2.\u00a0\u00a0Victim Status<\/em><\/p>\n53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant companies had lost their victim status as the Constitutional Court had found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and awarded EUR 15,000 each in compensation. It had found that the applicant companies could pursue proceedings for pecuniary damage before the LAB.Indeed a fresh declaration had been issued in 2009, and the amended law provided for direct access by applicants to the LAB guaranteeing the applicant companies\u2019 access to a court to challenge the compensation.Moreover, by then the applicant companies had been offered pecuniary compensation (see paragraph 15 above).<\/p>\n
54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies submitted that an award of EUR 15,000 in non\u2011pecuniary damage, while they remained without any pecuniary compensation for property that remained unused for decades, did not deprive them of their victim status. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had sent them to obtain pecuniary compensation before a tribunal which, by the Constitutional Court\u2019s own admission, was not independent and impartial. They also considered that the inadequate offer in pecuniary compensation deposited in court (which they had not withdrawn) had not redressed the violation. Furthermore, the applicant companies had not yet been served with the relevant judicial act (Section 22 (7) of the Act) and thus could not start such proceedings, a matter also noted by the Constitutional Court which confirmed that they still had no access to court (see paragraph\u00a029 above). Lastly, the applicant companies submitted that the finding of a violation had not encompassed all their complaints, particularly that concerning the lack of public interest in the taking.<\/p>\n
55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an applicant is deprived of his or her status as a victim if the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for a breach of the Convention (see, for example, Scordino v.\u00a0Italy (no.\u00a01) [GC], no.\u00a036813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 178-193, ECHR 2006-V; Gera de Petri TestaferrataBonici\u00a0Ghaxaq v. Malta, no. 26771\/07, \u00a7 50, 5 April 2011; and Frendo\u00a0Randon and Others, cited above, \u00a7 34).<\/p>\n
56.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first condition, namely the acknowledgment of a violation of the Convention, the Court considers that the Constitutional Court\u2019s findings amounted to an acknowledgment that there had been a breach of, inter alia, Article 1 of Protocol No.1.<\/p>\n
57.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the second condition, namely appropriate and sufficient redress, the Court must ascertain whether the measures taken by the authorities in the particular circumstances of the instant case afforded the applicant companies appropriate redress in such a way as to deprive them of victim status. The Court notes that the Constitutional Court awarded the applicant companies EUR 15,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage (from which they had to pay part judicial costs). However, after twenty years the Constitutional Court \u2013 having established that there had been a violation of the applicant companies\u2019 rights \u2013failed to determine the amount of pecuniary compensation due,advising the applicant companies to pursue proceedings before a tribunal which the Constitutional Court itself found to be non\u2011complaint with Article\u00a06 requirements (see paragraph 31 above).<\/p>\n
58.\u00a0\u00a0Given that in the present case the violationunder Article 1 of Protocol No.1,upheld by the Constitutional Court, persisted for more than twenty years during which the applicant companies received no compensation for the taking of their property the Court considers that the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment did not offer sufficient relief to the applicant companies, who continue to suffer the consequences of the breach of their rights under Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention (see, inter\u00a0alia, Azzopardi v.\u00a0Malta, no. 28177\/12, \u00a7\u00a034, 6\u00a0November 2014;FrendoRandon and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a039; and Vassallo v.\u00a0Malta, no.\u00a057862\/09, \u00a7 47, 11\u00a0October 2011).<\/p>\n
59.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Government\u2019s objection in this respect is dismissed.<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/em><\/p>\n60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants<\/p>\n
61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companiessubmitted that the taking had not been in the public interest in so far as more thantwenty years later the alleged legitimate aim had not yet become a concrete reality \u2013 this distinguished the case from Vassallo(cited above). In so far as the Government relied on obstacles in obtaining relevant permits, the applicant companies considered that this could only have been due to Government presenting permit applications which did not comply with planning policies. Indeed the last planning application was dated 2000, and in more than fifteen years it did not appear that the Government had made any progress in obtaining that permission.It surely could not be said that more than fifteen years was the norm to process a planning application.<\/p>\n
62.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law they noted that placing property in reserve did give rise to issues under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, if the delay was not based on public interest grounds and where the passage of time generated a significant increase in value. Both criteria were satisfied in the present case. Firstly, the evictions had been the responsibility of the Government, which was empowered by law to enforce them.It was not for the applicant companies to suffer an inefficient administrative and judicial system. In law an occupier had to yield possession within fourteen days of being offered alternative accommodation. It was thus the State that had failed, for no specified reason, to propose adequate accommodation for seven years. After that, the delay in obtaining permission was a result of applications for a proposed development which were problematic and subject of incompatibilities with domestic planning policies. These reasons could not be considered as public interest. Moreover, during such time (over twenty-two years) the property undoubtedly increased in value (see, for example, paragraph 116below).<\/p>\n
63.\u00a0\u00a0As to compensation, relying on the Court\u2019s case law, the applicant companies submitted that since the measure was not in pursuit of economic reform or aimed at achieving greater social justice, there was no basis for the payment of compensation lower than the market value. As to the actual value of the property they noted that it was situated in a street perpendicular to the main central street of Valletta, at a distance of fifteen meters from it, and therefore in the hub of the city, and therefore in a prime area. By way of comparison the applicant companies noted that in 2015, the Government purchased property further away from theirs at EUR\u00a01,645,000 (for half the undivided share of the property). On the basis of that scale, thus not augmenting the price because the applicant companies\u2019 property was in a better location, according to an ex partearchitect\u2019s report, the total value of the expropriated properties would amount to EUR 589,875, thus the share of each applicant company (one third undivided share) would be EUR\u00a0196,625. This was in stark contrast with the offer of the Government of EUR\u00a039,017 of which each applicant company\u2019s share would amount to EUR\u00a013,000.67. The applicant companies did not agree that their property was in a derelict state and submitted that the Government was confusing their property with a neighbouring property. They also emphasized that the Government had failed to submit evidence in regard to this allegation or in regard to the value of properties in the vicinity, as no supporting documents had been submitted.<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n
