{"id":5573,"date":"2019-05-23T17:30:54","date_gmt":"2019-05-23T17:30:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=5573"},"modified":"2021-09-22T07:55:46","modified_gmt":"2021-09-22T07:55:46","slug":"regulation-eu-no-1176-2011-of-the-european-parliament-and-of-the-council-of-16-november-2011-on-the-prevention-and-correction-of-macroeconomic-imbalances","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/laweuro.com\/?p=5573","title":{"rendered":"Regulation (EU) No 1176\/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances"},"content":{"rendered":"
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23.11.2011<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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EN<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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Official Journal of the European Union<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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L 306\/25<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

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REGULATION (EU) No 1176\/2011 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL<\/strong><\/p>\n

of 16 November 2011<\/strong><\/p>\n

on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances<\/strong><\/p>\n

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,<\/p>\n

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 121(6) thereof,<\/p>\n

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,<\/p>\n

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,<\/p>\n

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank\u00a0(1<\/span>),<\/p>\n

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee\u00a0(2<\/span>),<\/p>\n

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure\u00a0(3<\/span>),<\/p>\n

Whereas:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union should be developed in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound and sustainable public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

There is a need to draw lessons from the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union and, in particular, for improved economic governance in the Union built on stronger national ownership.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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Achieving and maintaining a dynamic internal market should be considered an element of the proper and smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

The improved economic governance framework should rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus on developing and strengthening the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and budgetary policies (European Semester), an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits (the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

The strengthening of economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council recommendation or decision in accordance with Article 7(2), Article 8(2) or Article 10(4) of this Regulation. The Member State’s participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(6)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

The Commission should have a stronger role in the enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, on-site missions, recommendations and warnings.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to include a more detailed and formal framework to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and to help the Member States affected to establish corrective plans before divergences become entrenched. Such broadening of the surveillance of economic policies should take place in parallel with a deepening of fiscal surveillance.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

To help correct such excessive macroeconomic imbalances, it is necessary to lay down a detailed procedure in legislation.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 121 TFEU with specific rules for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances, as well as the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the Union. It is essential that the procedure should be aligned with the annual multilateral surveillance cycle.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(10)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

That procedure should establish an alert mechanism for the early detection of emerging macroeconomic imbalances. It should be based on the use of an indicative and transparent \u2018scoreboard\u2019 comprising indicative thresholds, combined with economic judgement. This judgement should take into account, inter alia, nominal and real convergence inside and outside the euro area.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(11)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

In order to function efficiently as an element of the alert mechanism, the scoreboard should consist of a limited set of economic, financial and structural indicators relevant to the detection of macroeconomic imbalances, with corresponding indicative thresholds. The indicators and thresholds should be adjusted when necessary, in order to adapt to the changing nature of macroeconomic imbalances due, inter alia, to evolving threats to macroeconomic stability, and in order to take into account the enhanced availability of relevant statistics. The indicators should not be understood as goals for economic policy in themselves but as tools to take account of the evolving nature of the macroeconomic imbalances within the Union.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(12)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

The Commission should closely cooperate with the European Parliament and the Council when drawing up the scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators for Member States. The Commission should present suggestions for comments to the competent committees of the European Parliament and of the Council on plans to establish and adjust the indicators and thresholds. The Commission should inform the European Parliament and the Council of any changes to the indicators and thresholds and explain its reasons for suggesting such changes.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(13)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

In developing the scoreboard, due consideration should also be given to catering for heterogeneous economic circumstances, including catching-up effects.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(14)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

