the applicant had not clarified that he had only been criticising abortions, which were according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (see paragraph 17 below) unlawful but not subject to criminal liability, he had exceeded the limits of justifiable criticism.As to the claim for damages the Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance judgment. It also did not grant leave to appeal on points of law.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid for his complaint against the denial of leave to appeal on points of law on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint lodged by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1659\/07).<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law and practice have been set out in the Court\u2019s judgment in the caseAnnen (no. 2) (no. 3682\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 13 \u2013 18, 20\u00a0September 2018).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the injunction, ordering him to desist from asserting that Dr S. performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice, had violated his freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the Convention, which reads, inso far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. …<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ….\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is neitherinadmissible for non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Annen v. Germany, no.\u00a03690\/10,\u00a7\u00a7\u00a037-40, 26 November 2015) nor manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal\u2019s desist order had interfered with his freedom of expression without being justified by the protection of the personality rights of Dr\u00a0S. He submitted that his leaflets had contributed to a public debate and had not personally attacked Dr S., but had criticised the legal situation in Germany under which abortions performed by a doctor within twelve weeks of conception and following obligatory counselling were considered to be unlawful, but were exempt from criminal liability. The use of the term \u201caggravated murder\u201d did not have to be understood as a legal qualification of Dr S.\u2019s professional activities but as critique of the \u201ckilling\u201d of unborn children. The applicant further submitted that abortions could be considered aggravated murder in a legal sense, since the killing of defenseless unborn babies could be seen as malicious, within the meaningof Article 211 of the Criminal Code. In any case, in the light of his contribution to a public debate of great importance, possible interferences with doctors\u2019 personality rights had to be justified.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the injunction by the Court of Appeal had not violated the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. The courts had carefully weighed the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression against the rights ofDr S., arising from Article 8 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. They acknowledged that the applicant had made his statement in the context of the public debate about abortion. Within the scope of its margin of appreciation, the domestic courts had come to the compelling conclusion that the statements in the leaflets, distributed by the applicant, had constituted such a serious violation of Dr S.\u2019s personality rights as to justify a restriction on the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the domestic courtshad carried out an extensive analysis of the leaflets, discussed various conceivable possibilities of interpretation and come to the convincing conclusion that Dr S. hadbeen pilloried as a supposed lawbreaker. Based on this conclusion it had issued an injunction which hadbeen limited to the claim that Dr S. had performed unlawful abortions and had put these within the same context as \u201caggravated murder\u201d, and\/or expressly characterising them as \u201cinfanticide\u201d. The applicant had not been prohibited from taking a public \u2013 and very clear \u2013 stance against abortion and the Court of Appeal had even emphasised the applicant\u2019s right, protected by freedom of expression, to characterise abortion as an injustice. Moreover, he had also not been prohibited per se from personally and sharply criticising abortion providers such as Dr S. for their activities.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court considers \u2013 and this is not in dispute between the parties \u2013 that the injunction interfered with the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression, had a legal basis and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and reputation of Dr S. It therefore remains to be determined whether the interference was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d and whether the balancing exercise undertaken by the domestic courts was in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court\u2019s case-law.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The fundamental principles concerning the question of whether an interference with freedom of expression is \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d are well established in theCourt\u2019s case-law and have recently been summarised as follows (see Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569\/09, \u00a7 131, 16 June 2015 with further references):<\/p>\n \u201c(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual\u2019s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to \u2018information\u2019 or \u2018ideas\u2019 that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no \u2018democratic society\u2019. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which … must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly …<\/p>\n (ii) The adjective \u2018necessary\u2019, within the meaning of Article 10 \u00a7 2, implies the existence of a \u2018pressing social need\u2019. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a \u2018restriction\u2019 is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.<\/p>\n (iii) The Court\u2019s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was \u2018proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued\u2019 and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are \u2018relevant and sufficient\u2019… In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article\u00a010 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts …\u201d<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that the right to protection of reputation is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (see Chauvy and Others v. France, no. 64915\/01, \u00a7 70, ECHR\u00a02004-VI; Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556\/03, \u00a7 35, 15 November 2007; and Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, no. 34147\/06, \u00a7 40, 21\u00a0September 2010). In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person\u2019s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be made in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see A. v. Norway, no. 28070\/06, \u00a7 64, 9 April 2009; Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954\/08, \u00a7 83, 7 February 2012; and Delfi AS, cited above, \u00a7 137). In cases that concerned allegations of criminal conduct the Court also took into account that under Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention individuals have a right to be presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proved guilty (see, among other authorities, Worm v.\u00a0Austria, 29 August 1997, \u00a7 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011V and Du Roy and Malaurie v. France, no. 34000\/96, \u00a7 34, ECHR\u00a02000-X).