{"id":5535,"date":"2019-05-22T17:07:03","date_gmt":"2019-05-22T17:07:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=5535"},"modified":"2019-11-01T18:08:20","modified_gmt":"2019-11-01T18:08:20","slug":"majcan-v-croatia-european-court-of-human-rights","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=5535","title":{"rendered":"MAJCAN v. CROATIA (European Court of Human Rights)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: center;\">SECOND SECTION<br \/>\nDECISION<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">Application no. 45366\/14<br \/>\nJosip MAJCAN<br \/>\nagainst Croatia<\/p>\n<p>The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 18\u00a0September 2018 as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n<p>I\u015f\u0131lKaraka\u015f, President,<br \/>\nJulia Laffranque,<br \/>\nPaul Lemmens,<br \/>\nValeriu Gri\u0163co,<br \/>\nKsenijaTurkovi\u0107,<br \/>\nJon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro,<br \/>\nGeorges Ravarani, judges,<br \/>\nand Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n<p>Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 June 2014,<\/p>\n<p>Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n<p>Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Mr Josip Majcan, is a Croatian national who was born in 1943 and lives in Buzet. He was represented before the Court by Mr\u00a0I.\u00a0Milanovi\u0107, a lawyer practising in Umag.<\/p>\n<p>2.\u00a0\u00a0The Croatian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms \u0160. Sta\u017enik.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>3.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n<p><em>1.\u00a0\u00a0Background to the case<\/em><\/p>\n<p>4.\u00a0\u00a0The legal system of the former Yugoslavia prohibited the acquisition of ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession (dosjelost) unless the statutory requirements for doing so had been met by 6\u00a0April\u00a01941.<\/p>\n<p>5.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 October 1991 the Croatian Parliament lifted the above-mentioned ban.<\/p>\n<p>6.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently, the new Property Act of 1996, which entered into force on 1 January 1997, provided in section 388(4) that the period prior to 8\u00a0October 1991 was to be included in calculating the period for acquiring ownership of socially owned immovable property by adverse possession.<\/p>\n<p>7.\u00a0\u00a0By a decision of 17 November 1999 the Constitutional Court invalidated that provision as being contrary to the Croatian Constitution.<\/p>\n<p><em>2.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings in the present case<\/em><\/p>\n<p>8.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 November 2006 the applicant brought a civil action against the State in the Buzet Municipal Court (Op\u0107inskisud u Buzetu), seeking to be declared the owner of twelve plots of land and to have them registered in his name in the land register. He submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register as being in social ownership, had been in his and his ancestors\u2019 possession since the 1890s. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed, the applicant claimed to have acquired ownership of the land.<\/p>\n<p>9.\u00a0\u00a0By a judgment of 24 June 2008 the Buzet Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant.<\/p>\n<p>10.\u00a0\u00a0Following an appeal by the State, on 12 April 2010 the Pula County Court (\u017dupanijskisud u Puli) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for fresh consideration.<\/p>\n<p>11.\u00a0\u00a0In resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 24 December 2012 the Pazin Municipal Court (Op\u0107inskisud u Pazinu), to which the Buzet Municipal Court had in the meantime been annexed, dismissed the applicant\u2019s action.<\/p>\n<p>12.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 December 2013 the Pula County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final.<\/p>\n<p>13.\u00a0\u00a0The ordinary courts found that the applicant had proved that he and his predecessors had been in continuous possession of the property in good faith since 1947 until the present day, but not before that period. That being so, and given that in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8\u00a0October 1991 it had been legally impossible to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession (see paragraph 4 above), the statutory time\u2011limit for doing so could not, in the applicant\u2019s case, have even started to run before 8\u00a0October 1991. Furthermore, the time between 8\u00a0October\u00a01991 and the dates on which those courts had given their judgments was not sufficiently long as ownership of State-owned immovable property could have been acquired by adverse possession only after forty years of continuous uninterrupted possession in good faith.<\/p>\n<p>14.\u00a0\u00a0On 31 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He complained that the ordinary courts had dismissed his action and infringed his constitutionally guaranteed right of ownership because they had wrongly assessed the evidence. In particular, the courts had held that he had managed to prove that his ancestors had been in continuous possession of the property in question since 1947 but not before only because none of the witnesses who had given evidence in the proceedings had been born before 1943. In addition, the courts had completely ignored the statement given by one of the two oldest witnesses, who had testified that his father had told him that the land in question had been in the possession of the applicant\u2019s family even before 1947. In that way the ordinary courts had disregarded the collective memory of the small village (consisting of only ten houses) in which the land was located, where each family had known for generations which land belonged to whom and passed this information on by word of mouth from one generation to another.