The crossing of one or more indicative thresholds need not necessarily imply that macroeconomic imbalances are emerging, as economic policy-making should take into account interlinks between macroeconomic variables. Conclusions should not be drawn from an automatic reading of the scoreboard: economic judgement should ensure that all pieces of information, whether from the scoreboard or not, are put in perspective and become part of a comprehensive analysis.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(15)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Based on the multilateral surveillance procedure and the alert mechanism, or in the event of unexpected, significant economic developments that require urgent analysis for the purpose of this Regulation, the Commission should identify the Member States to be subject to an in-depth review. The in-depth review should be undertaken without the presumption that an imbalance exists and should encompass a thorough analysis of sources of imbalances in the Member State under review, taking due account of country-specific economic conditions and circumstances and of a wider set of analytical tools, indicators and qualitative information of country-specific nature. When the Commission is undertaking the in-depth review, the Member State should cooperate to ensure that the information available to the Commission is as complete and correct as possible. Furthermore, the Commission should give due consideration to any other information which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned is relevant, and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and to the Commission.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(16)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The in-depth review should be discussed within the Council, and within the Eurogroup for the Member States whose currency is the euro. The in-depth review should take into account, where appropriate, Council recommendations or invitations addressed to Member States under review adopted in accordance with Articles 121, 126 and 148 TFEU and under Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 of this Regulation, and the policy intentions of the Member State under review, as reflected in its national reform programmes, as well as international best practices as regards indicators and methodologies. When the Commission decides to undertake an in-depth review in the event of significant and unexpected economic developments that require urgent analysis, it should inform the Member States concerned.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(17)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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When assessing macroeconomic imbalances, account should be taken of their severity and their potential negative economic and financial spill-over effects which aggravate the vulnerability of the Union economy and are a threat to the smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union. Actions to address macroeconomic imbalances and divergences in competitiveness are required in all Member States, particularly in the euro area. However, the nature, importance and urgency of the policy challenges may differ significantly depending on the Member States concerned. Given vulnerabilities and the magnitude of the adjustment required, the need for policy action is particularly pressing in Member States showing persistently large current-account deficits and competitiveness losses. Furthermore, in Member States that accumulate large current-account surpluses, policies should aim to identify and implement measures that help strengthen their domestic demand and growth potential.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(18)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The economic adjustment capacity and the track record of the Member State concerned as regards compliance with earlier recommendations issued under this Regulation and other recommendations issued under Article 121 TFEU as part of multilateral surveillance, in particular the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, should also be considered.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(19)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

A procedure to monitor and correct adverse macroeconomic imbalances, with preventive and corrective elements, will require enhanced surveillance tools based on those used in the multilateral surveillance procedure. This could include enhanced surveillance missions to Member States by the Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (ECB) for Member States whose currency is the euro or Member States participating in the Agreement of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union\u00a0(4<\/span>) (ERM II), and additional reporting by Member States in case of severe imbalances, including imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union. Social partners and other national stakeholders should, where appropriate, be involved in the dialogue.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(20)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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If macroeconomic imbalances are identified, recommendations, where appropriate involving the relevant committees, should be addressed to the Member State concerned to provide guidance on appropriate policy responses. The policy response of the Member State concerned should be timely and should use all available policy instruments under the control of public authorities. Where appropriate, relevant national stakeholders, including social partners, should also be involved in accordance with the TFEU and national legal and political arrangements. The policy response should be tailored to the specific environment and circumstances of the Member State concerned and should cover the main economic policy areas, potentially including fiscal and wage policies, labour markets, product and services markets and financial sector regulation. The commitments under ERM II should be taken into account.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(21)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The warnings and recommendations by the ESRB to Member States or to the Union address risks of a macrofinancial nature. These should also warrant appropriate follow-up action by the Commission in the context of the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances, where appropriate. The independence and confidentiality of the ESRB should be strictly observed.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(22)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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If severe macroeconomic imbalances are identified, including imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union, an excessive imbalance procedure should be initiated that may include issuing recommendations to the Member State, enhanced surveillance and monitoring requirements and, in respect of Member States whose currency is the euro, the possibility of enforcement in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1174\/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area\u00a0(5<\/span>) in the event of sustained failure to take corrective action.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(23)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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A Member State subject to the excessive imbalance procedure should establish a corrective action plan setting out details of its policies designed to implement the Council’s recommendations. The corrective action plan should include a timetable for implementing the measures envisaged. It should be endorsed by a recommendation of the Council. That recommendation should be transmitted to the European Parliament.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(24)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The power to adopt individual decisions establishing non-compliance with the recommendations adopted by the Council within the framework of the corrective action plan should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council, as provided for in Article 121(1) TFEU, those individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the recommendations adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 121(4) TFEU in the context of the corrective action plan.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(25)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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In applying this Regulation, the Council and the Commission should fully respect the role of national parliaments and social partners, as well as differences in national systems, such as the systems for wage formation.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(26)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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If the Council considers that a Member State is no longer affected by an excessive macroeconomic imbalance, the excessive imbalance procedure should be closed following the Council’s abrogation, on a recommendation from the Commission, of its relevant recommendations. That abrogation should be based on a comprehensive analysis by the Commission showing that the Member State has acted in line with the relevant Council recommendations and that the underlying causes and associated risks identified in the Council recommendation opening the excessive imbalance procedure no longer exist, taking account, inter alia, of macroeconomic developments, prospects and spill-over effects. The closure of the excessive imbalance procedure should be made public.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(27)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the establishment of an effective framework for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances and the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial interlinks between Member States and the spill-over effects of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole, and can therefore be better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective,<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:<\/p>\n