64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the deprivation of property was in accordance with the Ordinance and was thus lawful. The premises had been taken in order to relocate the Office of the Attorney General. However, the implementation of the project had stalled because part of the premises had been occupied by squatters and steps had to be taken for their eviction.After that there were problems with the issuing of the relevant permits (as the previous one had expired) by the planning authorities, mainly because of planning restrictions related to Valletta\u2019s World Heritage status, as well as the fact that the fa\u00e7ade of the building had to be preserved while rebuilding the interior. In the Government\u2019s viewthe fact that, to date, the property had not yet been used did not cancel the original public interest behind the taking given that the authorities\u2019 action had been constant, as had also been held by the Constitutional Court which was best placed to assess the public interest requirement. Relying on the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, they noted that placing in reserve expropriated property even for a long time, did not necessarily entail a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.They noted that from the witness testimony during the domestic proceedings it transpired that the property was abandoned and in total dilapidation, generating no revenue for the owners. Furthermore, any increase in the value of the property was reflected in the compensation offered to the applicant companies, which they could withdraw, and contest if they did not agree with the quantum.<\/p>\n
65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the Constitutional Court had already found that the applicant companies had suffered a disproportionate burden until 2009 for which they had been awarded compensation. In 2009 the relevant offers (see paragraph 15 above), which had to be shared amongst the co\u2011owners, reflected the fact that property was outside the prime property market of Valletta and that when it was taken it had been in a dilapidated state with a collapsed roof. Such compensation offer was the result of valuations made in conformity with the Ordinance, based on 2005 valuations which, in the Government\u2019s view, was a year in which there had been a peak in property prices, and such prices were probably higher than those in 2015. Moreover, according to the Government, given the public interest involved, the taking had not required compensation at the full market value. Further, unlike other cases decided by this Court against Malta, in the present case, after 2009, the applicant companies could contest the amount of compensation offered in the President\u2019s declaration of 2009 directly before the LAB. They could also have withdrawn the sums offered without prejudice to any challenges to the compensation offered, in this connection they referred to examples from domestic case\u2011law.<\/p>\n
66.\u00a0\u00a0At a later stage in their observations, the Government also noted that the area had been developed in recent years; however, in their view, the applicant companies should not benefit from developments made after the expropriation.The Government also noted that the property the applicant companies referred to by way of comparison was not a regular comparator. Indeed in respect of that sale an investigation and audit had ensued, as a result of which proceedings were brought before the domestic courts, by which the Government was attempting to rescind and annul the transfer which had not been carried out in accordance with the law. In the Government\u2019s view the amount offered in compensation was adequate given the location, the state in which the property was in when it was taken, comparative references to property in the vicinity and particularly the public interest involved, as a result of which payment at market value was not called for.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/p>\n
67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a taking of property can be justified only if it is shown, inter alia, to be \u201cin the public interest\u201d and \u201csubject to the conditions provided for by law\u201d. Any interference with property must also satisfy the requirement of proportionality. As the Court has repeatedly stated, a fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirement of protecting the individual\u2019s fundamental rights, the search for such fair balance being inherent in the whole of the Convention. The requisite balance will not be struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (see Sporrong\u00a0and L\u00f6nnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a069-74, Series A no.\u00a052, and Brum\u0103rescu v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a028342\/95, \u00a7 78, ECHR 1999\u2011VII).<\/p>\n
68.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation terms under the relevant legislation are material to the assessment of whether or not the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance and, in particular, whether it imposes a disproportionate burden on the individuals (see Jahn and Others v.\u00a0Germany [GC], nos.\u00a046720\/99,\u00a072203\/01 and 72552\/01, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2005\u2011VI). In this connection, the taking of property without payment of an amount proportionate to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference, whilst a total lack of compensation can be considered justifiable under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in exceptional circumstances (see Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC], no.\u00a025701\/94, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2000\u2011XII, and The Holy Monasteries v.\u00a0Greece, 9\u00a0December 1994, \u00a7\u00a071, Series A no. 301-A). However, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances. Legitimate objectives in the \u201cpublic interest\u201d, such as those pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may warrant reimbursement of less than the full market value(see Urb\u00e1rska\u00a0ObecTren\u010dianskeBiskupice v. Slovakia, no.\u00a074258\/01, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2007-XIII).<\/p>\n