<\/p>\n<p>15.\u00a0\u00a0By a decision of 11 December 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible, finding that the case did not raise any constitutional issues. The court served its decision on the applicant\u2019s representative on 20 December 2013.<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant domestic law and practice<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>16.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law and practice is set out in the Grand Chamber case of Radomilja and Others v. Croatia ([GC], nos. <a href=\"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=8645\">37685\/10 and 22768\/12<\/a>, \u00a7\u00a7 46-61, ECHR 2018).<\/p>\n<p><strong>COMPLAINT<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>17.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions had been violated because the domestic courts had refused to acknowledge his ownership of land he had acquired by adverse possession.<\/p>\n<p><strong>THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the Pazin Municipal Court\u2019s judgment of 24 December 2012 had deprived him of property he had acquired by the operation of law. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n<p>The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><em>1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/em><\/p>\n<p>19.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed the admissibility of the application, arguing that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was not applicable to the present case, that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies and that the application was in any event manifestly ill\u2011founded.<\/p>\n<p>20.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Government averred that the present case had to be distinguished from the case of Trgo v. Croatia (no. 35298\/04, 11\u00a0June\u00a02009), in which the Court had found Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention applicable and had eventually found a violation of that Article. In particular, they submitted that, unlike in Trgo, in the present case the applicant had instituted civil proceedings after the Constitutional Court had invalidated section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). Accordingly, he could not have had legitimate expectations that that provision would be applied in his case and that his claim to be declared owner of the property in question would be allowed.<\/p>\n<p>21.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further stated that the applicant had fully agreed with that argument by admitting that his case had a factual and legal background different from the Trgo case (see paragraph 23 below). In the Government\u2019s view, his arguments as to why Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention was nevertheless applicable (see paragraphs 22 below) concerned questions of fact and the application of domestic law, which under the Convention were not the Court\u2019s task to examine.<\/p>\n<p><em>2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/em><\/p>\n<p>22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant replied that his civil action had been aimed at establishing that his ancestors had acquired the land in question by adverse possession before 6 April 1941. The domestic courts had held that he had succeeded in proving that his ancestors had been in continuous possession of the property in question since 1947 but not before only because none of the witnesses heard in the proceedings had been born before 1943. They had however completely ignored the collective memory of the small community where every family had always known to whom land belonged and passed this information on by word of mouth from generation to generation.<\/p>\n<p>23.\u00a0\u00a0In view of those arguments, the applicant submitted that the Government\u2019s argument referring to the Trgo case was not relevant in the present case. In particular, in his reply to the Government\u2019s observations he stated:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cEven though from the observations themselves it follows that the applicant Josip Majcan does not rely on the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991, this did not prevent the Government from [arguing] that in the said period it had not been possible to acquire ownership of socially owned immovable property by adverse possession. The applicant points out that his civil action had been aimed at establishing that the ownership of the immovable property [in question] had been acquired by adverse possession through his predecessors before 6 April 1941.<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>&#8230; the applicant points out that the Government has erroneously referred to the decision in [the case of] Trgo v. Croatia because the applicant did not argue that he had acquired ownership by adverse possession in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 but, on the contrary, [argued that he had] acquired [it] before 6\u00a0April\u00a01941.