CHAPTER I<\/p>\n

SUBJECT MATTER AND DEFINITIONS<\/span><\/p>\n

Article 1<\/p>\n

Subject matter<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This Regulation sets out detailed rules for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances, as well as the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the Union.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This Regulation shall be applied in the context of the European Semester as set out in Regulation (EU) No 1175\/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No\u00a01466\/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies\u00a0(6<\/span>).<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The application of this Regulation shall fully observe Article 152 TFEU, and the recommendations issued under this Regulation shall respect national practices and institutions for wage formation. This Regulation takes into account Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and accordingly does not affect the right to negotiate, conclude or enforce collective agreements or to take collective action in accordance with national law and practices.<\/p>\n

Article 2<\/p>\n

Definitions<\/p>\n

For the purposes of this Regulation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

\u2018imbalances\u2019 means any trend giving rise to macroeconomic developments which are adversely affecting, or have the potential adversely to affect, the proper functioning of the economy of a Member State or of the economic and monetary union, or of the Union as a whole;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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\u2018excessive imbalances\u2019 means severe imbalances, including imbalances that jeopardise or risks jeopardising the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

CHAPTER II<\/p>\n

DETECTION OF IMBALANCES<\/span><\/p>\n

Article 3<\/p>\n

Alert mechanism<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0An alert mechanism shall be established to facilitate the early identification and the monitoring of imbalances. The Commission shall prepare an annual report containing a qualitative economic and financial assessment based on a scoreboard with a set of indicators the values of which are compared to their indicative thresholds, as provided for in Article 4. The annual report, including the values of the indicators of the scoreboard, shall be made public.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission’s annual report shall contain an economic and financial assessment putting the movement of the indicators into perspective, drawing, if necessary, on other relevant economic and financial indicators when assessing the evolution of imbalances. Conclusions shall not be drawn from a mechanical reading of the scoreboard indicators. The assessment shall take into account the evolution of imbalances in the Union and in the euro area. The report shall also indicate whether the crossing of thresholds in one or more Member States signifies the possible emergence of imbalances. The assessment of Member States showing large current-account deficits may differ from that of Member States that accumulate large current-account surpluses.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The annual report shall identify Member States that the Commission considers may be affected by, or may be at risk of being affected by, imbalances.<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall transmit the annual report to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee in a timely manner.<\/p>\n

5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0As part of the multilateral surveillance in accordance with Article 121(3) TFEU, the Council shall discuss and carry out an overall assessment of the Commission’s annual report. The Eurogroup shall discuss the report as far as it relates to Member States whose currency is the euro.<\/p>\n

Article 4<\/p>\n

Scoreboard<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The scoreboard comprising the set of indicators, shall be used as a tool to facilitate early identification and monitoring of imbalances.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The scoreboard shall comprise a small number of relevant, practical, simple, measurable and available macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators for Member States. It shall allow for the early identification of macroeconomic imbalances that emerge in the short-term and imbalances that arise due to structural and long-term trends.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The scoreboard shall, inter alia, encompass indicators which are useful in the early identification of:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(a)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

internal imbalances, including those that can arise from public and private indebtedness; financial and asset market developments, including housing; the evolution of private sector credit flow; and the evolution of unemployment;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
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(b)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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external imbalances, including those that can arise from the evolution of current account and net investment positions of Member States; real effective exchange rates; export market shares; changes in price and cost developments; and non-price competitiveness, taking into account the different components of productivity.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In undertaking its economic reading of the scoreboard in the alert mechanism, the Commission shall pay close attention to developments in the real economy, including economic growth, employment and unemployment performance, nominal and real convergence inside and outside the euro area, productivity developments and its relevant drivers such as research and development and foreign and domestic investment, as well as sectoral developments including energy, which affect GDP and current account performance.<\/p>\n