69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the adequacy of the compensation would be diminished if it were to be paid without reference to various circumstances liable to reduce its value, such as unreasonable delay. Abnormally lengthy delays in the payment of compensation for expropriation lead to additional financial loss for the person whose land has been expropriated, putting him or her in a position of uncertainty (see Akku\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey, 9 July 1997, \u00a7\u00a029, Reports of Judgments and Decisions1997-IV). The same applies to abnormally lengthy delays in administrative or judicial proceedings in which such compensation is determined, especially when people whose land has been expropriated are obliged to resort to such proceedings in order to obtain the compensation to which they are entitled (see Aka v. Turkey, 23\u00a0September 1998, \u00a7\u00a049, Reports 1998 -VI).<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case<\/p>\n
70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has not been contested that in the present case there has been a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. and that the taking was in accordance with the law. It will therefore proceed to analyse the public\u2011interest requirement.<\/p>\n
71.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of Beneficio Cappella Paolini v.\u00a0San Marino (no.\u00a040786\/98, \u00a7 33, ECHR 2004\u2011VIII), which concerned property that had been lawfully expropriated but not used, it found that the partial use of expropriated land raised an issue as to respect for property rights, having regard in particular to the change in use following the approval of a new land\u2011use plan. A similar situation obtained in the cases of Ke\u00e7ecio\u011flu\u00a0and\u00a0Othersv.\u00a0Turkey (no. 37546\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 28-29, 8 April 2008) and Motais\u00a0de\u00a0Narbonne v.\u00a0France (no. 48161\/99, \u00a7 19, 2 July 2002). In the latter case the Court found a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of a significant delay between a decision to expropriate property and the actual undertaking of a project in the public interest which had formed the basis of the expropriation. While the placing in reserve of expropriated property, even for a long period of time, does not necessarily entail a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, thereis clearly an issue under that provision where such an action is not itself based on public\u2011interest grounds and where, during that period, the property in question generates a significant increase in value of which the former owners are deprived (ibid., \u00a7 21).<\/p>\n
72.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, for example, in FrendoRandon and Others(cited above) the Court accepted that the original intention behind the expropriation of the land, namely the Freeport Terminal Project, was in the public interest. However, no use had been made of some of the plots which had been taken over by the authorities for over forty years.The delay in making use of those plots wasnot based on any public-interest concern and the value of that land had substantially increased over the years that followed the taking of the land, andthus an issue arose in respect of the public-interest requirement (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a061-62). Similar considerations where made in Vassallo(cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 42-43) concerning the laps of twenty eight-years during which no concrete use was made of the property at issue in that case.<\/p>\n
73.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the specific circumstances of the present case,and in the light of the Constitutional Court\u2019s findings on the matter, the Court can acceptwithout a further in-depth examination, that the original intention behind the expropriation of the property, namely to use it as government offices, in particular as the Office of the Attorney General\u2011 a body that performs duties in the interest of the community as whole\u2011 was in the public interest (see, mutatis\u00a0mutandis, FleriSoler and Camilleri v.\u00a0Malta, no.\u00a035349\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a066\u201167, ECHR 2006\u2011X). However, the property remained unused for twenty\u2011five years and, as recently confirmed by the Government in view of their inability to carry out the project, a new place has been sought for sucha purpose (see paragraph\u00a034 above). The Court considers that while it might be said that at least part of the delay was itself based on a public-interest concern, namely to avoid making homeless the occupiers of the premises, it cannot be said that the Government pursued the matter diligently, as it took them fourteen years to vacate the premises. Subsequently, since 2007 when the premises were vacated no use was made of the property. Indeed while obtaining a permit is surely in the general public interest, the same cannot be said of a delay amounting to eighteen years to obtain such a permit, because of the inefficiency of the authorities \u2011 be it of the Commissioner of Lands or of the planning authorities in assessing and granting or refusing such a permit. Given the circumstances of the present case, it must have been evident years ago that the project was not viable in the then near future. Nevertheless, in 2009, at a time when they already should have known, instead of releasing the propertythe authorities issued a new declaration. Indeed, even to date, despite the recent change of plan admitted by the Government and thus the extinction of the original public interest in relation to the taking of the applicant companies\u2019 property, the property has not been returned to the applicant companies. Little comfort can be found in the Government\u2019s submission (see paragraph 34 above) that nevertheless the property at issue remains designated for a public use, which the Government failed to specify or elaborate on. Furthermore, it is indisputable, in the light of the material and submissions before this Court, thatthe property has seen an increase in value, of which the applicant companies have been deprived.<\/p>\n
74.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the finding concerning the public interest at issue has an impact on the compensation due, as well as the fact that to date there is no final decision concerning the compensation due to the applicant companies (see, mutatis mutandis, Vassallo v. Malta (just satisfaction), no.\u00a057862\/09, \u00a7\u00a019, 6 November 2012), which will in any event be dealt with under the Article\u00a041 section of this judgment, the Court does not find it necessary to examine the adequacy of the compensation offered. It suffices to hold, in this connection, that (despite an offer which does not appear to have been served on the applicant companies)given that twenty-five years after the taking the applicant companies have not received any compensationthey have been required to be bear a disproportionate burden (see, mutatis mutandis, Vassallo (merits), cited above, \u00a7 44\u201145).<\/p>\n
75.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.<\/p>\n
III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies further complained that they remained victims of the alleged violations given the Constitutional Court\u2019s failure to give redress, including adequate compensation. Thus,constitutional redress proceedings could not be considered as an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention.Article 13 reads as follows:<\/p>\n
\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations<\/em><\/p>\n77.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on domestic case\u2011law, the Government submitted that the applicant could have instituted a fresh set of constitutional redress proceedings to complain under Article\u00a013 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the Constitutional Court judgment.<\/p>\n