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0When examining whether there is a need for an interference with freedom of expression in a democratic society in the interests of the \u201cprotection of the reputation or rights of others\u201d, the Court may be required to ascertain whether the domestic authorities have struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in certain cases, namely on the one hand freedom of expression protected by Article 10, and on the other the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 (see Hachette Filipacchi Associ\u00e9s v. France, no. 71111\/01, \u00a7 43, 14 June 2007; MGN Limited v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, no. 39401\/04, \u00a7 142, 18 January 2011; Axel\u00a0Springer AG, cited above, \u00a7 84 and Delfi AS, cited above, \u00a7 138).<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0Although opinions may differ on the outcome of a judgment, where a balancing exercise was undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court\u2019s case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (see Lillo-Stenberg and S\u00e6ther v. Norway, no. 13258\/09, \u00a7 44, 16\u00a0January 2014 with references to Axel Springer AG, cited above, \u00a7 88, and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660\/08 and 60641\/08, \u00a7\u00a0107, ECHR 2012).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that while the Regional Court considered the statements to be statements of fact, the Court of Appeal left this question open as in both cases the applicant\u2019s statements had not been justified. It considered that while strictly speaking calling abortions unlawful was correct, the statement read in conjunction with the rest of leaflet could be understood as alleging that Dr\u00a0S.\u2019s professional activities constituted aggravated murder.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has held in a previous decision (see Annen v. Germany (dec.), nos. 2373\/07, 2396\/07, 30 March 2010) that:<\/p>\n \u201c…German law, under Article 218a of the Criminal Code, draws a fine line between abortions which are considered to be \u201cunlawful\u201d, but exempt from criminal liability, and those abortions which are considered as justified and thus \u201clawful\u201d. It follows that the applicant\u2019s statement that the physician performed \u2013 among others \u2013 \u201cunlawful abortions\u201d was correct from a strictly judicial point of view. However, having regard to the fact that the applicant primarily addressed his statement to laypersons, the Court accepts that the domestic courts also took into account the point of view of a reasonable man with ordinary susceptibility, who would assume that the \u201cunlawful\u201d abortions were forbidden in a stricter sense and subject to criminal liability.\u201d<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the present case is comparable to the case of Annen v. Germany (dec.) (cited above), as the leaflets provided no further explanation regarding the fact that doctors providing abortions were exempt from criminal liability under Article 218a of the Criminal Code. In contrast, the applicant even reinforced the assumption that the abortions provided by Dr\u00a0S. were subject to criminal liability by providing his own definition of aggravated murder in international law in the first leaflet and calling abortions \u201cinfanticide\u201d in the second leaflet. The Court therefore agrees with the domestic courts, that, when taking into account the leaflets as a whole, they could be understood as alleging that Dr S.\u2019s professional activities constituted aggravated murder. This conclusion is not called into question by the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Annen (cited above), since in that case the leaflet in question had provided sufficiently clear further explanation, according to which the abortions were not subject to criminal liability.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would further reiterate that while the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. However, even where a statement amounts to a value judgment, there must be a sufficient factual basis to support it, failing which it will be excessive (see Jerusalem v. Austria, no. \u00a026958\/95, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2001\u2011II). The Court notes that the applicant has neither in the domestic proceedings nor before the Court submitted any indication that Dr S. committed aggravated murder or that the abortions performed by him were subject to criminal liability. Moreover, in so far as the applicant argued before the Court that abortions could be considered aggravated murderwithin the meaning of Article 211 of the Criminal Code, the Court notes that there is no evidence for that argument in domestic law or domestic case-law. In contrast, Article 218 of the Criminal Code clearly defines abortions that are not exempted from criminal liability under Article 218a of the Criminal Code. In sum, the Court finds that, even assuming that the applicant\u2019s statements were to be considered value judgments, there was not a sufficient factual basis for calling abortions as performed by Dr S. \u201cmurder\u201d. In that regard the Court also notes that these accusations were not only very serious, something reflected in the fact that a conviction for aggravated murder would carry a life sentence, but might also incite to hatred and aggression.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0In regard to the seriousness of the sanction imposed on the applicant, the Court observes that he was not criminally convicted for slander or ordered to pay damages (contrastPedersenandBaadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017\/99, \u00a7 93, ECHR 2004\u2011XI). In addition the injunction was limited in scope and \u201conly\u201d prevented the applicant from stating that Dr S. was performing unlawful abortions and putting these within the same context as \u201caggravated murder\u201d, and\/or expressly characterising them as \u201cinfanticide\u201d. In that regard the Court notes that the applicant was not per se prohibited from campaigning against abortions or criticisingdoctors that conducted abortions.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that the domestic courts carried out a detailed analysis of the leaflets and discussed various possibilities of interpreting the statements therein. It is therefore satisfied that the legal protection received by the applicant at the domestic level was compatible with the procedural requirements of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances the Court concludes that the injunction was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of the rights and reputation of Dr S., and that the reasons given by the domestic courts were relevant and sufficient. The interference with the applicant\u2019s exercise of his right to freedom of expression could therefore reasonably be regarded by the domestic courts as necessary in a democratic society.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaint concerning Article 10 of the Convention admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 September 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Claudia Westerdiek\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Yonko Grozev
\nAngelika Nu\u00dfberger,
\nAndr\u00e9 Potocki,
\nS\u00edofra O\u2019Leary,
\nM\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits,
\nL\u04d9tif H\u00fcseynov,
\nLado Chanturia, judges,
\nand Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n