The scoreboard shall also include indicative thresholds for the indicators, to serve as alert levels. The choice of indicators and thresholds shall be conducive towards promoting competitiveness in the Union.<\/p>\n

The scoreboard of indicators shall have upper and lower alert thresholds unless inappropriate, which shall be differentiated for euro and non-euro area Member States if justified by specific features of the monetary union and relevant economic circumstances. In developing the scoreboard, due consideration shall be given to catering for heterogeneous economic circumstances, including catching-up effects.<\/p>\n

5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The work of the ESRB shall be taken into due consideration in the drafting of indicators relevant to financial market stability. The Commission shall invite the ESRB to provide its views regarding draft indicators, relevant to financial market stability.<\/p>\n

6.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall make the set of indicators and the thresholds in the scoreboard public.<\/p>\n

7.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall assess on a regular basis the appropriateness of the scoreboard, including the composition of indicators, the thresholds set and the methodology used, and it shall adjust or modify them where necessary. The Commission shall make changes in the underlying methodology and composition of the scoreboard and the associated thresholds public.<\/p>\n

8.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall update the values for the indicators on the scoreboard at least on an annual basis.<\/p>\n

Article 5<\/p>\n

In-depth review<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Taking due account of the discussions within the Council and the Eurogroup referred to in Article 3(5), or in the event of unexpected, significant economic developments that require urgent analysis for the purpose of this Regulation, the Commission shall undertake an in-depth review for each Member State that it considers may be affected by, or may be at risk of being affected by, imbalances.<\/p>\n

The in-depth review shall build on a detailed analysis of country-specific circumstances, including the different starting positions across Member States; it shall examine a broad range of economic variables and involve the use of analytical tools and qualitative information of country-specific nature. It shall acknowledge the national specificities regarding industrial relations and social dialogue.<\/p>\n

The Commission shall also give due consideration to any other information which the Member State concerned considers to be relevant and has communicated to the Commission.<\/p>\n

The Commission shall undertake its in-depth review in conjunction with surveillance missions to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 13.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission’s in-depth review shall include an evaluation of whether the Member State in question is affected by imbalances, and of whether these imbalances constitute excessive imbalances. It shall examine the origin of the detected imbalances against the background of prevailing economic circumstances, including the deep trade and financial interlinks between Member States and the spill-over effects of national economic policies. The in-depth review shall analyse relevant developments related to the Union strategy for growth and jobs. It shall also consider the relevance of economic developments in the Union and the euro area as a whole. It shall, in particular, take into account:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(a)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

where appropriate, Council recommendations or invitations addressed to Member States under review adopted in accordance with Articles 121, 126 and 148 TFEU and under Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 of this Regulation;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(b)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

the policy intentions of the Member State under review, as reflected in its national reform programmes and, where appropriate, in its stability or convergence programme;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(c)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

any warnings or recommendations from the ESRB on systemic risks addressed to, or being relevant to, the Member State under review. The confidentiality regime of the ESRB shall be observed.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the results of the in-depth review and shall make them public.<\/p>\n

Article 6<\/p>\n

Preventive action<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0If, on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in Article 5, the Commission considers that a Member State is experiencing imbalances, it shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the Eurogroup accordingly. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may address the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 121(2) TFEU.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council shall inform the European Parliament of the recommendation and shall make it public.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The recommendations of the Council and of the Commission shall fully observe Article 152 TFEU and shall take into account Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council shall review its recommendation annually in the context of the European Semester and may, if appropriate, adjust it in accordance with paragraph 1.<\/p>\n