78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies submitted that lodging a constitutional case to argue that the amount of compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court was not enough had no prospect of success as it would be tantamount to lodging an appeal against an appeal judgment which was final. Indeed according to the applicant companies the Government in such a case would surely have raised a plea of res\u00a0judicata. They noted that, unlike in their cases, the case\u2011law relied on by the Government concerned a new breach which had occurred during the constitutional redress proceedings which was independent from the merits of the original complaint.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already established, in the context of Maltese cases before it, that even though Maltese domestic law provides for a remedy, for the purposes of a complaint under Article 13, in respect of a final judgment of the Constitutional Court, the length of the proceedings detracts from the effectiveness of that remedy and that, in view of the specific situation of the Constitutional Court in the domestic legal order, in certain circumstances it is not a remedy which is required to be exhausted (see, inter alia, Apap Bolognav. Malta, no. 46931\/12, \u00a7 62, 30\u00a0August 2016).<\/p>\n
80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant companies have suffered a violation of their rights for a period of over two decades. They have already been through one set of constitutional redress proceedings, as a result of which the Court has found that they remained victims of the violation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 recognised by the domestic courts (see paragraph\u00a058above). Given the nature of the complaint and the above\u2011mentioned specific situation of the Constitutional Court in the domestic legal order, the Court finds that the institution of fresh constitutional redress proceedings was not a remedy which was required to be exhausted in the specific circumstances of this case (ibid, \u00a7 63).<\/p>\n
81.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Government\u2019s objection that domestic remedies have not been exhausted is dismissed.<\/p>\n
82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 13 does not apply in the absence of an arguable claim (see Maurice v. France [GC], no.\u00a011810\/03, \u00a7\u00a0106, ECHR 2005\u2011IX).<\/p>\n
83.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court has found that the applicant companies\u2019 complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 was not manifestly ill\u2011founded and concluded that there has been a violation of the provision. Thus, there is no doubt that the complaint relating to that provision is an arguable one for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention. It follows that Article\u00a013 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable in the present case.<\/p>\n
84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants<\/p>\n
85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies submitted that they had no effective remedy to ensure the protection of their property rights.<\/p>\n
86.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, concerning a civil action, they noted that even if a court where to urge the CoL to initiate proceedings, there was no way of enforcing such a judgment, and thus the initiation of proceedings remained at the discretion of the CoL. Moreover the applicant companies did not consider that such an action would be justified given that the obligation to start proceedings and respect the applicant companies\u2019 property rights was on the State. Thus, as stated in Vassallo cited above, this remedy could not be effective and required of applicants.<\/p>\n
87.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional redress proceedings, the applicant companies submitted that there was no doubt that the constitutional jurisdictions had far and wide ranging powers, yet they had failed to use them. Indeed in their case not only had the Constitutional Court failed to award pecuniary damagebut they also ordered the applicant company to pay costs thus diminishing further the compensation awarded. Indeed, the failure to award pecuniary compensation had become habitual practice in such cases. The applicant companies relied on Alfred Spiteri et vs Transport Authority et, Constitutional Court judgment of 7 October 2013 and B & B Property Development Co Ltd vs Commissioner of Land, 9 November 2012, where solely non-pecuniary damage had been awarded.Moreover, as to their powers, the applicant companies noted that, according to domestic\u2011case law, the Constitutional Courthad the power to pronounce the incompatibility of a law with the Constitution or the Convention, but it did not have the power to remove that law from statute. Thus, in their case despite the Constitutional Court finding a violation of Article 6 concerning the composition of the LAB as laid down in law, the same legal provisions remained in force until parliament decided otherwise, in consequence in such a situation they were not empowered to give an adequate remedy.<\/p>\n
88.\u00a0\u00a0In connection with the two judgments relied on by the Government (see paragraph 91below), the applicant companies noted that both judgments had been appealed against and specifically in the second one, the Government was arguing that there were limitations on the powers of the constitutional jurisdictions and that the remedy ordered by the first\u2011instance court had not been legitimate. This was precisely the contrary of what the Government were arguing before this Court.<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n
89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant companies could have instituted an ordinary civil action [under Article 1078 of the Civil Code] to impose a time-limit on the CoL to initiate compensation proceedings. After 2009 they could also contest the public interest of the measure before the LAB. They also had the possibility, which they availed themselves of, to institute constitutional redress proceedings challenging both the public interest and the compensation due. Should the applicant companies still feel aggrieved following such proceedings, they could initiate a fresh set of proceedings complaining about the period subsequent to the judgment of the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n
90.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that constitutional proceedings were capable of providing adequate redress for the violation found by the domestic courts. In fact and in practice, the courts of constitutional jurisdiction could award any type of redress, ranging from an award of compensation, which was the usual type of redress granted in cases of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (they relied, for example, on AIC\u00a0Joseph Barbara vs the Prime Minister, Constitutional Court judgment of 31 January 2014, and AngelasiveBalzan vs the Prime Minister, Constitutional Court judgment of 7 December 2012, both concerning rent cases), to various other types of orders. The Government submitted, as examples from actual judgments, the reintegration of an employee into the public service, as well as an order made to the courts of criminal jurisdiction to discard a statement made by the accused when it had been taken by the police without legal assistance. They reiterated that there were no limits to the powers of the courts of constitutional jurisdiction to grant redress for Convention violations.<\/p>\n