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an applicant may allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions relate to his or her \u201cpossessions\u201d within the meaning of that provision. \u201cPossessions\u201d can be \u201cexisting possessions\u201d or claims that are sufficiently established to be regarded as \u201cassets\u201d (see, for example, Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 142, and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n<p>25.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court first observes that the applicant\u2019s civil action before the domestic courts was aimed at establishing that his ancestors had acquired the land in question by adverse possession (see\u00a0paragraphs 8 and 22 above).<\/p>\n<p>26.\u00a0\u00a0It further notes that under Croatian law ownership will, in principle, be acquired by adverse possession ipso jure when all statutory conditions are met (see Trgo, cited above, \u00a7 46). However, it also notes that the question whether or not the applicant satisfied the statutory conditions for acquiring ownership by adverse possession was to be determined in the proceedings before the competent courts, and that he needed a declaratory judgment acknowledging his ownership in order to effectively enjoy his property. The Court therefore considers that the \u201cpossession\u201d relied on by the applicant was a claim rather than an \u201cexisting possession\u201d (see\u00a0Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 142-152).<\/p>\n<p>27.\u00a0\u00a0Where a proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim, it may be regarded as an \u201casset\u201d only if there is a sufficient basis for that interest in national law (for example, where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming it), that is, when the claim is sufficiently established as to be enforceable (see, for example, Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 142, and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n<p>28.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court takes note of the applicant\u2019s submission that his civil action was aimed at establishing that his ancestors had acquired the land at issue by adverse possession before 6\u00a0April 1941 and that therefore the Court\u2019s findings in Trgo were not relevant in his case (see\u00a0paragraphs 22-23 above).<\/p>\n<p>29.\u00a0\u00a0That being so, and having regard to the Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Radomilja and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 98-133), it must be concluded that the applicant limited the factual basis of his complaint, and thereby the scope of the case before the Court, to the period before 6\u00a0April\u00a01941. Consequently, the Court\u2019s findings in Trgo, which primarily relate to the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991, are not relevant in the present case.<\/p>\n<p>30.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the issue to be examined is whether the applicant\u2019s claim to be declared the owner of the land in question because his ancestors had acquired it by adverse possession before 6 April 1941 had sufficient basis in national law to be regarded as an \u201casset\u201d and therefore a \u201cpossession\u201d protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 144).<\/p>\n<p>31.\u00a0\u00a0It is to be noted in this regard that the applicant challenged certain findings of fact of the domestic courts (see paragraph 22 above). However, the Court reiterates that it is not its task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts, and that it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact made by those courts (see, for example, Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 150).<\/p>\n<p>32.\u00a0\u00a0Since, in the present case, there are no elements that would lead it to contradict the findings of fact of the domestic courts, the Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s claim to be declared the owner of the land in question because his ancestors had acquired it by adverse possession before 6\u00a0April\u00a01941 did not have sufficient basis in the national law to qualify as \u201cpossessions\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>33.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the present application is inadmissible as being incompatible rationemateriae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 thereof.<\/p>\n<p>34.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of this conclusion, the Court does not find it necessary to rule on the Government\u2019s remaining inadmissibility objections (see\u00a0paragraph 19 above).<\/p>\n<p>For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n<p>Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n<p>Done in English and notified in writing on 11 October 2018.<\/p>\n<p>Stanley Naismith\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 I\u015f\u0131lKaraka\u015f<br \/>\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n<div class=\"social-share-buttons\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer\/sharer.php?u=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=5535\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Facebook<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/intent\/tweet?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=5535&text=MAJCAN+v.+CROATIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Twitter<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/shareArticle?url=https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=5535&title=MAJCAN+v.+CROATIA+%28European+Court+of+Human+Rights%29\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">LinkedIn<\/a><a 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