CHAPTER III<\/p>\n

EXCESSIVE IMBALANCE PROCEDURE<\/span><\/p>\n

Article 7<\/p>\n

Opening of the excessive imbalance procedure<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0If, on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in Article 5, the Commission considers that the Member State concerned is affected by excessive imbalances, it shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the Eurogroup accordingly.<\/p>\n

The Commission shall also inform the relevant European Supervisory Authorities and the ESRB. The ESRB is invited to take the steps that it deems necessary.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may, in accordance with Article 121(4) TFEU, adopt a recommendation establishing the existence of an excessive imbalance and recommending that the Member State concerned take corrective action.<\/p>\n

The Council’s recommendation shall set out the nature and implications of the imbalances and shall specify a set of policy recommendations to be followed and a deadline within which the Member State concerned is to submit a corrective action plan. The Council may, as provided for in Article 121(4) TFEU, make its recommendation public.<\/p>\n

Article 8<\/p>\n

Corrective action plan<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Any Member State for which an excessive imbalance procedure is opened shall submit a corrective action plan to the Council and the Commission based on, and within a deadline to be defined in, the Council’s recommendation referred to in Article 7(2). The corrective action plan shall set out the specific policy actions the Member State concerned has implemented or intends to implement and shall include a timetable for those actions. The corrective action plan shall take into account the economic and social impact of the policy actions and shall be consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council, on the basis of a Commission report, shall assess the corrective action plan within 2 months of submission of that plan. If, upon a Commission recommendation, the Council considers the corrective action plan sufficient, it shall endorse the plan by way of a recommendation listing the specific actions required and the deadlines for taking them, and shall establish a timetable for surveillance, paying due attention to the transmission channels and recognising that there may be long lags between the adoption of the corrective action and the actual resolution of imbalances.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0If, upon a Commission recommendation, the Council considers the actions or the timetable envisaged in the corrective action plan insufficient, it shall adopt a recommendation addressed to the Member State to submit, within 2 months as a rule, a new corrective action plan. The Council shall examine the new corrective action plan in accordance with the procedure laid down in this Article.<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The corrective action plan, the Commission report and the Council recommendation referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be made public.<\/p>\n

Article 9<\/p>\n

Monitoring of corrective action<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall monitor implementation of the Council’s recommendation adopted under Article 8(2). For that purpose, the Member State shall present to the Council and the Commission at regular intervals progress reports, the frequency of which shall be established by the Council in the recommendation referred to in Article 8(2).<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council shall make Member States’ progress reports public.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission may carry out enhanced surveillance missions to the Member State concerned, in order to monitor the implementation of the corrective action plan, in liaison with the ECB when those missions concern Member States whose currency is the euro or Member States participating in ERM II. The Commission shall, where appropriate, involve social partners and other national stakeholders in a dialogue during those missions.<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In the event of relevant major changes in economic circumstances, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may amend the recommendations adopted under Article 8(2) in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Article. Where appropriate, the Council shall invite the Member State concerned to submit a revised corrective action plan, and shall assess that revised corrective action plan in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 8.<\/p>\n

Article 10<\/p>\n

Assessment of corrective action<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of a Commission report, the Council shall assess whether the Member State concerned has taken the recommended corrective action in accordance with the Council’s recommendation issued under Article 8(2).<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall make its report public.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council shall make its assessment by the deadline set by the Council in its recommendations adopted in accordance with Article 8(2).<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Where it considers that the Member State has not taken the recommended corrective action, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt a decision establishing non-compliance, together with a recommendation setting new deadlines for taking corrective action. In this case, the Council shall inform the European Council, and shall make public the conclusions of the surveillance missions referred to in Article 9(3).<\/p>\n

The Commission’s recommendation on establishing non-compliance shall be deemed to have been adopted by the Council, unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendation within 10 days of its adoption by the Commission. The Member State concerned may request that a meeting of the Council be convened within that period to take a vote on the decision.<\/p>\n