91.\u00a0\u00a0In their further submissions the Government relied on more recent case\u2011law, in particular Dr Mark Refalonoe vs Director of Landsfirst\u2011instance judgment of 28 January 2016, whereby the constitutional jurisdiction, in an expropriation case, ordered the restitution of the property as well as that parts of the Grand Harbor Local Plan relative to the property were to be without effect in relation to the owners of the property. On the same day, in another first-instance judgment the constitutional jurisdiction in Maria Stella sive Estelle Azzopardi Vella et vs\u00a0Attorney\u00a0General, awarded EUR 20,000 in compensation as well as EUR\u00a03,000 per year until the legislation found to be in violation of the property rights of owners was amended.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/p>\n
92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held on many occasions that Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. Although the scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint, the remedy required by Article 13 must be effective in practice as well as in law. The \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the \u201cauthority\u201d referred to in that provision necessarily have to be a judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective. Furthermore, even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Ali\u0161i\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Bosnia\u00a0and\u00a0Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former\u00a0Yugoslav\u00a0Republic\u00a0of Macedonia [GC], no. 60642\/08, \u00a7\u00a0131, ECHR 2014).<\/p>\n
93.\u00a0\u00a0For the purposes of Article 13,\u00a0it is for the Court to determine whether the means available to an applicant for raising a complaint are \u201ceffective\u201d in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that had already occurred (see Kud\u0142a, citedabove, \u00a7\u00a7 157\u201158). In certain cases a violation cannot be made good through the mere payment of compensation (see, for example, Petkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos.\u00a077568\/01,\u00a0178\/02 and\u00a0505\/02, \u00a7 80, 11 June 2009 in connection with Article 3 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01) and the inability to render a binding decision granting redress may also raise issues (see Silver and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 25\u00a0March 1983, \u00a7\u00a0115, Series A no. 61; Leander v.\u00a0Sweden, 26\u00a0March 1987, \u00a7 82, Series A no.\u00a0116; and Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v.\u00a0Sweden, no.\u00a062332\/00, \u00a7 118, ECHR 2006\u2011VII).<\/p>\n
94.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, Article 13 does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State\u2019s laws as such to be challenged before a national authority (seeMaurice, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0107).<\/p>\n
95.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of Article 13, the Court\u2019s role is to determine whether, in the light of the parties\u2019 submissions, the proposed remedies constituted effective remedies which were available to the applicant in theory as well as in practice, that is to say, that they were accessible, capable of providing redress and offered reasonable prospects of success (see McFarlane v.\u00a0Ireland [GC], no. 31333\/06, \u00a7 114, 10\u00a0September 2010).<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case<\/p>\n
i.\u00a0\u00a0Constitutional redress proceedings<\/p>\n
96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that a remedy, in the form of constitutional redress proceedings, was in principle available under Maltese law, which enabled the applicant companies to raise with the national courts their complaint of a violation of their Convention right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.<\/p>\n
97.\u00a0\u00a0Until recently the Court had regularly held that constitutional redress proceedings were effective in respect of complaints under Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1, in so far as it had always been considered that there were no limits on the means of redress (including financial redress) which may be provided by the courts of constitutional jurisdiction (see the provisions of the Constitution and the European Convention Act in the relevant domestic law part in Apap Bologna, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 28\u201129, as well as a series of Maltese cases, for example, Gera\u00a0de\u00a0Petri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070; Deguara\u00a0CaruanaGattoand Others v.\u00a0Malta, no.\u00a014796\/11, \u00a7 82, 9\u00a0July 2013; and Lay Lay Company Limitedv.\u00a0Malta, no.\u00a030633\/11, \u00a7\u00a0100, 23\u00a0July 2013).<\/p>\n
98.\u00a0\u00a0In the recent judgment of Apap Bologna(cited above, \u00a7\u00a084) the Court observed that the wording of the law was clear. Under the Constitution, in order to redress human rights violations which are protected by the provisions of the Constitution, a court of constitutional jurisdiction \u201cmay make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions …\u201d. The same wording was used in the European Convention Act, in connection with human rights protected by the Convention. The Government had also emphasised in their observations, as they did in the present case (see paragraph\u00a090 above), that there were no limits to the powers of the courts of constitutional jurisdiction to grant redress, and that they could also, if necessary, release property and evict a tenant.Nevertheless, the Court noted that it had found in a number of cases brought under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 against Malta, that the applicants maintained their victim status notwithstanding a favourable decision by the Constitutional Court (see, for example, Azzopardi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a034, and FrendoRandon and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 38\u201139 in connection with expropriations; and Gera\u00a0de Petri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a053, concerning the control of property under title of possession and use subject to recognition rent) mainly because the domestic courts had failed to award compensation for the relevant pecuniary damage decades after the applicants had started being affected by the violation.<\/p>\n
99.\u00a0\u00a0The same was the case in Apap Bologna(cited above) in connection with requisition orders. In that case, as in many others, the applicant had also remained a victim of the violation despite an acknowledgment by the Constitutional Court. Thus, the Court had to assess the effectiveness of such a remedy in practice and found,for the first time in connection with Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1,that despite having the power to do sothe Constitutional Court hadin practice repeatedly failed to take the required action which would bring the violation to an end (\u00a7 86) or to give adequate compensation by awarding adequate pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage. It thus did not constitute an effective remedy in respect of complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning requisition orders (\u00a7\u00a091).<\/p>\n
100.\u00a0\u00a0The present case deals with an effective remedy for the purposes of complaints concerning expropriations, particularly where no compensation is paid years after the taking, or where applicants complain about the inadequacy of the compensation offered. The Court will thus examine the Constitutional Court\u2019s effectiveness in that regard.<\/p>\n
(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cPreventing the alleged violation or its continuation\u201d<\/p>\n
101.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Constitutional Court awarded the two applicant companies non-pecuniary damage for the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which they had suffered as a result of the fact that for more than twenty years after the taking of their property the procedure had been stalling, and they had thus not received any compensation for the taking. There is no doubt that in law, the Constitutional Court could award the pecuniary compensation due.Nevertheless, it failed to do so, opting to send the applicantcompanies to seek another remedy \u2011 the same remedy which had failed them for two decadesbecause the CoL had not taken the required action and despite the fact that the LAB was not Article 6 compliant.<\/p>\n
102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this course of action was not particular to the present case. Indeed the cases before the Court show that this practice was the regular trend in such types of cases (see for example, Azzopardi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a034, and FrendoRandon and Others, cited above,\u00a7\u00a7\u00a038\u201139; Vassallo(merits), cited above, \u00a7 18; and more recently Galea and Others v.\u00a0Malta,\u00a7\u00a7 20 and 47, all in connection with expropriations and delayed compensation). While the Government relied on one first-instance decision concerning expropriations where relevant measures had been ordered, this had been overturned by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph\u00a044 above) \u2011 as was the other example cited by the Government concerning rent laws (see paragraph 45 above). Thus, despite having been requested to do so, the Government have not provided one example of a final judgment of the Constitutional Court in an expropriation case in relation to which it has found a violation,in which the relevant action \u2011 be it release of the property, or award of the pecuniary compensation due, or any other relevant measure\u2011 had been taken to bring the situation to an end. Indeed cases before this Court show a practice where any relevant measures ordered by the first\u2011instance constitutional jurisdiction, are regularly overturned by the Constitutional Court (see, as the most recent example, Galea and Others (cited above), \u00a7\u00a7 18 and 20). It follows from the above thatdespite having the power to do so, in practice the Constitutional Court has repeatedly failed to take the required action which would bring the violation to an end.<\/p>\n
(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cProviding adequate redress for any violation that had already occurred\u201d<\/p>\n
103.\u00a0\u00a0In the specific circumstances of expropriation cases where owners have not been paid any or sufficient compensation for the taking of their property, the same considerations made above lead to the conclusion that the owners who suffered a violation are regularly not redressed, in so far as no adequate compensation, in particular as concerning pecuniary damage, is awarded to them by the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n
104.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as it concerns non\u2011pecuniary damage, the Court notes that such awards are often made by the Constitutional Court. However, as happened in the present case, these awards are frequently reduced by an order of payment of costs, despite applicants being successful in many of their claims.The Court considers that while this might not always be the case, such orders may result in non\u2011pecuniary compensation being also inadequate. The Court thus finds it useful to reiterate that imposing high costs may in itself shed doubts on the compatibility with the Convention of a remedy to seek redress for human rights violations (see Francesco\u2011Quattronev. Italy, no. 13431\/07, \u00a7 40, 26 November 2013), and this is even more so if no reasons are given to justify such an order (ibid.\u00a7\u00a045).<\/p>\n
(\u03b3)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion concerning constitutional redress proceedings<\/p>\n
105.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, and in view of the domestic judgments brought to its attention on the subject matter, the Court concludes that although constitutional redress proceedings are an effective remedy in theory, they are not so in practice, in cases such as the presentone. In consequence, they cannot be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 concerning arguable complaints in respect of the taking of property which has not been followed by payment of adequate compensation.<\/p>\n
ii.\u00a0\u00a0Other remedies<\/p>\n
106.\u00a0\u00a0The Governmentalso referred to the procedure under Article\u00a01078 of the Civil Code. In this connection the Court notes that according to the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance, as it stood at the time, it was up to the authorities to initiate the relevant compensation proceedings (see Vassallo (merits), cited above, \u00a7 46 and alsoBezzinaWettinger and Others v.\u00a0Malta, no. 15091\/06, \u00a7 92, 8\u00a0April 2008). The Court reiterates that without prejudice to the effectiveness of such an action under the Civil Code \u2011 an action of a general nature and in respect of which the Government have not produced any evidence in relation to its prospects of success \u2011 in such cases, owners could not be expected to incur the expense and burden of instituting proceedings to ensure the authorities\u2019fulfilment of their legal obligation. Moreover, the mere fact that the Government would have been forced by means of a court decision to initiate proceedings, would not guarantee that those proceedings would thereafter be pursued with due diligence (see Vassallo (merits), cited above, \u00a7 46). Indeed, the Court has previously found a violation of the reasonable time requirement in relation to LAB proceedings in the Maltese context (seeBezzinaWettinger, cited above,\u00a7 93; and Gera de Petri, cited above, \u00a7 43). Thus,quite apart the issues in connection with proceedings before the LAB which were identified by the Constitutional Court,the preventive element of the procedure under Article\u00a01078 of the Civil Codehas not been substantiated. Nor have the Governmentreferred to any other proceedings \u2011 apart from the constitutional redress proceedings examined above and found to be defective\u2011which alone or in combination with others, provided adequate redress in the form of awards for both pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage for the violation suffered.<\/p>\n
107.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Government have not demonstrated that the remedies proposed by them, in connection with complaints about the failings of the domestic system concerning compensation proceedings in relation toexpropriations, constituted effective remedies available to the applicant companies in theory and in practice at the relevant time.<\/p>\n