5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Where the Council, on the basis of the Commission’s report referred to in paragraph 1, considers that the Member State has taken the corrective action recommended in accordance with Article 8(2), the excessive imbalance procedure shall be considered to be on track and shall be held in abeyance. Nevertheless, monitoring shall continue in accordance with the timetable set out in the recommendation under Article 8(2). The Council shall make public its reasons for holding the procedure in a position of abeyance and recognising the corrective policy actions taken by the Member State concerned.<\/p>\n

Article 11<\/p>\n

Closing of the excessive imbalance procedure<\/p>\n

The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall abrogate recommendations issued under Articles 7, 8 or 10 as soon as it considers that the Member State concerned is no longer affected by excessive imbalances as outlined in the recommendation referred to in Article 7(2). The Council shall make a public statement reflecting that fact.<\/p>\n

Article 12<\/p>\n

Voting within the Council<\/p>\n

For the measures referred to in Articles 7 to 11, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.<\/p>\n

CHAPTER IV<\/p>\n

FINAL PROVISIONS<\/span><\/p>\n

Article 13<\/p>\n

Surveillance missions<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with the authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions for the purpose of assessing the economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission may undertake enhanced surveillance missions for Member States which are the subject of a recommendation as to the existence of an excessive imbalance position under Article 7(2) for the purposes of on-site monitoring.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Where the Member State concerned is a Member State whose currency is the euro or is participating in ERM II, the Commission may, if appropriate, invite representatives of the European Central Bank to participate in surveillance missions.<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall report to the Council on the outcome of the missions referred to in paragraph 2 and may, if appropriate, decide to make its findings public.<\/p>\n

5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0When organising the missions referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission shall transmit its provisional findings to the Member State concerned for comments.<\/p>\n

Article 14<\/p>\n

Economic Dialogue<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(a)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

information provided by the Council on the broad guidelines of economic policy pursuant to Article 121(2) TFEU;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(b)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

general guidance to Member States issued by the Commission at the beginning of the annual cycle of surveillance;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(c)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

the conclusions of the European Council concerning orientations for economic policies in the context of the European Semester;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(d)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

the results of multilateral surveillance carried out under this Regulation;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(e)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

the conclusions of the European Council concerning the orientations for, and results of, multilateral surveillance;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(f)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

a review of the conduct of the multilateral surveillance at the end of the European Semester;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(g)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

the recommendations taken pursuant to Article 7(2), Article 8(2) and Article 10(4) of this Regulation.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to the Member State which is the subject of a Council recommendation or decision under Article 7(2), Article 8(2) or Article 10(4).<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council and the Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament of the results of the application of this Regulation.<\/p>\n

Article 15<\/p>\n

Annual Reporting<\/p>\n

The Commission shall report annually on the application of this Regulation, including the updating of the scoreboard as set out in Article 4 and shall present its findings to the European Parliament and to the Council in the context of the European Semester.<\/p>\n

Article 16<\/p>\n

Review<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0By 14 December 2014 and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall review and report on the application of this Regulation.<\/p>\n

Those reports shall evaluate, inter alia:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(a)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

the effectiveness of this Regulation;<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n
\n

(b)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the TFEU.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Where appropriate, those reports shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Commission shall send the reports referred to in paragraph 1 to the European Parliament and to the Council.<\/p>\n

Article 17<\/p>\n

Entry into force<\/p>\n

This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union<\/span>.<\/p>\n

\n

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.<\/p>\n

Done at Strasbourg, 16 November 2011.<\/p>\n

\n

For the European Parliament<\/span><\/p>\n

The President<\/span><\/p>\n

J. BUZEK<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

For the Council<\/span><\/p>\n

The President<\/span><\/p>\n

W. SZCZUKA<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\n

(1<\/span>)\u00a0\u00a0OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.<\/p>\n

(2<\/span>)\u00a0\u00a0OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p. 53.<\/p>\n

(3<\/span>)\u00a0\u00a0Position of the European Parliament of 28 September 2011 (not yet published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of 8 November 2011.<\/p>\n

(4<\/span>)\u00a0\u00a0OJ C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21.<\/p>\n

(5<\/span>)\u00a0\u00a0See page 8 of this Official Journal.<\/p>\n

(6<\/span>)\u00a0\u00a0See page 12 of this Official Journal.<\/p>\n