108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds it relevant to point out that this conclusion concerns the situation as stood at the time of the applicant companies\u2019 complaint and the relevant proceedings undertaken by them, and is without prejudice to the current situation which would merit an assessment based on the current domestic case-law which may have evolved in the recent years, particularly in the light of the findings of the Court in Apap\u00a0Bologna, cited above, which might have led to a change in practice by the Constitutional Court, in order to be in line with the obligations imposed by the Convention.<\/p>\n
iii.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/p>\n
109.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that, in the present case, there has been a violation of Article 13, in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention.<\/p>\n
IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
110.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies also complained that the domestic authorities had failed to carryout proceedings within a reasonable time, and that they had had no access to an independent and impartial tribunal to initiate compensation proceedings. This situation remained the same to date, despite the Constitutional Court judgment, and they still did not have access to an impartial and independent tribunal to whom to address their compensation request, both because the CoL had not issued a notice to treat and because the LAB was not an Article 6 compliant tribunal, due to the legislation concerning the appointment and removal of its members. They further complained that the order to the applicant companies to pay part costs of the constitutional redress proceedings in which they had been successful also constituted a hindrance to their access to court under Article\u00a06.<\/p>\n
111.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and the Court\u2019s findings under Articles 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present applications and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the remaining complaints (see, among other authorities, Kamil Uzun v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a037410\/97, \u00a7 64, 10\u00a0May 2007; and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin\u00a0C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7\u00a0156, ECHR 2014).<\/p>\n
V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
112.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n
\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants<\/p>\n
113.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies claimed 196,625 euros (EUR) eachplus\u00a08% interest on that amount to run from the date of the expropriation, as well as EUR 64,145each representing one third of lost rents from 1993 to 2015in respect of pecuniary damage. The value of the properties together was calculated by an ex parte architect as being EUR\u00a0589,875 on the basis of the purchase price of one other property in Valletta purchased by the Government in 2015, which was however situated in a less prime location.The applicant companies noted that their property had never been derelict and that the Government must have confused it with neighbouring properties. They referred to a publication concerningMaltese architecture which described the area as one of the jewels of Maltese architecture and the corner where the applicant\u2019s property was situated as worthy of attention. The applicant companies also relied on extracts from an estate agent\u2019s website which showed the prices of palazzos in Valletta ranging from one to three million euros.<\/p>\n
114.\u00a0\u00a0They further claimed EUR 35,000 each in non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n
115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies submitted that the Government had already acquired title to the property given that the Government had acquired title to the property by virtue of law (Section 22 (8) of the Ordinance), within three months of the President\u2019s declaration. The applicant companies submitted documents showing the registration in the name of the Government of the said property, dated July 2009.<\/p>\n
116.\u00a0\u00a0In 2018, the applicant companies updated their claims, noting that in the third quarter of 2017 there had been a boom in property prices, which increased by 4.3%. According to an updated architect valuation dated 2018, the open market value of nos. 124 and 125 was EUR\u00a0140,000 and EUR\u00a0130,000 respectively while property no. 109 was valued at EUR\u00a0140,000. The same architect estimated the current annual rental value at EUR\u00a09,100, EUR 8,450 and EUR 9,100 respectively. The architect\u2019s valuation dated 2013 had established the current market values for properties no. 124 and 125 as being EUR 85,000 and EUR\u00a078,000 respectively while property no.\u00a0109 was valued at EUR 87,000.<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n
117.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that a finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction. In any event the Government considered that the valuations of the property submitted by the applicant companies were exorbitant and highly inflated when compared to those of the court\u2011appointed expert. Moreover, the Government contested any claim for rent, reiterating that when the property was taken it had been in a derelict state and was considered to be a dangerous structure. Thus, as things stood at the time of the taking the applicant companies were exposed to actions for damage by their neighbours and the property could surely not generate income in the absence of considerable reconstruction costs. The Government also considered that no interest was due since no amount was liquidated and the claim for rent had no basis. In any event 8 % was well above the commercial interest rate available in the banking sector.<\/p>\n
118.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view if the Court were to award pecuniary damage, this should be on condition that the applicant companies appear on the deed of transfer of the title to the property to the Government. In their view the pecuniary damage award should not exceed EUR\u00a026,011.33 jointly, representing two thirds of the value of the property as valued on the market in 2005 by the architect commissioned by the CoL. As to non\u2011pecuniary damage the Government submitted that this had already been awarded by the domestic jurisdictions, in any event they opined that if the Court were to make an award it should not exceed EUR 4,000.<\/p>\n
119.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the updated claims, the Government considered the valuations to be inflated. In their view the values attributed by the court\u2011appointed expert reflected more realistically the market value of the property. Nevertheless, the Government requested the Court to rely on the valuations made by architect FHV (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, it had to be noted that the property was currently dilapidated and did not lend itself to being rented out as is.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n120.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has held on a number of occasions, a judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no.\u00a031107\/96 \u00a7 32, ECHR 2000-XI, and Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy(just satisfaction) [GC], no. 58858\/00, \u00a7 90, 22 December 2009). The Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. This discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attached to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (Article 1). If the nature of the violation allows of restitutio in integrum it is the duty of the State held liable to effect it, the Court having neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself. If, however, national law does not allow \u2011 or allows only partial \u2011 reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach, Article\u00a041 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (ibid.). The Court notes that while restitution of the property does not appear impossible given that no use has been made of it, the applicant companies have not requested its return nor did the Government offer to return it.<\/p>\n
121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has repeatedly found that when domestic proceedings relating to the payment of compensation have not come to an end decades after the taking of a property, it would be unreasonable to wait for the outcome of those proceedings (see Serrilli v. Italy (just satisfaction), no.\u00a077822\/01, \u00a7\u00a017, 17 July 2008; Mason and Others v. Italy (just satisfaction), no.\u00a043663\/98, \u00a7 31, 24 July 2007; FrendoRandon and Others,cited above, \u00a7 77, and Vassallo (just satisfaction), cited above, \u00a7\u00a013). The Court considers that by awarding amounts for damage at this stage there is no risk that the applicant companies will be compensated twice, as the national authorities would inevitably take note of this award in respect of the applicant companies\u2019 share of the property.<\/p>\n
122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that compensation in the present case must be awarded in the light of the fact that over time the taking failed tofulfillthe public interest requirement (\u00a7 43).Thus, the Court considers that compensation in the present case must be awarded on the lines of that in Motais de Narbonne v. France ((just satisfaction), no. 48161\/99, \u00a7\u00a020, 27\u00a0May 2003), and Ke\u00e7ecio\u011flu and Others v. Turkey ((just satisfaction), no.\u00a037546\/02, \u00a7 19, 20 July 2010), in which the Court had in its principal judgments found a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of a significant delay between a decision to expropriate property and the undertaking of a project in the public interest which had denied the applicants the appreciation (\u201cplus-value\u201d) of their property(see Motais\u00a0de\u00a0Narbonne (merits), cited above, \u00a7 19, and Ke\u00e7ecio\u011flu and Others (merits), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 28-29). In both these cases, where the violation pertained to a lack of public interest, the Court considered under Article\u00a041 that the applicants were to be paid compensation corresponding to the appreciation they had been denied. It thus awarded pecuniary damage on the basis of the then current market value of that property (\u201cla valeurv\u00e9naleactuelle du b\u00e2timent\u201d) and deducted what the applicants had already received in compensation for the expropriation years before. The same reasoning was reiterated in Vassallo ((just satisfaction), cited above, \u00a7\u00a018), although in that case, unlike in the above cases, the project was eventually carried out and thus compensation was calculated in that light.<\/p>\n
123.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted on one hand that the court\u2011appointed architect\u2019s evaluation reflected more realistically the market value of the property. Nevertheless, they requested the Court to rely on valuations made by architect FHV (see paragraph 119 above), an ex parte architect commissioned by the CoL, who estimated the property for the purposes of the CoL\u2019s offer, which was much lower and represented the value in 2009 (see paragraph 15 above).<\/p>\n
124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the striking difference between on the one hand the valuation made by FHV and on the other hand those made by the applicant\u2019sex parte expert (see paragraph 116 above) and the court\u2011appointed expert (see paragraph 7 above). Indeed the valuations made by the applicant\u2019s ex parte expert and the court-appointed expert are similar and concerning property no. 109, identical, thus credible, as also confirmed by the Government (see paragraph 119 above), who considered the court-appointed architect\u2019s valuations to be realistic.<\/p>\n
125.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above factors, in the absence of the restitution of the property, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant companies, as owners of one third of the property, EUR 100,000 each, in pecuniary damage, for the transfer of their property.<\/p>\n
126.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the Constitutional Court\u2019s award in non\u2011pecuniary damage of EUR 15,000 to each applicant company, the Court makes no further award in that respect.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n127.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant companies also claimed the court costs they were ordered to pay by the constitutional jurisdictions, EUR 4,879.84, and EUR\u00a01,820.23 for the first and second applicant company respectively. They also claimed further legal expenses in connection with the domestic proceedings, amounting to EUR 3,401.67 and EUR 2,067.01 for the first and second applicant company respectively as well as EUR 1,510.77 and EUR\u00a052.12 respectively and EUR 1,343.54 jointly, (in respect of architect fees) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. They later also claimed EUR\u00a0725.70 jointly, in respect of the update architect\u2019s report.<\/p>\n
128.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant companies did not prove that the expenses in relation to domestic proceedings had been paid. As to the costs relative to proceedings before this Court they considered that they should not exceed EUR 1,500.<\/p>\n
129.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, as well as the fact that outstanding domestic court expenses remain payable, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 10,000 and EUR4,500 respectively to the first and second applicant companies covering costs under all heads.<\/p>\n
C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n1.\u00a0\u00a0Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaints concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention admissible.<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant companies, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts:<\/p>\n
(i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 100,000 (one hundred thousand euros), each, plus any tax that may be chargeable,in respect of pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n
(ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) and EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), respectively to the first and second applicant company, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant companies, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n
7.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant companies\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 September 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n
MarialenaTsirli\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ganna Yudkivska
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n